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Marketplaces are frequently a key dimension of local governance in developing states. Yet 
to date, their role, and that of the social capital operating within them, in the evolution of 
formal and informal local governance structures has lacked systematic theoretical and 
empirical investigation. This is the case in the developing world in general, and in Pakistan 
specifically. This absence is of notable significance in the context of Pakistan and the 
Malakand region given that marketplaces, characterised by their complex formal and 
informal relationships, are centre-stage in the processes of local economic development and 
governance. This study addresses this gap by drawing together three streams of literature on 
decentralisation and local governance, social capital, and marketplaces, to explore the 
manner in which marketplaces generate social capital and the outcomes of this social capital 
for local governance.  
Adopting a relational framework for social capital and local governance, the thesis 
argues that marketplaces, as an element of both formal and informal local governance, 
generate both individual and associational social capital. To understand the implications of 
this marketplace-generated social capital, the study examines how it is generated by the 
economically dynamic Batkhela bazaar, and how it impacts on the evolving local governance 
of the Malakand region. To unearth the complex interrelationships between social capital 
and local governance, a qualitative, multi-method case study of Batkhela bazaar in Malakand 
District was undertaken. Working within a critical realist tradition, a survey of market traders 
was followed by intensive qualitative data collection through semi-structured interviews 
conducted with bazaar traders, local political leaders and local administration officials. 
Relevant records from related government departments, social welfare associations and 
bazaar traders’ associations were also collected and analysed. 
Theoretically, the thesis develops and applies an original meso-level analysis grounded 
in the Bourdieusian tradition, to improve understanding of the continuities and changes in 
the generation, operation and outcomes of social capital within marketplaces, and the 
relationship between social capital and local governance in developing state contexts. The 
results are presented in relation to the influence and impact of bazaar-generated social capital 
on citizens' empowerment and participation, the implementation of regulations, and social 
welfare provision. Although associations in Pakistan are weak, economic development is 
contributing to the development of associational life. The findings demonstrate that the 
individual and associational forms of social capital generated by the bazaar are frequently 
complementary and are linked in various ways to the political, regulatory and service 
provision activities of formal local government. Interpersonal networks of traders governed 
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by the norms of trust and reciprocity have a dual role in a weak-state, low-trust environment: 
they stabilise the everyday governance of the marketplace, while simultaneously reinforcing 
formal institutional weakness by facilitating corruption and intercession. Neither individual 
nor associational social capital has a normatively “dark” or “bright” side: the major 
determinants of the outcomes of its use are rooted in the motives for which it is employed 
by differentially powerful actors, and in the domain in which it operates.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Ever since the publication of Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993), the concept of 
social capital (SC) has been at the centre of a lively debate about the relationship between 
SC and local governance across the developed and developing world. Yet the literature on 
this relationship in the developing world remains underdeveloped. Research based on 
Putnam’s tradition of SC-governance relationships, and arguments calling for the 
integration of the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to SC, remains heavily focused 
on the developed state context.1 This is mainly due to the World Bank’s adoption of the SC 
concept for dealing with bad governance in the developing world, without paying much 
attention to the role of the state in the generation of SC, and discarding Bourdieu’s concept 
of SC from its much-celebrated social capital initiative (O’Donovan, 2017).2 This thesis 
explores the relationship between SC and local governance through marketplace 
interaction with local government in Malakand District in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) 
province of Pakistan. Instead of adopting either a purely statist (Tarrow, 1996; Lowndes 
and Wilson, 2001) or non-statist (Putnam, 1993, 1995) perspective of SC, this study 
develops a relational framework in a Bourdieusian tradition to explore SC’s role in local 
governance. It argues that the role of marketplaces as an element of local governance 
structure, in terms of the generation of SC, has implications for evolving local governance 
in developing economies. Allowing for the role of the state and economic development as 
important contextual factors in the development of SC, it also argues that SC is an 
emergent property of the dynamic interaction between formal and informal institutions in 
the local governance structure. In the rest of this chapter, Section 1.1 explains the rationale 
of the study, Section 1.2 presents the research aims, and Section 1.3 sets out and discusses 
the research questions. An introduction to the themes of local governance, social capital 
and marketplaces is provided in Section 1.4, before Section 1.5 elaborates on why Pakistan 
                                                          
1 For an overview of this literature see Breuskin (2012), and for recent empirical attempts at integrating 
these perspectives see Pisani et al. (2017).  
2 The Social Capital Initiative (SCI) is a World Bank project under which the bank funds projects in more than 
a dozen countries to help define, measure and understand social capital in better ways, to lead to better 
monitoring of its stock, evolution and impact (World Bank, 1998, The initiative on defining, monitoring and 





was chosen for the study, and why Batkhela bazaar was an appropriate location for the case 
study. Finally in this chapter, Section 1.6 presents the thesis structure. 
1.1 Study rationale 
Within the developing state context, marketplaces frequently play a central role not only 
within local economies, but also within the practice of local governance. Defining 
marketplaces depends on their type, the settings in which they operate, and the way in 
which they are governed (Morales, 2011, pp. 3-4; see Section 2.4 of this thesis). For the 
purposes of this study, marketplaces are defined as spatially bounded places for the 
production and exchange of goods and services, surrounded by a series of social 
relationships embedded in their respective institutional environments. Their significance 
for local governance stems from their integrative potential in the organisational and 
institutional structure of local governance (Schappo and Van Melik, 2017). This means that 
the role of marketplaces in local governance extends to the processes of participation, the 
implementation of regulations, and the delivery of social services.  
 Marketplaces are referred to with varying names in different regions of the worlds: 
bazaars in the greater Middle East and South and Central Asia; souks (souqs) in the Middle 
East; and marketplaces in the literature on the developed world and African markets 
(Wilson, 1995; Pati-Sharman, 2011; Ahluwalia, 2003; Watson, 2009). This study employs 
the term marketplace and bazaar interchangeably, because in both the Urdu and Pashto 
languages, the word bazaar refers to a marketplace in both a physical and a more abstract 
sense.3 In conceptualising the bazaar/marketplace, this study follows Keshavarzian (2007, 
pp. 48-53) who warns against “exoticising” the bazaar. Like Keshavarzian (ibid., p. 2) the 
author of the present study views a bazaar both as physical place where exchanges takes 
place, and in a more abstract, metaphysical sense. 
The varying degrees of the formalisation of marketplaces along different dimensions 
influences their role in local governance (Holland, 2015; Grossman, 2016). These 
dimensions of formalisation include the extent to which trading activities are taxed (Khan, 
2017a), access to the physical space of the marketplace is regulated by the state 
(Hüwelmeier, 2013), and contracts between traders are enforced through formal 
institutions (Lyon, 2007). Therefore, understanding the operation of marketplaces as an 
element of local governance requires a combination of aspects of both formal and informal 
governance practices to be taken into account. Fundamental to this operation is the role of 
                                                          




SC, which acts both as a facilitator of marketplace interaction with local government and 
more broadly as a generator of SC within local governance processes. 
Since Putnam’s (1993) seminal study of Italian regions, there has been recognition of 
the significant role of social capital in relation to healthy civic life and effective local 
governance. Putnam’s conception of social capital – covering features of social life such as 
networks of relationships, and norms of cooperation such as trust and reciprocity that 
facilitate collective action – triggered a variety of research into the nature of the 
relationship between social capital and local governance within the developed world 
context. Yet much of this research has focused on social capital in relation to the formal 
structures of local government and to formal membership-based organisations within local 
governance. However in the developing world context, where the formal institutions of 
local government and other organisations are weak, informal interpersonal relationships 
often play a fundamental role. Consequently it is the relationship between these informal 
interpersonal relationships on the one hand, and the local institutions displaying varying 
levels of formalisation on the other, which is often crucial to understanding the practice of 
local governance within developing states. To this end, a theoretical framework, exploring 
the links between the operation of SC at micro- and meso-level is required (Eloire, 2015; 
Christoforou, 2014a).  
1.2 Research aims 
This research seeks to explore the evolving relationship between bazaars and local 
governance in the developing state context, and the role of SC within this interrelationship. 
Its central aim is to better understand how the SC generated through bazaars shapes the 
development of local governance in the developing and weak state contexts. It seeks to 
make three central contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it aims to offer an 
improved theoretical conceptualisation of the relationships between bazaars, local 
governance and SC. Secondly, it seeks to provide an original empirical study of these 
relationships in the specific state context of Pakistan and through an in-depth study of 
Batkhela bazaar in Malakand District. Thirdly, by studying bazaars as an element of local 
governance, it seeks to refine the concept of SC regarding its role in the local governance 
structure in the developing state context.  
Furthermore, this research seeks to add to the knowledge in an area of study that has 
received little attention. The researcher was able to locate only 11 studies on marketplaces 
in Pakistan in the published literature (Ahmed, 1980; Jan, 2014 [2017]; Jan and Aman, 
2016; Jan and Raza, 2015; Khan, 2017a; Suleri, Shahbaz and Shah, 2016; Javed, 2017; 




Amirali, 2017). With the exception of Javed, Amirali, Hasan et al., and to some extent 
Williams et al., the rest of the 11 studies overlook the role of marketplaces at the interstices 
between formal and informal governance. A distinct contribution of the present thesis is 
therefore to develop the literature on the SC-local governance-marketplace relational 
framework by conceptualising marketplaces as an important element of local governance 
(see Section 5.3.2). Of particular note here is the lack of attention to the notion of SC in 
any of these prior studies. 
To this end, this thesis develops and empirically explores a theoretical framework 
within the political economy, informed by the Bourdieusian notion of social capital, to 
explain state-society interaction in relation to marketplaces and local governance. A 
Bourdieusian theory of practice, characterised by the nexus of field, habitus and capital 
(power), has merit over the mainstream approaches to social capital for three reasons. 
Firstly, it equates social capital with power and explains its role in relation to other forms 
of capital (sources of power) (Christoforou, 2013, 2014a, 2014b). Secondly, it considers 
the dynamic relationship between agency and structure in the generation and use of social 
capital. Thirdly, it provides an ontological framework that has the capacity to explain 
power as an omnipresent but culturally and symbolically relegitimised factor that shapes 
agents’ motives for action (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 65-67) and their contextual understanding 
(see Chapter 3). Thus, this theory is important for explaining the role of social capital in 
connection with the relevant institutional design of local government, and the implications 
of change in the institutional design of government for the role of SC in local governance 
(Górriz-Mifsud, Secco and Pisani, 2016; McDonough and Polzer, 2012). In this way, this 
thesis aims to show that Bourdieu’s notion of social capital is a missing link not only in the 
development discourse (Mansuri and Rao, 2003; Bebbington, Woolcock, Guggenheim, and 
Olson, 2006; Christoforou, 2014b), but also in the social capital-local governance 
discourse (Harriss, 2001; Stokke and Selboe, 2009). 
Operating within this theoretical framework, the thesis aims to achieve the following 
specific objectives:  
(1) To explain the ways in which marketplaces generate SC, and the ramifications of 
this marketplace-generated SC for local governance; 
(2) To explore, through the case study of Batkhela bazaar, the role of marketplace-
generated SC in the local governance of developing economies; 
(3) To understand the ways in which the governance structure of the Malakand 




(4) To stimulate future research on one of the most underdeveloped bodies of 
literature in the fields of SC, marketplaces and local government: namely bazaar-
local governance relationships in developing economies in general, and in 
Pakistan in particular.  
Providing a better understanding of these marketplace-local governance-SC 
relationships will also identify key areas for policy improvement relating to the governance 
of marketplaces in Pakistan and the wider local governance structure within which 
marketplace governance is rooted. These areas include:  
(1) Political empowerment and participation; 
(2) The implementation of regulations governing price, health and quality standards 
in the marketplaces; and 
(3) The improved governance of the social welfare provision at the district level. 
1.3 Research questions 
Marketplaces are often at the centre of the local economy, and are highly dynamic 
elements of local governance (offering informal governance input) in areas where formal 
institutions are characteristically underdeveloped. Within such contexts, the role of the SC 
generated by marketplaces is critical to understanding evolving local governance and the 
effectiveness of formal governance institutions. Any endeavour to improve governance in 
these contexts, characterised by ineffective government institutions, requires a better 
understanding of the types of policies involved. To enhance this understanding, the present 
research asks the following central question: How has the social capital generated by the 
economically dynamic Batkhela bazaar impacted on the evolving governance of Malakand 
region?  
The process of SC generation is not simple or straightforward, owing to the 
simultaneous and often overlapping operation of both inherent and contingent SC, which 
are embedded within the broader institutional environment. Therefore, two ancillary 
dimensions are added to the central question above, raising the following two points: How 
does the social capital embedded in the bazaar economy affect the evolution of local 
governance; and How do the local governance processes rooted in the bazaar influence the 
stocks and flows of local social capital.  
This line of investigation is translated into the following specific research questions 
which form the basis of this thesis:  
(1) What forms of social capital are significant for understanding marketplace-local 




(2) Why, and in what ways, are the interrelationships between these forms of SC 
important for local governance? 
(3) How does social capital generation shape the role of bazaars as an element of 
local governance in developing/weak state contexts?  
(4) How does the social capital generated through the economically dynamic 
Batkhela bazaar influence the evolving governance of the Malakand region? 
To unpack the impacts of governance structure on marketplace-local government 
interaction, these questions are investigated in relation to the bazaar’s interactions with the 
social, political and bureaucratic spheres of governance. This exploration offers a better 
understanding of how the incapacity of local government creates a greater space for 
informal mechanisms (SC) in the day-to-day governance of the marketplace. In addition, 
the ineffectiveness of the state in service delivery also leads to greater activities by third 
sector and local voluntary associations. This study will also therefore examine how the 
economic, social and political embeddedness of marketplaces facilitates the functions of 
social welfare associations (SWAs) to make an impact on local governance. These 
questions are developed into specific topical questions in Section 4.3. 
1.4 Local governance, social capital and marketplaces 
The term local governance encompasses the direct and indirect role of local government 
(formal institutions) and government hierarchies, as well as the “informal norms, networks, 
community organisations, and neighbourhood associations in pursuing collective actions 
by defining a framework for citizen-citizen, and citizen-state interaction, collective 
decision-making and delivery of public services” (Shah and Shah, 2006, p. 1). This 
conception of local governance treats local government (LG) as an element of the local 
institutional infrastructure that is critical to understanding how the entities and networks 
beyond the formal institutions of governance shape the local governance structure (ibid., p. 
2; Stoker, 2011; Sellers and Jefferey, 2016). Within this framework, this thesis explores the 
role of local government institutions, marketplaces and social structures in the formation, 
operation and outcomes of SC for local governance in Pakistan. 
Seeking to understand the role of SC in evolving local governance practices in 
developing states requires critical engagement with what constitutes SC (Christoforou, 
2013; Pisani, 2017, pp. 142-44). While the huge body of literature on SC broadly agrees 
that it comprises networks of relationships and norms of cooperation manifested through 
trust and reciprocity (Christoforou and Davis, 2014, p. 3), there is considerable 
disagreement over its precise definition and constitutive elements (Christoforou, 2013; 




the relationships between individual and collective social capital (Krishna, 2002; Levien, 
2015), and between membership-based associations and informal networks (Hooghe and 
Stolle, 2003, p. 12; Norris and Inglehart, 2003, p. 3; Granovetter, 2002). While Putnam’s 
view of SC emphasises collective SC, Bourdieu’s conception places greater emphasis on 
both individual SC and group membership (Smith and Kulynych, 2002; Tzanakis, 2013). 
This is to say that for Bourdieu, SC is a property not only of social groups but of 
individuals, which means that its role in local governance can be grasped through networks 
of personal relationships and individual positions within fields (Eloire, 2015). This is not to 
play down the value of Putnam’s seminal work on SC and local governance, but to explore 
the possibility of developing a framework that transcends analytical binaries such as 
structure vs. agency, formal vs. informal, and “top-down” vs. “bottom-up”. Marketplaces 
generate both types of SC (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005): hence understanding the relationship 
between SC and local governance in the context of marketplaces requires developing the 
existing conceptions of SC. 
Three major conceptualisations of SC exist, each with varying implications for its 
role in local governance.4 Putnam (1993, 1995, p. 67) defines SC as “features of social 
organisation such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate cooperation and 
coordination for mutual benefit”. Coleman (1988, pp. 95-96) views it as a characteristic of 
social structure with productive outcomes. For Bourdieu (1986, p. 248), social capital is 
“an aggregate of actual or potential resources that are linked to durable networks of 
institutionalized nature”. Individuals accrue benefits owing to their membership of 
networks of interpersonal relationships or groups (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 250, 1985, p. 25).5 
Thus social capital facilitates the achievement of individual or group objectives 
(Nooteboom, 2007). Against this backdrop, marketplaces are viewed as generators of both 
individual and associational SC with both negative and positive outcomes for local 
governance.  
                                                          
4 Lin’s (2005) proposal, Burt’s (2000) network approach and Svendsen’s (2003) neocapital versions are some 
of the other notable conceptions of SC. See Häuberer (2011) for a review of network conceptions and 
Christoforou (2014b) for a brief overview and critique of Svendsen’s neocapital conception. 
 
5 There is an evident affinity between network theory and social capital theory, although they are not 
identical (Fine and Lapavitsas, 2004, Note 12). The author of the present study uses SC instead of network 
analysis because the latter generally reduces the context of social structure to individual intersubjective 
relations. This is not to undermine the significance of networks or network analysis. However, the 
Bourdieusian approach to SC distances itself from Granovetterian-type interactionism because Bourdieu 
believes that such an approach reduces the broader objects of social structures like fields and power to the 
conjuctural structure of their observed interaction in a particular situation or group (Christoforou, 2014, pp. 





Employing Bourdieu’s notion of SC, this thesis focuses centrally on the role of 
marketplaces as an element of local governance, a role which they perform through 
engendering SC. Two critical factors shape this role of marketplaces. Firstly, marketplaces 
are embedded within their respective political and social structures (Keshavarzian, 2007; 
Erami and Keshavarzian, 2015).6 Secondly, the embeddedness of marketplaces results in 
the generation of SC, which in turn forms an emergent property of the dynamic interaction 
of the contiguous evolution of marketplaces and their respective local governance 
structures. Following Odabaş and Adaman (2014b), this second factor avoids both 
rationalist and structuralist determinisms in the formation and operation of SC. 
Furthermore, it transcends the dualism relating to SC as a “top-down” or “bottom-up” 
phenomenon. Local governance arrangements are constituted by a combination of formal 
and informal institutions, social structures and power relations, which together form the 
context for the generation and operation of SC and its implications for local governance 
(Cento Bull and Jones, 2006; Górriz-Mifsud Secco, Da Re, Pisani and Bonet, 2017). In this 
vein, three major processes of governance are the focus of this research: empowerment and 
participation; the implementation of regulations; and the service delivery functions of local 
government. It is argued that both the individual and collective SC generated by 
marketplaces have implications for each of these governance processes.  
1.5 Why Pakistan - and why Batkhela bazaar? 
Pakistan presents a typical example of a weak developing state, as it performs badly on all 
six governance indicators developed by Kaufman and Kraay (Easterly, 2001).7 The 
ineffective design of local government coupled with socioeconomic inequalities translate 
into ineffective local governance. Participation structures at the local level are designed 
without sufficient consideration of the challenges presented by the local social structures to 
the improvement of local governance. Within this context, the role of marketplaces in the 
local economic or governance policies is largely overlooked. Not only do marketplaces 
have historic political and economic significance for state-society relations (Hasan and 
Raza, 2009, pp. 42-43), but their significance for local governance is increasing owing to 
                                                          
6 Keshavarzian uses neither the term nor the concept in any of his studies, but provides a comprehensive 
treatment of the social embeddedness of marketplaces, and the implications of ties developed around 
marketplaces for various governance processes. Keshavarzian does “not find it [social capital] a very useful 
analytical concept” (Email communication, April 16, 2015). 
7 Easterly was referring to worldwide governance indicators project that began in 1996 and cover more than 
200 countries along six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. 
for an overview and methodology of the project see Kaufmann, D. K., Ray, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2011). The 




the current economic restructuring, as an outcome of the rising momentum in the shift 
from an agrarian to a market economy (M.A. Jan, 2017, p. 3).8 The literature on local 
governance in Pakistan highlights the restructuring effects of marketplace development for 
the local social hierarchies that often operate to the detriment of effective local governance 
(Chaudhary, 1999; Martin, 2015).  
Recent studies of the political economy of Pakistan have highlighted the rise of an 
emerging merchant class and the implications of this for the country’s local and national 
power structures (Javed, 2017; Akhter, 2017). Nevertheless, a systematic explanation of 
the evolution of marketplaces and their role in the local governance structure has yet to be 
developed. In particular, the significance of marketplaces as an element of local 
governance structure, the role of marketplaces in the formation of social capital, and the 
implications of these factors for the interaction between various spheres of governance, 
lack systematic theoretical and empirical treatment in the literature on marketplaces, SC 
and local governance in Pakistan. This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by 
providing a systematic theoretical treatment and detailed empirical exploration of the role 
of marketplaces in the local governance processes of Pakistan.  
Two of the major limitations of the existing literature on marketplaces in Pakistan 
suffice to make a strong case for this thesis. Firstly, none of these existing studies develops 
a relational conception of marketplaces as an element of local governance, even though 
most of them invariably converge on the role of marketplaces as drivers of change in the 
local economy and social structures (Akhter, 2017; Javed, 2017; Amirali, 2017; Jan, 2017). 
Secondly, most of the existing literature views the political embeddedness of marketplaces 
in the traditional class models of patron-client relationships, which leads to the omission of 
trust as an important factor in explaining marketplace-local governance relations. The 
cause of this omission, presumably, can be attributed to the non-application of SC as a 
valuable theoretical construct for the investigation of marketplace-local government 
interaction and its implications for local governance. The novelty of this thesis lies in the 
development and application of a social capital theoretical framework, applying both its 
structural and cognitive elements in order to study the role of marketplaces in the local 
governance of Pakistan, and especially in the Malakand region. 
                                                          
8 Muhammad Ali Jan (2017) and Muhammad Ayub Jan (2017) are identical in terms of their surnames, 
initials and years of publication. To avoid confusion in the in-text citations, Muhammad Ali Jan is cited as 





It does so by offering the first systematic, meso-level treatment of the role of 
marketplaces as an element of Pakistan’s local governance structure. Unlike traditional 
structuralist (Jan, 2017; Akhter, 2017) and individualist (Lindholm, 1982, p. 123) readings 
of marketplaces or traders’ communities in Pakistan, the present study develops a 
relational framework in order to situate marketplaces as an integral element of local 
governance (see Chapter 3 and Section 9.2). Such a framework allows an understanding of 
the contiguous evolution of formal and informal governance processes, and of the role of 
marketplaces in the evolving local governance dynamics of Pakistan. This timely 
endeavour to understand the role of marketplaces as embedded governance spaces, and as 
generators of SC, develops the scarce literature on marketplaces in Pakistan.  
The choice of Batkhela bazaar as a case study site was based in part on its major 
characteristics, in addition to the availability of existing literature (Jan, 2010; Jan and 
Aman, 2016; Jan, 2014, 2017). Its key features include a rich history of evolution in a 
socially stratified political and economic context, the development of a vibrant traders’ 
association, also with a rich evolutionary history (Jan 2010), its role in facilitating political 
inclusivity (Jan, 2014), and its geographical location in a region which has seen an 
evolving governance structure (Khaliq, 2012; Marsden and Hopkins, 2013). Furthermore, 
Batkhela is the only officially designated urban town in Malakand District. The 
urbanisation of Batkhela is due to the phenomenal growth of the bazaar since the 1960s 
(see Appendix 1). Over this period, the bazaar has evolved from a small cluster of 20-25 
shops at the periphery of Batkhela village, to a large hub of more than 5,000 shops situated 
at the heart of Batkhela town. The centrality of Batkhela bazaar to the district’s economy, 
its role in employment generation, its influence on land-holding and income distribution, 
and its embeddedness in local politics, make it an appropriate setting in which to study 
bazaar-local governance interrelationships (Khan, 2017a). These factors make it an 
illuminating case study to address the major concerns of the present study (see Sections 
4.3.2 and 5.3.2). 
Batkhela bazaar has evolved within a dynamic governance structure underpinned 
by social stratification and designed political exclusion, especially in terms of participation 
and service delivery (see Section 5.3.1). The transformation of the local government 
structure from a centralised to a decentralised system, the introduction of more inclusive 
participatory governance, and increased governmentalisation in terms of rule enforcement 
and service delivery, are some of the processes that have co-evolved with the evolution of 
Batkhela bazaar and the local economy more generally. This contiguous evolution of the 




role of the marketplace in social capital generation and the implications of this for regional 
governance processes. Unlike in the past, when the agrarian economy was the major 
underpinning factor of the local social and political structures (Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 
1982), Batkhela bazaar has emerged as a significant field of power with implications not 
only for the local economy, but also for related social and political structures. This is not to 
assume a one-to-one correspondence between the evolving formal governance structure 
and the changes in Batkhela bazaar: instead, the historicity of events in the broader local 
context relating to the bazaar and the formal governance structure has shaped the dynamic 
interrelationship between the two.  
One notable feature of Batkhela bazaar is what Weiss (1998, p. 71) calls the 
“practical and symbolic division of trading spheres” between marketplaces and the home-
based economy in Pakistan, in which the former is reserved for men and the latter for 
women. As a result, there are no female market traders in the governance structure of the 
bazaar, and no women hold political or administrative positions that interact with the 
marketplace in its everyday governance. The current study is therefore restricted in its 
analysis to the role of men within the interaction between the marketplace and local 
governance, although it is recognised that work focused on a better understanding of the 
gender relationships in this domain provides an important avenue for future work.  
1.6 Thesis structure 
The rest of the thesis is divided into two major parts. Firstly, four chapters (Chapters 2-5) 
provide an interdisciplinary literature review, explain the development of an SC theoretical 
framework, detail the research design and outline the context for SC-local governance-
marketplace relations in Pakistan. Secondly, three empirical chapters (Chapters 6-8) set out 
the study’s findings on the role of Batkhela bazaar and its SC in the local governance of 
Malakand. These empirical chapters are then followed by a synthesis chapter which speaks 
directly to the SC theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3, before Chapter 10 
concludes the study. Further details of each of these chapters are provided in the following 
paragraphs.  
Chapter 2 reviews the key literature on both decentralisation and marketplaces, 
with the aim of offering a relational understanding of the marketplace-local governance 
interaction. It first develops a political economy framework in a Bourdieusian tradition by 
demonstrating that existing decentralisation models are unable to account for the dynamic 
marketplace-local government relationships, and by showing how Bourdieu’s field theory 
better explains the interstices between formal and informal governance at local level. A 




marketplaces as an element of local governance structure, focusing primarily on the 
implications of this role for the processes of political participation, regulation enforcement 
and social welfare provision.  
Chapter 3 develops a social capital theoretical framework in a Bourdieusian 
tradition in order to understand the embeddedness of marketplaces in local governance 
(state institutions), and their interaction through SC. It argues that individual networks are 
the primary connectors of various governance sectors and that these networks are 
embedded in social, political and economic structures characterised by power asymmetries. 
Institutions and spheres of governance (fields) shape agency (habitus), which is embedded 
in multiple fields whose interaction depends on the exchange of different forms of capital 
(power). In this vein, the chapter links, through the notion of habitus, the cognitive 
elements of SC the nexus of field, habitus and practice, in order to develop an 
understanding of the role of marketplace-generated SC in various local governance 
processes. To explain the dynamic interaction of economy, society and polity at local level 
in this SC framework, the notion of embeddedness is employed, and is viewed beyond the 
institutional and structural variances developed by Polanyi (1944 [2001]) and Granovetter 
(1985) respectively. This section also shows how SC forms a critical link in the 
marketplace-local governance interaction.  
Following this exposition of the context-dependent, relationally embedded nature 
of SC, Chapter 4 outlines the research design. Starting with critical realism (CR) as the 
foundation of the research design, the chapter chronicles the ontological underpinnings, 
epistemological position and methodological decisions specific to the theory and empirics 
of this research. It also includes reflections on some design considerations, such as the 
ethical issues involved, the positionality of the researcher,9 and the implications for 
negotiating access, etc.  
SC is context-dependent and so is its role in the interaction between the 
marketplace and local government. Therefore, Chapter 5 sets out the specificities of the 
context regarding the role of formal local government (LG) and the broader local 
governance structures in Pakistan, and the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions in this context. Reviewing the existing literature on local government, local 
governance, SC and marketplaces in Pakistan, the chapter elucidates the ways in which 
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marketplaces feature in the dynamics of interaction between formal and informal 
institutions at the local level. This chapter is broadly divided into two main parts: the first 
explores formal and informal local governance in the Pakistani context through the existing 
literature on marketplaces; the second is concerned with the political economy of the 
Malakand region. The focus in both parts is on the social structure of the local economy 
and its influence on local governance, in order to highlight the role of marketplaces as an 
element of local governance in Pakistan.  
Chapter 6 empirically explores the development and evolution of the Batkhela 
Bazaar Union (BU) and its increasing role in the local governance structure of Malakand 
District. The BU is analysed as a specific case demonstrating the bazaar’s role in 
generating associational SC within a particular governance context. This embeddedness 
also has implications for the power dynamics of the interaction between the political and 
bureaucratic fields, with implications for empowerment and political inclusion. Alongside 
demonstrating the increasing role of the BU in local politics, the chapter also highlights the 
centrality of individual networks for facilitating the collective action of the BU. It was 
found that traders’ decisions to rely on the BU was correlated to their endowment of 
economic, social and political capital, to the extent that in some instances the BU relied on 
individual networks of powerful traders in the bazaar.  
Against this backdrop, Chapter 7 focuses on the role of individual networks of 
traders in the day-to-day governance of Batkhela bazaar. While exploring the 
implementation of regulations relating to health, price and quality standards, this chapter 
analyses the role of both the networks of relationships in the bazaar and of the norms of 
cooperation such as trust and reciprocity in the development of various implementation 
processes. The chapter finds a dual role of SC in the everyday governance of Batkhela 
bazaar, firstly in stabilising economic exchange relationships in the absence of effective 
formal institutions, and secondly in obstructing the implementation of regulations relating 
to health, price and quality standards.  
This leads to the problematic role of interpersonal networks in facilitating the 
functions of voluntary associations, and the implications of this for social welfare 
provision. Chapter 8 argues that, if associations are the sole unit of analysis, the 
examination of voluntary associations falls into the classic theoretical problem of ignoring 
the role of informal networks in the function of these associations (Norris and Inglehart, 
2003). Therefore, the focus of the empirical analysis in Chapter 8 is on the totality of 
relationships that constitutes these associations. By adopting this approach, the chapter 




service provision in two ways: firstly by demonstrating the ways in which Batkhela bazaar 
is an element of the governance of social welfare provision alongside government 
institutions and social welfare associations; and secondly by making the distinct 
contribution of highlighting the resourceful value of interpersonal networks of individual 
traders in facilitating the role of SWAs in the provision of social services. Contra to the 
Beckerian rationalist approach to the functioning of interpersonal networks (Becker, 1974), 
interpersonal ties are viewed in this study as embedded in the order of social judgement 
through which they reflexively produce externalities for the governance of social service 
provision. 
Chapter 9 synthesises the empirical findings and existing theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 3 in order to showcase the theoretical contributions of this research. 
It begins by setting out the implications of the contiguous evolution of the marketplace and 
the political and bureaucratic fields for the generation and operation of SC. It then 
proceeds to show that the bazaar generates both individual and associational SC. Individual 
and associational SC on the one hand, and the bonding and bridging dimensions on the 
other, are interrelated: bonding ties facilitate the operation of bridging networks. The key 
theoretical point here is that these forms of SC are interrelated, and most of the bridging vs. 
bonding binaries result from misinterpretations of Putnam’s argument on bonding/bridging 
as an analytical distinction. The theoretical argument of the present thesis, relating to trust 
as the product of habitus, is confirmed by the empirical findings. The relationship between 
trust and reciprocity is contextual and temporal. However, reciprocity is a mechanical law 
which structures an agent’s habitus, with structuring effects on social exchanges 
characterised by power-dependence. The final section of this chapter assesses the 
aggregate role of bazaar-generated SC in the local governance structure. It is argued that 
the “dark” or “bright” sides of both associational and individual SC are determined by (1) 
the purpose of their use for private or public good; and (2) the alignment or misalignment 
between the operation of formal rules and the local norms of trust and reciprocity. 
Chapter 10 concludes with a summary of the main theoretical and empirical 
contributions, reflections on the extent to which the research questions have been 
answered, a summary of the policy impact, an elucidation of the theoretical and 





Chapter 2 - Local governance and marketplaces: An 
integrated literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an integrated literature review of two key components of this thesis: 
local governance and marketplaces. The review aims at conceptualising marketplaces as a 
key element of local governance. The major argument of this chapter is that the structure of 
formal governance offers a context for the evolution and role of marketplaces as an 
element of local governance. Local government is the level of governance with which 
marketplaces most directly interact. The interaction between marketplaces and government 
institutions at this level is determined not just by how local government administrations 
perform their functions, but also by how they evolve or whether the structure of local 
government (LG) is administratively or politically decentralised. Coming straight to the 
heart of the matter, decentralisation offers a central theoretical construct which can be used 
to look at the role of marketplaces in the local governance structure of developing states. 
Therefore, the existing approaches to decentralisation require a relational framework to 
better explain the dialectical interaction between the formal and informal realms of 
governance.  
In this chapter, Section 2.2 explores the literature on decentralisation and local 
governance. It reviews three key political economy models and argues that Bourdieu’s 
field theory can better explain state-society interaction at the local level. Section 3 shows 
that the weakness of decentralised local government as an outcome of institutional design 
is common across the developing world, but socioeconomic structures at the local level are 
also important. Therefore, local governance should be viewed in a relational framework as 
a dynamic interaction of institutional design and asymmetric socioeconomic structures. 
Section 4 reviews the literature on marketplaces to demonstrate their role as a key element 
of local governance and their influence on participation, the implementation of regulations, 
and social development. Finally Section 2.5 sets out the conclusions and key insights from 
this review for the development of the analytical framework which informs the rest of this 
thesis. 
2.2 Local governance and decentralisation: From political economy framework to a 
field model 
The term local governance is employed variously to refer to increased citizens’ 
participation and inclusion in decision-making (Blair, 2000); local government-societal 




empowerment, participation and efficient service delivery (Meyerson, 2014). This 
literature broadly agrees that government policies do not shape local governance 
arrangements in isolation, noting that local government is only one element of the local 
governance structure (Stoker, 2011). As Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock (2013) argue, 
“top-down” governance reforms are unable to bring meaningful and lasting change in local 
governance unless they incorporate the significance of local agents into these reform 
agendas. For instance, increased participation in decision-making and inclusive service 
delivery are the intended outcomes of local governance policies, but most of the 
developing world has failed to achieve these goals owing to the elite capture of state 
institutions at the local level (Manner, 1999, p. 91, cited in Blair, 2000). Therefore 
governance is not only governing by government (Fukuyama, 2013): instead, it represents 
the role of state, market and civil society as critical components of the concept of 
governance (Nadeem, 2016). 
The questions that need to be addressed in analysing any governance arrangements 
should be: Who governs?; What is governed?; and At what level is governance carried out? 
(Steurer, 2013). Various governance models have been developed and assessed for 
understanding local governance (Pierre, 1999; Jessop, 1998; Termeer et al., 2010; 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015; Smoke, 2015; Faguet, 2015). Despite the varying 
modalities of governing in these models, such as the complexion of state-market 
relationships, modes of participation and areas of governing, the literature broadly agrees 
that local governance is embedded in the broader economic, political and institutional 
structure, and local government is an element of that structure (Pierre, 1999; Smoke, 2015; 
Faguet, 2015). Network governance models are unable to explain the role of local 
government in local governance in developing states (Stoker, 2011; Asaduzzaman, Kaivo-
oja, Stenvall and Jusi, 2016). If inclusive decision-making, coordination and steering are 
the defining features of network governance (Parker, 2007, p. 122), most of the local 
governance arrangements in developing states and the interactions within these 
arrangements fail on this count (Grindle, 2002). Furthermore, the most important feature of 
network governance is heterarchy as opposed to hierarchy (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; 
Rhodes, 1996), the latter being the key feature of local governance in developing states 
(Termeer et al., 2010). This is mainly because most developing countries are a hybrid of 
tribal, agrarian and capitalist economic systems and practices, and understanding the 
functions and outcomes of decentralised governments requires an understanding of this 
context, which is characterised by asymmetric power relations and ineffective coordination 




In order to understand state-society relations in the developing state context, a local 
political economy model is required (Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson, 1989). State 
institutions, both central and local, are one element in this model – along with the local 
economy and civil society – to explain the functions and effectiveness of local government 
(Faguet, 2015). This model places state structure at the centre of all other interactions, to 
support the view that all civil society (collective community) actions are structured in 
relation to institutions that are defined by the state (Harriss, 2001, pp. 37-38). In the 
present study, decentralisation is employed as a theoretical construct for three reasons. 
Firstly, decentralisation explains how people participate in formal governance processes at 
local level, or at least how these processes are influenced by people’s participation. 
Secondly, it provides an understanding of the discrepancies between universal state 
institutions and their variegated local realities. Thirdly, it explains how the strengths and 
weaknesses of local government create interdependencies across the formal and informal 
spheres of local governance.  
A key argument in the decentralisation literature is that decentralisation empowers 
local communities through change in the institutional design of LG (Haque, 1997). 
Undoubtedly, formal governance structures cannot achieve this objective alone (Hadiz, 
2004; Nadeem, 2016), since local governance structures are shaped by a complex interplay 
of formal and informal governance processes. At the local level, the literature typically 
divides local governance arrangements into three broad sets of institutions: administrative 
(comprised of appointed officials), elected/representative (comprised of elected officials), 
and societal (comprised of market, community, civil society organisations etc). Social 
networks of actors located within these spheres overlap across these fields of power that 
shape local governance practices (Blair, 2000; Gulzar and Pasquale, 2017). There are three 
central theoretical perspectives on decentralisation: the deconcentration of functions to 
local administrative units; the delegation of powers and responsibility to local authorities; 
and the devolution of political powers with the aim of increasing local participation in local 
governance (Schneider, 2003).10 To understand decentralisation as a theory of local 
governance, and its impacts on empowerment (participation), service delivery (economic 
                                                          
10 This thesis primarily focuses on the deconcentration and devolution aspects of LG because: (1) in 
agreement with Agrawal and Ribot (2000, note 25), fiscal power is “just one of the powers that may be 
devolved in administrative or political decentralisation”; (2) the fiscal dimension as a direct link between the 
marketplace and LG is absent in Malakand District because local trade is legally exempted from taxes; and 






development), and redistribution (welfare) functions, three political economy frameworks 
have been developed specifically to explain local governance in developing countries.11 
These frameworks are reviewed because they explore not only the features, outcomes, 
strengths and weaknesses of local government, but also the dynamic interaction of the state 
with markets and society, and the role of power distribution and agency within this 
interaction.  
2.2.1 Three theoretical frameworks on decentralisation: Why Bourdieu’s field theory is 
needed 
While drawing on the inadequacies of the neoclassical approaches and the public policy 
and finance theories on decentralisation, Rondinelli et al. (1989) developed an integrated 
political economy framework encompassing the political, social and economic dimensions 
of decentralisation and local governance. This approach focuses on expenditure efficiency, 
the allocation of resources, the characteristics of service users, institutional rules and 
alternative governance institutions. However, as Mohan and Stokke (2008, pp. 252-253) 
observe, this approach is state-centric and views citizens as consumers. It suffers from 
three limitations. Firstly, it is designed to implement the policies of decentralisation, 
instead of providing information about the interdependent nature of state, society and 
market institutions. Secondly, it lacks the account of embedded human agency, in 
particular that of citizens who are the major stakeholders in decentralised governance 
processes. And finally, although it encompasses the role of alternative governance 
institutions, such as voluntary organisations and private businesses at the local level, it 
overlooks local power relations, socioeconomic stratification, and the unequal provision of 
services which is a fundamental characteristic of many decentralised local governance 
systems in the developing countries (Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; 
Mookherjee, 2015). 
The adapted analytical framework proposed by Agrawal and Ribot (2000) 
understands local governance in terms of actors, powers and accountability, with an 
integrative focus on political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation. Any change in 
local governance, according to this approach, is due to a change in the governance actors, 
their powers or accountability mechanisms (Agrawal and Ribot, 2000, pp. 23-26). This 
framework shows how various levels of governance are linked through accountability 
                                                          
11 Other political economy models of decentralisation that investigate the motives of national actors to 
decentralise (Eaton et al., 2010), and development models that empower local communities through 
development aid (Mansuri and Rao, 2012, reviewed in Myerson, 2014), are not reviewed here simply due to 
their unidirectional “top-down” approach and inability to account for local power structures in shaping the 




mechanisms, how formal and informal realms of governance coordinate, and how 
accountability as power-dependence evolves through changes in the rules of governance 
(ibid., pp. 35-39). As Agrawal and Ribot argue, accountability is relational. It determines 
the level of influence of the societal actors, or citizens, on the formal governance actors. 
For instance, if powers are devolved to actors who are responsible to their superiors 
(deconcentration) instead of to their constituents (devolution), then decentralisation is 
unlikely to increase broader participation in governance. If powers are devolved to 
representatives who are accountable to their constituents, and if decentralised governance 
is to be effective, accountability needs to be exercised by constituents as a countervailing 
power to prevent arbitrary actions. However, Agrawal and Ribot treat user groups and 
formal governance actors respectively as harmonious entities, which implies an absence of 
conflict within the various spheres of governance, and that accountability mechanisms are 
sufficient to keep various spheres of governance in check. However, such assumptions 
impair understanding of local governance in the developing state context, where agents are 
embedded in multiple institutions and their capacity to bring about change in local 
governance is structured by the location of their agency in the local power structure 
(Andrews et al., 2013, pp. 4-5).  
Faguet (2015) develops a more comprehensive, “bottom-up” model of 
decentralisation. While explaining variations in the accountability and service delivery at 
the local level in Bolivia and Bangladesh, Faguet (ibid., p. 30), following institutionalist 
scholars North, Olson and Williamson, argues that the varying patterns of accountability 
and incentives experienced by local officials explain variations in service provision; and 
that accountability and incentives are largely explained by the underlying understanding 
and dispositions that individuals must share if formal and informal institutions are to work 
effectively. Hence, as Faguet argues: 
“To understand decentralised outcomes, we must go beyond the organizations 
that produce success and failures in public service delivery, beyond the 
institutions in which they are enmeshed, and beyond even the informal rules and 
conventions that govern incentives. We must go down to the understanding of 
underlying dispositions and beliefs that drive social behaviours, and so help to 
determine where a particular set of organizations, and policies can successfully 
meet citizens’ needs, or not. By focusing our analysis at this level, we can better 
understand the incentives faced by both the users and producers of the services, 




Faguet’s (2015) model comprises three main elements: the institutional design of 
local government (Shami and Faguet, 2015); the health and structure of civil society 
organisations (Putnam, 1993); and the local political economy and its impact on the local 
governance structure (Channa and Faguet, 2016). These elements impact the underlying 
dispositions and understandings of the governance environment that shapes the agency of 
public authorities and citizens in the local governance structure (see Figure 1). Faguet’s 
model also demonstrates empirically how variations in the performance of identical formal 
governance structures are shaped by underlying dispositions and beliefs (Faguet, 2015, pp. 
37-38). He notes (ibid., pp. 8-9) that a change in the institutional design from centralised to 
decentralised local governance leads to more effective governance. Nevertheless, he argues 
that institutional ineffectiveness can be remedied only through governance from below 
(ibid., p. 38). This not only has implications for the effectiveness of local governance, but 
also suggests that the robustness of local governance institutions is due to the structure of 
the local economy, the beliefs, understandings and dispositions of the agents shaped by 
incentive structures, and party competition at local level.  
 
Figure 1: A theory of (local) government responsiveness. Reproduced from Faguet (2015)  
The model shown in Figure 1 offers a meso-level understanding of the local 
environment, and links multiple levels of governance through upward and downward 
accountability mechanisms. It effectively explains the evolution of formal governance 
from centralisation to decentralisation. However, a primary limitation of this model is that 
it treats institutional design as a constant, and regards incentive structures, the local 




41-42). Faguet (ibid., pp. 29-30) correctly argues that agents’ underlying dispositions, 
beliefs and understanding of formal institutions affect their behaviours towards these 
institutions. However, the effectiveness of the state in the delivery of services and 
enforcement of regulations is as important as both civil society organisations and the 
structure of the local economy (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 122-133). Therefore, socioeconomic 
structures are not the only determinants of agents’ dispositions towards government 
structures, as Faguet (2015) argues: the quality of government institutions (the rule of law) 
and institutional capacity (the ability to create inclusive structures) are also important in 
this equation (Rothstein, 2013, 2017; Andrews et al., 2013). This means that institutional 
design cannot be considered constant, as Faguet (2015) believes: instead, changes in the 
electoral system create new spaces for engagement and influence the motives of public 
officials, political actors and other social groups involved in local governance (Gaventa 
and Valderrama, 1999; Gulzar and Pasquale, 2017). In this sense, the spheres of 
governance are integrally linked in a dialectical relationship (Cornwall, 2002), and are 
constantly evolving as an outcome of changes in public policy, the local economy, social 
structures and the underlying dispositions and attitudes of agents towards these changes 
(Mohan and Stokke, 2000, p. 263; Andrews et al., 2013).  
Therefore, any attempt to view the state, society or the economy as disembedded is 
fruitless (Mohan and Stokke, 2008, p. 263). Furthermore, regarding institutional design as 
a constant obscures the causes of poor institutional performance (Nadeem, 2016). In their 
study of the conditions for effective decentralised local governance in Uganda and the 
Philippines, Azfar, Kähkönen, Livingston, Meagher and Rutherford (2000, p. 2) found that 
poor policy coordination, inadequate authority and resources, and the tendency towards 
elite capture were the major causes of the failure of decentralised local governance. This 
suggests that formal institutions are only one part of the story, albeit a very important one 
(Andrews et al., 2013). 
To construct a dynamic model of local governance that incorporates state and 
society together, local governance should be viewed using Bourdieu’s field theory 
approach (Stokke and Selboe, 2009; Dubois, 2012). This model will be more fully 
developed in Chapter 3 of the present study, but it is useful at this stage to outline a few of 
its features to incorporate institutional performance as an important determinant of local 
governance. Firstly, local governance structure is comprised of various fields, e.g. political 
actors, trades unions, government officials and institutions, etc. (Stokke, 2002, pp. 3-4). 
Secondly, these fields are a constellation of power positions (internally) and agents 




linked to each other, in that the effects of change in one field are felt in the others (Kluttz 
and Fligstein, 2016). Thirdly, the perceptions of agents, or social practices as a 
manifestation of those perceptions, are neither the product of social structures (spaces of 
positions), nor purely the products of habitus (internalised dispositions), but instead are a 
reflexive engagement between habitus and specific fields within which habitus is 
constituted (Odabaş and Adaman, 2014b; Stokke, 2002, pp. 8-9). Roles across the spheres 
of governance are internalised, in that the points of view that agents take on the field is a “a 
view taken from the field in point” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 101). This 
relationship between habitus, capitals and the fields in which these capitals are relevant 
structures the interactions between the local economy, politics and governance institutions.  
2.3 Institutional effectiveness and the local economy: Two key determinants of local 
governance  
Whether decentralisation improves governance still lacks a conclusive answer (Rondinelli 
et al., 1989; Channa and Faguet, 2016, p. 199). However, it arguably brings government 
closer to the people, a principle which can be decomposed into three main analytical 
advantages: providing greater information about local needs; delivering greater 
participation of citizens in decision-making regarding public services; and ensuring the 
responsiveness of public officials to their voters. Despite these advantages, decentralisation 
has failed to improve local governance and service delivery (Channa and Faguet, 2016, p. 
200). Two factors that shape social structures – the quality of institutions (measured 
through government effectiveness) and the local economy – explain the failure of 
decentralisation to improve governance (Smoke, 2015, p. 260). 
2.3.1 Ineffective decentralised governments across the developing world 
With a few notable exceptions, local government is frequently ineffective across much of 
the developing world. The ability of the state to perform its expected functions is the 
foremost condition for improving governance through decentralisation (Bardhan, 2016, pp. 
11-12). Resource inadequacy, the incomplete devolution of authority and a lack of 
commitment on the part of central governments are some of the factors that lead to 
ineffective formal governance structure at local level in the developing world in general, 
and particularly in Pakistan (Farooqi, 2013, p. 58; Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke, 2010, p. 2). 
Grindle (2011) notes that the lack of appreciation for these processes is a major cause of 
the failure of many decentralisation reforms. Table 2.1 reviews the empirical evidence on 
decentralisation in Africa, Latin America and Asia to demonstrate the pervasive weakness 
of formal governance institutions at the local level across the developing world (Agrawal 




provision of services is due not only to the governance structures from below, but also to 
the quality of government institutions, the design of decentralised local government, and 
the motives of institutional designers (Boex, Ammar, Devanne, and Benjamin, 2016, p. 4). 
In this context, the role of local government (LG) in local governance in Pakistan will be 





Table 2.1: Decentralised governance, service delivery and cases from the developing world 
Author and context Focus of study Key findings 
Crook and Manor 
(1998): Comparative 
study of Asia and 
Africa, highlighting 
Bangladesh 
Pattern of service 
provision 
Pattern of service provision reflected “elite 
bias, the domination of patronage, extensive 
corruption and electoral manipulation. 
Vulnerable groups received few of the 
resources provided” (pp. 233-234).  






Politicians and officials lack capacity to make 
realistic development plans; financial resources 
are insufficient; decisions seen as prerogatives 









Respondents reported greater satisfaction due 
to the responsiveness of authorities, and 
regarded local government as more responsive 





Service delivery benefits not targeted at the 
marginalised and poor; local representatives 
lack ability to make delivery more responsive. 
Wunsch (1998): 
Comparative study of 





Presence of resource availability, authority and 
political process leads to improved institutional 
performance in service delivery. All three 
variables were high in Botswana. 
Diaz-Cayero, 
Magaloni and Ruiz 
(2014): Study of 
traditional vs. official 
governance in 
Oaxaca, Mexico 
Provision of public 
goods 
Municipalities governed by traditional forms 
of collective choice enjoy improvements in 
electricity provision, a larger reduction in 
monitoring, and no differences in political 
entrenchments by local political bosses, 





delivery in Colombia 
Provision of water 
and sanitation 
services 
Municipalities which privatise water and 
sewerage services have higher child mortality 
than municipalities where these services 
remain in the hands of local government. 
Goncalvez (2014): 
Econometric analysis 
of municipalities in 
Porto Aligre, Brazil 
Impact of 
participatory 
budgeting (PB) on 
service provision and 
public sector outputs 
Municipalities adopting PB increase spending 
on health and sanitation more significantly 
than others (by 20-30% of the sample mean), 
and have lower infant mortality rates.  
Guess (2005): 
Pakistan, Indonesia 
and the Philippines 
Institutional design 
as a way to improve 
local governance  
Policy failures caused by lack of consideration/ 
appreciation of background support, local 
technical capacity, design and sequencing, 






Failure of decentralisation to improve 
governance is due to motives of institutional 
designers. 




Table 2.1 outlines a general picture of the developing world that reflects an inherent 
weakness of LG (Saito, 2007; Smoke, 2015). The essence of decentralisation is the 
devolution of authority, resources and responsibility to mandated elected local government 
officials who can work free of central control (Channa and Faguet, 2016, p. 10). The table 
also demonstrates that decentralised governments in developing states share some features, 
such as the limited availability of resources to perform service delivery functions, the 
failure of decentralised governments to improve governance, and the incapability of a 
unified theoretical approach to account for governance processes in different contexts 
within developing economies (Scot, 2009, pp. 6-9). Perhaps for this reason, Faguet (2014) 
emphasises a broader definition of governance to demystify the structures and processes of 
decentralised governance in the developing world. Nadeem (2016, p. 973) observes that 
decentralisation projects are grounded in a fundamental belief that it is flaws in the 
planning and execution of decentralisation programmes, and not the social, economic, 
cultural and political environments in which these programmes are set, which ultimately 
determine their success or failure. For this reason, variations in a range of local institutions 
as a consequence of distinct cultural, social and political institutions are largely 
overlooked. Nadeem concludes that, contrary to the neoliberal designs of decentralisation, 
which tie the efficiency of decentralised governance to the technical training and skills of 
officially trained technocrats, a context-society-politics-centred approach is required to 
understand the structures, mechanisms and processes involved in local governance.  
This is not to suggest an absence of influence by the state’s agency. Instead the 
state plays an active role in explaining improvements or deterioration in local governance 
(Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Teles, 2012b). For instance, the empirical literature on 
decentralisation and local governance points towards institutional design as a major factor 
in the failure of local government to enhance government capacity, service delivery, 
empowerment and participation (Boex et al., 2016). Studies on Bangladesh (Haque, 1997), 
Zimbabwe (Jonga, 2014), Cambodia (Eng, 2016), India (Nixon and Miller, 2011), South 
Africa (Andrews et al., 2013) and Pakistan (Shami and Faguet, 2015) show that local 
government is designed to exercise fewer powers, which raises concerns regarding 
officials’ capacity to implement government policies at local level. The problem lies with 
the motives of institutional designers (Nixon and Miller, 2011; Guess, 2005; Eaton et al., 
2010). However, Faguet (2007), in his study of Bolivian municipalities, found a change in 
the patterns of investment in human capital and social services as an outcome of 
decentralisation. Faguet’s key argument is that local government is more responsive to 




function effectively, institutional design in terms of adequate powers and the availability of 
resources for service delivery is essential (Azfar et al., 2000).  
In addition to the empirical case studies summarised in Table 2.1, the literature on 
decentralisation offers ample evidence of the failure of local government in effective 
service delivery. Farooqi (2013), for instance, argues that institutional performance is key 
to improving service delivery. However, in Pakistan, a lack of resources, lack of capacity 
and unresponsiveness affect the institutional performance of LG (Manning, Porter, 
Charlton, Cyan and Hasnain, 2003, pp. 9-10).12 Employing a subjective characterisation of 
the “public ends” of various health activities, Hutchinson and Strumpf (2005) offer 
evidence of the declining allocation of LG finances to public goods and increased 
allocation of their shares of budgets to publicly financed private goods. These findings, 
along with others on the ineffectiveness of decentralised governments, are, according to 
Channa and Faguet (2016, p. 7) compelling arguments for showing that decentralisation 
does not improve service delivery in all instances, especially where “top-down” models 
without realistic considerations of local needs and aspirations are implemented (Andrews 
et al., 2013, p. 6). This inability of local government to deliver services was projected two 
decades ago by Crook and Sverrisson (1999). They argued that the lack of technical, 
financial and human resources would prevent effective service delivery by LG. In addition, 
the motives of the institutional designers in keeping local government weak is one of the 
determinants in the larger equation of using institutional performance to improve local 
governance (Farooqi, 2013).13  
Nevertheless, a spate of literature, systematically reviewed by Sujarwoto (2017) 
and Sarker, Bingxin, Sultana and Prodhan (2017), offers empirical evidence that 
decentralisation as an institutional change has both positive and negative impacts on 
various aspects of governance, such as public spending, service delivery, bringing 
decision-making closer to the people, etc. Decentralisation determines the formal rules of 
participation, the collection and spending of revenues, the performance of service delivery 
functions, and the management of public facilities by governments (Smoke, 2015). 
Decentralisation as an institutional reform does not, and cannot, do all this from above 
(Faguet, 2015); it does, however, perform the most important function of what Brinkerhoff 
(2015, pp. 46-48, 53-55) calls “institutional unfreezing”. Samson and Houessou (2018) 
empirically show that the ability of LG administrations to perform these functions 
                                                          
12 Boex et al. (2016) in their review of local government in Asia and Africa identify similar factors affecting the 
performance of local government in otherwise comparable urban governance contexts. 
 




determines citizens’ perceptions of them. How local environments respond to institutional 
changes is a contextual question, determined by local political realities (Smoke, 2015). 
Public sector reforms create a wide variety of incentive structures, both at the centre and 
the periphery. Given this variation, the exact form that decentralisation takes and the 
outcomes that it produces also vary considerably (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015). This 
variation requires an examination of the local political economy and related social 
structures that determine the ability of institutions to bring change as an outcome of their 
implementation (Smoke, 2015, p. 260). Therefore, it is necessary to move beyond simple 
“top-down” (Fukuyama, 2013) and “bottom-up” (Faguet, 2015) perspectives of local 
governance.14 Instead, decentralised governance need to be viewed as a process in a 
relational framework. 
2.3.2 Economic structures, power asymmetries and local governance 
For effective local governance, the structure of the local economy and corresponding social 
structures play an important role in determining how LG operates (Faguet, 2015). Smoke 
(2015, p. 260) notes that the local economy, social structures and local civil society, along 
with informal accountability mechanisms, may even frustrate the operation of well-
designed LG systems. Unequal social structures, elite capture, and the bureaucracy-elite 
nexus are common themes in the decentralisation literature (Haque, 1997; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2000; Mookherjee, 2015; Cheema and Mohmand, 2006). Reviewing the 
political economy and public choice literature on decentralisation, Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2000) point out that the lower the level of governance, the higher the level of 
elite capture. The social structure of the local economy accounts for the variations that 
exist in the operation of local government at the subnational level (Bourdieu, 2005). Elite 
capture, an important barrier to improving governance through decentralisation, has its 
roots in the structure of the local economy. Testing for elite capture in 80 countries, 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) found that decentralisation resulted in improved service 
delivery in areas with low poverty rates, while in areas with high poverty rates the situation 
worsened. If empowerment through participation, along with improved service delivery, 
are the goals of decentralisation reforms aimed at improving governance, the literature 
demonstrates that elite capture prevents decentralised governance designs from achieving 
                                                          
14 Pure public policy perspectives on governance (Fukuyama, 2013), new public management on building 
partnerships from above (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015), or new institutionalist approaches, are of little 
help in this connection. For an interesting critique on the latter, especially in the developing state context, 





these aims (Smoke, 2003; Olowu, 2003; Blair, 2000). The literature on Pakistan (Manning 
et al., 2003; Martin, 2015; Hussain and Hussain, 2009), India (Blair, 2000; Mosse, 2004) 
and Africa (Olowu, 2003, p. 41) demonstrates that local governance reforms are unable to 
increase participation and service delivery owing to hierarchical social structures. In such 
instances, decentralisation has improved only targeted service delivery (Mohmand and 
Cheema, 2007). 
Without considering local power structures, any a priori assumptions regarding 
decentralisation reforms to improve participation and service delivery are flawed (Bardhan, 
2002, p. 202). The structure of the economy explains why subnational outcomes of a 
universal decentralised governance design vary. Faguet (2015), in his “transformation from 
below” model, demonstrates that, where the local economy is dominated by a limited 
number of firms, local government fails to serve the general interest, whereas a more 
diffuse local economy with a large number of firms of equal size will make it difficult for a 
limited few to dominate, leading to a more responsive service delivery. Mohmand and 
Gazdar (2007, pp. 7-10), in their study of six districts in Pakistan, found that patterns of 
land holdings were an important factor in explaining citizens’ access to the state in rural 
Pakistan. They found that the capture of state institutions was lower in the districts 
characterised by greater land fragmentation. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the division of the 
social structure between boralog (rich people) and chotalog (poor people) has prevented 
successive institutional reforms from building meaningful partnerships for improved 
participation and service delivery. Although institutional reforms cause a temporary shift in 
local power relations, repeated government efforts to preserve the dominance of the rich 
often cuts out the poor from participating in the system. These power asymmetries bear on 
formal institutional designs in two ways. They may result in the failure of the state to 
effectively engage the local population, as Olowu (2003) observes in African villages. 
Institutional design may provide representation on councils, as in the case of the Scheduled 
Caste (the former “untouchables” or Dalits) in Karnataka, India, but their representatives 
were found to be following the diktats of their patrons instead of working in the best 
interests of communities (Blair, 2000). 
Therefore, in most developing countries, formal institutions exist, but their 
operations may be affected by informal institutions that mainly preserve the interests of the 
powerful (Goodfellow, 2017).15 Highlighting the failure of mainstream neo-institutionalist 
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approaches to ensure full engagement with formal institutions and deal with power 
relations, Goodfellow (ibid.) argues that the power of elite groups lies in the capitalist 
evolution which underpins institutional arrangements. This “political settlement approach” 
has two important implications for the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions in structuring local governance. Firstly, it argues that informal institutions are 
adaptive in their functions, and that they operate in relation to formal institutions (Khan, 
2010, p. 1). Secondly, “capital holding” (access to material resources) determines a group’s 
power to influence formal institutions (Goodfellow, 2017). However, this approach has 
limitations of its own. It remains theoretically and empirically underdeveloped for 
analysing governance at subnational level (ibid., pp. 199-200). In its focus on institutions, 
capital and groups/factions, its treatment of individual agency that reflexively engages with 
these structures is superficial. In addition, it is unable to explain the functions of social ties 
in a context characterised by differentiated endowments of capitals. Finally, it has little to 
say about both the individual and collective agency of the poor and its role in changing 
power configurations, either as an outcome of economic restructuring (Schulman and 
Anderson, 1999) or of change in the formal governance structure.  
In order to enhance participation, improve service delivery and create inclusive 
governance structures, some researchers argue that building partnerships with civil society 
offers the best possible alternative (Asaduzzaman et al., 2016). This is proposed because 
any attempts at constructing a social order based purely on the state’s capacity have failed 
to achieve the intended objectives in most of the developing world (Johnson and Wilson, 
2000). However, the structure and functions of civil society in most developing countries is 
underpinned by the structure of the local economy.16 As Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 
p. 138) conclude, the elite capture of local government depends on the level of economic 
inequalities which influence participation structures. The literature on decentralisation and 
business development highlights the centrality of the local economy to the success of state-
civil society partnerships. For instance, Das’s (2000) study on Kerala, India, shows that in 
areas where democracy is solidaristic and land distribution is relatively egalitarian, 
municipal government, along with bankers and other social groups, is taking the lead in 
launching initiatives for local business development. Zhang (2002), in his study of 
                                                          
16 As Varshney (2001, p. 370) convincingly argues, civil society, if viewed as assemblage of individuals in a 
community or neighbourhood on matters of public relevance, the form that it takes, associational or 
informal gathering, depends on the degree of urbanisation and economic development, as well as on the 





decentralisation and urban governance in China, demonstrates that the level of economic 
development is a critical determinant of state-society relations at the local level. 
Nevertheless, where levels of inequality are high, partnerships are unlikely to improve 
government effectiveness in the implementation of regulations and service delivery. 
Instead of promoting state-civil society relations for improved governance, it strengthens 
political society with adverse outcomes for formal governance (Chatterjee, 2004, Chapters 
3-4).  
Interestingly, Sellers and Jefferey (2016, p. 474) attribute the incapacity of local 
government to the “fragmented informal economy, and hierarchically organised domestic 
firms which functions as a hurdle to effective local governance”. This may be true for 
fiscal decentralisation because the informal economy is inaccessible to the “long arm of the 
centralised state”, as Bardhan (2016, pp. 11-12) notes. The relationship between the state 
and the informal economy at any level of governance is not that simple, and the literature 
shows that the informal economy generates mechanisms of solidarity where state 
institutions have limited capacity (Portes and Haller, 2005, p. 401-410). It has the potential 
for collective action that may generate positive externalities for local government. 
Evidence from Ghana (Grossman, 2016), Mali (David, Oliver, Zelezeck and Majoe, 2001), 
Indonesia (Rachmawati, 2013), and Peru and India (Roever and Skinner, 2016) suggests 
that associations of street vendors may help local government to generate revenue or 
resolve conflicts over the use of public spaces. In this way, the informal economy helps in 
the development of informal institutions that substitute for the incapacity of formal 
institutions (Lyon, 2007; Amoako and Lyon, 2013). The present study is not concerned 
with the revenue generation capacity of the informal economy or marketplaces for local 
government, for reasons that will be explained in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the unit of 
analysis is not the informal economy per se, but marketplaces, requiring a focus on specific 
political, social and economic factors (Morales, 2009). To this end, the following section 
reviews the literature on marketplaces as an element of local governance. The review 
centres on the role of marketplaces in three central local governance processes: 
participation, implementation of regulations and service delivery.  
2.4 The role of marketplaces as an element of local governance  
The role of marketplaces as a key element of local governance is increasingly recognised 
in both the global North and South (Porter, Lyon, Potts and Bowyer-Bower, 2004; 
Morales, 2011; Janssens and Sezer, 2013). Their integrative potential lies beyond the 
market floor, in the institutional infrastructure and power dynamics of local governance 




public space, or limited utility in facilitating LGs’ revenue generation (David et al., 2001, 
p. 35), but to their increasingly proactive (Monteith, 2015) and reactive role in local 
politics (Mehta and Gohil, 2013; Dines, 2007; Marcinczak and Van Der Velde, 2008). This 
role generates both positive and negative externalities for local governance. There is very 
extensive literature on marketplaces (for reviews see Plattner, 1989; Porter et al., 2004; 
Pati-Sharman, 2011). This section focuses on three dimensions: political participation and 
inclusion; influence over local government’s capacity for enforcement; and local 
government’s role in the provision of social services.  
Markets can be organised along many lines (Aspers, 2009; Ahrne, Aspers and 
Brunsson, 2015). Defining marketplaces and exploring their role in local governance 
requires careful consideration of their different names, settings, governance and scales, and 
the scope of their economies (Morales, 2011). There are many different names for and 
types of marketplaces, including public markets, municipal markets, farmers’ markets, 
street markets, flea markets, craft markets, swap meet markets (defined as markets where 
goods are exchanged, although in reality they are often sold), or wet markets, i.e. those 
selling fresh produce rather than consumer durables (Morales, 2011, p. 4). In addition, 
there are periodic markets, festival markets and night markets, among others (Pati-
Sharman, 2011). Settings include public rights-of-way, indoors in a variety of buildings, 
outdoors in car parks, in the open air at allocated spaces, inside covered sheds, or inside a 
cluster of mobile containers, and elements of these are included in market districts or in the 
bazaars (Alff, 2015; Morales, 2011). They may also be a cluster of portable stalls (Mehta 
and Gohil, 2013), or fixed shops in a bounded space (Jan, 2014). Governance of these 
marketplaces includes public, private or a mixture of public-private partnership (Morales, 
2011, p. 4); planned or unplanned (Lindell, 2008); or self-organised, owned neither by the 
government or by private managers (most common in the developing states) (Varman, 
Costa and Eccles, 2009). Marketplaces may be taxed, illegal or constitutionally exempted 
from taxes (Khan, 2017a). Finally, in terms of their scope, marketplaces may be 
international/transnational, national, regional or local (Kaminski and Mitra, 2012; Favre, 
2004). Marketplaces are not ungoverned spaces (Schoofs, 2015), but rather are an active 
element of local governance (Monteith, 2015). Their role in local governance is determined 
by their defining characteristics, based on the types described above. 
The focus of the present empirical analysis, Batkhela bazaar in Pakistan’s 
Malakand District, is a fixed, self-organised informal marketplace that hosts diverse trades 
and is deeply rooted in its social and political context (Ünlü-Yücesoy, 2013; Schappo and 




spaces containing a series of socially embedded networks that facilitate the exchange of 
certain commodities. Marketplaces are not only bounded physical spaces: they have a 
regulatory system of their own, one that is built on multifaceted relationships and 
mechanisms. This embeddedness has implications for governance as an interaction 
between formal and informal institutions. This interaction, as noted in the previous section, 
is shaped by the distribution of capitals, and by the struggle over these capitals. This means 
that marketplaces, as fields of power and governance spaces, are shaped by the power 
relations which both surround and enter them (Gaventa, 2006; Cornwall, 2002). In this 
context, marketplaces as an element of local governance influence the processes of 
participation, regulation enforcement by local government, and provision of social welfare 
services. These three areas are explored in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
2.4.1 The impact of marketplaces on participation in local politics  
Marketplaces create opportunities for social and political inclusivity in otherwise 
conflictive environments (Watson, 2009; Janssens and Sezer, 2013; Schappo and Van 
Melik, 2017). In this sense, they can be viewed as claimed/created participation spaces that 
influence the politics of the electoral field of local government. Evidence from Africa, 
Latin America and Asia suggests that marketplaces influence local politics in three broad 
ways: through the participation of traders’ communities in local government elections 
owing to the traders’ rising economic power (Javed, 2017); by influencing the decisions of 
local political parties in their choices of electoral candidates (Grossman, 2016, p. 11); or 
through the creation of power-dependence relationships between the traders’ communities 
and the local political elites, which leads to patronage politics. The major source of 
marketplace influence on the electoral field of local governance lies in their street and 
shutter power that creates incentives for political elite and local administration to consider 
traders’ concerns (Grossman, 2016; Javed, 2017). Evidence from marketplaces in Uganda 
suggests that fear of traders’ protests and incentives created by their voting behaviour can 
even shape competition between municipal and national government (Goodfellow and 
Titeca, 2012). This is due to the significance of marketplaces in electoral politics “as 
centres of communication and containers of large number of votes” (Monteith, 2015, p. 
60). Roever (2016), in her study of street vending in India, suggests that traders’ ability to 
influence the policies of an administration is greater in contexts where they enjoy political 
patronage. 
Electoral politics in politically decentralised districts create incentives for political 
leaders to forgo enforcement against poor traders (Holland, 2015). Holland’s (ibid., p. 2) 




capacity. It is argued that electoral incentives are important but not the only determinants 
of empowerment and inclusivity produced by marketplaces (Polese, Morris and 
Rekhviashvili, 2017). Importantly, Holland (2015) concludes that rather than state 
weakness, it is the political agency of traders, especially of the poor, that explains their 
capacity to influence governance structure. However, unlike Holland’s focus on electoral 
incentives, it is argued that marketplaces bring change in the “deep governance structure”, 
where the capacity of the poor to exercise political agency lies in the distribution of power 
(Polese et al., 2017). Focusing on this level allows an understanding of how traders 
exercise political agency in oppressive governance structures (Gillespie, 2016). In other 
words, the evolution of marketplaces influences political participation, but its implications 
go far beyond non-enforcement and electoral incentives (Javed, 2017). 
The significance of marketplaces in the electoral field increases the political agency 
of traders, which often obstructs the enforcement of regulations (Gillespie, 2016). Roever 
(2016) and Goodfellow and Titeca (2012), in their respective studies of Indian and 
Ugandan marketplaces, demonstrate how the political patronage of marketplaces frustrates 
the ability of municipal government to enforce regulations. Monteith (2015, p. 58) found 
that unresponsive government policies that deprived traders of the outcome they desired 
also created tension within the marketplace between those who embraced government 
initiatives and those who were seeking patronage to obstruct government policies. Roever 
(2016) argues that, where political patronage is higher, the ability of traders to obstruct 
regulations is greater. Moreover, Polese et al. (2017), in their study of street vendors in 
Georgia, found that the embeddedness of marketplaces and enforcement officials in local 
social norms obstructed the policies of central government. Evidence from London (Dines, 
2007), Ukraine (Marcinczak And Van Der Velde, 2008), India (Mehta and Gohil, 2013) 
and Iran (Erami and Keshavarzian, 2015) demonstrate how the social embeddedness of 
marketplaces hinders the implementation of government measures aimed at improved 
governance. These studies, with the exception of the research by Erami and Keshavarzian 
(2015), suggest that the role of marketplace social embeddedness as an obstruction to local 
government policies is largely reactive. 
Overall, rather than the absence of the state, it is the degree of the state’s 
intervention in the marketplace that determines the latter’s role in local governance 
(Grossman, 2016). The participation of markets in wider governance is shaped by their 
interaction with state institutions (Monteith, 2015, p. 58). In some instances, the state may 




is felt in the ways the marketplace impacts on the local governance structure.17 For 
instance, elite capture is a central problem in developing states and particularly in Pakistan. 
Marketplaces emerge and evolve in a hierarchical social space where state institutions 
favour the dominant class. Nevertheless, economic transformation as an outcome of 
marketplace evolution mitigates political exclusion (Jan, 2014) with implications for the 
empowerment of the marginalised by enhancing their access to state institutions 
(Chaudhary, 1999; Martin, 2015; Khan, 2017b). It does not imply that “the magic of the 
marketplace” creates a space where power struggles among diverse groups dissolve as an 
“interaction effect” of the marketplace (Watson, 2009; Ahmed, 1980): instead, its 
generative potential offers a degree of empowerment to marginalised groups (Kelly, 2003; 
Peña, 1999) which is manifested through the marketplace’s embeddedness in local politics 
(Varshney, 2001). 
2.4.2 The impact of marketplaces on local government regulation of marketplaces  
City and local government authorities have a range of potential responsibilities in relation 
to regulating local markets; however, it is important to be cautious about the capabilities 
and constraints faced by local authorities in the governance of marketplaces (Porter et al., 
2004, p. 41). Porter et al. (ibid., p. 42) further note that a lack of staff capacity to design 
and implement programmes, insufficient financial resources, the influence of central 
government and a lack of dialogue with the private sector are the major constraints to the 
capacity of local government. Regulating food quality, the hygiene of sale points and 
prices, levying taxes on production, standardising weights and measures, providing 
security for the area where the market is situated, and controlling unauthorised goods are 
some of the major functions of local government relating to marketplace governance. 
Porter et al. (ibid., p. 42) note: “The likelihood of local governments being able to take on 
these activities is fairly remote without greater fiscal capacity.”  
Place-based specifications of the role of local government in regulating 
marketplaces are also important determinants of the scale and scope of LG control of 
marketplace activities. For instance, LG powers to levy taxes on local markets determine 
whether marketplaces should be managed by the municipality or privatised in order to 
generate greater revenues (David et al., 2001, p. 35). Some institutional designs may 
                                                          
17 On this point, Lindell’s (2008, pp. 1,897-1,898) notion of dispersed yet centred authority is helpful. In her 
study of a street vendors’ market in Maputo, Mozambique, she shows that authority and power may be 
dispersed but the state remains an important actor, in that its important practices impact decisively on the 





completely remove this incentive for LG by constitutionally curtailing its powers to levy 
taxes on local markets (Khan, 2017a). 
2.4.3 The impact of marketplaces on the provision of social welfare services  
The social embeddedness of marketplaces generates positive externalities for local 
governance that accommodate or act as a substitute for the ineffectiveness of formal 
institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). These positive externalities are multifaceted and 
contextual, ranging from promoting diversity and inclusivity (Watson, 2009) to the 
facilitation of urban development strategies (Janssens and Sezer, 2013). The externalities 
that marketplaces can generate in the developing state context range from a source of quick 
economic recovery in a post-conflict setting (Suleri et al., 2016) to employment generation 
(Alff, 2015) and ensuring food security (Ahluwalia, 2003). This role of marketplaces is 
especially significant in contexts where the government’s capacity for providing social 
welfare is in short supply. Traders’ associations provide welfare support for market traders 
and contribute to the development of infrastructure (Smith, Harlan and Luttrell, 1994; 
Javed, 2017), as well as developing lending facilities for traders (Porter et al., 2004, p. 47). 
Moreover, the institutional embeddedness of the marketplace economy makes it an 
important resource for fund-raising for religious welfare associations (Taylor, 2018, pp. 
266-267). The resourceful value of marketplaces in the provision of social welfare is not 
limited to religious welfare associations; rather it extends to the wider notion of civil 
society organisations (González-Torre, Pilar and Coque, 2016). 
This suggests that marketplaces contribute to the social development not only of the 
traders but also of wider society (Vermaak, 2014, 2017). The role of marketplaces in social 
development has historically evolved. Traditionally, alongside their role in revenue 
generation, marketplaces were an active source of support for mosques, public inns for 
travellers and a social community centre (Geertz, 1963; Ahmed, 1980). That role has 
evolved into support for other community development activities, especially providing care 
for vulnerable sections of the society. Watson (2009, p. 1,585) argues that marketplaces 
generate social capital by providing care for the elderly and disabled. This is not simply the 
outcome of interaction effect: the “resourceful value” of markets for social welfare lies in 
their institutional settings (Vermaak, 2017). Marketplaces are a resource for non-profit 
organisations in the provision of food for the poor (González-Torre et al., 2016; Schappo 
and Van Melik, 2017), and other community organisations such as schools (Hüwelmeier, 
2013) and mosques (Javed, 2017; Ashraf, 1988). This suggest the “resourceful value” of 
marketplaces can generate social capital for local governance. The marketplace literature 




which the “resourceful value” of marketplaces for social welfare translates into a role as an 
element of local governance in contexts characterised by ineffective LG institutions. 
2.5 Conclusions and the way forward 
The review and synthesis of decentralisation, local governance and marketplace literature 
in this chapter indicate the need to move beyond narrow conceptual frameworks that view 
governance from a unidirectional “top-down” or “bottom-up” perspective. This line of 
argument certainly invites criticism for being eclectic. However, without such a 
framework, the possibility of answering even simple questions relating to local governance 
is extremely limited (Faguet, 2015, p. 12). As demonstrated in Section 2.2.1, even the most 
encompassing decentralisation models leave out one or more important dimensions of local 
governance. Moreover, neo-institutional approaches to decentralisation are unable to 
explain the role of marketplaces due to their insensitivity to the role of individual agency, 
power and conflict in the formal and informal realm. Conflict, asymmetric power relations 
and social stratification also limit the scope for network governance approaches to capture 
the nuances of local governance in the developing world where steering and coordination 
remain underdeveloped. Reviews of the literature on local government suggest that 
indicators for measuring institutional efficiency are often selective (Narbón‐Perpiñá and 
De Witte, 2018). This frequently leads to the wrong sets of questions being asked, and to 
narrow conceptualisations of local governance (Faguet, 2015). This tendency limits 
understanding of the role of marketplaces as an element of the dynamic local governance 
structures in the context of developing states. To understand the role of marketplaces as an 
element of local governance, any conceptualisation, narrowly structured in a single 
discipline, or focused on a single (traditional) indicator of local governance, lacks 
parsimony (Morales, 2009).  
The key themes emerging from this chapter form the core of an analytical 
framework for investigating the dynamic evolution of marketplaces and their role in the 
local governance structure. These themes include institutional design (in terms of the 
quality and capacity of local government); the social structure of the local economy; 
networks of relationships; and individual dispositions and their power to exercise 
individual and collective agency in relation to these structures. Institutional design, social 
structures and the marketplace are linked in a dialectical framework. Change in any of 
these spheres of local governance has implications for the other spheres (Cornwall, 2002; 
Gaventa, 2006; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Individual dispositions, beliefs and 
understandings are shaped by these structures and their mutual interrelationship, which is 




implies that the development of networks of relationships, norms of cooperation, and their 
relative power vis-à-vis each other evolve owing to changes in their internal composition 
or their relationship to the field of power. In this context, networks of social relationships, 
internal heterogeneity and power struggles within and across these fields of power, and the 
influence of these changing structures on individual dispositions, shape the mutual 
interrelationship of the spheres of formal and informal governance. An analytical 
framework developed from these key themes in the next chapter is central to understanding 
how local government operates at the grassroots level (see Chapter 5) and what the 
outcomes of the transformative potential of marketplaces for the local economy and 
consequently for the operations of LG are likely to be. 
The theoretical framework that will be developed in Chapter 3 uses SC with its 
structural and cognitive elements as a heuristic device to understand the role of 
marketplaces as an element of local governance. The underlying assumption is that SC is a 
critical link for delineating the marketplace’s role in the local governance structure. 
Moreover, the dynamic interplay between the state, the marketplace and social institutions 
at local level, and its implications for the generation and outcomes of SC, are too complex 
to be explained by simple “top-down” or “bottom-up” models of local governance and SC. 
The major contention underlying this argument is that SC generation is possible through 
state intervention, but the capacity of the state and the degree of intervention are influenced 
by the structure of the economy and social structures, based on the distribution of capital. 
State policies to govern marketplaces are not constant. They are likely to emerge as critical 
responses to governance problems (Morales, 2011) or opportunities (Hummely, 2016) 
created by marketplaces. Likewise, the introduction of new governance rules entails 
reactions both active and passive from marketplace actors that require readjustment to the 
governing rules. A SC-local governance relational framework will therefore be developed 
to understand both the role of the marketplace as an element of governance structure, and 
the role of the SC generated by marketplaces in the interstices between the formal and 





Chapter 3 – The role of social capital in understanding 
marketplace-local governance interaction: Developing a 
Bourdieusian conception 
3.1 Introduction 
The existing literature on the interaction between the marketplace and local governance 
rarely employs social capital as a theoretical construct for understanding this 
interrelationship. The reasons for this limited amount of marketplace-social capital 
literature lie in the manner in which SC is conceptualised (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005; 
Watson, 2009; Vermaak, 2017). Following Bourdieu (1972, 1986), this chapter develops a 
theoretical framework for social capital in order to understand the role of marketplaces as 
an element of local governance, and the role played by SC as a critical link in this process. 
To demonstrate how this link is formed, stocks of SC and their flows across various 
governance spheres need to be explored. To this end, this chapter theorises not only SC, 
but other central components of this research: governance institutions, embeddedness, 
marketplaces, social relationships and the power structures within which these 
relationships are embedded. Both individual and collective actions are framed within this 
context to explain the implications of SC for various local governance processes. It is 
argued that Bourdieu’s notion of SC, together with his concepts of field, habitus and 
capital, have utility for understanding local governance-SC relations in developing 
economies (Mohmand, 2008), and can shed light on the current debates in relation to local 
governance, power relations and the provision of services (Hastings and Matthews, 2015). 
This framework allows for an understanding not only of how agents formulate and 
accumulate SC, but also how its different elements change with the evolution of different 
spheres of governance, and how their constitution is grounded in the broader rules of local 
social order where they operate. 
The state is a major element of any endeavour to understand the role of SC in local 
governance (Huppe and Creech, 2012; Méndez-Lemus, Vieyra and Poncela, 2017; 
Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). However, there is a degree of circularity in the arguments of 
the three major exponents (Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam) of SC when it comes to state-
society relations (Tzanakis, 2013, p. 10). Bourdieu’s notion of SC has been adopted for the 
current research owing to its ability to provide a better contextual understanding of the 
functions and outcomes of SC (Foley and Edwards, 1999). Unlike the concepts offered by 
Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1988), Bourdieu’s notion provides for placing the state in a 




tautological conception of SC, nor does it view state-society relations as a zero-sum game 
(Tzanakis, 2013; Field, 2008). Hence, for understanding marketplace-local governance 
interaction in the weak state context of the Malakand region, where both collective and 
individual interactions shape various local governance processes, Bourdieu’s relational 
approach is expected to have greater explanatory power.  
To develop this theoretical framework, Section 3.2 reviews different conceptions of 
SC and uses a relational approach to delineate the role of both individual and collective 
networks within a given context. Section 3.3 focuses on Bourdieu’s notion of SC in his 
theory of practice, which is the nexus of capitals (powers), habitus and field. Here, both 
individual and collective networks are equated with capital (i.e. social capital), and the 
cognitive dimensions of SC such as trust and reciprocity are linked to habitus. Section 3.4 
reviews the SC literature on embeddedness in order to add Bourdieu’s notion of field to 
explanations of the embeddedness of SC (in both its structural and cognitive dimensions) 
in various interconnected spheres of governance. The embeddedness of SC within these 
fields of power explains the synergy between the state, marketplace and social institutions 
that represent three embedded spheres within the local governance order. This 
embeddedness explains how SC forms a critical link in marketplace-local governance 
interaction. Finally Section 3.5 presents the conclusions of the chapter 
3.2 Dimensions and elements of social capital: Developing a relational approach  
Social capital is a multifaceted concept viewed through structural, cognitive and relational 
perspectives. This section reviews this literature to develop a relational approach for 
linking the structural and cognitive, and the individual and collective dimensions of SC. 
Throughout the 20th century, the term social capital has appeared in the literature in various 
forms and contexts, and differing conceptions of SC have been developed (Farr, 2014). 
The most systematic expositions have been developed by Bourdieu (1980, 1986), Coleman 
(1988, 1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995). These key proponents of SC adopt differing 
postulates on the relationship between the state and SC, and on the role of SC as public or 
private good, or individual or collective resource, and they propose distinct theoretical 
assumptions to explain the structure, functions and outcomes of SC (Field, 2008, pp. 44-
46). However, there is broad agreement that networks of relationships and norms of 
cooperation (trust and reciprocity) matter (López and Santos, 2013; Woolcock, 2010). In 
addition, the effects of these networks, both associational and quotidian, are experienced 
by agents more directly at the local level (Varshney, 2001, p. 393). At the outset, however, 




and collective SC, and the role of these forms of SC in state-society relations, requires 
scrutiny.  
For Putnam, SC is a feature of social organisation and a set of civic associations, 
while for Coleman it inheres in the structure of social relationships. In this sense, it is an 
attribute of a group or community which overlooks interpersonal relationships (Fischer, 
2001). Conversely, Levien (2015) views the Bourdieusian approach to SC as antithetical to 
collective action, and regards it as a theory of individual SC. However, the literature on 
voluntary associations views the Bourdieusian approach as having the potential to 
explicate the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in these associations, along with their 
internal heterogeneity (Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Tacon, 2014). Here, the Putnamian 
distinction between formal and informal networks is important. Formal networks are 
modern voluntary civic associations, whereas informal networks represent forms of 
everyday engagements that connect individuals and families (Varshney, 2001, pp. 363-
364).  
Putnam (1995, pp. 66-67) associates the decline in membership of formal 
associations with the decline in social capital. Putnam’s (1993) study on Italy categorises 
regions with an abundance of membership-based organisations as “civic”, and those with a 
predominance of interpersonal ties as “uncivic” communities. The question here is not 
about the deficit of social capital or its absence from “uncivic” communities, but rather 
about the distribution of resources that determine the structure and functions of social 
capital (Gowan, 2010, p. 51; Tlili and Obsiye, 2014, p. 559). Moreover, social capital in 
developing countries has a different and more informal structure (Nooteboom, 2007). The 
literature on SC in developing countries offers evidence of an abundance and growth of 
informal social capital, even in village communities which lack association-based networks 
(Krishna, 2007). This literature argues that the level of economic development and 
urbanisation determines the existence of formal associations and their significance for local 
governance (Varshney, 2001).  
Associational networks per se do not determine the effectiveness of governance, as 
Putnam suggests, nor they are formed entirely in the informal realm with varying and often 
opposing influences on the political system (Coleman, 1988, p. 99). As Varshney (2001, 
pp. 392-393) argues, the state controls the right of formal associations to exist. The 
question is also not simply about the existence of stocks of SC in one region or their 
absence in another (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993). The structure of governance and the 
role of formal institutions is certainly a significant element of any social capital equation 




organisations created for one purpose can be appropriated for other objectives, constituting 
important social capital for individual members who make their resources available to the 
organisation. However, Coleman’s organisations, unlike those of Putnam, are based on 
network closure, which does not explain how social capital in its transition from an 
individual to a collective resource creates interdependence across varying associational 
networks. Putnam (2000, pp. 22-23), on the other hand, discusses bridging and bonding 
types of associations, where the former are cross-cutting associations with positive 
implications for economic development and local governance. In this sense, the SC of a 
community or a group acquires a normative overtone. This overlooks the issues of: (1) 
class, power, and domination (Fine, 2001; Field, 2008, p. 44-46); (2) the dynamic 
interaction between state and social structures; and (3) the “dark” side of social capital for 
local governance (Levi, 1996; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997; Portes, 1998). 
Bourdieu’s critical perspective on SC, in which he links SC to other forms of 
capital, answers some of these questions in relation to politics, development and state-
society relations (Calhoun, 2006; Christoforou, 2014a; Mansuri and Rao, 2003, p. 9). This 
is not to say that Bourdieu’s notion of SC is better able to explicate the relationship 
between formal and informal networks on the one hand, and SC and local governance on 
the other. Instead, it offers an explanation of the evolutionary dynamics of local structures 
of power and the role and interrelationship between formal and informal networks in the 
production and reproduction of power (Christoforou, 2014b).  
SC has two key dimensions: networks and norms (Andriani and Christoforou, 
2016; Krishna and Uphoff, 1999). The former refers to the structure of SC, while the latter 
refers to its content which governs cooperation among agents within a network or a group. 
The structural dimension is further divided into bonding (strong or close) and bridging 
(weak or horizontal) ties or associations (Granovetter, 1985; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 
1998; Hawkins and Maurer, 2009). For Coleman (1988, p.105), bonding networks (closure 
of social networks) serve as an important resource, whereas for Putnam (1993, 1995) 
bridging or weaker ties are a more productive form of SC. As Putnam expressed it, 
bonding ties are essential for “getting by” while bridging ties are important for “getting 
ahead”.  
However, both of these approaches to SC displace the issues of power and 
inequality that are inherent in the structural dimension of social capital (Tlili and Obsiye, 
2014, p. 559; Christoforou, 2013). Although Putnam in his later work (2000) emphasises 
the vertical and horizontal networks that have the potential to deal with the issue of power 




agents to always produce positive externalities “hopelessly romanticises” horizontal 
associations (Levi, 1996; Harriss, 2001). None of these approaches, including that of 
Bourdieu, is free from limitations (Smith and Kulynych, 2002). However, as Field (2008) 
notes, the potential of the Bourdieusian approach to SC, which is mistakenly viewed as the 
narrowest approach, has yet to be realised. One way to realise the potential of this 
approach to SC as it relates to local governance is to combine it with the Putnamian 
concept, to see how both individual and collective SC together shape the dynamics of local 
governance (Pisani, Franceschetti, Secco and Christoforou, 2017). As Flora (1998, p. 498) 
argues, both bridging and bonding ties are critical to facilitate local developments. 
The cognitive dimension of SC refers to the content of social capital. Although 
there is broad agreement in the SC literature that trust and reciprocity facilitate cooperation 
for achieving productive outcomes (Coleman, 1988, 1990, pp. 301-304; Putnam, 1993 p. 
173), Bourdieu is thought to have paid limited attention to the notion of trust (Frederiksen, 
2014). However, if viewed in a relational framework, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus not 
only allows deep analytical insights into the role of trust as a component of social capital, 
but, as Frederiksen notes, it also helps in linking various dimensions of trust, e.g., personal, 
generalised and institutional. Reciprocity, on the other hand, can be viewed as underlying 
structural regularities or “mechanical laws” that not only serve as sanctions against the 
breach of trust, but also regulate (to varying degrees) the behaviour of the members of a 
network.  
Again, the differences between the major proponents of SC regarding its cognitive 
dimensions are noteworthy. Coleman views trust as a characteristic of the structure, and 
associates higher levels of trust with closure networks (Coleman, 1988, pp. 99-100; Tlili 
and Obsiye, 2014, pp. 560-561), whereas Putnam (1993, pp. 88-89) gives primacy to 
“generalised trust” as an essential characteristic of SC, while his treatment of interpersonal 
trust is superficial (Fischer, 2001). It is argued that trust rests not merely in interpersonal 
networks, nor it is a quality of the social structure: instead it is a product of an agent’s 
habitus that is constantly updated with his interactions with multiple structures and 
institutions. For this reason, trust is viewed as expectation relating to roles and rules in 
society (Uphoff, 2000, p. 220). In order to explicate its cause-effect relationship with 
reciprocity, trust needs to be deciphered into motive-based trust and competence-based 
trust (Blumberg, Peiró and Roe, 2015, p. 93; McAllister, 1995). This provides for 
exploring the linkages between institutional, social and interpersonal trust that shape the 




Reciprocity, an element of the cognitive dimension of SC, regulates cooperation 
within networks. It is distinct from, but closely associated with, trust (Wu et al., 2006; 
Torche and Valenzuela, 2011). The rise or decline of social trust is dependent on the norm 
of reciprocity. The SC literature broadly agrees that reciprocity is a norm that stabilises 
exchanges and cooperation (Putnam, 1993, p. 172; Coleman, 1990), generates externalities 
for others (Coleman, 1988, pp. 300-301), and finally transfers control of an agent’s action 
to others (Putnam, 1993, p. 171; Coleman, 1990, p. 300). In Putnam’s neo-institutionalist 
conception, the norm of reciprocity operates to solve collective action problems, and an 
agent’s decision to defect limits his ability to have beneficial future transactions (Putnam, 
1993, p. 172-3). Similarly, for Coleman, reciprocity, or control over an agent’s actions, 
applies equally without any reference to the agent’s capacity to defect (Karpik, 2014). This 
is mainly due to their tendency to view social capital as a normative concept and their 
limited attention to the issues of power and interdependence. Putnam, for instance, notes 
that hierarchical relationships are also governed by reciprocity, but that these relationships 
are more those of exploitation and dependence rather than of mutual recognition. 
Moreover, in such relationships, the upward application of sanctions is often ineffective, 
and the powerful actor may or may not accede to the norm of reciprocity (Putnam, 1993, 
pp. 175-177).  
For the present study, reciprocity is operationalised as an exchange relationship 
characterised by mutual interdependence or power-dependence (Emerson, 1962; Molm, 
2010). It is not only the product of repeated social interactions, or the collective ability of a 
community to ostracise defectors. It is rooted in the institutional structure or social order 
that manifests itself in various forms such as generalised, balanced or negative (Sahlins, 
1972, pp. 194-196). Even the positions of powerful actors in more complex economies are 
dependent on the acts of generalised reciprocity (or what Sahlins calls generosity). 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that reciprocity is very much rooted in local 
institutions and observable in day-to-day practices (Mauss [trans Gunnison],1950: pp. 30-
37). 
On this point, Smith and Kulynych (2002, pp. 155-156) note that Coleman has 
some affinities with Bourdieu, and comes even closer when he argues that society is 
characterised by systemic interdependence among agents whose tendency to form 
relationships with others stems from their interest in resources that are in control of others 
(Coleman, 1990, p. 300). However, Coleman’s conception of SC suffers from 
inconsistency when he argues that norms are intentionally created by agents to facilitate 




voluntary associations for collective benefits is unlikely without pre-existing social trust. 
Furthermore, Coleman (ibid., p. 319) regards the emergence of norms as an outcome of 
network closure. Finally, Coleman (ibid., p. 320) attributes the power of an agent from one 
set or group over an agent from another as a consequence of his or her social capital, 
regardless of class, status or possession of other forms of capital. The concepts put forward 
by both Putnam and Coleman valorise communities where social capital is high, while not 
dealing with the issues of those societies that are more complex or, in Chatterjee’s (1998, 
2004) terms, are caught between the introduction of modern civil society and traditional 
societal structure. Finally, Coleman (1988, 1990) entirely neglects the role of laws and 
formal institutions in the operation of social capital, while Putnam explicitly adopts a neo-
institutionalist perspective but is unclear on the role of the state in the development of 
social capital (Putnam, 1993, pp. 10, 184-185).  
In terms of explaining the role of SC in local governance, Bourdieu’s approach has 
two major limitations. Firstly, his research (1985, 1986, 2005) does not directly engage 
with the notion of trust. This is mainly because, as Frederiksen (2014, p. 172) notes, 
Bourdieu – unlike Coleman and Putnam, who assign a more pivotal role to trust – gives 
recognition a major role in his relational theory (see also Siisiainen, 2003). Furthermore, 
Bourdieu’s totalising conception of the omnipotent state has limited capacity to explain the 
“bottom-up” influences of SC on governance by government. However, his emphasis on 
SC’s contingency to other forms of capital in the field-habitus-capital nexus allow social 
capital to be situated more broadly in relation to the state and societal institutions, and for a 
more nuanced conception of trust to be developed.  
The literature stresses the distinction but interrelatedness of the structural (networks 
and associations) and cognitive (norms and expectations) dimensions of social capital 
(Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Uphoff, 2000; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Uphoff (2000, p. 
221) argues that, while both Putnam and Coleman include structural and cognitive 
dimensions in their concepts of social capital, they use these dimensions more 
descriptively than analytically (see also Krishna, 2007). Contrary to Coleman and North, 
Uphoff (2000, p. 231) argues that “mixed-motive” individuals and societies (both 
instrumental and normative) shape the development and preservation of SC. He claims that 
his framework is applicable across all contexts, but he is reticent on the notion of culture 
and “third-party” enforcement in shaping especially the cognitive dimension of SC. 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) developed a more sophisticated framework comprising 
structural, cognitive and relational social capital, drawing on both Coleman and Bourdieu. 




explain how networks overlap across organisations, and how agency is shaped by power 
differentials within and across organisations. Firstly, they failed to develop an explanation 
for the rules of inclusion and exclusion in these organisations. Secondly, as they admitted 
(ibid., pp. 261-262), they could not extend their theoretical framework beyond the 
institutional setting of the firm to more complex settings where multiple forms of 
organisations operate, and where social practices structure the operation of social capital 
(for instance, how SC creates individual or organisational advantage at the intersection of 
geographic, social or class boundaries). Nevertheless, this literature stresses the 
development of a theoretical and analytical framework where the interrelationship between 
the structural and cognitive dimensions of SC is explored, and their mutual connections 
and position in the broader institutional setting are explained. For developing such a 
relational framework, Bourdieu’s notion of SC needs to be situated in the meta framework 
of his theory of practice. 
3.3 Bourdieu’s theory of practice: An embeddedness approach to social capital 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice has gained traction in the recent literature on local 
governance, social capital and participation (Howard and Lever, 2011). In terms of the 
social capital-local governance interrelation, its significance stems from its emphasis on 
the role of context, the disposition of agents towards state and non-state actors, the role of 
power in facilitating or prohibiting access to state institutions, and the development of 
social capital through encounters in emerging fields of governance (ibid.; Hastings and 
Matthews, 2015). This literature, however, does not develop systematic links between 
elements of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the elements of SC. The rest of this section 
is devoted to this task.  
We know from Putnam (1993, pp. 172-173) that SC and institutions have a 
reinforcing impact on each other; other researchers inform us about the mutually 
reinforcing relationships between the structural and cognitive dimensions of SC (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998; Uphoff, 2000); and even the cognitive dimensions of SC (trust and 
reciprocity) have a mutually dependent relationship (Coleman, 1988; Blumberg et al., 
2015). Bourdieu’s theory of practice with its major elements (habitus, capital and field) 
provides a more powerful analytical tool to account for the dialectical relationship between 
social capital and local governance. An individual’s actions are the outcome of her/his 
“habitus”, which is an outcome of her/his position in the social structure. Her/his position 
in the social structure is the outcome of the total assets that she/he owns (Bourdieu, 1972, 
1985, 1986). Any change in an agent’s account of these assets will in turn impact her/his 




context of the present research, an aggregate impact of these actions can be observed in 
different governance practices, be it related to the internal governance of the bazaar, which 
is conceptualised as the “social field” (see Section 2.4), or to its role in the wider 
governance processes. The link between habitus and the institutional framework 
comprising various fields of power clarifies the contextual specificities of local governance 
structure, and the ways in which the participation of agents within that structure is shaped 
by their enduring and changing habitus (Howard and Lever, 2011).  
Social space is the interplay of power between various forms of capital that shapes 
agency within the governance structure. As Bourdieu (1985) argues, the social world is, to 
a large extent, what agents make of it, but they cannot change it beyond certain limits that 
their positions in the social structure, and their resultant dispositions towards others, 
impose on them. These limits are, however, subject to the distribution of different forms of 
capital that shape an agent’s position within the broader configuration of social fields. 
Possession of these assets determines an agent’s position and disposition towards those 
who hold differentiated stocks of capitals. The configuration of social space is not static, 
and it may change either with change in the distribution of capital within the field, or with 
the rise of new fields within the social space. An aggregate impact of these actions can be 
observed in different governance practices. These governance practices are the totality of 
interactions between various fields.  
Contrary to network analysis and interactionist approaches, it is argued that these 
interactions are not mere interactions, but they are underpinned by actors’ relative 
positions in the field, determined by the distribution of capitals in that field (Eloire, 2014). 
As Walther (2014) notes, an infinite number of interactions shape the daily life of an agent, 
entailing discussions, negotiations and conflicts. To understand these interactions, they 
have to be understood in their respective social space, that is divided into several social 
fields (champs sociaux). These fields are microcosms in which agents are integrated and 
interact in accordance with the rules specific to these fields (Walther, ibid., p. 8). These 
rules are not written, but rather are tacitly understood and followed (Wacquant, 2011). 
Thus, Bourdieu’s theory of practice, with its constituent elements and practice that include 
rules and obedience to or defiance of these rules, allows for the theorising of human 
actions and interactions in a space constituted of multiple interrelated fields. 
The following three sections set out habitus, capital and field in more detail. 
3.3.1 Habitus and its relationship to trust 
Habitus is a central concept of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. It should not be confused 




actions in a given situation. Habitus is also wider in scope and requires more sophisticated 
treatment beyond its conception as a mechanical process. Hodgson (2004, pp. 652-3) views 
it as a behavioural propensity or disposition. Once acquired, habit is not necessarily used in 
future events (ibid., p. 652). Habitus is a “an ensemble of schemata of feeling, perception, 
thinking, evaluating, speaking and acting that structures all expressive, verbal, and 
practical manifestations and utterances” (Walther, 2014, pp. 13-14). In this sense, habitus 
is both a classifying structure and a generative structure of practical action (Lizardo, 2004, 
p. 376). It is both ascribed and achieved: in its ascribed form it is attributed to an agent’s 
primary affiliation with family or ethnic ties, whereas in its achieved form it is associated 
with an agent’s engagements in the later stages of life (Walther, 2014, pp. 12-13). This 
section not only views habitus as an agency – as a Bourdieusian notion of habitus demands 
– but it also links it to the notion of trust, which is one of the central components of social 
capital.  
Bourdieu himself has little to say about trust. However, the concept was later 
developed in the literature on trust and social capital (Misztal, 1996; Oliver and O’Reilly, 
2010, pp. 56-57; Frederiksen, 2014; Bildtgård, 2008). This literature can be classified into 
three categories: Misztal’s (1996) seminal work, which treats trust as habitus (see also 
Westwood, 2000); Frederiksen’s (2014) study, which theorises trust as the product of 
habitus; and other authors who simply refer to the connection of trust with habitus 
(Kjærnes, 2006; Oliver and O’Reilly, 2010). It is argued that trust stems from habitus and 
that the latter is a broad concept that encompasses a whole range of tendencies, 
dispositions, beliefs and perceptions, of which trust is one. Misztal’s major work (1996, pp. 
121-145) links trust to reputation, memories (recollection) and institutions. Westwood 
(2000), in her study of Indian diamond traders, shows how trust as habitus is transformed 
with the increasing complexity of the diamond trade, caused by increased competition and 
the entry of opportunists seeking to make their fortunes. This has, she suggests, fractured 
the power structure and restructured the trusting dispositions, reinforcing the significance 
of family and kinship ties that were the lynchpin of the diamond trade, and leading to more 
complex strategies in dealing with strangers. This allows an understanding of the function 
of habitus as a source of making trusting choices between known people and strangers 
(Torche and Valenzuela, 2011; Misztal, 1996, pp. 140-142). 
Westwood (2000) identifies three elements of trust as habitus: “everyday routines, 
stable reputations and tacit memories” (Misztal 1996, p. 102, cited in Westwood, 2000, p. 
865), which contribute to a sense of social order and stability (Luhmann, 2000, p. 95). An 




analytically within organisational and institutional framing (Kjærnes, 2006). This suggests 
how an agent internalises the external world comprised of roles, rules, precedents and 
procedures that structures the ensemble of feelings, perceptions and dispositions towards 
external structures. This internalisation of the external world or “structured structures” 
shapes an agent’s actions, thereby “structuring structures” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
In this sense, the structure of a market and the interactions around it are shaped by the state 
structure or its power to regulate. The choices and preferences of agents are shaped by their 
“practical sense of the game”, and by their ability to play the game and pursue multiple 
interests associated with several fields related to the market (ibid., pp. 117-118; Bourdieu, 
2005). It is precisely this mechanism that not only shapes an agent’s trusting dispositions, 
but also establishes the link between interpersonal and generalised trust (Frederiksen, 
2014). 
Some market sociologists argue that a market is like a home to agents, whose desire 
to maintain stability in the market is the major underlying force (Beamish and Biggart, 
2012; Redmond, 2010). However, this logic of calculative intentions based on market 
stability leaves out those factors that are built into an agent’s pre-objectified habitus. This 
notion of pre-objectified habitus, or what Frederiksen calls familiarity (see also Luhmann, 
2000), along with the acquired habitus, an agent’s place in the game and his sense of the 
game (Bourdieu, 1985), expose the weakness of the unipolar logic of calculative 
computation. Each agent, as Bourdieu (1972, pp. 79-80) argues, is wittingly or unwittingly 
a producer and reproducer of an objective meaning, because his actions are the product of a 
mode of practice over which he has no control beyond a certain limit.  
Practice, as Bidet (1979, p. 204) notes, is an outcome of interaction between 
habitus and event (familiarity or practical sense). Different practices of governance, in 
either the regulatory or societal sphere, are partly predetermined and partly improvised. An 
agent’s actions are determined by her/his disposition vis-à-vis other agents that form the 
scene of the event. Any interaction within the economic field or other fields is shaped by 
the objective structure within which they occur, and they subsequently shape that structure. 
Habitus is the “sense of one’s place within that structure” (Bourdieu, 1972, p. 79). As 
Misztal (1996, p. 142) argues, memories of the past and interaction with the changing 
world allow an agent to make trusting choices by identifying trusting and non-trusting 
others. For this reason, Bourdieu cautions against conceiving habitus as habits (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992, pp. 121-122). It works as a generative principle or the “logic of 
action” which reproduce the structure (Bidet, 1979, p. 204). In this sense, trust is not 




of feelings and perceptions that includes trust, reciprocity, familiarity, confidence and 
many other underlying factors underpinning an agent’s action. 
Thus, habitus is a central concept that locates agency, including ones trusting 
dispositions, in a wider interaction between power (capitals) and field (structures) 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pp. 118-121). Trust is not the sole outcome of an agent’s 
rational decision: instead, it unfolds in specific relationships within which an agent is 
embedded (Frederiksen, 2014, p. 168). As Misztal (1996) argues, an agent’s motives to 
develop trust in his reputation depends on her/his place in the social order, e.g. public 
official, political representative or business owner (ibid., pp. 130-138). This implies that 
trust as a cognitive disposition is shaped in relation to past experience (Frederiksen, 2012; 
Misztal, 1996), the quality of institutions (Rothstein, 2003, 2013; Rothstein and Eek, 
2009), the reputation of the trusting others (Westwood, 2000), and the competence of the 
trusted to realise the expectations of the truster (Blumberg et al., 2015, pp. 93-94). In this 
sense, trust is not a stable disposition but a reflexive process framed within situations and 
relationships within which agents engage each other (Frederiksen, 2014, p. 169). Thus, 
trust as expectation emerges, but is differentiated from the relationship within which a 
person is constituted (Frederiksen, 2012).  
In the final analysis, the present study agrees with Frederiksen (2014, p. 175) who 
defines “trust as a disposition stemming from habitus, but not habitus in itself: the 
generativity of habitus is a driver of the variability and adaptability of trust, but does not 
determine trust”. However, it departs from Frederiksen on his second argument that trust as 
a relational process is separate from generalised trust, in that the latter is static. An agent’s 
dispositions relating to organisational capacity to apply rules, the role of enforcement 
agents relating to the application of formal rules, and the competence of other agents to 
influence formal institutions, structure an agent’s familiarity (Luhmann, 2000) and his 
practical sense (Tacon, 2014), which thus links interpersonal trust to generalised (social) 
and institutional trust (see more broadly Uphoff, 2000, pp. 220-222). Frederiksen (2014, p. 
183) identifies that trust as a relational process is based on familiarity and justification. For 
this reason, he suggests that it should be viewed both as constituted and constitutive. In 
doing so, he argues:  
“We should engage the structural, institutional and biographical elements of trust as 
no more the cause of trust than the situated elements of trust. The impact of history 
and structure on trust in a specific moment is never a given, but unfolds in new and 
unpredictable ways within the situated relationships of emotions, substances 




investigate interpretation and experience as much as conditions and institutions” 
(Frederiksen, 2014, p. 189 and the references therein). 
In this sense, if social space is dissected between known and unknown agents, and 
institutions of various type, then the interlinkages between types of trust, such as 
interpersonal, social and civic (associational and institutional), can be explored. 
Principally, habitus can be used as a “classificatory scheme” to explain these trusting 
dispositions (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 113-114). Various typologies of trust have been 
formulated that have the potential of capturing trust in this broader schema of conception. 
However, the argument here is that trust stemming from habitus is not an entirely 
conscious choice, but rather is an agent’s familiarity with his surroundings and any change 
in these surroundings that structures trusting decisions (Luhmann, 2000). For instance, the 
quality of institutions has implications for the radius of trust (personal or generalised) 
(Delhey, Newton and Welzel, 2011). Similarly, material conditions, or the distribution of 
capital, impact the competence-based trust of agents (Oliver and O’Reilly, 2010; 
Westwood, 2000). It is on these grounds that habitus is designated as a source of trust. 
Habitus serves a classificatory system for making trusting or non-trusting choices based on 
the diachronous (past experience) and synchronous (practical sense) functions of the 
habitus (Frederiksen, 2014; Bildtgård, 2008). An agent’s memories of the past (related to 
the field in which he is situated and other fields), his tendency to draw boundaries for 
identification on the bases of these memories, and routinised behaviour to make trusting 
choices, explain the centrality of habitus to explain trust as a component of SC (Misztal, 
1996, pp. 122, 28, 41-42). 
3.3.2 Capital: Positions and practices 
To explain the practices aimed at the accumulation, use and transformation of SC, the 
notion of capital, as explained by Bourdieu, requires understanding in its entirety. For 
Bourdieu, capital denotes power in both its inherited and institutionalised forms, which 
determines the objective structures and agency within those structures. The central tenet of 
Bourdieu’s philosophy is the concept of capital (Anheier, Gerhards and Romo, 1995). Its 
significance lies in the fact that the “sense of one’s place” (habitus) or the position of an 
actor are determined by the endowment of different forms of capitals. Bourdieu’s (1986) 
theory includes not just economic capital, but other intangible forms such as cultural, 
social and symbolic capital. He further argues that it is impossible to account for social 
structure without bringing the other forms of capital into the analysis. Economic theory 
alone does not account for non-economic actions which are sometimes the cause, and at 




actions which link the economic field to other relative fields, is strengthened or weakened 
by the existence or non-existence of these intangible forms of capitals (Svendsen and 
Svendsen, 2003). 
Capital, as Bourdieu (2002, p. 280) defines it, “is an accumulated labour (in its 
materialised form or its ‘incorporated’ embodied form) which, when appropriated on a 
private i.e. exclusive basis by agents or group of agents, enables them to appropriate social 
energy in the form of reified or living labour”. It is a force that is inscribed in objective and 
subjective structures, but it is also a force underlying “the imminent regularities of the 
social world” (ibid.). It mainly exists in three forms: economic capital (material form), 
cultural capital (objectified, embodied and institutionalised forms), and SC (obligations 
and connections). All of these together form “symbolic capital” which is an important 
factor in shaping and reshaping the habitus of an agent (Bourdieu, 1985, 1986). Calhoun 
(2006) notes that social and symbolic capital are closely interrelated. 
Although these forms of capital are produced in their own fields, they are 
convertible. This inter-convertibility of capitals accounts for the dialectical relationships 
between habitus, field and practice. Social capital, as Bourdieu (1986; 2002, p. 286) 
argues, is never completely independent. Its quality and volume depend on the size of the 
network, and the type and volume of capital possessed by those to whom an agent is 
connected. Thus, an agent may be connected to a large number of agents belonging to the 
same cultural, ethnic or religious group situated in different social fields, but the quality 
and size of his social capital depends on the endowments of different forms of capital 
(Walther, 2014, pp. 14-15). Differentiated endowment of different types of capital 
determine an agent’s capacity to influence the rules of engagement within and across the 
fields (Walther, 2014). 
Against this backdrop, SC is defined as networks through which individuals derive 
profits, both as an individual or a member of a group (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 249-250; 
Christoforou, 2014a, p. 75). Although SC cannot be reduced to economic capital without 
difficulty as Bourdieu (2002, p. 281) argues, change in the distribution of economic capital 
has transformative effects on the other forms of capital, including social capital. This 
relational logic of convertibility explains interdependence and a whole range of exchanges 
that takes place across the social space (Smart, 1993). As Bourdieu (1986, pp. 252-253) 
argues:  
“The different types of capital can be derived from economic capital, but only at 
the cost of a more or less great effort of transformation, which is needed to produce 




goods and services to which economic capital gives immediate access, without 
secondary costs; others can be obtained only by virtue of a social capital of 
relationships (or social obligations) which cannot act instantaneously, at the 
appropriate moment, unless they have been established and maintained for a long 
time, as if for their own sake, and therefore outside their period of use, i.e., at the 
cost of an investment in sociability which is necessarily long-term because the time 
lag is one of the factors of the transmutation of a pure and simple debt into that 
recognition of nonspecific indebtedness which is called gratitude.” 
Defining social capital in this relational framework, Bourdieu brings together the 
group theories of Durkheim and Weber with the theories of reciprocity of Mauss and 
Simmel. In this view, networks form a resource from which their members benefit socially 
and economically (Svendsen, 2001). Nevertheless, Bourdieu defines these networks 
relationally as opposed to the substantivist or structural definitions of Putnam and Coleman 
respectively. Although Bourdieu accords primacy to economic capital, as Calhoun (2006) 
notes, it is not dominant in all fields and its role may in varying degrees be denied or 
misrecognised. 
3.3.3 Field: Networks and power relations 
If habitus denotes agency, and capital is equated with power, a field represents the 
structure of power and the arena for the struggles for acquisition and retention of power. A 
field has, as Bourdieu notes, its own dominant and dominated areas, and the principles of 
its dynamics lie in its structure, especially in the distance and asymmetries between various 
forces that confront one another in that field. The position of actors or entities in a given 
field is determined by the distribution of the forms of capital. Not only the stock of capital 
(amount or volume), but the structure (relative distribution) are significant to determining 
the position of an agent or an entity in the field. For instance, firms of similar size within a 
given field may vary in their stocks of economic and cultural capital, and hence their 
capacity to act and influence the field (or dominate the game) will also vary (Hanappi, 
2014; Eloire, 2014). This power asymmetry shapes an agent’s speech and actions within 
that field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 101). A field is a site of capital production 
specific to that field (economic, cultural, political etc.). It has no visible boundaries, but the 
boundaries lie where the effects of power specific to a field cease. In this sense, a multitude 
of fields forms a social order, and each field has its own form of capital over which agents 
try to achieve their mastery. These fields, however, do not operate in isolation, and power 




field may bring esteem and status that has currency for the social field (Kluttz and 
Fligstein, 2016). 
Local governance structure consists of several fields, each with its own rules and 
struggles (Steinmetz, 2008). To understand social space as constellation of fields, as 
opposed to system theories, certain features of the field are pertinent. Firstly, a field is not 
a deliberate creation, and unlike games, it does not have codified or explicit rules. It is 
governed by rules and regularities that are uncodified and not explicit (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). Secondly, agents are not merely particles that are pushed and 
pulled by the forces active in the field, but rather they are the bearers of capital which 
allow them to exercise agency and shape the structure of that field (ibid., 1992, pp. 108-
109). Thirdly, a field is influenced not only by its internal struggles, but also by the forces 
external to it, by its relationship to other fields of power. Fourthly, this provides for a 
relational understanding of the networks of relationships within and across fields. 
Characterising local governance structure as a field is problematic, owing to explicit state 
regulations for market governance and the relationship between the elected and 
bureaucratic spheres of governance. However, an infinite number of exchanges across 
these spheres are underpinned by local structures which often run counter to the logic of 
written regulations for governing. Here, the limits of the state’s ability to turn every person 
into a law-abiding person is exposed, and the generativity of the actions of state officials 
explains the deviation from the universal rules. 
For the present study, this is the point of departure from the state-building school 
that advocates a universalising logic of effective state institutions to all governance 
challenges. This position is argued on the basis of two central grounds. Firstly, a state is a 
set of institutions (public sector) which exist in the local field along with societal 
institutions (Eriksen, 2017). Secondly, a state’s effectiveness or ineffectiveness reside in 
the subjectivities of citizens, who are active players in local governance regardless of 
whether they are included or not (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 67). Thus, the capacity of state 
institutions to deliver services, regulate effectively and reach all sections of society has 
significant impact on citizens’ dispositions and their civic or “uncivic” actions (Wacquant, 
1998). States possess, undoubtedly, monopolies over policy-making, distribution of 
resources, and physical and symbolic violence. However, dichotomies between the policies 
of the central state for service provision and the implementation of regulations, and the 
reality of state power at local level, reinforces the stance of viewing the state as a field of 
power vis-à-vis other fields (Filčák, Szilvasi and Škobla, 2018). Unregulated connections 




officials, social networks of citizens, and group loyalties, all underpin the inability of 
bureaucratic officials to pursue state policies in the developing world (Migdal, 1988, cited 
in Goodwin, 1991, pp. 218-219; Eriksen, 2017). Although Steinmetz (2008) argues that 
internal struggles among actors who constitute the state as a field of power account for 
why governing strategies vary at local level, these struggles also cause the alignment of 
interests among state and non-state actors, which accounts for variance in central state 
policies and local governance arrangements. 
As Bourdieu argues, the real is the relational, noting:  
“What exists in the social world is the relations, not interactions among agents or 
intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist 
independently of individual consciousness and, as Marx said, a field may be 
defined as a network, or a configuration of relationships between positions. These 
positions are objectively defined in their existence and in their determination, they 
impose on their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential 
situations (situs) and in the structure of distribution of various species of powers 
(capitals) whose possession commands access to specific profits that are at stake in 
the field, as well as by their objective relationship to other positions (domination, 
subordination, homology, etc.)” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).  
To summarise, a field is a critical mediation between the habitus and capital 
(power), and each form of capital is relevant to the field in question. At each moment, it is 
the state of the relationship of force between the players within the field that defines its 
structure and operation (ibid., pp. 99-100). Put simply, the structure of the field allows 
agents to frame their actions taking into consideration the actions of others (Kluttz and 
Fligstein, 2016). In order to guard against structuralist determinism, fields should not be 
construed as static (Lizardo, 2004, pp. 394-395). 
The interaction between formal and informal institutions, and the cooperation and 
conflict between actors within and across these fields, can be conceptualised in a space that 
Bourdieu (2005) calls a “local field”. Broadly, this study divides local governance structure 
(local field) into three primary fields: state, market (economy) and political. These three 
fields in turn have their own subfields, which are linked to each other through habitus and 
capital. Networks of relationships (social capital) connect these fields through the nexus of 
habitus and capital, allowing agents to accrue benefits from these networks that are the 
domain of a specific field. The state is, in this configuration, a dominant field because of 




holder of all sorts of capitals: economic, military, political and symbolic. With this power, 
it shapes the cognitive structures of those inhabiting its sphere of control (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992, p,100). However, its inability to turn subjects into citizens, or to ensure 
the rule of law, signifies the impact of its strength and weakness on the habitus of agents, 
and the role of habitus in structuring the local field through the use of agents’ networks 
(Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994; Bourdieu, 2005). This has also implications for 
citizens’ trust in state institutions. As Misztal (1996) notes, the state offers a wider social 
context for explaining the structure and functions of trust. For instance, “not being able to 
trust the state, people would not trust one another and would limit their obligation to their 
families” (Misztal, 1996, p. 138). The notion of fields, and the capitals specific to these 
fields, allows an opportunity to situate social capital as a theoretical link not only between 
state, market and society, but also between different levels of governance. 
In sum, the notion of fields not only accounts for the interaction between structure 
and agency (distribution of capitals and habitus), but also allows for an understanding of 
the relationship of dependence and interdependence between fields. Although Fligstein and 
McAdam (2016) criticise Bourdieu for not developing a fuller account of “field-to-field 
linkages”, the author of the present study argues that the interrelationship between fields, 
and the effect that change in one has on another, is provided by field-related concepts such 
as habitus and capital, and specifically social capital. For instance, Wacquant (1998, pp. 
28-29) shows how the failure of state functions as a field of power resulted in the 
development of negative social capital in ghettos in the USA. This was mainly due to the 
unequal distribution of cultural and symbolic capital by the state, leading the marginalised 
groups to adopt an alternative path that resulted in the increase of crime and violence in 
African-American neighbourhoods. This embeddedness of fields has implications for the 
structure and functions of social capital (Westwood, 2000; Gowan, 2010; Eloire, 2014). It 
suggests that all the fields are interconnected to varying degrees, and there is a complex 
pattern of interdependence between these fields. Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012, p. 9) 
metaphor of throwing a stone into a still pond that causes ripples in all the proximate fields 
gives the closest approximation of the interdependence between fields. In a similar vein, 
Bourdieusian field theory, with its notions of habitus and capitals, offers an explanation of 
how change in one field causes changes in others (see more generally Wacquant, 2015). 
 This change is also reflected in the changing configuration of social capital which 
Fligstein and McAdam seem to have missed (Calhoun, 2006, 2010; Christoforou, 2014a). 




for the current study, situating social capital generated by a marketplace as a critical link 
between the marketplace and local governance.  
3.4 Field and embeddedness: Marketplace-local governance interaction through 
social capital 
While exploring the theoretical links between Bourdieu’s field theory and the 
embeddedness tradition (an important placeholder in SC theory), this section argues that 
the framing concept of embeddedness within Bourdieu’s field theory has certain merits 
over existing embeddedness traditions (Polanyi, 1944 [2001]; Granovetter, 1985). It avoids 
both the structural determinism of Granovetter’s embeddedness approach, and the 
economic reductionism in the SC embeddedness tradition characteristic of institutionalist 
approaches and Coleman’s rational choice tradition. This is significant for explaining state-
society synergy through marketplace-state interaction. Contrary to structuralist notions of 
SC (Burt, 2000; Lin, 2008) which overlook the role of state institutions in the formation of 
SC (Woolcock, 2001), Bourdieu’s notion of field is closer to Polanyi’s embeddedness 
tradition, which reinforces the contextual nature of SC by placing state institutions as an 
important contextual element. Finally, by conceptualising the marketplace as a field within 
the embeddedness framework outlined in this section, cooperation and conflict between the 
marketplace as a generator of SC and the state as a regulator and service provider are better 
explored. 
The SC literature, following on from the embeddedness literature, has attempted to 
connect these interrelated fields (Christoforou, 2013). For instance, Woolcock (1998, 
2001) describes social capital as “embeddedness” and “autonomy”. Woolcock defines 
embeddedness at the micro-level as intra-community ties that help individuals to cooperate 
to realise collective goals (bonding social capital), while autonomy refers to inter-
community ties that prevent subordination to dominant group or classes (Granovetter’s 
propositions regarding the density of networks and strength of weak ties). Similarly, 
embeddedness at the macro-level refers to those ties that cross the public-private divide 
(linking social capital), whereby autonomy is realised through improvements in 
institutional capacity and credibility. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) call this 
simultaneously embedded and autonomous view of social capital a synergistic view, which 
combines network and institutional approaches to social capital. The problem with this 
approach to social capital is its reliance on Granovetter’s conception of network,18 and the 
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institutionalist approaches by North (1990) and Knack and Keefer (1997), which rely on 
individualism and overlook the impacts of contextual factors, especially power and conflict 
(Christoforou, 2013).  
Other extensive treatments of embeddedness in the SC literature (Streeck, 1998; 
Evans, 1997) do not go into detail on the structure-agency relationships which configure 
and reconfigure economic actions and related social structures within their specific 
institutional context (see Section 2.4). While commenting on this literature, Christoforou 
(2013) argues that such interactions (between structure and agency) are embedded in the 
institutional environment, which is characterised by various and often conflicting social 
spheres. To follow Polanyi (1944 [2001], p. 48), the institutional context is determined by 
certain forms of social organisations and integration: exchanges performed in the market; 
redistribution of resources by the state; and reciprocity associated with voluntary 
organisations. Critics may argue against such framing of social capital in Bourdieusian 
field theory, considering at this point Baker and Faulkner’s (2009, pp. 1,533-1,534) notion 
of double embeddedness with Coleman's macro-micro-macro logic of economic actions. 
Undoubtedly, their approach has the potential to address contextual factors in explaining 
individual actions. However, their explicit exclusion of cognitive and political 
embeddedness leads to the neglect of state institutions (present author’s emphasis). 
Institutional embeddedness is one of the crucial determinants in contextualising 
marketplace social capital and its implications for local governance system (Bourdieu, 
2005).  
At this point, Bourdieu can be drawn closer to Polanyi for constructing a meso-
level explanation of state-society-economy relations. Polanyi argues on the one hand that 
the economy is institutionally embedded, and on the other that “the working of the 
economic system not only influences the [society] but actually determines it” (Polanyi, 
1977, p. 12, cited in Maucourant and Plociniczak, 2013, p. 518). While Bourdieu (1987) 
reduces all other forms of capital to economic power, he regards the state as a meta-field in 
which all the other forms of power are embedded. Markets, in whatever form, are regulated 
by the state, though there may be variations in how universal rules for their governance are 
determined by the state and how their implementation at local level is carried out (Khan, 
2017a). Polanyi (1944 [2001], p. 56) and Bourdieu (2005) broadly agree over the role of 
state in governing economic activities. For instance, for Bourdieu (2005, pp. 12-13), the 
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state is the legitimate holder of authority in the imposition of taxes, regulating the housing 
market, allowing the flow of capital through the central bank, regulating prices and many 
other aspects of economic life, e.g. labour contracts, etc. In summary, the economy is, for 
Bourdieu, one of the fields where the monopolisation of the universal (state) applies 
(Paolucci, 2014). Paolucci further notes that the state considers regulating these practices 
for two reasons: legitimation of itself, and reproduction of a stable social order.  
However, Bourdieu’s conception of the state as a field of power is subject to 
serious criticism. Firstly, his notion is totalising and is simply inapplicable outside the 
French governance system, or at least cannot be applied anywhere else in Europe (Arnholtz 
and Hammerslev, 2013, p. 45; A. Scott, 2013, p.67; Schinkel, 2015, pp. 227-229). 
Secondly, Bourdieu’s totalising, “top-down” conception of the state undermines any 
attempt to construct an appropriate historical sociology of the state (Riley, 2015). All the 
literature in this area, with the exception of Schinkel (2015), implicitly suggests that the 
state is the only field which is disembedded, and that the dispossessed are not part of this 
field. For the present research, the author argues that Bourdieu has offered a strong basis 
for conceptualising change from below and for how changing the habitus of agents allows 
them to participate in the broader field that is the state; and further argues that Bourdieu’s 
(2005) conception of the local state is not as totalising, a point which the criticism of him 
fails to appreciate. 
Bourdieu, in fact, discusses two conceptions of the state as a field. In the first, the 
state is a set of governmental institutions; in the second, it comprises all the citizens within 
its jurisdiction. It is the ultimate centre of power because the state as a field holds the 
maximum powers, but, as Bourdieu argues, a field is divided into various subfields, and in 
the case of the state, the political field enables citizens to influence the power of the state 
and in some instances curtail it. This theoretical position is especially relevant in the case 
of markets embedded in local governance arrangements, which forces state officials to 
grant exceptions in the application of universal rules (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 122-123). It is 
this power of the other fields, exercised in the informal (private) realm, which accounts for 
the weakness of modern-day developing states.  
Despite the limitations, framing the embeddedness of economic, political and social 
actions in Bourdieu’s field theory in order to explain the interrelationship between SC and 
governance has three advantages from the vantage point of the author of the present study. 
Firstly, it allows for the measurement of ability of formal institutions to perform their role 
in the development of social capital (Wacquant, 1998). Secondly, it provides for the 




as a site of struggle for various forms of capital, the Bourdieusian conception allows for 
understanding power, conflict and the SC’s role these struggles over several forms of 
capital. Finally, this Bourdieusian perspective sees interactions among agents as relational, 
thus explaining how embedded actors take others into consideration while performing any 
action (Wacquant, 2011, 2015). For the purpose of the present study, it provides for 
conceptualising social capital’s role in the contexts characterised by weak or strong states. 
The state thus offers an essential supporting infrastructure for the development of 
community stocks of SC, whereas social relationships that link different spheres of 
governance facilitate or impair the state’s capacity to govern effectively. Emphasising the 
significance of the synergy perspective, Woolcock (2001) rightly points towards the 
limiting impact of thinking about state and society as binaries, arguing that both are needed 
to achieve positive outcomes. Therefore, the nature and extent of social relationships 
(bonding and bridging) in a community, and their interactions with formal institutions, 
need to be identified. This is important to develop institutional strategies based on the 
understanding of social relationships, particularly the stocks of bonding or bridging 
networks in a society or a community; and to take up the task of transforming situations 
where community SC has been substituted for weak, hostile or indifferent formal 
institutions into a situation in which both realms (state and social) complement one another 
(Evans, 1997, p. 1,127; Harriss, 2001, pp. 71-3). For this purpose, three distinct but 
interrelated spaces constitute the field of local governance. These spaces include closed 
(bureaucratic), invited (provided by formal institutions), and claimed/created spaces 
(created by socioeconomic mechanisms) (Gaventa, 2006, p. 26). Social capital lies at the 
intersection of these spaces, and expanding the division of labour due to socioeconomic 
change shapes agents’ propensity to reach out across their own group boundaries while 
simultaneously identifying with their own group identity (or fields) (Simmel, 1971 [1908], 
pp. 253-255], cited in Woolcock, 1998, Note 83). The question here, is then, how SC forms 
a critical link between marketplaces and local governance. 
3.4.1 Social capital: A critical link between the marketplace and local governance 
This section situates SC as a critical link between the marketplace and local governance in 
the relational framework developed in the preceding sections. Two key premises underpin 
this relationship. Firstly, the state is not the generator of SC; instead, it offers an essential 
context for the generation and operation of SC (Pisani et al., 2017; Górriz-Mifsud et al., 
2016). Secondly, marketplaces and their interactions with local government are embedded 
within the local social order, which is characterised by conflict of interest and unequal 




governance therefore requires a shift away from regarding marketplaces as traditional 
public spaces in the generation of SC (Watson, 2009). This is mainly because, if one 
wishes to understand marketplace-local governance interaction from the perspective of SC, 
a dialectical approach helps to understand the “bi-directionality” in the social capital-local 
governance cause-effect relationship (Teles, 2012a; Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2016). It is 
argued that institutional reforms open up the space for participation, whereas the 
socioeconomic dispositions of individuals and groups shape their capacity to influence the 
governance process (Pisani et al., 2017; Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2016; Roy, 2008, p.681).  
In terms of the SC-governance relationship, the statist and non-statist perspectives 
are diametrically opposed (Borzaga and Sforzi, 2014). Statists argue that the state plays an 
important role in the construction of social capital (Petro, 2001; Lowndes and Wilson, 
2001). whereas non-statists view stocks of social capital as a major determinant of the 
performance of state institutions (Putnam, 1993). In this vein, some take an extreme 
position, arguing that, if SC is generated by the state, by definition it is not SC (Lehning, 
1998, p. 242). Coleman (1990, p. 321) views the relationship between state-sponsored 
activities and SC within zero-sum dynamics. He argues that a “state’s involvement leads to 
atrophy of informal networks, diminishing social capital” (cited in Evans, 1997, p. 2). 
Doubtless, institutional change may provide a context for the destruction of SC by 
favouring the dominant (Levien, 2015), but context matters in determining its role in 
governance processes (Wallis and Dollery, 2002). Similarly, the statists incorrectly argue 
that the state alone can shape local institutions for the generation of social capital (Petro, 
2001). As observed in Section 2.3.2 of the present study, the state’s power is often 
curtailed by local social structures (Cronin, 1996). Therefore, as Harriss (2001, p. 28) 
argues, political conditions and institutional performance are influenced by a society’s 
stocks of SC, but without the agency of state, it is unlikely to develop the context in which 
people can realise the potentialities of their SC. This SC-local governance literature has 
captured state-society relations from multiple perspectives (Schulman and Anderson, 1999; 
Teles, 2012a; Pisani et al., 2017; Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2016). 
For local governance, two points are central to exploring this relationship. Firstly, 
instead of viewing decentralised local government as an active player in the construction of 
social capital, it needs to be viewed as a facilitator of the development of social capital 
(regardless of its “dark” or “bright” sides). Secondly, instead of uni-directional “bottom-
up” (Putnam 1995) or “top-down” approaches (Warner, 1999; Maloney, Smith and Stoker, 
2000) to the generation of SC, a state-society synergy perspective best captures the 




community (Evans, 1997; Woolcock, 2001). This perspective not only captures the 
combination of embeddedness and complementarities between state institutions and social 
capital embedded within community relationships, it also links multiple levels and spheres 
of governance (Evans, 1997). While observing the dialectical relationship between state 
and community social capital, Harriss (2001, p. 8) argues: “The energy for change lies in 
the community but has to be broadened by a broader set of ideas and organisation. External 
linkages, which may operate through NGOs, political parties, local organisations and even 
individual social relationships with a basis outside the community, play an essential role in 
enabling communities to become effective agents of liveability.” In this connection Evans 
(1997) and Heller (1997) show that realising the potential of a community’s social capital 
depends on its relationships with other agents, among which state and political actors are 
the primary ones. 
This synergy perspective contrasts two views (endowment and constructability) on 
SC generation and its implications for local governance. The underlying assumption of the 
endowment perspective is that state-society relations are determined by pre-existing stocks 
of SC. Civic associations contribute to effective state institutions, which, in turn provide 
environment for the development of SC (Putnam, 1993). The endowment of social capital 
limits the possibility of change in the short-run. Conversely, the constructability view does 
not subscribe to the assumption regarding pre-existing stocks of social capital, and instead 
holds that the introduction of institutional changes and new organisational structures may 
create state-society synergy that produces positive social capital (Evans, 1997, pp. 6-7). 
Evans (ibid., pp. 7-8) argues that both effective state institutions and egalitarian social 
structures are essential conditions for the development of productive state-society relations. 
However, these conditions are often absent in the developing world, making state-society 
synergy difficult (ibid., pp. 7, 203-204). Nevertheless, Evans (ibid., p. 177) argues that 
even in the most adverse conditions characteristic of the developing world, synergy is 
constructible. In situations where state institutions provide support for emerging 
expressions of SC for this reason, Evans argues that the endowment of social capital is a 
lesser constraint to the development of synergy. The limit lies not in the absence of the 
density of networks and trusted ties at the micro-level, but in the ability of the state to 
scale-up micro-level SC to the level that is politically and economically efficacious. Thus, 
social capital at micro-level exists in every society, but the most obvious “missing 
ingredient” to synergy is a set of competent and engaged set of public institutions (ibid., p. 
192). 




that shapes opportunities for action, and historic and current human and natural resources 
(Pisani et al., 2017, p. X). The major challenge lies in constructing SC in areas where it is 
historically weak (ibid., p. IX). The outcomes of SC for local governance are the function 
of both the political system and social structures, depending on the context. Robust state 
institutions are a prerequisite for constructing SC (Warner, 1999, 2001). Poor institutional 
design not only limits the possibilities for the creation of social capital, but also reinforces 
existing inequalities and results in the generation of negative social capital (Wacquant, 
1998). However, the empirical literature demonstrates that power relations and social 
stratification often frustrate well-intentioned institutional design aimed at the construction 
of SC. Cento Bull and Jones (2006, p. 77), in their comparative study of urban regeneration 
in Bristol and Naples, conclude that, despite the intentions of institutional designers to 
enhance local participation, some powerful actors curtailed the power of local government 
to implement policies aimed at inclusion. There are instances of successful government 
efforts to reach out to different social groups to increase participation and inclusion (Petro, 
2001; Heller, 1997). However, much of the public policy literature on SC and local 
governance attributes the failure of the state in this connection to unequal power structures 
and patronage politics (Teles, 2012a; Méndez-Lemus et al., 2017; Filčák et al., 2018). 
Therefore, it is argued, economic change leads to power-dependence relationships 
among agents located across various spheres of governance. The introduction of 
institutional reforms in a context facing endogenous economic transformation may have 
different outcomes for political structures (Watson, 2009; Lin, 2008; Ahmed, 1981, more 
generally). Perhaps for this reason, Hussain (2008) views the development of local 
enterprises as one of the key development strategies for the empowerment of the poor. The 
literature on marketplaces in Pakistan has started exploring their empowerment potential 
and the implications of this political inclusion (Javed, 2017; Khan, 2017b; Jan, 2014). This 
literature has yet to explore their integrative potential in the broader political structure. 
This potential, as Section 2.4 of the current study has suggested, extends to the areas of 
participation, the implementation of regulations and the provision of social welfare.  
Marketplaces evolve as governance spaces, or fields of power, in their respective 
governance structures. This evolution results in the formation of political, social and 
economic connections that extend into formal governance processes. The evolving power 
of marketplace, and the SC that marketplaces generate, create incentives for actors and 
organisations that constitute local governance structure. This embedded evolution of 
marketplaces explains their role in generating individual and associational SC, and the 




and social welfare provision. As argued in Section 2.4 of the present study, this role 
depends on the type, governance and setting of the marketplace. Depending on the context 
and situation, the SC generated by marketplaces may be an opportunity (Morales, 2009) or 
challenge for formal governance (Polese et al., 2017). It may be a proactive response to 
formal institutional fragility (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002), or a reaction against policy 
implementation (Mehta and Gohil, 2013). In any event, it is clear that SC forms a critical 
link in the marketplace-local governance interaction.  
In sum, the causality between social capital and good governance is complex 
(Cusack, 1999, p. 8). Similarly, the state is unable to construct social capital through 
deliberate policies if it fails to consider local power structures and the forms of social 
capital operating within a region. In this sense, state institutions offer a context for the 
generation, operation and restructuring of SC, but are ill-suited to the generation of SC 
(Fukuyama, 2001). New governance approaches that focus on economic development and 
promoting inclusion have generated much ambiguity. Within this governance paradigm, 
instead of promoting inclusion, the state has reinforced the SC of the powerful actors and 
groups in the community (McDougall and Banjade, 2015; Cento Bull and Jones, 2006, p. 
770). This suggests that state policies and their implementation are influenced by the 
structure of SC at the local level. The effectiveness or otherwise of state institutions has 
implications for the structural and cognitive dimensions of SC, which in turn have 
implications for the operation and effectiveness of formal institutions (Newton, 2001; 
Hsung et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is clear that the processes of policy or rule 
implementation clarify the dialectical relationship between SC and local government 
(Harriss, 2001, p.31) 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed a relational framework to understand the role of social capital 
in the interaction between the marketplace and local governance. The source of SC lies 
neither in the state, nor purely in societal institutions: it is an emergent property of the 
dynamic interaction between fields of power in the formal and informal realms of 
governance. Framing social capital, marketplace and local governance structure in the 
nexus of habitus, capital and field requires binaries such as formal and informal, individual 
and associational, structure and agency to be transcended. This means that in the dialectical 
interaction between marketplace and local governance structure, the state is neither the 
cause nor the outcome of SC, but is an important determinant in its formation and 




This dynamic governance structure is characterised by power and conflict which structure 
the alignment or misalignment of interests within and across the fields of power.  
In this context, the capacity of an agent or group to use SC for both individual or 
collective ends is shaped by a multitude of factors. Key among these factors are the 
capacity of state institutions to govern, equitable access to state institutions, the distribution 
of economic and social resources between individuals and groups, and the ability of 
individuals or communities to mobilise SC for individual or collective action. The 
influence of these factors also suggests that the sheer existence of associational networks 
or individual subjectivities (other regarding interests) is insufficient to understand the use 
and outcomes of SC unless these are understood as a function of individual relationships to 
various structures. This means that local governance structure, and the relationships 
between individuals and groups within that structure, determine how norms of cooperation 
such as trust and reciprocity operate. 
 This context-dependent approach to SC has major theoretical and methodological 
implications for the role of SC in the dynamics of local governance (Foley and Edwards, 
1999). Firstly, it demonstrates that the relationship between individual and associational 
SC is not necessarily zero-sum, and context matters. Secondly, it highlights that 
institutional measures to develop SC are significant insofar as the levels of socioeconomic 
inequalities are manageable. The efficacy of collective actions may significantly increase 
with the restructuring of economic life, as Schulman and Anderson (1999) demonstrate. 
Such a restructuring may result in the emergence of constructed forms of organisations 
such as networks and associations, as opposed to primordial ties (kinship, caste, 
geographic, etc.). This suggests that stocks of SC are not impervious to change. Thus, 
social capital can be viewed as a dependent variable affected by the dynamic 
interrelationship between the fields of power including bureaucratic, political and 
economic. Networks of relationships, the alignment of objectives, and power are key 
mechanisms that generate cooperation or friction within and across these fields. At this 
point, networks and their ability to serve as SC for their members should be located in the 
broader context, where the position of a network is an important determinant of its capacity 
to generate benefits for its members and to influence various governance processes (Foley 
and Edwards, 1999, p. 166). In this way, networks as a micro-foundation of SC can be 





Chapter 4 - Methodology and research design 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research design for this study. As noted earlier, SC is a 
multifaceted, context-dependent and emergent phenomenon: it requires a relational 
framework. This means that a more complex, process-based, multi-method qualitative 
research design is required for an in-depth exploration. A qualitative, interactive design 
following Maxwell (2012) was therefore developed.19 Keeping in view the critical realism 
(CR) position, the research design was sequential and theory-laden, which iterated back 
and forth between theory and empirics through to the final stage of data analysis. 
Using a qualitative approach to investigate SC and local governance requires, among 
other things, identifying the types of networks that exist in the community, the location of 
networks in the various spheres of governance, the role of these networks in various 
governance processes, and their aggregate impact on local governance structure (Dudwick, 
Kuehnast, Jones and Woolcock, 2006; Svendsen, 2006). This chapter eschews mainstream 
methodological approaches to investigate SC, mainly because of their representation of SC 
as a universal phenomenon, their insensitivity to place and space, and their emphasis on 
productive outcomes associated with formal networks (Svendsen, 2006, pp. 41-42). Social 
networks and their functions are the product of historicity of political, social and material 
processes. This does not suggest that purely phenomenological approaches to the study of 
social networks should be adopted. Instead, a relational framework that combines both 
structural and phenomenological elements is required (Devine and Roberts, 2003). This 
relational approach was preferred over social network analysis because the latter was unfit 
for purpose (see note 17 and Section 3.4 of this thesis). The present study focuses on both 
individual and associational networks and the way their interrelationship generates 
externalities for governance.  
The underlying assumptions of this research design are outlined in Section 4.2. In 
Section 4.3, the research questions outlined in Section 1.3 are translated into specific 
topical and empirical questions. Section 4.4 presents the conceptual framework drawn 
from the review of literature in Chapters 2 and 3. Section 4.5 discusses why a case study 
method is appropriate for the research, before Section 4.6 explains the two-fold process of 
                                                          
19 The complexity of interactions across fields, deciphering multiple-nested networks and their overlapping 
operations, the sensitivity of some of the subjects covered, and the scarcity of data on bazaars, local 





case-selection and the units of analysis within the case study site. Section 4.7 then explains 
how the scope of the study was determined, and the exploratory research that was 
undertaken. Section 4.8 outlines the two stages of data collection, as well as explaining the 
issue of gaining access to the site and issues raised in conducting interviews. Section 4.9 
outlines the data analysis methods used, while Section 4.10 discusses validity and relevant 
ethical considerations guiding the data collection, analysis and presentation. Finally, 
Section 4.11 offers a reflexive account of the researcher’s positionality and the ways in 
which this shaped various decisions related to the research design.  
4.2 Philosophical assumptions underlying the research design 
Critical realism is a layered ontology comprising three domains: real, actual and empirical. 
In other words, it links the ontological, epistemological and methodological underpinnings 
of this (or any CR) research. The domain of the “real” includes objects and structures with 
causal powers and liabilities that cause mechanisms which may not be visible (Zachariadis, 
Scott and Barrett, 2013, p. 856; Maxwell, 2004). Lawson (1998, p. 21) argues that a 
mechanism is the pattern of acting or working of a structured thing. These structured things 
(either objects or social processes) hold causal power when they are called into action. 
They work as generative mechanisms to determine the actual phenomenon of the external 
world. They are not persistently or empirically observable, but their potentiality still exists 
and therefore they demand careful consideration. The “actual”, meanwhile, is a sub-set of 
the real, and includes the events which have resulted from both exercised and unexercised 
mechanisms. “Empirical” refers to a sub-category of observable, experienced events of 
change (Zachariadis et al., 2013 p. 856). These stratified domains of CR allow the 
researcher to adopt a different mode of inference by identifying and explaining 
mechanisms (powers and liabilities) that are capable of producing the events (Sayer, 1992, 
p. 107). Table 4.1 outlines the stratified domains of CR ontology to show their mutual 
interrelation. 
Table 4.1: Stratified domain of CR ontology 
Real Actual Empirical 
Structures, powers and 
liabilities 
Generative mechanisms 
(interrelationship of structures 
and powers, and processes)  
Events, situations and actions 
(manifestation of the actual) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Fletcher (2016) and Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen and 
Karlsson (2002) 
Instead of seeking a linear cause-effect relationship, the focus of realist research is 




specific situation. As realists believe, there are few A-to-B causalities, and the real world is 
structured by a relationship of multiple causal powers that shapes human actions within a 
given context (Sobh and Perry, 2006, p. 1,199). For that matter, temporality (period), 
spatiality (place), agency (people) and process together have a combined effect on various 
causal processes. The knowledge produced by a researcher is contingent to his field 
experiences that allows him to confirm, modify or reject his specific worldview. In this 
sense, any research only uncovers fragments of reality. The focus is not merely on 
observable reality in the empirical domain, but on an explanation of what produces a 
specific outcome in a specific context (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014, p. 35). This suggests 
that the levels of reality in the stratified ontological framework of CR are integrally linked 
to each other (Fletcher, 2016). As Sobh and Perry (2006, p. 1,200) argue, because of this 
complexity of reality, a positivist method like surveys is unlikely to offer an understanding 
of the “deeper reality” and therefore should not be a major component of any CR research 
design (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014, p. 35). 
Recognising this complexity of the layered world calls for SC to be investigated 
using qualitative methods, and also points towards the inadequacy of variance-based 
research design (Holt, 2008; Svendsen and Svendsen, 2006; Gowan, 2010; Tacon, 2014). 
In addition, a review of the business management literature suggests that research 
combining the structural, cognitive and relational dimensions of SC in an overarching 
framework tend to rely on qualitative in-depth interviews and interpretative data analysis 
methods (Lee, 2009, p. 259-63). Three particular factors are central to indicating that 
qualitative methods are appropriate for the present study. Firstly, unlike quantitative 
measurements, ethnographic accounts show that associations of a similar type with similar 
objectives in a similar context produce markedly different outcomes (Eastis, 1998). 
Secondly, understanding the impacts of the levels of generalised trust on agents’ trusting 
dispositions cannot be captured by world value survey questions, due to cultural 
differences and varying understandings of the survey measures (Delhey et al., 2011); while 
network analysis, based on cross-sectional surveys, also fails to document the influence of 
power on agents’ trusting dispositions within and across networks (Lee, 2009, p. 264). 
Thirdly, a researcher’s ontological position, theoretical commitments and subjective biases 
affect the way in which SC is conceptualised and investigated (Devine and Roberts, 2003), 
whether it is viewed as a resource (Putnam, 1995), an access to a resource (Lin, 2008; Burt, 
2000), a cause (network perspective) (Lee, 2009), or a consequence of enabling or 




 In the literature on social capital and local governance, these diametrically opposed 
positions are often evident, as Section 3.4 suggests. Both the context and the role of agency 
in the formation and outcomes of SC are important, but are often neglected in network and 
institutional traditions using quantitative measures (Lee, 2009). The cause of this neglect 
lies in the tendency to attribute to networks universal qualities emptied of their place-based 
complexities (Holt, 2008, pp. 228, 230). Social networks and actors constituting these 
networks also have a history, which accounts for the intricacies involved in the formation 
of SC and the specific outcomes produced by it (Devine and Roberts, 2003, pp. 94-95). 
Bourdieu’s approach to SC, unlike mainstream approaches, offers a better contextual 
understanding of its role (Foley and Edwards, 1999, p. 145). For Bourdieu (1986, p. 249), 
SC is not merely a matter of networks of durable relationships that provide their members 
with the backing of collectivity, but it is also linked clearly to other forms of capital that 
indicate an agent’s ability to benefit from social resources (ibid., p. 253). Unlike other 
network scholars who follow Coleman’s rational choice model, Bourdieu emphasises the 
temporality of experiences that shape human agency, which then reflexively interact with 
existing structures (Christoforou, 2013; Tacon, 2014, p. 240). Therefore, the existence or 
absence of membership-based associations or density of networks, in the absence of the 
data needed for multiple levels of abstractions, do not sufficiently account for the 
complexity of the layered world and the contribution of each layer in forming the whole 
(Devine and Roberts, 2003, p. 96). 
Three principles of critical realism are central to the present research. Firstly, reality 
is theory-driven but not theory-determined (Fletcher, 2016). This implies that the mode of 
inquiry is neither purely inductive nor deductive: instead obduction and retroduction define 
the relationship between the theoretical framework and empirical research. Furthermore, 
the inquiry is process-orientated rather than variable-orientated, which means it places 
emphasis on providing detailed explanations of which mechanisms generate certain kinds 
of events. In this sense, it goes beyond the cause-effect relationship of observable patterns 
and events, and explores underlying structures and mechanisms that produce regularities in 
the observable patterns of relationships (Maxwell, 2004). And finally, reality exists, which 
is understood objectively through the experiences of the research participants. This implies 
that a problem theorised within a specific framework is approached through the 
experiences of the research participants, rather than imposing theory on their articulation of 
that problem (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 161). Nevertheless, the researcher plays an 
active role by triangulating data generated from multiple sources to make more accurate 




Unlike grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1994), in CR 
research, the preconceived notions of the researcher, based on the understanding of the 
literature, perform an important role in the data collection and analysis (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997, pp. 159-162). This is because researchers with different backgrounds have 
approached social capital in different ways, and have uncovered “aspects of reality” 
(Maxwell, 2004; Devine and Roberts, 2003). However, the present research treats these 
theories as just initial theories, or what Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 17) call preliminary 
conceptual frameworks developed before entering the field. These theoretical frameworks 
are readjusted, redefined or updated after their interaction with the empirical research. In 
this sense, the research design developed is “interactive” rather than purely deductive as 
would be the case in positivist research, or inductive as with interpretive research 
(Maxwell, 2012, pp. 48-53, 88-90, 106-108). Chapter 9, in which the empirical findings are 
reconnected to the initial theoretical framework in Chapter 3, demonstrates this CR stance.  
Disenchantment with cross-sectional and survey/polls methods leads SC scholars to 
believe in the efficacy of multi-method (not necessarily mixed) research (Van Deth, 
Maraffi, Newton and Whiteley, 1999; Devine and Roberts, 2003). Reality is fragmented, 
and is only partially known by the researcher. Thus, the mode of analysis used to analyse 
that reality is retroduction. In this mode of analysis, the researcher is aware of the values, 
beliefs and other structural influences on the views of research participants. To understand 
the influence of those causal powers and create an accurate description of the reality, 
multiple methods are employed for data collection, which are then triangulated to confirm, 
refute or modify any parts of the theory that was originally proposed (Zachariadis et al., 
2013). This approach is necessary mainly because what is observed at the empirical level is 
caused by underlying structures and mechanisms. Conditions prevailing in the “open social 
world” may facilitate or prevent the actualisation of a structure’s causal powers. That is to 
say, its effects may or may not be observed at the empirical level. Retroduction examines 
particular social conditions under which a particular causal mechanism takes effect in the 
social world (Fletcher, 2016). Therefore, CR studies are concerned more with theoretical 
generalisations instead of empirical generalisations (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014, pp. 22-
24). 
In summary, some major principles of critical realism serve as a guiding framework 
for the present study, because CR:  
(1) Explains structures, mechanisms and context through the interrelationship 




(2) Provides for triangulation of methods in which interviews are one of the central 
elements of the research design, but not the only method for investigating the 
subject (Maxwell, 2012);  
(3) Combines both inductive and deductive logic, i.e. employs a theoretical 
framework, but allows for its modifications as a consequence of empirical 
findings, resulting in the research being theory-driven but not theory-determined; 
and  
(4) Provides an ontological and methodological framework that captures the deeper 
mechanisms (power relations in the case of the present study), for understanding 
the daily realities of bazaar life.  
The research design outlined in the rest of this chapter is guided by these 
foundational principles.  
4.3 Research questions 
The overarching question set out with its ancillary dimensions in Section 1.3 is further 
developed in specific theoretical and empirical questions in this section. There are two sets 
of questions, the first dealing with broad (conceptual) issues and the second raising a more 
specific set of empirical questions. These questions are linked to theories, methods and 
analysis. These linkages are displayed in a methods matrix (Maxwell, 2012). Table 4.2 
consists of the questions that require analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature, 





Table 4.2: Theoretical and topical questions 
What do I need to know? Why do I need to know 
this? 
What type of 
data is needed?  
How will it be 
analysed? 
(1) What forms of SC are 
significant for understanding 
marketplace-local governance 
relationships in developing 
state contexts? Why and in 
what ways are these forms 
important? What types of SC 
are generated by 
marketplaces/bazaars within 
local economies? How are 
these embedded in local power 
relations? How does SC 
generated through 
marketplaces interrelate with 
development and working of 
local governance? 
To understand the 
significance of different 
forms of marketplace 
interaction with local 
governance in varying 
institutional 
environments; to view the 
ways, if any, in which 
marketplace SC plays a 
role in local governance; 
to understand how SC is 
interrelated with different 
capitals (powers); to 
establish the outcomes of 




















and concepts for 
a coherent 
synthesis. 
(2) What is the interrelation 
between different forms of 
social capital? How does this 
interrelation shape formal and 
informal governance 
interaction in the developing 
state context? What are the key 
institutional components 
(formal and informal) of local 
governance in Pakistan, 
particularly in Malakand 
region? 
To understand the forms 
and processes of 
governance in developing 
states in general, its 
formal and informal 
institutional components 
and the role of SC in 
influencing those 
processes; and to explain 
the local governance 
system in Pakistan, its key 
institutional components, 
and to place governing by 












Pakistan, and on 
governance 







(3) How does the generation of 
social capital shape the role of 
marketplaces as an element of 
local governance in 
developing/ weak state 
contexts? In what ways is 
marketplace/bazaar SC 
significant to local governance 
in developing state contexts? 
 
To understand the 
generation of marketplace 
SC in developing states 
and its negative and 
positive outcomes for 
various local governance 
processes, based on 



























Table 4.3: Field-specific questions, data collection and analysis methods 
What do I need to know? Why do I need to know 
this? 
What type of 
data is needed? 
How will it be 
analysed? 
With regard to the generation 
of SC: what types of SC are 
generated by Batkhela bazaar? 
To acquire a broad 
understanding of the 
forms of SC generated 
through the economic and 
non-economic interaction 










of the open 





With regard to the aspects of 
local governance relevant to 
Batkhela bazaar: what aspects 
of local governance are 
important to the working and 
development of Batkhela 
bazaar, and why? 
To develop explanatory 
logic of theoretical claim 
that bazaar-generated SC 
has implications for 
various governance 
processes; to identify the 
most relevant aspects of 
governance that explicate 
the role of bazaar-
generated SC for local 
governance in the context 












With regard to the implications 
of bazaar-generated SC for key 
evolving governance processes 
of the Malakand region:  
(a) What are the implications 
of the social capital generated 
by Batkhela bazaar for 
political participation and 
inclusion?; 
(b) how does the social capital 
generated by Batkhela bazaar 
impact upon regulatory 
practices in the Malakand 
Region?; 
(c) How does the social capital 
generation by Batkhela bazaar 
shape its role in the provision 
of social welfare services by 
government and social welfare 
associations in the Malakand 
District? 
 
To gain an in-depth 
understanding of the 
structures, processes and 
mechanisms that shapes 
bazaar-local government 
relations; to confirm, 
refute or modify the major 
theoretical propositions; 
to generate knowledge 
that may be helpful for 
investigating bazaar-local 
government relationships 
in developing economies 





































4.4. Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework encapsulates the major elements of the inquiry: the theoretical 
assumptions, and the researcher’s understanding of the theory and knowledge of the 
research area (Ravitch and Riggan, 2011, p. 9). The conceptual framework outlined in this 
section seeks to take ownership of the core concepts and the logic underlying their 
synthesis: it will be employed as a tool for learning about the subject, and will justify the 
research both substantively and methodologically while conveying its sense to the reader 
(ibid.). The conceptual framework outlined here, following Maxwell (2012, p. 39) is 
employed as a “system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, and beliefs and theories” to 
guide and inform the research. In line with realist research, it is used as a preliminary 
guiding framework that is subject to modification (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 17-18). 
As realist theory suggests, the process of the development of knowledge begins at the 
“most primitive” level by conceptualising objects and then proceeding to one of its 
specialised forms, structural analysis. This analysis demands an examination of the nature 
of relationships and structures (Sayer, 1992, p. 85). These relationships, in the context of 
Batkhela bazaar, involve those between the marketplace and local government, and those 
between agents embedded in social structures; while the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of these structures and mechanisms also require examination (ibid.). However, the theory 
proposed for investigating these relationships is not divorced from the mechanisms which 
shape them. For this purpose, a sequenced conceptual framework of inquiry including the 
theory, rational judgement (and thought experiments or reflexive framework) and 
exploratory research for scope determination guided the overall research process 
(Maxwell, 2012, Chapters 3 and 4). In a Bourdieusian vein, Chapter 3 linked the main 
objects of this thesis in a field-habitus-capital nexus. In the following paragraphs, the 
function of these objects in the study’s conceptual framework is operationalised.  
The marketplace, local administration and political sphere (political actors) constitute 
three distinct but overlapping fields of power within the local governance structure. Each 
field has some areas in which it is dominant and others in which it is dominated; and each 
produces capital that has utility (or influence) for the other fields. These fields do not 
operate independently of each other; instead, they are microcosms, each with their own 
particular stakes and rules. Networks of relationships link these fields, and these networks 
are governed by trust and reciprocity. Here, the operation of trust and reciprocity as a 
governing mechanism is the function of habitus, which can be described as an agent’s 
familiarity with “the rules of the game” from the standpoint of an agent within that game. 




interpreting and applying norms of cooperation such as trust and reciprocity. This 
familiarity evolves with the changing rules of the game due to unseen structures which are 
shaped by their material existence (distribution of capitals) (Houston, 2002, p. 163).  
To investigate the role of SC in local governance, recognising the key operations of 
LG relevant to the marketplace was important in order to understand the influence of 
various structures and mechanisms in shaping the operation of SC. These structures are 
sometimes evident while at other times latent with sufficient causal powers. The state is, in 
the author’s conception, a meta-field, and an important context for SC; therefore, its roles 
in shaping participatory structures, implementing regulations and providing welfare 
services were used as indicators for measuring its capacity, and also for measuring 
citizens’ trust in government institutions. It was important for these indicators to be linked 
to the development of the marketplace for two reasons: firstly since it was argued in 
Section 2.3 that marketplaces are playing an increasing role in these aspects of local 
governance; and secondly since this role is structured by a constellation of networks 
(interpersonal and associational) within which marketplace actors are embedded. However, 
the main proposition of the study is that economic development as an outcome of 
marketplace development generates SC, which has implications for its integrative potential 
in the broader governance structure. Contrary to Putnamian tradition, marketplaces 
generate both individual and associational SC which influence the development of local 
governance. In addition, economic capital generated by the marketplace was identified as a 
key mechanism that shapes the power embedded in both individual and collective networks 
and their interrelationship.  
4.4.1 Exploratory research 
This preliminary conceptual framework, developed as an outcome of engagement with the 
wider literature, was further refined through exploratory research conducted in Batkhela 
bazaar in July-September 2015. An overview of the method used is provided in Section 
4.7.2. However, its findings suggested the need to investigate the role of social capital both 
as an input and output factor in a number of areas of the bazaar-local governance interface. 
Five specific areas requiring investigation were identified as follows: 
(1) The impact of bazaar-generated SC on the interaction between elected and 
appointed local government officials. Here, SC is viewed not as a cause or an 
outcome of the governance structure, but as a generative mechanism that shapes 
marketplace-local government interaction. 
(2) The greater impact of informal institutions and relational networks on the 




establish the weakness of formal institutions, but allows for an investigation into 
the causes of lesser impact of formal institutions on the bazaar economy.  
(3) The norms of reciprocal expectations underpinning the structure and functions of 
the bazaar union, and also its strength. However, it was not clear at this stage how 
different power relations within Batkhela bazaar contributed to its strength or 
weakness. 
(4) The implications of the SC generated in the bazaar for the provision of social 
services. However, the absence of the third sector’s influence on local businesses, 
and business owners’ membership of voluntary associations, requires an 
investigation into the deeper mechanisms that structure the reciprocal relationships 
between marketplace and voluntary associations and the implications of 
marketplace-SWA relations for state functions and local politics.  
(5) The networks of friendship and family ties, which play an important role in 
different aspects of bazaar life as Jan (2014) argues.20 However, these are not the 
only or even the most important networks in shaping marketplace governance and 
its relationship to broader governance structure. This gave rise to the following 
questions: What other types of networks do marketplaces generate, and what norms 
of trust and reciprocity govern these networks?; If norms are dominant institutions, 
what are those norms and what is their origin?; Are they a cause or consequence of 
relational networks in the bazaar?; and Does economic transformation of the 
bazaar have any impact on the role and operation of those norms, and if so, what is 
this impact?  
In terms of marketplace interaction with local government, this phase also extended the 
focus of research from the input elements (functions of representative structure) of the 
political system to the output elements (administrative functions of government). That is, 
from the participation side to the implementation side of LG. Initially, the two major 
propositions of this study were: (1) that actors in the bazaar have an influence on local 
governance through their ties with elected local government officials; and (2) that these 
actors have an impact on local governance through direct participation in local government 
elections. However, the findings of the exploratory research rejected the latter proposition. 
Therefore, the focus was shifted to the implementation side, which has more frequent 
contact with the bazaar on different matters. Here, relational networks with elected local 
                                                          
20 In their studies on Batkhela bazaar, Jan (2010, 2014) and Jan and Aman (2016) did not deal with the 
norms of trust and reciprocity, their role in governing individual and associational networks, and the role of 




government officials and other political actors also play a greater role. These interactions 
range from matters relating to the political structure of the district, to the implementation 
of regulations in the bazaar, through to the provision of social services in Malakand.  
In summary, the overall conceptual framework establishes a bridge between the 
“real”, “actual” and “empirical”, in order to deliver an in-depth understanding of the 
processes and mechanisms of bazaar-local government interaction. 
4.5 Why use a case study method? 
There are primarily eight possible research designs from which a critical realist researcher 
can choose, of which the two leading methods are case study and comparative case study 
(Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014, p. 23). For in-depth CR research, the case study method is 
the most suitable research design (Easton, 2010; Smith, 2010). Contrary to the variance-
based positivist approaches that are concerned with observable events and their cause-
effect relationships, the case study method offers an opportunity for in-depth exploration of 
the theoretical propositions in an iterative fashion. The major building blocks of this 
research, e.g. relating to SC (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000), 
marketplaces (Monteith, 2015; Lyons and Snoxell, 2005) and local governance (Mosse, 
2004; Blair, 2000; Fukuyama, 2013) tell us separately that these phenomena are contextual 
in nature. Investigating the role of marketplaces as SC generators, and the implications of 
this for local governance processes, requires a contextual understanding of the conditions 
for certain events and situations caused by the use of SC by agents (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). Two examples from the literature illustrate this point very clearly. Firstly, Hummely 
(2016) found that better-organised marketplaces created incentives for the enforcement 
authorities to pay these organisations for better governance, but in other circumstances the 
enforcement authorities were interested in creating a divide within these organisations to 
enforce state policies (Monteith, 2015; Lindell, 2008). Secondly, local government may 
privatise marketplaces for better tax collection in one context (David et al., 2001, p. 35); 
whereas tax collection as a variable of marketplace-local government interaction may be 
absent due to constitutional provisions for tax exemption for the local economy (Khan, 
2017a). In any event, marketplaces have a necessary relationship with the state, that is, 
they are the object of governance. In both cases, they generate SC: that is, they have 
collective organisation. However, the implications of this organisation, in terms of 
facilitating or preventing enforcement, is contingent on various contextual factors, 
requiring an understanding of the deep structures that explain the “dark” and “bright” sides 




generative mechanisms also explain why the enforcement authorities are interested in 
strengthening or weakening the organisation of marketplaces.  
Neither Bhasker nor Sayer have developed a specific methodology for conducting 
CR research. However, several authors have made clear that they regard case study as the 
best-suited method for conducting CR research (Easton, 2010; Wynn and Williams, 2012, 
p. 788). Yin (2003, p. 13) states: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” A case study 
investigation deals with “the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and […] relies on multiple sources of evidence, 
with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” (ibid., pp. 13-14). It does so by 
“sustained consideration of activities and behaviour in a particular location” (Ackroyd, 
2010, p. 535, cited in Wynn and Williams, 2012. p. 795). A contextual phenomenon like 
the marketplace generation of SC and its implications for local governance processes is too 
complex to be explained by survey research; therefore an explanatory case study research 
methodology was employed (Baxter and Jack, 2008, p. 746).  
In the present study, the set of five principles set out by Wynn and Williams (2012) 
for conducting CR case study research was followed. These principles are:  
(1) Identifying and abstracting the event being studied, usually from experience, as a 
foundation to gain an understanding of what actually happens in a phenomenon; 
(2) Explaining structure and context, which involves identification of components of 
social and physical structures, their context and the interrelationship between 
them, followed by their critical redescription from actors’ viewpoints into 
theoretical concepts;  
(3) Retroduction, which involves identifying power tendencies of structures that may 
have interacted to generate an explicated event (as in the first principle); 
(4) Empirical corroboration, which requires confirming that the proposed 
explanation of the causal mechanisms is better than the available alternatives; and 
(5) Triangulation and multimethod research (not necessarily mixed), which requires 
the use of multiple methods of data collection for supporting existing causal 
analysis with a variety of data sources, analytical methods and theories (see Table 
4.3).  
  These principles were not followed in a strict sequence, but since they are dynamic 
and iterative, they informed methodological decisions at various stages of the research 




Thus, ontological reference, the contextual nature of the major theoretical constructs, 
and epistemological considerations led to the case study method being identified as the 
optimal choice for this research. However, investigating the role of SC in a bounded context, 
i.e. the Malakand region, with its historical and contextual specificities, may raise questions 
for the generalisability of this research. Undoubtedly, marketplace-local governance 
interaction is contextual, since it is underpinned by certain factors such as the institutional 
design of local government, the size of marketplaces, the nature of economic activities, and 
the cultural context, all of which shape an agent’s use of SC to the benefit or detriment of 
the state. This research offers explanations of the causal mechanisms involved in the 
production of negative and positive externalities generated by SC for various local 
governance processes. In this sense, the causal explanations of events and their theoretical 
outcomes are analytically generalisable across a wide range of marketplaces in multiple 
governance contexts (Piekkari, Welch and Paavilainen, 2009; Yin, 2013; Simons, 2015; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; for a critical perspective on this see Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011).  
4.6 Selection of case study site and units of analysis 
A two-fold case selection process was followed, including the selection of the case study 
site, and the selection of the embedded units of analysis for an integrative case study of 
marketplace-local governance interaction.21 Pragmatic considerations such as the 
availability of literature on the case study, access, time and resources were initial 
considerations. These are legitimate but insufficient justifications for the case selection 
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 298). Jan (2010, 2014) has contextualised Batkhela 
bazaar in the local governance structure, and in the latter study he elaborates the role of 
cohesive vs. diverse ties in entrepreneurial successes. However, he does not explain the 
impact of these different forms of ties on various political processes, especially the 
evolution of the Bazaar Union (BU), the implementation of regulations, and service 
delivery. In addition, he offers an account of the emergence and evolution of the BU, but 
without contextualising it in relation to other bazaars and their unions. After exploring 
other bazaar unions in Malakand and the surrounding districts, the BU at Batkhela was 
found to be the most politically active. It also has the longest history of evolution as a 
traders’ association in the region. Furthermore, Batkhela bazaar has evolved from a cluster 
of 15 shops in the early 1950s to a three-kilometre-long bazaar comprised of 5,500 fixed 
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shops at the time the present study was conducted, demonstrating its significance for the 
local political economy (Khan, 2017a). This evolution has implications not only for local 
social structures, but also for the development of associational SC, which is not explored in 
any of Jan’s works on the bazaar (Jan, 2010, 2014; Jan and Raza, 2015; Jan and Aman, 
2016). 
This rich background information makes Batkhela bazaar an interesting case for 
exploring the generation and role of SC in local governance (Gerring and Cojocaru, 2015). 
The contextual nature of SC does not imply that the concept has no validity for 
investigating marketplaces (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Krishna and Shrader, 1999; 
Fafchamps and Minten, 1999). Instead, the operation of Batkhela bazaar provides fertile 
ground for gaining an understanding of the mechanisms generating social capital. 
Measuring the generation of SC and the outcomes requires multiple methods of 
investigation (Lyon, 2000; Häuberer, 2011, Chapter 1). To make this case study 
manageable, its boundaries were delimited by selecting three major areas of bazaar life as 
embedded units of analysis (Baxter and Jack, 2008).  
These chosen areas were as follows: the evolution and role of the BU and its 
embeddedness in the broader political structure; the implementation of regulations in the 
governance of the bazaar (health, price and quality standards); and the complementary or 
substitutive role of bazaar-generated SC in social welfare provision by the state. These 
disparate areas are significant and relevant for the following reasons: 
(1) All have direct relevance to bazaar life, its socioeconomic dynamics and the local 
governance of the region; 
(2) Each, in its own way, explains the existence or generation of SC by the bazaar’s 
economic activities, its integrative potential in the broader governance structure, 
and its impact on the development of local governance;  
(3) Comparing these different cases enables testing of whether SC does not 
necessarily have a “dark” or “bright” side, and whether a combination of context, 
mechanisms and processes determines its role in local governance; and  
(4) Reporting an integrated set of findings from these units of analysis in a holistic 
case study demonstrates how SC is deployed across these “social fields” of the 
same bazaar, and what mechanisms explain the use of SC in varying aspects of 
the interstices between formal governance institutions and local social structures 




4.7 Scope determination and exploratory research 
The scope of this research was delimited at two levels: theoretical (during the literature 
review) and empirical (exploratory phase). An account of these phases is offered in 
Sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 respectively. 
4.7.1 Scope determination before major field intervention  
Delimitation of the scope of the literature was crucial due to the inter-disciplinary nature of 
SC and of this research in particular (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009). Therefore, three 
broad streams of literature were identified which were then thematically focused on the 
critical aspects of this study. On a broader level, the literature on marketplaces (Pati-
Sharman, 2011), SC (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Farr, 2004), and governance and 
decentralisation (Faguet, 2015; Fukuyama, 2013) were reviewed.  
The scope was further refined by focusing on literature that encompassed all three 
subjects, or at least focused on the interrelationship between two of these phenomena. While 
identifying these two levels, a broad range of research on various elements of SC such as 
trust (Newton, 2001; Uslaner, 2013; Misztal, 1996; Frederiksen, 2014), reciprocity (Mauss, 
1954; Emerson, 1962; Sahlins, 1972; Molm, 2010) and networks (Hsung et al., 2009; Burt, 
2000; Granovetter, 1985) was reviewed in the sociological, political science and social 
economy literature (Portes, 1998; Newton, 1999; Rothstein and Eek, 2009; Sabatini, 2009; 
Borzaga and Sforzi, 2014).  
In the literature, the role of SC in the interstices between formal and informal 
governance in general, and within the marketplace context in particular, is often defined in 
terms of its relationship to the formal governance structure. The concept of SC within the 
Bourdieusian framework explicates the role of human agency in both its individual and 
aggregated form. Bazaars or marketplaces represent an empirical setting where this formal-
informal institutional interaction occurs. Thus an institutional design, i.e. formal 
governance structure, determines the context for the structure and function of informal 
marketplaces; the role of social capital within those marketplaces; its interaction with the 
state authorities at local level; and its embeddedness in, and implications for, the local 
governance environment.  
Finally, similar strands of literature, if available, with a particular focus on Pakistan 
and the Malakand region, were reviewed to offer a contextual understanding of the 
theoretical premises of this research (See Chapter 5). 
4.7.2 Exploratory survey and scope determination  
CR research requires generation of both extensive and intensive data. The former is 




depth understanding of the phenomenon (Fletcher, 2016). In this case, following Maxwell 
(2012), the extensive data was generated mainly during the exploratory phase to unearth 
the internal structure of the marketplace as a field and its linkages with other spheres of 
governance, such as elected political institutions, enforcement authorities and SWAs. This 
last unit of analysis was incorporated during the initial survey design, but how Batkhela 
bazaar generates social capital for this sphere of governance was refined after triangulating 
the survey data (see Section 5.3). The survey coverage was extensive and exploratory in 
nature: a large amount of data on both formal and informal networks of business owners 
was collected and analysed. Moreover, since the literature agrees that marketplaces are 
internally heterogeneous and their constituent elements (business owners) therefore have 
differentiated access to and influence on various formal organisations, it was assumed that 
marketplaces generate both associational and individual SC (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005). 
Accordingly, questions relating to both these dimensions were included in the survey 
questionnaire. This internal heterogeneity of marketplaces has implications for the 
production and operation of SC. For example, one critical proposition, in a Bourdieusian 
conception of social capital, is the contingency of social capital to economic capital. The 
literature on voluntary associations argues that this contingency affects the way 
associational membership is perceived by the members of these associations.  
In addition, the differences between rural and urban population census data were 
also analysed to outline the context of the bazaar and its impact on the local economy and 
governance (see Appendix 1). Moreover, to understand the context of generalised trust in 
Pakistan, and in Malakand in particular, the World Values Survey (2011) data was used to 
sensitise the research to the general picture of social trust. The major exploratory survey 
was conducted between July and September 2015.  
4.7.2.1 Survey questionnaire and data collection 
The exploratory survey questionnaire (shown in Appendix 2) was thematically 
organised into four major areas in addition to demographic data such as age, gender, 
education and income, etc. The major themes of this thesis, namely social capital, local 
governance, the economically dynamic Batkhela bazaar, and evolving governance 
processes, guided the structure of the questionnaire. The survey was administered by the 
researcher in the form of face-to-face interviews. The questionnaire was translated into 
Pashto, which is the only language spoken in the bazaar. It comprised 75 items including 
mixed questions such as binaries, rating-scale questions, multiple-response items and open-
ended responses. A strict sampling procedure could not be employed because the traders 




survey responses were gathered through random walks in the bazaar (Lyon, 2000), during 
normal trading hours at the respondents’ business premises (Watson, 2009). The overall 
non-response rate was 20%: 250 traders were approached, of whom 200 agreed to take part 
in the survey. All the survey respondents were male, because local customs prohibit 
women’s access to public spaces, and especially their access to trading in the bazaars 
(Mohmand and Gazdar, 2007, p. 7). The complete absence of women from the traders’ 
community, local governance institutions related to the bazaar, and the SWAs that interact 
with the bazaar, excluded them from the sample. The aim of the survey was to collect 
extensive information regarding community resources, types of economic activities, major 
governance problems, and ways to achieve their resolution (through formal or informal 
networks) (Dudwick et al., 2006).  
The questionnaire was designed to generate data around the following four themes:  
(1) Features of economic life in Batkhela bazaar. This section comprised 39 items, 
with three major elements: (a) features of the businesses (b) features of the 
business owners, and (c) features of economic transactions in the bazaar. 
(2) Bazaar governance. This section comprised 24 questions relating to the bazaar’s 
internal governance and the influence of different formal institutions (such as 
elected local government, banks and police, etc.) on businesses in the bazaar. It 
also included questions regarding governance problems in the bazaar, disputes 
between traders, and their preferred channel of resolution for these problems. 
Bazaar members’ affiliations with political parties, their voting tendencies in 
local government elections and their ties with elected local government officials 
were also explored in this part of the questionnaire.   
(3) Informal networks (family and friendship ties). This section comprised nine items 
to generate data in three dimensions: (a) whether friends and family members 
have a positive impact on the business activities of individual entrepreneurs; (b) 
whether friends or family members who serve in any local government office are 
helpful for the businesses in the bazaar; and (c) the size of individual networks 
within and outside the bazaar.  
(4) The collective dimension of SC (formal networks). This section, consisting of 
nine binary items, was aimed at exploring the role of the bazaar in generating 
externalities for the local governance environment. These externalities were 
captured by looking into the associational membership (voluntary associations) 
of bazaar members, and their contributions to community development and 




In addition to generating extensive data, this exploratory research helped in 
identifying some important dimensions for the major field intervention. A fairly high 
amount of associational membership was found in the bazaar, but reliance on informal 
networks was much higher. A respondent could simultaneously be a member of three 
different types of associations: the BU, a political party and an SWA, along with informal 
networks overlapping across these associational boundaries. Questions regarding voting 
behaviour and membership of political parties often generated additional comments: these 
could not be ignored, and instead became one of the central dimensions of the major field 
intervention. Similar “background noises” were frequently generated in relation to 
membership of the voluntary associations and their utility for individual businesses in the 
bazaar. On the rating scale from one to five, these voluntary associations were regarded as 
insignificant for the bazaar, but nevertheless 12.5% of the business owners were members 
of them,22 and 27 % were contributing to their community development activities. This 
established grounds for thinking about the role of bazaar-generated SC and its contribution 
to the provision of welfare activities. To verify this emerging trend, a short survey 
comprising five binary questions, two rating-scale questions and two open-ended 
questions, was administered with nine SWAs: the results suggested that the bazaar served 
as an important resource for the activities of these associations (see Appendix 3).  
Nevertheless, the arrow of causality suggested by the empirical reality is not 
straightforward: multiple structures and mechanisms in the actual domain shape this 
reality, and the relationships between the empirical and the actual are mediated by an 
agent’s habitus (Ogutle, 2013, pp. 499-501). Two factors necessitated intensive data 
generation: firstly the inadequacy of the survey to grasp the complexity of the 
interrelationship between the individual and collective SC generated by Batkhela bazaar; 
and secondly the absence of further extensive data on various dimensions of the role of SC 
in relevant governance processes.  
4.8 Intensive data generation: Semi-structured interviews and field observations 
Eighty qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted for the intensive data 
generation (See Appendix 4). All but eight interviews were audiotaped with the 
interviewee’s consent. The interviews lasted between 25 and 65 minutes. The interviews 
were a major, but not the only, source of intensive data generation. Field observations, 
through attendance at meetings of the BU, the price review committee comprising 
government officials and bazaar representatives, activities and events of the voluntary 
                                                          




associations and two district political meetings, also formed a significant part of the 
intensive data generation. Additionally, field observations before and after the interviews 
offered a rich contextual opportunity for establishing the validity of the claims of 
individual interviewees. Much of this data offered a foundation for contextualising the 
interview responses, exercising analytical judgements, and identifying the structures and 
mechanisms that cause events (Smith and Elger, 2014, pp. 119-120). As in the case of the 
exploratory survey, all the interviews were conducted in Pashto, and were then transcribed 
and translated into English by the researcher before coding.  
Semi-structured interviews were a logical choice for three reasons. Firstly, they 
provide the possibility of mutual knowledge production, whereby both the interviewer and 
interviewee are both involved in the production of knowledge. The interview guide was 
theory-driven (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, pp. 162-163), but the semi-structured design 
allowed the interviewees to shift positions to explore multiple dimensions of the 
phenomenon (Smith and Elger, 2014, pp. 111-112). Secondly, the thematic concerns of the 
theories in Chapters 2 and 3 were considered while forming the interview guide, but they 
were not mechanically translated into strictly worded questions (Maxwell, 2012, pp. 101-
102) because of the diversity of the sample frame. Finally, as in constructivism, the 
subjective experiences and narrative accounts offered by interviewees were taken 
seriously, but critical analytical judgements were not suspended in the process (Smith and 
Elger, 2014, p. 119; Braun and Clarke, 2016). This means that interviewees’ accounts were 
subjected to scrutiny by comparing them against other sources of data such as field 
observations and records where appropriate. This was also useful for guarding against 
interviewees’ wariness of the process, which might have led them to answer inaccurately 
because of a lack of trust.23 
Three important considerations grounded in the CR perspective guided the entire 
interview design:  
(1) Selecting interviewees with varying patterns of expertise (sampling frame);  
(2) Employing semi-structured interviews as a tool for investigating the reflexivity of 
agents; and  
(3) Using interviews for understanding different aspects of a layered social world 
(Smith and Elger, 2012, p. 3).  
With regard to the layered social ontology, the effects of the “real” in the “actual” 
and “empirical” domains can be understood through interviews. However, the empirical 
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domain includes those actions and events that are actually experienced by the agents, and 
they actualise the domain of material existence, consisting of events and experiences that 
shape agents’ habitus. The “real” domain, on the other hand, includes structures and 
mechanisms that generate those experiences and events. It implies that interviews may not 
reveal a complete picture, but also suggests that without conducting an inquiry into the 
actions and subjective experiences of the agents, it is unlikely that insights will be gained 
into the empirical and actual representation of the actors (ibid., p. 5). 
The sample selection was “purposeful” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 97), based on two 
principles: respondents’ expertise and maximum variation. As Miles and Huberman (1994, 
p. 36) argue, even within a single case study, one cannot study everyone, everywhere, 
doing everything. For this reason, Miles and Huberman (ibid.) emphasise the usefulness of 
thinking in terms of a “sampling frame’. Following Maxwell (2012, p. 96), it is not just the 
interviewees who are being investigated: researchers are also concerned with events, 
processes and positions which must form the underlying principle of their sampling frame. 
The discussion so far has outlined the broad parameters of this research, and the 
spheres of governance and their interrelationship which it has sought to explore. Maxwell 
(ibid.) rightly asserts that the initial processes, settings and events that come to researchers’ 
minds are not always the most appropriate ones, which was true for this study of Batkhela 
bazaar. The criteria for sample selection became clear with the findings of the exploratory 
survey. Delimitation of the research scope made it clear what information was needed and 
who could provide that information (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, pp. 159-161). This 
consideration also influenced the gendered dimension of the sample frame (see below). 
The selection of interviewees with diverse backgrounds (traders, political actors and 
government officials) was aimed at analysing the perspectives they implied, the discourses 
they employed, and the role of their field-specific habitus, which proved fruitful for a 
holistic understanding of the phenomenon (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 96). 
Although a few design considerations, such as three embedded units of analysis, the 
use of semi-structured interviews and the number of interviews (one per participant), 
offered a rationale for a larger sample size (Morse, 2000, p. 4), any a priori sample size 
determination based on the rule of thumb was unfit for purpose (Crouch and McKenzie, 
2006). Therefore, the basic parameters of the sampling frame were determined according 
to the CR principle of respondents’ expertise (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, pp. 161-162). 
Given the broad aim of the present research, the initial sample was divided into traders, 
political leaders and government officials. The findings of the exploratory research helped 




of the emerging dominant themes from the interviews, along with the marginal yet 
important themes that were important for the next interview (Miles, Huberman and 
Saldaña, 2014, p. 124). This tracking process facilitated the continuous evaluation of the 
sample size and closure decisions for each subcategory (Malterud, Siersma and Guassora, 
2016). Malterud et al.’s (ibid.) insight regarding the inverse relationship between sample 
size and information power was useful in the closure of the sub-categories. The initial 
frame was designed for effective planning, but the ultimate sample size for the qualitative 
interviews was determined by information saturation across the three empirical questions 
outlined in Table 4:3 (Braun and Clarke, 2016, pp. 741-742). Hence, the research design 
and setting (Morse, 2000), the scope of the question/research aim (Malterud et al., 2016), 
the respondents’ expertise (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) and information saturation together 
guided the subsequent stages of sample size determination (see also Sim, Saunders, 
Waterfield and Kingstone, 2018). 
The sample frame was structured into three broad categories: traders (the largest part 
of the frame); government officials in three main departments including health, food and 
social welfare, along with key district administrators; and local political actors including 
currently elected and former local government officials. The sample size for the second 
and third categories was 10 each, while 60 traders were interviewed (as set out in 
Appendix 4). The business owners were further subdivided into three categories according 
to the type of information being sought from them: those who were directly involved in 
bazaar politics; those who were active members of and contributors to SWAs; and those 
who were involved in violating rules relating to health and quality standards. Regarding the 
third category, rule violation was found to be so pervasive that the size of this category 
could easily have reached twice its intended size (see Section 7.2.2 for further explanation 
of this point): therefore only business owners who had been convicted or were involved in 
ongoing cases were placed in this category.  
Regarding the three main categories, it was assumed that government officials, 
political actors and business owners of varying sizes held distinct perspectives and 
experiences across vertical and horizontal divisions in terms of their location in the social 
structure (Smith and Elger, 2014, p. 129; Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Hence, the sampling 
frame was aimed at drawing out the distinct approaches and priorities of the respondents 
(Smith and Elger, 2014, p. 120). 
The interview guide was semi-structured and theory-driven, since the goal was to 
understand how the SC generated by Batkhela bazaar functions in these varied spheres of 




semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed the necessary flexibility for the theory to 
be refuted, modified or rejected altogether with the help of the knowledge produced by the 
interviewees. The key topics around which the interview guide was developed included 
government institutions, social structures, disputes between traders and their resolution, the 
role of formal and informal networks in offering support in the three areas (as explained in 
Section 4.6) of bazaar life, the implementation of regulations relating to health and food 
standards, trust in the government, trust in voluntary associations, trust in individual 
networks, the evolution of formal governance structure and the bazaar association, and 
social stratification and resultant tensions in the bazaar (see Appendix 5a for the full 
interview guide). A few questions on trust and reciprocity were included in the interview 
guide, but a deeper understanding of these norms of cooperation was inductively 
developed by analysing events and situations and the agents’ responses to those situations. 
A bazaar is a field of power, but not an inclusive public space: its rules of inclusion 
and exclusion are not determined by formal institutions, but by informal practices and 
customs. Owing to the strict patriarchal culture, gendered norms and fixed relational 
boundaries, women’s economic activities are confined to household entrepreneurship 
(Gohar, 2010). For this reason, not a single woman, either in Malakand District, or in the 
surrounding districts of Dir and Swat (see Map 1) owns or works in any business in the 
bazaar (Jan, 2010; Suleri et al., 2016, pp. 7-8). Women are an important part of the 
marketplace economy as consumers, but even this role is regulated by the normative 
structure that is characterised by the “practical and symbolic division” of public and 
private spaces (Weiss, 1998). For instance, to visit the marketplace, a woman had to be 
either accompanied by a male, or by several women. Sectors like clothes, shoes, jewellery 
and medicines had large numbers of female customers; but in sectors like grocery, 
synthetic fibres, mobile phones and computers, currency exchange and other service 
sectors, there was no face-to-face interaction with female customers. In an environment as 
structured as Pukhtun society in Malakand, access to female participants as a male 
researcher proved to be challenging (Jan, 2010; Ahmed, 1980; Barth, 1959a). Ahmed 
(1980, pp. 7-8), in his seminal study on Pukhtun society and its economy, describes 
enlisting the help of his sister and wife to conduct the survey as “outsider” women; the 
researcher in the present study had extensive family ties in a village near Batkhela that 
allowed insights to be gained into women’s entrepreneurial activities in the private sphere 
of the households. In this region, it is not only difficult for male researchers to interview 
women, but according to Saeed (2012), it is also a daunting task to find male participants 




researchers may have different types of accessibility issues while conducting research with 
men in the marketplaces of Pakistan.24 Nevertheless, the exclusion of women from the 
sampling frame was largely a question of their methodological irrelevance to the main 
objects of the study (Creswell, 2007, p. 204):, since “women’s social capital”, as it should 
be termed, was not involved in the everyday politics of the bazaar, the implementation of 
regulations, or shaping the bazaar’s significance for SWAs.  
4.9 Data analysis 
Data analysis, as Maxwell (2012, p. 106) argues, is an essential component of the research 
design; it therefore began as soon as the first interview had been conducted. As in the 
previous stages, data analysis and its relationship to the theory is contested in qualitative 
methods generally, and in CR research specifically. Some researchers, such as grounded 
theorists, advocate an inductive coding and analysis process, whereas constructivists 
advocate using theory for organising and analysing data (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2011, 
pp. 5-6). Still others, in the CR spirit, adopt a middle way by advocating a flexible 
approach to coding and analysis (Fletcher, 2016). This suggests it is appropriate to use of 
obduction and retroduction, two key CR processes for data analysis. Since the present 
study produced multiple datasets – e.g. surveys, field observations, documentary records 
and interview data – coding and categorising as a mode of analysis were supplemented by 
comparing and contrasting strategies for identifying the interrelationship between context, 
mechanisms and outcomes. Hence, following Braun and Clarke (2006, 2016), flexible 
thematic analysis was employed. This method is not particularly wedded to any theoretical 
framework, and is suitable for CR analysis which sits between the dualism of theory-
testing versus theory-generating modes. It shares with CR the notion of the dominant 
expertise of the researcher, but also requires a contextual understanding of reality through 
the experiences of the participants (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p, 80). Due to the absence of 
an agreed method of analysis in CR research, and very few examples of applied analysis 
(Smith, 2010; Fletcher, 2016), CR has been criticised as a “philosophy in search of a 
method” (Yeung, 1997).  
Following the work of Maxwell (2012), the analysis in the present study was more 
grounded in the data. Fletcher (2016) criticises this approach due to its inductive overtones. 
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However, two points are central to this positioning. Firstly, regardless of the mode of data 
analysis, the emergence of themes and patterns do not occur in an epistemological vacuum 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). Secondly, even realists like Maxwell (2012) do not discount the 
role of theory in sensitising the researcher to the data, a point that Fletcher (2016) plays 
down in her theory-laden flexible coding method. Due to disagreements in the literature 
about methods, and a lack of proper fit between these two analytical traditions and the 
specific objectives of the present research, a distinct analytical framework was designed. 
Firstly, the entire datasets of the interviews and field notes were coded in the words of the 
respondents for sorting the data into what Maxwell calls organisation codes (or themes). 
However, unlike Maxwell, this process was theory-driven. Twenty-seven organisation 
codes were designed but were soon exhausted: this generated an interesting dialogue 
between theory and the data, which, in the CR spirit, called for obduction, or reformulating 
the original thematic codes (Sobh and Perry, 2006, pp. 1, 203). The 27 initial codes were 
expanded and reformulated into 34 substantive codes. This flexibility implies that 
theoretical codes were not unnecessarily forced on the data. Where counterintuitive data 
emerged, the existing theoretical codes were eliminated, redefined or expanded (Fletcher, 
2016). One specific example relating to the structural dimension of SC illustrates this point 
(see Table 4.4). After identifying subthemes relating to the structural and cognitive 
dimensions of SC, the next step was to identify the context for the generation of these 
dimensions and their outcomes. For this reason, various comparing and contrasting 
strategies were employed to perform higher level theoretical abstractions. An outcome of 
these abstractions was the theoretical redescription of the relationship between individual 
and associational SC, which is one of the significant theoretical contributions of this study.  
Table 4.4: The process of code expansion 
Organising code on SC 
structural dimension  
Individual networks Voluntary associations  
Expansion/redescription of 
organising codes  
Family; friendships; economic 
networks; acquaintance-based 
networks; role-based networks 
Interest-based associations 
(political parties, traders, 
literary clubs, rotary clubs); 
welfare associations (sports 
groups, health, emergency and 
relief, education) 
Source: Author’s data analysis 
The practical utility of the analytical framework can be illustrated by a few key 
mechanisms and outcomes. For instance, in relation to the corrupt practices used for 
violating health and quality standards, the word “corruption” was never directly used in 




“paying money for getting one’s job done”. These interrelated phenomena form part of the 
complex web of interdependence between retailers and their suppliers, traders and political 
actors, and political actors and government officials (further explored in Chapter 7): they 
were thus described as “power-dependence” relationships (Emerson, 1962, p. 31), a 
broader code that explicates the logic of cooperation in bazaar politics, the dynamics of 
health and quality regulations, and the provision of services. This notion of power-
dependence helped in identifying various modes of trust and reciprocity that were 
relationally experienced by agents in the events occurring in the empirical domain. This 
explains the operation of hierarchical SC within both formal and informal networks. These 
two concepts – power-dependence and hierarchical social capital – have led to the 
development of the theoretical explanation of the “dark” side of social capital, especially in 
the context of the implementation of regulations in the governance of the bazaar (again, 
further explored in Chapter 7). It had initially been expected that institutional design, or the 
weakness of formal institutions, would cause the “dark” side of social capital to emerge 
(Wacquant, 1998), but it emerged that the power structures embedded in social 
relationships fed equally into the fragility of the institutions. This does not suggest an 
inevitable correspondence between weak institutions and hierarchical social structures: the 
interaction between these institutions in a given context determines their cause-effect 
relationship. Through this obductive analytical process, 34 themes were redescribed into 
six major theoretical codes. Table 4.5 further refines these six codes into a structure-
agency matrix.  
Table 4.5: Theoretical codes for marketplace-local governance interaction through SC 
Theoretical categories of 
codes  
Habitus/agency Structures 





For developing these complex explanations of the mechanisms involved in causing 
any particular event and of the outcomes, Maxwell’s (2012, p. 110) connecting strategies 
proved helpful to understanding both the events and the agents’ reflections about them in 
the broader social and material context. Two major instruments constituted the core of 
these connecting strategies: the contact directory log, which offered ready access to the 
contextual information to interpret any event in a broader context (see Appendix 6 for an 
example); and reflexive memos, which were often developed to triangulate data for 




and conclusions were drawn after applying many “if-and-then” tests (Miles et al, 2014, p. 
304). This mode of inference is often evident in the chapters where findings are reported 
which allow the reader to understand how distinct mechanisms produce similar 
consequences, and how sometimes similar mechanisms produce varying outcomes. Put in 
CR terms, the power of x to cause y is dependent on c (context) (Smith, 2010). A general 
example in this case is hierarchical SC, which produces negative outcomes for the 
implementation of regulations, but has produced positive outcomes for the provision of 
social services. This mode was not simply developed during the analysis process: it was 
part of the data collection phase. After identifying critical incidents, a few were studied in 
detail to gain a greater understanding of the processes and mechanisms involved in 
producing outcomes.  
Since this research uses multiple data sources that have been triangulated during the 
data analysis process, the presentation of the findings, especially in tabular forms, runs the 
risk of misleading readers. To avoid the risk of confusion, readers are reminded that the 
sample size for the survey and interview data was 200 and 80 respectively. Wherever the 
tables report figures/numbers of 80 or fewer, this implies that interview data is being used, 
while those reporting 200 respondents suggest that the table is using the survey data. In 
some of the tables drawn from the interview data, 20 or 23 total respondents are reported. 
This is due to the division of the interview sample into three categories: the politics of the 
traders’ association, the enforcement of regulations, and social welfare provision. Four 
tables present numbers that are drawn from government records or records of SWAs. In 
addition, a note following each table specifies the data source used. 
4.9.1 Validity of research findings 
Validity is not an ex-post assessment of analysis: it is an integral part of the research 
design (Maxwell, 2012). There are different stances on validity in quantitative and 
qualitative research (Maxwell, 2012; Guba and Lincoln, 1985; Zachariadis et al., 2013). 
Maxwell (2012, p. 120) defines validity as the “correctness or credibility of a description, 
conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account”. This common-sense 
definition of validity has specific implications for CR research. For instance, Zachariadis et 
al. (2013, p. 59), in their comparison between conventional approaches to validity in 
qualitative and quantitative studies, argue that CR adopts a different stance on validity. 
They suggest it moves the centre of inquiry from observable events to the mechanisms 
underlying those events, while these can be independent or non-related to each other. This 
implies that a positivist researcher is fundamentally concerned with correlated events and 




events were caused by the underlying generative mechanisms that have been hypothesised 
or uncovered. Secondly, for a critical realist, generalisability entails the generalisability of 
knowledge rather than the replicability of findings: in other words, it poses the question 
“Do the generative mechanisms that caused an event in the context under investigation 
produce similar (or even different) events in other domains?” Finally, as opposed to 
positivist research, constructing validity in CR implies that the empirical observations 
provide information about actual events that are presumably caused by the generative 
mechanisms (ibid., p. 59). Thus, the essence of CR validity, as Maxwell (2012, pp. 125-
127) argues, is the integrity, not the replicability of one’s findings, and the ways in which 
rival explanations, hypotheses and evidence are treated in order to validate the findings. 
In the present research, a few specific measures were adopted for ensuring the 
credibility of the conclusions drawn. Firstly, the multiple methods of data collection used, 
along with the triangulation of the data generated through these methods, provided a 
considerable measure of internal validity. Triangulation was employed not only as a 
confirming strategy, but to also to look for evidence that could point to the conclusions 
being wrong.  
Secondly, comparing the interpretation of events offered by different interviewees 
significantly reduced reliance on the interpretation of any event by a single interviewee. As 
demonstrated in Box 4.1, interviews do not provide the whole picture of the reality: they 
were therefore compared with other sources such as field observations, documents 
(government records and others), and the findings of the exploratory survey. This 
triangulation of methods allowed the strengths of each to sufficiently balance the 
weaknesses of the others (Shenton, 2004, p.66); it also prevented narrow abstractions 
based on the partial accounts of interviewees, again demonstrated by the account in Box 
4.1. 
Thirdly, member checking was conducted, which entailed taking the data or the 
researcher’s interpretations back to the research participants so they could confirm or 
refute the researcher’s account (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 128). Member checking 
could not be uniformly used across the whole sample because of time constraints and 
access issues, in particular to government officials and political actors. Participants were 
asked to comment on the researcher’s interpretations rather than the raw data. A total of 31 
respondents did so, which proved to be an effective strategy for establishing a credible 
connection between events and their reality. For instance, it had been observed that the 
everyday use of the term “friend” lacked any substantive meaning, but before treating this 




interviewee confirmed: “If I use the word friend, it depends on the context. [...] Sometimes 
a person may not be my friend, but I will use the word friend to describe my relationship to 
him because the situation requires it” (Informal conversation with Sohaib, 16 May 2016). 
It can therefore be concluded that the word “friend” is used as an umbrella term, and that 
sensitivity to its figurative use and contextual underpinnings is essential in order to 
understand the networks.  
Fourthly, the information gathered in the qualitative interviews was recorded 
additionally in analytical tables for drawing conclusions, specifically to examine which 
types of events were usual and which were rare. These tables, depending on the case in 
hand, included the frequency of responses, the frequency of occurrences, or simply 
comparisons between two cases. These “quasi-statistics” were used to draw conclusions 
and record discrepancies, and are embedded in the text in the chapters setting out the 
findings.  
Fifthly, comparisons offered within interviewees’ own accounts were a helpful way 
to avoid inaccurate and narrow conclusions. Two essential techniques were used in this 
connection. In the first, interviewees, specifically wholesale traders and government 
officials, would comment on the marketplace-governance interaction in other regions. For 
instance, government officials, describing their experiences in other settings, would often 
compare the implementation of regulations or interaction with traders’ associations, 
commenting that “it was same there” or “the association was not very active there”. In the 
second, the sequences of experiences within the narratives of interviewees were 
inductively developed (e.g. references to “the previous cabinet”, “the current cabinet”, “in 
the past”, “the previous inspector”, etc; or in the case of government officials, “I could not 
impose penalties in my native town,” etc.) 
Finally, a more abstract level contextual comparison between the researcher’s 
inferences and the existing literature on the region was developed (see Section 5.3.3). To 
guard against any bias in terms of theoretical commitments or a specific worldview, a few 
interviews were read and coded by a colleague. This exercise was aimed at identifying any 
bias that might have resulted from the author’s interpretations of the data as a lone 
researcher. The colleague was neither an expert in the subject area nor acquainted with the 
empirical context, but had a long-standing experience in teaching qualitative analysis 
techniques and doing research on social policy issues. More than 75% of the colleague’s 




4.10 Ethical considerations 
Four major ethical considerations guided the entire research design: informed consent; 
keeping a balance between truth and reality; anonymity; and confidentiality (the relevant 
documentation for all these areas is set out in Appendix 7). 
Informed consent implies that participants must both understand and voluntarily 
agree to the nature of research and their role within it (Israel and Hay, 2006). The current 
research adopted procedural consent and actual consent, the former in line with Middlesex 
University’s ethics review board and ESRC research ethics guidelines (2015), and the 
latter requiring pragmatic judgements according to the situation. Participants were 
informed about the source of funding, and were offered the right to opt out at any stage 
before the final submission of the dissertation (Rowe, 2007, p. 44). Participation was 
entirely voluntary, and the interviewees were assured of anonymity and confidentiality 
(Parry and Mauthner, 2004, pp. 144-145). Given the cultural, legal and political 
environment, obtaining written consent proved anything but straightforward. Two distinct 
methods were adopted for obtaining consent from government officials and other 
interviewees. In the first method, a notification of cooperation was sent to the whole 
department by the district government, which helped in gathering relevant government 
records, but created additional difficulties in interviewing government officials, most of 
whom initially refused to be interviewed until convinced by other participants with whom 
they had personal ties. Consent forms were provided to government officials, who returned 
a copy to the researcher and kept a copy for their records. In the second method, consent 
was first negotiated orally, and the consent form was signed after the interview. This 
cumbersome method was adopted because the very act of obtaining signed consent was 
proving detrimental to the research objectives, since it was generating distrust about the 
research. At the time the fieldwork was carried out, the legal and political environment of 
Malakand was beset by suspicion and uncertainty because of a federal government 
notification to abolish the region’s tax-free status.25 In many instances, the researcher was 
assumed to be an income tax or customs official. On one particular occasion, an 
interviewee said: “I was informed before your arrival that an income tax official was 
coming here. If you want an interview, you have to first put your phone and recording 
device on my counter. After that, explain the purpose of your visit. If I am convinced, I 
will answer all your questions” (Grocery wholesaler, 15 June 2016). The interviewee’s 
requests were respected and he later agreed to be interviewed. Not only that, but he later 
                                                          
25 Recorder report. April 3 2016. “KP governor extends Customs Act, 1969 to Malakand Division, Kohistan”. 




proved to be one of the many important “gate-keepers” for negotiating access to other 
business owners. Hence, the consent form was orally read to the participants before 
formally incorporating them into the interview process, and their consent was orally 
recorded. The tension between procedural and pragmatic consent was subsequently 
resolved by requesting signed consent forms from the interviewees in the final month of 
the research intervention. At this stage, nine interviewees opted out of the research process 
and are therefore omitted from Appendix 4.  
Regarding the second major area of ethical consideration, that of keeping a balance 
between truth and reality (extensively discussed in relation to CR in the previous sections), 
it was ensured that the descriptions of the weakness of formal institutions, the ways in 
which rules were violated, SC’s contribution to these violations, and SC’s positive 
contribution to governance were close enough to mirror reality (Didier, 2014). 
In terms of the third ethical area, that of ensuring anonymity, this was more complex 
and required certain analytical decisions and judgements, since procedural ethics relating 
to anonymity may appear straightforward, but do not necessarily offer direction in 
particular situations that arise during data collection or analysis (Kaiser, 2009; Parry and 
Mauthner, 2004; Wolford, 2005). Therefore, certain judgements were made in terms of 
presentation because the case study area was not anonymised: there was a specific focus on 
certain government departments, e.g. health, food and social welfare, and on key offices in 
the district administration, and the issues of corruption and intercession had to be 
illustrated through critical moments; but these locations and the actors involved could have 
been readily recognised by the local population via “deductive disclosure” (Kaiser, 2009). 
In addition, the use of three SWAs as case study material for social services provision 
highlighted the inability of the rather “cute concept” of pseudonyms to ensure anonymity 
(Wolford, 2005, p. 83). However, two points are important here. Firstly, Israel (2004) 
argues that officials who are socially accountable do not have an automatic right to 
anonymity, and that it depends on the researcher’s judgement whether or not to grant this 
right. In the case of Batkhela bazaar, this right was denied to organisations and institutions, 
but granted to all the individuals. Secondly, not everyone wants anonymity (Israel, 2004, p. 
3). However, to ensure uniformity, and to conform to the procedural ethics (informed 
consent form), pseudonyms were used to refer to all 80 of the interviewees. Furthermore, 
certain measures were adopted to ensure individual anonymity and reduce the chances of 
deductive disclosure. Firstly, the designations of government officials were concealed, and 
descriptors were used instead. For instance, senior officials such as district commissioner 




presented as senior officials. The officials’ actual designations are used only in those cases 
that are publicly available in local news or social media, for instance those involving major 
tensions between political actors and administrative officials, mainly in instances where the 
BU is involved. Similarly, for inspectors from various departments, “inspector” is used as a 
general descriptor. For mayors and deputy mayors of union councils (UCs), the designation 
“an elected official of local government” is employed as descriptors because there are three 
UCs in Batkhela alone, and using these does not reveal the identity of the interviewees 
unless some background description (such as Upper, Middle or Lower Batkhela) is 
provided. To preserve the richness of the data, these union councils are assigned random 
descriptors of UC1, UC2 and UC3. However, in some places, references are made to 
district mayors or deputy mayors: these references are based on field observations where 
no consent agreement is involved. Additionally, information was classified as sensitive, 
less sensitive and not sensitive. The principle of harm to the respondent served as a 
yardstick for this classification (Parry and Mauthner, 2004, p. 144). All matters of 
corruption and related business practices in the bazaar were placed in the “sensitive” 
category. The “less sensitive” category contained instances where an interviewee’s opinion 
may have had implications for him, e.g. identifying an act of malpractice supported by 
government officials or political actors, or expressing an opinion about a person who may 
have reacted negatively to that opinion. The “not sensitive” category included instances 
where no personal relationship between the interviewee and any other organisation or 
individual could be established, for instance, collective meetings of political parties against 
the administration, or SWAs’ fund-generating events. However, a fourth category emerged 
from this third type, in cases where people’s identity could not be concealed in any case 
because of their status, such as members of the BU, and presidents/ managers of the 
SWAs. Some of these participants expressed their desire not to be anonymised, while for 
seven others anonymity was renegotiated to obtain “additional consent” because altering 
the data was inappropriate (Asa, 1999, cited in Kaiser, 2009, p. 1,636). As noted in the 
previous section, the researcher’s interpretations of the data was shared with many 
participants, which allowed adjustments to the consent process, and facilitated 
renegotiating confidentiality and anonymity where necessary (ibid., p. 1,639).  
4.11 Reflections on positionality: From access to analysis 
Contrary to the writing style elsewhere in the research, this section is written in the first 
person. In addition to the theoretical and ontological commitments that are evident 
throughout the chapter, my positionality was unique in various senses, influencing the 




2015). However, here I will reflect on the most important dimensions. I was male, Pukhtun 
and a local researcher, which made me an “insider” in both the cultural and regional 
context. Researchers who were either female or “outsiders” would have had difficulty in 
negotiating access and probing the types of subjects that I gained access to due to my 
gender and cultural-regional positionality (Kerstetter, 2012). However, my profession as an 
academic, and my lack of direct familiarity with Batkhela bazaar, classified me as an 
“indigenous outsider”. I had many pre-existing ties in the region that enabled my access to 
the bazaar to be negotiated. However, none of these ties existed within the bazaar, creating 
difficulties during the pilot stage which required extensive data generation. During this 
stage, I had to employ a local, educated research assistant (RA) who was living in Batkhela 
town. This was not only a methodological choice, but a necessity due to my unique 
positionality as a visually impaired researcher (VIR). Employing an RA was helpful in 
negotiating initial access, but detrimental to the quality of the survey data generated, owing 
to the RA’s political and religious affiliations. As explained in Section 4.6, the survey data 
was generated from random walks in the bazaar, but the RA preferred to visit his 
acquaintances or relatives, whose demographic data would have had less variation in terms 
of political affiliation and size of individual networks. The RA was replaced after 
generating 45 responses over four days. The new RA had family ties to the president of the 
BU, which proved useful both in terms of enhancing access and in generating data from 
diverse business owners; however, during the 125th interview, a conflict over political 
affiliation in the bazaar arose between the RA and the interviewee. For the rest of the 
interviews, I stopped relying on RAs and instead hired a local cab driver who facilitated 
the fieldwork. This generated people’s confidence in my research, and my effort and 
ingenuity also inspired many business owners who helped negotiate my access during the 
major field intervention. 
My visual impairment did not affect the recordings, interviews, note-taking, 
transcription or first-cycle coding due to my high level of proficiency with computers, 
smartphones and other technology. However, the issue raised its head again when it came 
to using NVivo or other Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) 
software for organising the data and performing more sophisticated qualitative analysis. 
Given the size of the data corpus and multiple datasets that I had generated, the risk of 
missing useful data and trends was higher without a robust organising and retrieval system. 
It was my experience that the claims of the CAQDAS manufacturers regarding 
accessibility standards were not accurate (see Appendix 8). However, an answer to the 




hence all the databases and indices of organisational and substantive codes were generated 
in Microsoft Access (for information on how to use Access for advanced qualitative 




Chapter 5 - Evolving local governance, marketplaces and 
social capital: The Pakistan context 
5.1 Introduction 
Social capital (SC) is context-dependent. To understand its role in local governance, it is 
necessary to understand the specificities of, firstly, the role of local government (LG), and 
secondly, the role of wider local governance, featuring the interaction of formal and 
informal practices and institutions, with particular reference to the role of marketplaces. 
For this purpose, local government in this chapter is defined as state institutions, designed 
to deliver basic public services in a geographically bounded, sub-provincial area (Shah and 
Thompson, 2004). These institutions include elected and appointed structures and 
regulations defining their role in the wider local governance structure. The local 
governance structure, meanwhile, refers to the local political economy that encompasses 
both formal and informal institutions, the local economy, political and civil society 
organisations, and informal social relationships that connect the formal and informal 
spheres of governance (Shah, 2004, p. 1).  
Developing the argument made in Chapter 2 of the present study, this chapter 
asserts that local government in Pakistan is weak, and that the sources of this weakness lie 
in poor institutional design and the asymmetric structure of powers in the social realm. 
Within this dynamic relationship between formal and informal institutions, marketplaces 
have evolved as an important element of local governance in Pakistan and particularly in 
the Malakand region. In addition to reviewing the literature on SC, local governance and 
marketplaces in Pakistan, this chapter also provides a context for the role of Batkhela 
bazaar as an element of the local governance structure, and identifies substantial gaps in 
the literature.  
The chapter proceeds in two main parts. Section 5.2 explores the evolving 
political economy of local governance in Pakistan. It outlines the features of LG and its 
influence on SC; the wider governance structure within which LG operates and SC is 
developed; and the impact of the emerging bazaar economy on local governance processes 
in Pakistan. The role of local culture as an influencing factor is also highlighted. Section 
5.3 then demonstrates that changes in the local government structure in the Malakand 
region co-evolve with socioeconomic transformations. This contiguous evolution provides 
the context for the role in various local governance processes of the SC generated by 
Batkhela bazaar. This section sets out the history of the governance structure in the 




bazaar’s evolving role in the district’s economy and as an element of the local governance 
structure. Finally, Section 5.4 sets out the chapter’s conclusions. 
5.2 Evolving local governance and social capital development in Pakistan 
5.2.1 Local government 
Local government in Pakistan is historically weak (Cheema and Mohmand, 2006, Cheema 
and Myerson, 2014). Central governments in Pakistan have always designed local 
government systems to consolidate and legitimise their rule, instead of creating meaningful 
participation structures (Ahmed, 2009). From British colonial rule of India through to its 
partition, decentralised local administrations were used to consolidate state power instead 
of empowering local communities. Since Pakistan’s inception in 1947, decentralisation 
followed the same logic, albeit with the additional devolution of some responsibilities with 
limited authority. Four LG reforms have been implemented with the stated aim of 
devolving powers to local communities and improving service delivery. The key features 
of these successive reforms are summarised in Table 5.1. Apart from the most recent 
reforms, all have been introduced by military rulers in Pakistan. Without exception, the 
civilian governments that have followed military rule, rather than strengthening LG, have 
obliterated the system (Hasnain, 2008; Anjum, 2001). The reluctance of the political elite 
and bureaucracy to share powers with local administrations has remained a formidable 
challenge to meaningful decentralisation and empowerment through LG in the country.  
Even the most ambitious local government reforms (the devolution plan of 2000) 
were underpinned by the same design considerations as those used in earlier changes, such 
as the consolidation and legitimisation of military rule, the creation of a loyal cadre of 
politicians to undercut the authority of the political elite, and the devolution of political 
responsiveness without meaningful powers (Shami and Faguet, 2015; Mohmand and 
Cheema, 2007, p. 47). After the most recent reforms, provincial and national political 
leaders continued dragging their heels on the issue of devolving powers until the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan passed an order on 2 March 2015 directing provincial governments to 
hold LG elections26. Even after the elections in 2015, provincial leaders delayed the 
devolution of powers to local administrations (Kakar, 2017, p. 3). 
                                                          
26 Khan, A.S. “The ECP agrees to hold local body polls by September.” Dawn, March 4, 2015. Available at  



































































































































The 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan not only provides constitutional 
protection to LG under Article 140a,27 but also devolves 21 departments, including local 
government, from the federal to the provincial government. The major devolved areas 
include health, education, social and population welfare, and food (Buzdar, 2017). 
Provincial administrations can legislate on the extent to which they wish to devolve powers 
and functions to local government. However, in all provincial acts relating to LG, elected 
councils are offered limited control over the fiscal and administrative affairs of the district. 
In a continuation of past practices, these LG acts place bureaucracy in a powerful position 
(Nelson, 2011; Shami and Faguet, 2015).28 This ongoing dominance by bureaucracy of the 
fiscal and administrative affairs of the district is largely due to the state’s fragility, the 
weakness of political parties, and the motives of the provincial government in seeking to 
avoid challenges that may arise from an autonomous and powerful local government. The 
underlying motive of the current drive towards decentralisation in Pakistan is political 
expediency, rather than an authentic intention to enact the essence of the 18th constitutional 
amendment, which seeks to empower the lower tier of LG (Kakar, 2017, p. 1). As observed 
in Section 2.3, LG in the developing world has a general weakness in terms of meeting its 
goals of increased participation and improved service delivery. The picture in Pakistan is 
similar. 
Decentralisation in Pakistan has improved service delivery on some selected 
variables (Aslam and Yilmaz, 2011). However, a number of factors has led to the 
strengthening of patronage structures and targeted service delivery, rather than a wider 
strengthening of civil society (Mohmand and Cheema, 2007, pp. 55-57). Firstly, non-party 
elections have reinforced the influence of caste, class and kinship relationships on voting 
preferences, and have served to undermine party-based voting in LG elections. Recent 
research on LG in urban Pakistan has highlighted the positive impacts of party-based 
elections on upward accountability (Cheema, Mohmand and Liaqat, 2017). Secondly, 
limited fiscal powers (Kardar, 2006, pp. 90-91), the limited authority to allocate resources 
                                                          
27 The 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan 1973 inserted article 140A which clearly states: “Each 
province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and fiscal 
responsibility to the elected representatives of the local governments” (cited in Kakar, 2017, p. 1). 
 
28 LG structure is typically divided in two major spheres: political (elected) and bureaucratic 
(administrative/enforcement) (Jacobsen, 2006). The author reserves the term bureaucracy for the 
administrative heads of tehsils and the district (district commissioner, assistant commissioner and executive 
heads of administrative departments at the district level); whereas officials of the district welfare, food and 






(Keefer, Vishvanat and Narayan, 2003) and increased electoral responsiveness have 
created incentives for political leaders to satisfy their constituencies by acquiring illegal 
favours for them from the administration. Thus, voting patterns are underpinned by voters’ 
propensities to protect their narrow interests instead of aiming at the wider public good and 
improved service delivery (Javed and Rehman, 2016). Thirdly, resource constraints 
seriously impair local government’s capacity to deliver meaningful services (Manning et 
al., 2003, p. 10). As Guess (2005) observed, own-resource generation by local government 
under Pakistan’s devolution plan was limited, and 95% of resources were provided by the 
central government. LG dependence on provincial governments continues to be a major 
characteristic of the new system (Buzdar, 2017). 
The technical, fiscal and political constraints on LG have further undermined its 
capacity to empower the local population (Guess, 2005, pp. 220-221).29 For this reason, 
citizens’ perception surveys comparing pre- and post-LG reforms find that the weakness of 
local government prevents a positive change in the perceptions of its capacity to improve 
governance (Arif, Cartier, Golda and Stone, 2010; Suleri, Shahbaz, Commins and Mosel, 
2017). In the Pakistani LG structure, elected officials who are directly accountable to 
citizens enjoy the fewest powers (Hussain and Hussain, 2009, p. 300). They can, however, 
channel people’s grievances to higher tiers of government (Arif et al., 2010, p. 44). 
Nevertheless, the weakness of LG is a designed characteristic aimed at justifying the 
control and intervention of higher tiers of government in the functions of LG. Reviews of 
the current local government system in Pakistan suggest that the provincial and federal 
levels maintain strong control over the local governments in their respective jurisdictions.30 
LG reforms, instead of contributing to civic improvement in the Putnamian sense of the 
term, have resulted in targeted service delivery and the development of patronage-based 
networks (Mohmand, 2008). Ahmad and Talib (2015) therefore argue that, although LG 
reforms have devolved state powers to the local level, they are yet to be translated into a 
sense of community and collective action at this level. 
The design of formal LG institutions provides a context for the ways in which SC is 
generated and operates in the local governance structure. Regardless of the motives of 
                                                          
29 Design constraints are a historic characteristic of LG reforms in Pakistan. Before the 18th amendment to 
the constitution, central government were responsible for legislating on LG; since the 18th amendment 
provincial governments have held this responsibility. 
 
30 Under the 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan 1973, local government became a provincial 
responsibility. Therefore, each provincial government passed its respective LG acts in 2012-3, and 
Islamabad federal territory has its own LG system that operates under the federal government (See 




institutional designers in Pakistan, LG reforms arguably open up participatory structures 
for new entrants (especially non-elites) in local politics (see Zaidi, 2005). For instance, 
“almost 350,000 Pakistani citizens with little or no previous experience of electoral 
contests participated in municipal level elections across the country in 2015” (Akhter, 
2017, p. 142). Demographic data regarding the mayors and vice-mayors from 22 of the 28 
union councils in Malakand District reveals that 65% had contested LG elections for the 
first time in 2015. This suggests that “ordinary people” maintain an interest in politics, and 
that introducing participatory structures to LG accords them the expression of this interest. 
Akhter (ibid.) further notes that these “ordinary people” participated even though they 
were conscious that those with more money and power would dominate the electoral game. 
As previously noted in Section 2.2.1, decentralisation allows for opening up the field for 
participation and representation, but its functions are not independent of other fields such 
as the social structure of the local economy, the evolving marketplace, and the existing 
bureaucratic/administrative structures (Stokke and Selboe, 2009, p. 62).  
To summarise, LG in Pakistan is able only to generate restricted types of SC such 
as patronage-based networks, weak associations embedded in asymmetric power relations 
and loyalties based on quid-pro-quo arrangements (Filčák et al., 2017). This is mainly for 
two reasons. Firstly, formal institutions, even in the most developed states, do not have the 
capacity to generate Putnamian-type SC (Cento Bull and Jones, 2006). This incapacity is 
amplified in the developing state context, which is characterised by weak states with strong 
societies (Migdal, 1988, cited in Goodwin, 1991, p. 217). Secondly, and as a result of this 
incapacity, the focus on state institutions and their capacity to deliver services often leads 
to narrow conceptualisations of local governance, and especially of the role of SC within it. 
As Mohmand (2016) argues: “In rural south Asia, a great deal of governance is conducted 
through agents, social networks and procedures that do not feature in the formal text and 
sometimes seen to violate wholesale the law, norms of good administrative practice, and 
the principles of representative democracy.” This implies that the sources of authority are 
complex and varied, and an understanding of public authority runs the risk of being 
incomplete if it is based on narrow conceptualisations of politics and governance centred 
around formal state institutions. (ibid., p. 5). Therefore, the design of local government 
systems and their structure and functions alone are unable to explain what is going on in 
the informal realm. The need for understanding local institutions and associations, their 
internal norms and power relations is a “must” for any governance intervention aimed at 




5.2.2 Local governance  
This section argues that civil society is weak in Pakistan because its politics is historically 
instituted within the model of patron-client relations. This does not imply that there is an 
absence of prospects for SC generation. Instead, the social structure of the local economy 
determines the type of SC that the governance context generates (Bourdieu, 2005). Any 
change in the distribution of capital affects relationships within the informal realm, and 
generates interdependencies across the formal and informal spheres of governance. In this 
sense, social capital affects the functions and outcomes of government institutions, as 
Putnam argues, but SC is context-dependent in that its operations and outcomes for 
governance are contingent on the distribution of capital within the region (Schulman and 
Anderson, 1999). The literature on SC and local governance in Pakistan is limited, but 
provides a solid contextualisation of SC and its role in the local governance structure 
(Beall, 1995, 1997; Mohmand, 2008; Khan, 2017b). The key characteristics of the wider 
local governance structure in Pakistan comprise elite capture, patronage politics, economic 
inequalities, social stratification, changing socioeconomic configurations, informal 
networks and group affiliations, and weak civil society (Mohmand, 2008). These features 
are common to most of the developing world (see Section 2.2).  
Elite capture is a central problem of local governance in Pakistan which is 
underpinned by economic inequalities (Easterly, 2001, p. 3). As a consequence, local 
government elections or service delivery functions fail to empower marginalised 
communities (Martin, 2015). The landed elite in the rural areas (Mohmand, 2011) and the 
business elite in the urban context undermine government efforts aimed at inclusion 
(Murtaza and Rid, 2016). For instance, in the 2015 LG elections in Islamabad, a large 
number of seats reserved for peasants and labourers were captured by affluent people. Of 
these reserved seats, 35% were taken by traders, 15% by property dealers and 11% by 
professionals, with only 11% going to representatives of the marginalised communities for 
whom the seats had been intended (ibid., p. 33). Evidence from rural Punjab suggests that 
the landed elite employs violent methods and threats of eviction against sitting tenants to 
acquire votes in LG elections (Martin, 2015). However, Khan (2017c) did not find any 
evidence of coercion or threats of eviction in Malakand District, because of the area’s more 
fragmented land holdings (see also Mohmand and Gazdar, 2007, pp. 6-7, for Dir District). 
Mohmand (2008) found that rich neighbourhoods of LG areas with elected mayors were 
better served than the poor parts of the same electoral ward.31 For this reason, the literature 
                                                          




on service delivery in Pakistan argues that Putnamian-type SC is unable to explain local 
governance in both rural (Channa, 2015) and urban Pakistan (Beall, 1997). 
Economic inequality is an important determinant of the stocks of SC for local 
governance in Pakistan. Sajjad (2012), in a comparison between southern and northern 
Punjab, notes that in the south, where economic inequalities are higher, community social 
capital and the accountability of government officials are lower, while in the north, which 
has higher levels of economic development, there is a higher level of civic engagement and 
government officials are more accountable. Evidence from rural Punjab suggests that the 
relationship between political actors and voters is not one of feudal domination but of 
changing power relations, and landlords modify their strategies to adapt (Mohmand, 2011, 
pp. 205-206; Anderson, 1978). If SC serves as an “institution of restraint” on the conduct 
of government officials, as Hussain (1999, p. 512) argues, then the economic conditions of 
the community are an important determinant of the quality of that social capital (Beall, 
1997).  
The weakness of civil society in Pakistan is often attributed to economic inequalities, 
asymmetric power relations and clientelism (Mohmand, 2011, p. 212; Beall, 1995, p. 444). 
As Mohmand (2008, p. 388) argues, the specific social structures that give rise to social 
stratification, conflict and marginalisation deprive the poor of access to resources and 
opportunities. As previously noted (see Section 2.1), the local economy is an important 
factor in this connection (Faguet, 2015). Mohmand and Gazdar (2007, pp. 5-6) in their 
study on social structures and poverty in six districts across Pakistan, found that in Dir 
District, which had among the lowest economic inequalities of the districts studied, SC was 
higher than in the districts with higher inequalities in land distribution. They argue that 
social structures are a major cause of social exclusion and poverty: in other words, the 
unequal distribution of economic capital – a major characteristic of the South Asian 
economy – underpins the structures of exclusion, whereby the traditional landed and 
capitalist elites enjoy dominance. However, economic transformation, coupled with 
increased governmentalisation, not only provides opportunities for the upward mobility for 
the poor working in the agricultural and non-agricultural informal sectors, but also 
generates new patterns of dependence in which the poor can exert pressure over their 
political representatives through collective organisation (Chatterjee, 2008, p. 59-61).32 
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This suggests that SC exists both in villages (Suleri et al., 2017; Akram and Kumar 
Routray, 2013) and in the urban governance structures of Pakistan (Beall, 1995). However, 
the economic conditions of a community determine the sustainability of its SC. Beall 
(ibid.), in her study of 10 marginalised communities across Punjab and Sindh provinces, 
found that the social networks of these poor communities provide a social safety net that 
acts as a substitute for ineffective formal institutions. However, these communities are 
resource-constrained, which makes Beall (ibid., p. 404) sceptical about the sustainability of 
their SC. 
Pakistani politics at both the national and local level have historically been instituted 
within the model of patron-client relationships (Hussain and Hussain, 2009). These 
relationships are asymmetric and individualistic, and are often developed in the informal 
realm of governance. From everyday practices in the provision of services to the design of 
participation structures, these patron-client ties structure the patterns of citizens’ access to 
state institutions (Mohmand, 2011). The literature on SC in Pakistan agrees that these 
hierarchical relationships are a major hurdle to the development of effective civil society 
(Mohmand, 2008). Unsurprisingly, disagreements on the question of the political agency of 
the poor exist within the literature on patron-client relationships. One strand argues that 
these relationships simply reproduce traditional hierarchies and limit access by the poor to 
state institutions (Martin, 2013, 2015). Others view these relationships as dynamic and 
flexible, and as affording a limited degree of power to the poor in terms of their access to 
the institutions (Lyon, 2002). As Lyon (ibid., p. 192) argues, these ties are not fixed bonds 
of loyalty, but rather are voluntary reciprocal relationships based on the mutual interests of 
the parties involved, stating: “Neither the factions nor the patron/client ties should be 
understood as enduring or fixed sets of relationships but rather should be understood as 
flexible bonds which are instantiated for particular purposes, some of which may appear 
relatively long term” (ibid., pp. 197-198). 
Within this discursive space, informal relationships are developed around formal 
governance processes which constitute “the politics of common sense” (Akhter, 2017, p. 
1). Akhter’s (ibid., p. 11) insights into changes in Pakistani politics, the rise of informal 
trade, changing socioeconomic relations, and the implications for various governance 
practices, demonstrate change both from above and below. These insights show that the 
logic of state and capital together structure these patronage relationships in a dialectical 
fashion (Chatterjee, 2008, p. 59). A key argument of Akhter’s account of Pakistan’s 




emergence of new forces, and have thus constituted the evolution of patronage structure 
(Akhter, 2017, p. 13).  
The most important element of Akhter’s study is the issue of the rise of informal 
traders in the services and retail sector, which, according to Akhter, has gradually become 
part of the politics of common sense.33 Akhter (ibid., p. 12) argues that this has made 
corruption and intercession primary characteristics of the Pakistani governance structure. 
However, the study’s grand theorising with an explicit commitment to materialist models 
of coercion and consent leads Akhter to discard any possibility of change as an outcome of 
the reflexive engagement of agency with these structural forces (Stokke and Selboe, 2009). 
Kaviraj’s (1988, pp. 2,429-2,433) critique of class-based political economy models 
correctly highlights hierarchies within the classes, and the interdependence that holds these 
classes together. Kaviraj notes that the dissatisfaction of any component of this class 
structure with the existing arrangements leads to a change in the patterns of cooperation. 
Nevertheless, these structuralist, macro-political economy models are lacking on two 
grounds: there is an implicit or explicit omission of the reflexive engagement of individual 
agency with evolving class structures; and an inability to offer a meso-level place-based 
explanation of local governance practices. Contrary to Akhter’s (2017) argument rejecting 
the possibility of change brought about by the reflexive engagement of agency with 
structural forces, there is much more yet to be seen regarding the role of emerging 
collective action, which may restructure existing class relationships without necessarily 
reproducing these structures.  
Due to the peculiarities of local governance structures in South Asia, postcolonialist 
scholars such as Chatterjee (2004, p. 66) reject social capital and civil society as useful 
theoretical lenses to explain governance in such contexts. Chatterjee’s criticism of SC is 
directed specifically towards the Putnamian notion of SC, owing to its focus on the civic 
community with positive outcomes both for its members and operation of government 
institutions. To explain collective action and its outcomes for community and government 
institutions, Chatterjee develops the concept of political society. Chatterjee (ibid., p. 66) 
contends that organisations emerging out of excluded classes exert “the right pressure at 
the right places in the governmental machinery”. In addition, often these organisations 
appropriate powers for themselves and thus lose the community’s trust. Chatterjee’s 
premise that the poor also have organising power, which accords them a degree of 
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influence over formal governance institutions through political actors, is correct. However, 
the analysis of SC in the present study requires distance from both Chatterjee and the 
critiques of his concept in Pakistan’s context for two distinct but related reasons. Firstly, 
SC is a useful concept for explaining the local governance structure in Pakistan and similar 
contexts if viewed through a Bourdieusian lens (Mohmand, 2008). Secondly, the structural 
determinacy in Chatterjee’s critiques (Akhter, 2017; Martin, 2015) incorrectly deprives the 
poor of any individual or collective agency that is reflexively developed in their everyday 
engagement with governance structures. It is this reflexive engagement with changing 
government structures and economic relationships that explains the role of trader 
communities built around marketplaces as an element of local governance  
5.2.3 The bazaar as an element of local governance 
Within the context of evolving local governance in Pakistan and the role of marketplaces 
as one element of this, the literature on marketplaces remains significantly 
underdeveloped. Overall, however, the literature agrees that marketplaces have resulted in 
political inclusivity due to their transformative potential from below (Jan, 2014; Javed, 
2017). This section argues that marketplaces have evolved into a significant element of 
local governance with socioeconomic and political implications.  
Marketplace evolution in Pakistan has significantly influenced the country’s class-
based, patronage structures. Economic restructuring over the past four decades and the rise 
of the traders’ class has restructured the traditional relationships of domination between the 
landed (property-owning) and landless classes (M.A Jan., 2017, pp. 1-2). This change is 
more conspicuous in rural areas, which are often dominated by a landed family or a group 
of these families. Martin (2015), in his ethnography of a Punjabi village, observed in 
passing that the development of market towns had allowed the occupational classes to 
escape from traditional patronage relationships and forced labour. For Akhter, 
“shopkeeping” is the most common means for upward mobility for subordinate classes” 
(Akhter, 2017, p. 86). Ahmed (1980, pp. 297-303), in his brief account of the bazaars in 
Mohmand Agency, found that the economic opportunities generated by marketplaces had 
forced members of the landed class (against their traditional class habitus) to adopt trade as 
an occupation due to their changing socioeconomic conditions. The majority of the 
businesses in the bazaars were owned by the landed class, who hired members of the 
occupational classes to run the businesses on their behalf. Beneath this simple transactional 
pattern lay changing patterns of structural interdependence: for a Pukhtun landlord, trading 
in the bazaar was seen as undermining his “honour”, as it would ultimately mean joining 




The implications of evolving (rising) marketplaces for political inclusion are even 
more significant than their role in the changes to patronage structures, and have received 
by far the most attention in the literature on Pakistani politics. Market traders and 
shopkeepers are “the most vocal of the intermediate classes, and are often at the forefront 
of popular agitation” (Akhter, 2017, p. 86). As Wilder (1999, p. 131) notes, the “shutter 
power” of the bazaar has a significant and immediate impact on government. Beyond the 
politics of agitation, the influence of marketplaces extends to the politics of participation 
and inclusion. Jan (2014), in his study of Batkhela bazaar, notes that the socioeconomic 
transformation due to Batkhela bazaar has resulted in political inclusivity, although he is 
unable to explain the ways in which this inclusion has occurred in terms of participation, or 
the implications for the governance of service delivery. In his study of markets in urban 
Lahore, Javed (2017) argues that the rise of the trading class reflects a gradual shift in 
election patterns, which has rendered traders the second largest occupational class in 
politics. In the 2015 municipal government elections, Javed (ibid.) notes that 184 of the 
268 elected members of the ruling party were entrepreneurs from the bazaar sector.  
Amirali (2017, pp. 144, 190, 275-9) concludes that politics is still dominated by 
those with access to economic capital and with some social standing in their town. 
However, she noted the growing role of the traders’ community, especially the 
involvement of its affluent members in local politics, and the traders’ strategy of 
cultivating patronage relationships by sponsoring the candidacy of politicians and 
maintaining well-connected institutional networks (ibid., p. 144). This increased role of 
business in politics has particularly influenced bureaucracy-elite relations, strengthening 
the ties between the political class and the traders’ community to the detriment of the 
administration (ibid., p. 275). Chapter 6 of the present study will investigate in greater 
depth how the marketplace influences local politics.  
Marketplaces also impact on the governance of service delivery. As Javed (2017) 
argues, traders develop both internal and external networks that help them negotiate taxes 
with local government, land-use rights and municipal services. Asad Ullah (2014) found in 
his study of Sharaqpur bazaar that traders negotiate the payment of bribes rather than 
relying on legal channels owing to lack of trust in the administration of justice. This 
sometimes, as Asad Ullah reports, leads to abuses of power by administrative officials 
which in turn lead to informal negotiations between traders and the local administration. 
However, these informal negotiations are not necessarily an outcome of the abuse of power 
by the local administration. Hasan et al. (2008), in their study of street vendors in the 




administration’s plans to improve local governance. These accounts of marketplace actors 
focus on the “dark” side of the increasing political agency of traders for the governance of 
service delivery (Amirali, 2017, pp. 276-277). However, these accounts fail to focus on the 
dynamic interdependence that evolving marketplaces, as increasingly significant elements 
of local governance, generate between the political and administrative spheres of 
governance. Within this context, the participation of traders in elections is not the only way 
to measure change; it can be also observed in the extent to which traders rely on the local 
political elite to access state institutions (Khan, 2017a). 
The role of marketplaces in service delivery is also linked to Islam. Traders are 
often linked to Islamic political parties, mosque committees and religious philanthropic 
foundations. In performing their service delivery functions, these foundations benefit from 
the religious embeddedness of the bazaar traders (Javed, 2017). Historically, it has not 
been possible to distinguish religious giving from the interdependence between religion, 
the economy and politics. Given that Pakistan ranks sixth in the world in terms of religious 
giving (Osella, 2018, p. 4), the implications of giving for service delivery and the role of 
marketplaces in this connection remain underexplored. Moreover, the roles of interpersonal 
networks and trust have entirely escaped the analytical attention of scholars on 
marketplaces in Pakistan (Jan, 2014; Javed, 2017; Akhter, 2017; Amirali, 2017; Ahmed, 
1980). Despite a trader’s religious obligation to donate, interpersonal networks and 
informal social exchanges among traders are central to facilitating service delivery by 
charity associations. The social complexity of bazaar-generated SC and the implications 
for service delivery are explored further in Chapter 8 of this study. 
The existing knowledge on the role of marketplaces as an element of local 
governance, especially in relation to the SC they generate, has two major limitations. 
Firstly, in its focus on the issues of class power and patronage relationships, the literature 
on marketplaces in Pakistan views the state and markets as two broad categories. It 
therefore overlooks their internal conflicts, and the complex processes of SC generation 
across these spheres of governance. Moreover, informal relationships of patronage 
influence service delivery processes, but the literature omits any role of trust and 
reciprocity as key explanatory factors in the governance around service delivery. Secondly, 
the literature that directly delves into the role of marketplaces in local governance has 
focused on urban metropolitan centres (Akhter, 2017; Javed, 2017; Hasan et al., 2008). In 
their illuminating historical account of marketplaces in Pakistan, Hasan and Raza (2009, 
pp. 39-43) note a decline in the political significance of marketplaces in small towns due to 




traditional role that marketplaces performed. However, this urban perspective impedes 
understanding of the integrative potential of marketplaces as an element of local 
governance. Furthermore, the context for the present research is distinct, in the sense that 
Batkhela bazaar has evolved from a village economy to an officially designated urban 
town of Malakand District (Jan, 2017).  
5.2.4 Local culture and governance: Pukhtunwali  
Any discussion of state-society relations in Malakand District is incomplete without 
reference to Pukhtunwali (Marsden and Hopkins, 2013, pp. 1-2). Pukhtunwali can be 
defined as an informal institution in Uphoff’s (1993) sense, as a composite of norms and 
behaviours that persist over time. As Harriss-White (2010, pp. 170-171) argues, informal 
institutions tend to guide economic behaviours owing to ineffective state institutions and 
the complexity of local social realities in developing states.  
As a set of social rules, Pukhtunwali is an important element of the local political 
economy in the Malakand region (Barth, 1959a, Chapter 4; Lindholm, 1979). The literature 
regards it as a source of private order in the weakness or absence of the state (Ginsburg, 
2011). In relation to marketplaces, Pukhtunwali defines rules of inclusion/exclusion, 
regulates economic and non-economic exchanges (Ahmed, 1980, pp. 299-300), and 
underpins the logic of collective action. However, the role of Pukhtunwali in relation to 
marketplaces or governance is non-deterministic. This means that the practice of 
Pukhtunwali is co-evolving with economic and political change: as a cultural practice, it is 
not fixed, but is constantly being reproduced. For instance, the adoption of trading as an 
occupation for a member of the landed class was against the ideals of Pukhtunwali 
(Lindholm, 1982, pp. 122-123; Ahmed, 1980, pp. 297-298). However, with the changing 
distribution of capital and power relations, that “ideal model of Pukhtun society has 
changed” (Ahmed, 1980., pp. 202-203). Moreover, the changing technologies of 
production and the increased monetisation of the local economy have fundamentally 
restructured the traditional patron-client relationships that are characteristic of Pukhtun 
society (Anderson, 1978; Lindholm, 1982). Finally, interaction with the state and the 
quality of institutions also account for variations in how Pukhtunwali is practised (Ahmed, 
1980, pp. 7-8). 
Key elements of Pukhtunwali include: honour (nang), gender inequity, which is 
closely related to the question of honour, retribution (badal), rivalry with cousins 
(tarburwali), status envy (siali), women’s chastity (tor), submission or asylum (nanavati), 
hospitality (melmastia), and doing good (khair-khegara). In everyday life, this code is 




women’s chastity, without rendering religion insignificant in the Pukhtun culture. In fact, 
Pukhtun culture has three competing sources of authority: Islam, expressed through 
mullahs and mosques; jirgas (tribal councils) that represents the will of the community, 
and whose membership is determined by the possession of land; and maliks (tribal elders) 
whose position in the social structure is determined by the possession of various forms of 
capitals such as wealth, access to state institutions and education (Ginsburg, 2011).  
Some elements of Pukhtunwali are critical to understanding marketplace-local 
government interaction. For instance, the role of the jirga as a dispute resolution 
mechanism is preferred over formal institutions in many cases. The jirga, in its modern 
sense, may comprise a few people of good repute who are entrusted by one party with the 
task of negotiating on its behalf. Land-related and business disputes are often resolved 
through this mechanism outside the formal courts (Suleri et al., 2017, p. 11). It can also 
function as participatory space, or as an instrument of interest articulation for a group or a 
community. The traders’ union of Batkhela bazaar has its roots in this institution (Jan, 
2010).  
Badal or retribution, as a key element of Pukhtunwali, governs economic and non-
economic exchanges between and among individuals (Lindholm, 1982, Chapter 4). The 
literature often incorrectly interprets badal narrowly as revenge. In fact, it covers all sorts 
of social exchanges ranging from responding to someone’s request for a favour to the 
rituals of gift exchanges to punishing a violator of trust (ibid., pp. 115-116).  
The combined outcomes of the Pukhtunwali principles of honour and women’s 
chastity result in women’s seclusion, restricting the role of women primarily to the private 
sphere of the household. This not only limits their mobility in the public space in general, 
but also curtails their agency in terms of making choices for adopting an occupation, 
especially trading in the bazaar (Gohar and Abrar, 2016). As a result, women are excluded 
from the marketplace and the occupation of trader is exclusively male. Furthermore, 
existing gender roles in the patriarchal Pukhtun culture not only forbid women’s access to 
the marketplaces as traders, but also define the spaces within the markets which women 
can and cannot visit. Local accounts from Malakand suggest that in rural areas of the 
district, the exclusion of women from the public space of marketplaces is so rigorously 
enforced that they are rendered entirely dependent on male family members for purchasing 
the items they need, including clothes, undergarments and cosmetics. Some Pukhtun 
societies do appear to countenance women becoming traders: for example, evidence from 
Pukhtun communities in Afghanistan suggests that women from elite families in urban 




businesses are extremely limited in size owing to their dependence on the network of an 
individual. Generally, women are restricted to trading activities that operate within the 
household, such as producing specialised crafts or carrying out small-scale manufacturing 
(Ritchie, 2013, pp. 1-2; Khan, 2016). 
Pukhtunwali also has rules for cooperation, solidarity and collective action. 
Informal voluntary associations at village or ward level are a common feature of Pukhtun 
society. These associations often gather to help at times of death, marriage or emergency 
situations (Suleri et al., 2017, pp. 14-15). Cooperation within these community-level 
collective groups is underpinned by communal reciprocity. Members of a neighbourhood 
participate in these events in the belief that others will be forthcoming in similar situations 
(Beall and Schütte, 2006, pp. 51-52), whereas in associations of other types such as 
political parties, collective action is on the basis of the convergence of interests. To achieve 
political ends, ties are formed even with family rivals, but these alliances are rather short-
lived (Lindholm, 1979, pp. 491-494). These relationships are often asymmetric, but they 
are based on mutual dependence and voluntary cooperation (ibid., pp. 20-21). This means 
that social structures are internalised in an agent’s habitus, determining his/her ability to 
make choices for materialising his/her objectives. 
Flexibility of habitus explains why individual differences, underpinned by 
differences of class and status, are discounted and how class and status boundaries are 
temporarily displaced to achieve collective interest (Arbab, 2017, p. 227). A striking 
feature of collective action by political parties (ibid., p. 221) and traders’ associations in 
Pakistan is their mobilisation capacity, especially on the question of religion or perceived 
state oppression (ibid.).34 In Pukhtun society, even rival factions renounce their differences 
and support the collective cause against an external threat (ibid., p. 221). This complexity 
of the local social order explains why generally weak traders’ associations display 
successful collective action and why interest-based associations of the Olsonian type differ 
from the voluntary associations of the Putnamian type in their capacity to generate 
community support and displays of collective action (Olson, 1965, p. 6; Putnam, 1995, p. 
67). 
Owing to its complexity and influence over local life, Pukhtunwali has always been 
central to government reforms, in that the cultural institutions of Pukhtunwali have been 
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fused into local governance policies.35 Historically, attempts to change it from above 
without proper understanding, whether by the British colonial state, the Pakistani state or 
donor agencies, have led to policy failures (Ahmed, 2013; Geiser, 2013). Development 
scholars argue that changes in the role of Pukhtunwali as an element of local development 
is possible through complex interactions among actors both from above and below (local 
power holders and institutional entrepreneurs) (Ritchie, 2016). In Malakand District, this 
change can be observed, but as a product of a more complex dialectical relationship 
between institutional changes from above and socioeconomic change from below. 
Therefore, the next section of this chapter sets out the context of the political economy of 
the Malakand region, in order to outline the contiguous evolution of the state and the local 
economy. 
5.3 The evolving governance structure of Malakand region: A political economy 
analysis 
5.3.1 Changes in the local economy and governance 
The Malakand region comprises seven districts including Malakand District (see Map 1). 
The local governance structure in the region is characterised by changes in the local 
government structure and the introduction of formal structures for political participation 
and service delivery (Jan, 2010; Khaliq, 2012), and by significant economic restructuring 
from below (Lindholm, 2013). This contiguous evolution of state and socioeconomic 
structures provides the context for understanding the evolving nature and role of SC in 
local governance.  
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  Making sense of the local political economy and the increasing role of 
marketplaces in the governance structure of the Malakand region requires an understanding 
of both the continuity and change in the interstices between formal and informal 
governance. One important area of continuity is the centrality of informal governance and 
the local economy in the operation of formal institutions (Suleri et al., 2017); while change 
is represented by the evolving forms of LG and the increased role of marketplaces in the 
local governance structure (Ahmed, 1980, pp. 7, 203; Khan, 2017a). There is no one-to-
one correspondence between these twin structural evolutions; they are therefore viewed in 
the field-capital-habitus dialectic outlined in Chapter 3. Table 5.2 gives an overview of the 
evolved local political economy of the Malakand region, which also provides an important 
context for the overview of the historical evolution of local governance structures later in 
this section. 
Table 5.2. Evolution of the political economy of the Malakand region 
Period/ 




Land-owning Pukhtuns Jirgas*, courts and elected 
representatives  
Decision-making body Jirgas  Public representation, state 
institutions and jirgas 
Local government Centralised Decentralised 
Local economy Agrarian (non-monetary 
exchanges) 
Market (monetary exchanges) 
Social structure Minority of land-holders 
(dominant class); majority of 
landless/occupational classes 
(dominated classes) 
No dominant land-holding class 
Relationship between 
landed and landless class 




Major source of power Land-holding and large 
followership (vertical networks) 
Land-holding, economic capital 
and cross-cutting ties 
Access to state institutions Members of landed class only Anyone with economic, 
political, cultural or social 
capital 
Political participation Through jirgas (exclusive to 
landed class) 
Universal adult franchise for 




None (only in crises, war or 
external aggression) 
None (except for the protection 
of collective interests) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration36 *Jirgas are councils comprising land-owning Pukhtuns 
                                                          





The current political history of Malakand originates with the migration of Yusufzai 
Pukhtuns to the region from Afghanistan in the 17th century. With their arrival, they 
defeated the rulers of the region (Jan, 2010, p. 58) and devised a new system of land-
distribution called wesh/esh,37 which divided the land into dawtar (rotating ownership) and 
seray (fixed ownership) allotments. The former rotated among Yusufzai Pukhtuns like 
shares among the members of a firm, while the latter was fixed land (Sultan-i-Rome, 2008, 
p. 234; Barth, 1959b).38 Pukhtuns remained as a ruling elite from their conquest of the 
region in 1515 until recent times. Their dominance was cemented with the advent of 
British control of the region. The British government was unnerved over the unrest 
developing in the state of Chitral (see Map 1), and a military campaign was launched in 
1895 to gain control of it. The British military used Malakand as their route to Chitral, and 
thus established a hold in Malakand first. The Malakand agency was formed, constituting 
the current districts of Malakand, Swat, Dir and Chitral (see Map 1). The administrative 
system of the agency was different from that in the settled districts of the frontier region, a 
system that still has its imprint on certain aspects of the formal governance structure 
(Pakistan country report, 2015).  
The governance system introduced by the British government had four key pillars. 
Firstly, it included the office of political agent (PA), a representative of the colonial 
government who was responsible for the maintenance of peace through a number of 
inducements and punitive measures for the initiation and continuity of treaties with the 
tribal chiefs, and for the protection of British government interests in the region. The PA 
also had at his disposal a kind of police force called levies or khasadars. Secondly, the 
institution of maliki was designed to ensure good conduct from the tribes. Maliks (tribal 
chiefs) were paid in various ways by the British government to facilitate government in the 
region,39 and served as members of the jirgas (tribal councils) created under the Frontier 
Crimes Regulations (FCR) (see following point). Thirdly, the FCR laws were introduced 
with the aim of punishing crimes instead of administering justice: they introduced a set of 
severe measures, including collective punishments and the removal of the right to habeas 
corpus, to facilitate the PA’s control over his jurisdiction, in addition to creating the jirgas 
for the adjudication of civil and criminal cases (Jan, 2010, p. 57). Fourthly, rivaj, literally 
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39 Ahmed (1980) identifies five types of leadership in Pukhtun society: traditional maliks (recognised by the 
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meaning customs, was an important element of this system. These customs and 
conventions were based on centuries-old usage by the Pukhtun society, and the jirgas had 
legitimacy to interpret these usages (Jan, 2010, p. 60). Due to these features, governance 
dispensations in the tribal areas were different from those in the settled areas of the 
province. Such a system of loose control was due to the weakness of the central state in 
controlling the region without the help of traditional governance actors and institutions 
(World Bank, 2005, pp. 5, 9, 17-18). 
 This governance system legitimised and formalised the hierarchical social structure 
that was divided between land-owning Pukhtuns and all other occupational classes 
(Lindholm, 1979).40 In the Malakand region, land was “the main source of economic and 
political power” (Sultan-i-Rome, 2005, p. 30). Social hierarchy, underpinned by 
differences in land distribution, was a major determinant of people’s access to state 
institutions.41 The political sphere was dominated by the land-owning Pukhtuns, while the 
landless class had access to state institutions only through jirgas, where they had no 
representation. This institutionalised exclusion of the landless class from access to state 
institutions (Akhter, 2017) favoured the minority land-owning class, which constituted 
between a fifth and a tenth of the total population in various territories of the Malakand 
region (Asad, 1972).  
 State capture by the landed elite even prevented indigenous rulers from creating 
inclusive governance spaces. For instance, Sultan-i-Rome (2005, p. 30) notes that the 
education policies of the ruler of Swat State resulted in a generation of educated people 
within the unprivileged class, who demanded more civil and political rights.42 The ruler, 
however, could not grant these rights, fearing retaliation from the landed Pukhtuns whose 
                                                          
40 For an example of the role of state in excluding non-landowners from the right to land in the broader 
Malakand region, see Sultan-i-Rome, N.D., Land Ownership in Swat: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspective. Available at: 
http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/Land%20Ownership%20in%20Swat.pdf 
 
41 The hierarchical social structure of traditional Pukhtun society was broadly divided into different 
categories: Pukhtuns, land-owning Yusufzais, religious leaders who were entitled to fixed land but inactive 
in politics and should be differentiated from religious teachers (mullahs) who were the dependents of 
Pukhtun landlords, and all landless classes e.g. farm labourers [fakirs] village specialists [barbers, 
leatherworkers, tailors, etc.] and hill-dwelling Gujjars. Each class had its own internal hierarchies (see 
Lindholm, 1979, pp. 489-492; for an approximate hierarchy within the landless class see Lindholm, 1982, p. 
97). 
 
42 The current Malakand District was part of Swat State until 1924, whereas Swat was a princely state ruled 
by the wali of Swat until 1969. The princely states (Swat and Dir) were abolished and the Malakand region 
(PATA) was merged into the state of Pakistan (for a comprehensive history see Sultan-i-Rome, 2008, Swat 
State (1915-1969) From genesis to merger: An analysis of political, administrative, socio-political and 




support was critical to the maintenance of his authority. Similarly, during British rule, and 
later under the Pakistani state, the state was dependent on these powerful tribal leaders in 
Malakand to facilitate its control and retain its authority in the region (Jan, 2010, pp. 88-
89). Explaining the magnitude of this institutionalised exclusion, one interview respondent 
stated: 
“It was their khans’ rule, because they were the members of the jirga. They could 
declare an innocent person as thief, and a thief as an innocent person. Not all of us 
were poor, we could have purchased land, but the system did not allow us to do so” 
(Sardar interview, 12 July 2016) 
This edifice of state-society relations and the class structure within society rested on 
title to land. Losing one’s title to land implied losing one’s place on the council and hence 
direct access to state institutions. It should be noted, however, that a non-Pukhtun who 
acquired land did not earn membership of the council. Thus, caste and land ownership 
qualified a person to have direct access to state institutions. In this formal governance 
arrangement, the occupational (landless) classes, including the traders of Batkhela bazaar, 
were denied the right to purchase land and to directly access state institutions (Jan, 2017, 
pp. 309-310).  
 The agrarian economic structure, with its related class dynamics, has existed for 
centuries, but its expression as a political society was institutionalised by British imperial 
rule. However, this class structure, in Asad’s (1972) words, should not be viewed as a 
frozen instant in time, but as unfolding process in which the life chances of an individual 
are determined by the practical and ideological relationships of a group to the means of 
production. This evolutionary logic of capital also has implications for social relationships. 
Contrary to earlier anthropological observations (Barth, 1959a, p. 112), the patterns of land 
ownership, instead of concentrating land in the hands of a few Pukhtun landowners, have 
acquired a trajectory of diffusion whereby land is fragmented and owned by a greater 
number of individual households. Economic restructuring and the evolution of 
marketplaces in the heart of the agrarian economy offered the foundation for this change. 
As Lindholm (1982, pp. 123-125) notes, the growing bazaar in Durushkhela (Swat 
District) has resulted in a transformation from bartering to monetised exchanges. These 
transforming exchange relationships in a socially embedded economy have set the tone for 





Certain policy measures at the macro-level have also impacted on the local political 
economy, with significant effects on the poorest groups. Firstly, since the oil boom of the 
1970s in the Middle East, the Pakistani government has sent hundreds of thousands of 
workers to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries (Amjad and Arif, 2013). 
Remittances from this overseas labour have been used to build houses or have been 
invested in a wide variety of local businesses. This inflow of resources has also contributed 
to reducing the dependence of the landless on the landed class. Capital from foreign 
remittances allows the upward mobility of the poor which, in turn, has implications for the 
local political structure (Ahmed, 1981). 
The evolution of the political structure is not simply an outcome of economic 
transformation from below: changes in formal institutions in the Malakand region have 
also shaped this evolution. The withdrawal of official support for jirgas, the introduction of 
electoral politics and the integration of the region into the state’s political structure have 
increased the political agency of the excluded classes in the region’s power-politics 
(Lindholm, 1979, 1982; Jan, 2010, pp. 96-99). In addition, the introduction of electoral 
politics in the early 1970s, at the time when the first uprising against the landed class was 
taking place in the region, allowed “some hope for change” for the discontented masses 
(Lindholm, 2013, p. 23). This institutional change has at least unfrozen legal barriers to the 
right of the occupational classes to participate in representative structures. Electoral 
politics is still dominated by members of the landed class; however, the structure of 
political participation at the grassroots level reflects a clear break from the past. Table 5.3 
compares the pre-1970 period with the situation the year after the 2015 elected local 
government system was introduced, in terms of the representation of the landed and 
landless classes, to demonstrate the impact of formal institutions on political participation. 
Table 5.3: Background of political representatives in Malakand District, pre-1970s and in 2016 
Period/ 
Type of representation 
 Pre-1970s 2016  
Representative institution Jirgas*  Elected local government** 
Proportion of members drawn 
from landed class 
100% 66% 
Proportion of members drawn 
from landless class 
0% 34% 
Source: A short telephonic survey by the author. *Jirgas are councils of elders. **This column 
shows data on the elected mayors and deputy mayors (n=48) at village/Union Council level from 
24 out of 28 councils in Malakand District 
The long-term implications of these contiguous changes for the local political 
economy are conspicuous in Malakand District. Jan (2010, p. 117) notes this shift in an 




dispute with the government. This reflects a clear change since the 1970s, when the landed 
class had a monopoly on access to state institutions through the institution of jirgas. A 
prominent wholesaler in Batkhela, who started as a street vendor in 1984, stated: “I don’t 
need these political leaders to talk to the administration. If you want, I can invite the AC 
for a dinner at my house and you will also be present there” (Sohaib interview, 8 May 
2016). Within this context, the shift from jirgas to elected LG has caused a change in the 
interaction between the formal and informal institutions of governance. The state’s 
deliberate policy of creating patronage structures has been replaced by pragmatic 
interaction between the local administration and political elite (Giustozi, 2013, p. 248). In 
the current decentralised governance structure of Malakand District, proximity between 
elected representatives and their voters creates incentives for the local administration to 
patronise these representatives for controlling local population (Khan, 2017a). This 
suggests that increasing governmentalisation at local level causes changes in state-society 
interrelationships (Chatterjee, 2008). 
Two contiguous “bottom-up” processes, the interaction of social institutions with 
government institutions, and the integration of the local economy into the wider economic 
structures, serve as drivers of change in local governance practices. Ahmed’s (1980) 
distinction between encapsulated and unencapsulated societies is a useful heuristic device 
to understand the changes in state-society interaction due to the increased 
governmentalisation in the Malakand region. While comparing the Yusufzais living in 
Swat and the Mohmands living in Mohmand agency, Ahmed categorises Pukhtun social 
organisation into nang (honour) and qalang (tax) societies. Nang society is a tribal, 
egalitarian society, governed strictly by tribal codes and uncaptured by state institutions, 
whereas qalang society is stratified, and encapsulated by centralised state apparatus and 
broader economic forces (ibid., p. 3).43 44 The transitional factors, as Ahmed (ibid., p. 120) 
argues, are both economic and political. He emphasises that mere economic factors such as 
large arable lands and artificial irrigation systems were not the only factors that caused the 
transformation of the Swati society into a qalang society: British control and the 
introduction of the maliki system also helped prepare the transition from one form to 
                                                          
43 In his later study on economic change as an outcome of foreign remittances, Ahmed (1981) notes that 
nang has become irrelevant and this society was moving towards connectedness within the broader 
system.  
 
44 Ahmed (1980, p. 119) admits that this ideal-typical distinction is an oversimplification of the complex 
Pukhtun social organisation. However, it was useful to place Mohmands and Yusufzais in antithetical 
models to demonstrate his argument that, just as Swat offers a typical model of the qalang category, 





another. Change comes about as a consequence “of a dynamic and direct relationship 
between ecological and larger political factors” (ibid., p. 121).45 Since the 1970s, the 
evolution of the local economy from an agrarian to a monetised market, and the 
institutional restructuring from jirgas to more inclusive invited spaces, have served as an 
impetus for change in the political economy of the Malakand region. 
Within this context, as Marsden and Hopkins (2013) note, much of the recent 
literature on contemporary local governance in the Malakand region is limited by its focus 
on terrorism and militancy. This is mainly due to misinterpretations of the local culture by 
donor-driven utilitarian academic excursions (ibid., pp. 2-3). A recent panel survey of 
governance perceptions by Secure Livelihood Research Consortium (SLRC) in four local 
councils of Swat and Dir Districts is instructive (Shahbaz, Suleri, Khan and Ali, 2017). 
However, a more grounded perspective on contemporary local governance provided in the 
present research, focused on the everyday lived experiences of citizens and their 
engagement with local government, along with the implications of these interactions for 
state-society relations, will provide new insights about the functioning of LG in the 
governance structure of the Malakand region.  
5.3.2 Conflict, governance and marketplaces in the Malakand region 
In 2008-9, the Malakand region was brought to attention of the world’s media and to 
scholars when Swat and its surrounding districts (including Malakand) were transformed 
into the “South Asian theatre of the global war on terror because of the Taliban’s uprising 
and the subsequent military intervention by the Pakistani Army” (Marsden and Hopkins, 
2012, pp. 1-2). Anthropological studies that refocused attention on the region in the light of 
these new developments “lacked theoretical and empirical rigour required to bring the 
story of Swat up to date” (ibid., p. 2). Marketplaces have received by far the least attention 
in this respect. An important point here for the local economy relates particularly to the 
role of marketplaces in the post-conflict governance of the region, in that they were 
affected differently by the conflict, and thus their role in the local governance needs to be 
conceptualised as such (WFP, 2010, pp. 20-22). Suleri et al.’s study on fruit and vegetable 
markets in the post-conflict Swat district, and Jan and Aman’s (2016) study on Batkhela 
bazaar for instance, published more than half a decade after the conflict, reinforce this 
point. Undoubtedly, the operation of all markets across the Malakand region was disrupted 
                                                          
45 Ahmed’s distinction between nang and qalang societies is structural, not cultural. He wished to explain 
how structural differences in localised structures underpinned cultural interpretations, and how varying 





during the conflict, but those in the Malakand District were less affected than those in the 
Swat and Dir Districts. This line of reasoning may well affect scholarship on the region if 
we critically engage with the theoretical understanding and empirical realities of the 
region. The present study refrains from conceptualising the region in the language of 
conflict and post-conflict, because it is concerned with the issues of broader significance to 
the people in their everyday lives and broader social and governance affairs (Marsden and 
Hopkins, 2012, p. 4). 
Several factors account for the varying effects of the impact of the conflict on 
marketplaces. Some conflict areas faced massive internal displacement and infrastructural 
damage to roads, shops and storage facilities in the markets, while others were affected in 
the short run, where access to markets was inhibited for both customers and traders due to 
protracted curfews. Malakand District falls under the latter category, since most of the 
traders and local population was not displaced, Batkhela (and other bazaars in Malakand 
District) did not suffer infrastructural damage, and some large entrepreneurs even adopted 
innovative ways to cope with the situation (Jan and Aman, 2016). Doubtless, the conflict 
affected the economy of Batkhela bazaar which resiliently recovered after the crisis. The 
existing literature fails to appreciate the varying impacts of the conflict on the region’s 
different marketplaces and their differentiated trajectories of recovery.  
More importantly, international and government interventions failed to capture the 
role of markets in the broader political economy, i.e. relationships among actors across the 
commodity supply chain, and between market and governance actors, and the governance 
structure of market and market access (Suleri et al, 2016, p. 8). The conflict affected the 
role of Batkhela bazaar in local governance in many ways; however, marketplaces as a 
permanent characteristic of the local political economy of the region require attention first. 
Therefore, this study focuses on the centrality of marketplaces to the local political 
economy and the implications of its SC generation for local governance. To this end, it 
focuses on the role of Batkhela bazaar in the governance dimensions that capture the role 
of marketplaces in the local political economy beyond conflict and crises. This is to ensure 
the generalisability of the research findings on the role of marketplaces in the local 
governance to those areas of Pakistan that were unaffected by the conflict (Javed, 2017; 
Amirali, 2017; Hasan, Polak and Polak, 2008). 
 
5.3.3 Malakand District: Socioeconomic and political profile 
Malakand District, previously known as the Malakand protected area or the Malakand 




PATA comprises seven districts that are accorded special status under Articles 246 and 
247 of the 1973 Constitution.46 This special status includes tax exemptions for trade, 
agriculture and industry, and a provision that the provincial parliament cannot legislate for 
the area unless the provincial governor and national president give their approval (Pakistan 
country report, 2015, pp. 2-3; Carter, 2017, p. 5). Malakand District, situated in the Khyber 
Pukhtunkhwa province, has a similar LG structure to the rest of the province in terms of 
citizens’ participation, the number of tiers of government, and the formal relationships 
between the representative and administrative spheres (Khaliq, 2012). However, the 
structure has some peculiarities: for example, the district has its own police force (levy), 
and, as part of the PATA, the tax exemptions noted above distinguish it from settled areas 
of Pakistan (Jan, 2010, pp. 62-63).  
Malakand District, which covers an area of 952 sq. km., is bounded by Lower Dir 
District to the north, Swat District to the east, Mardan District to the south-east, and 
Charsadda District and Mohmand Agency to the south-west.47 It has a population of 
720,295,48 of whom 98.2% speak Pashto and 99.6% practise Sunni Islam (Jan, 2010, p. 
54). Data from the 2017 national housing and population census shows that the district 
remains predominantly rural, with only 11.5% of the population living in urban areas (see 
Appendix 1). This ranks it 11th out of 24 districts in the province in terms of the size of its 
urban population (UNDP, 2011). In official terms, Batkhela is the only urban centre in 
Malakand District (Jan, 2010, p. 93), which indicates its transformative potential for local 
economic development. The increase in the district’s urban population – which stood at 0% 
in 1981 – has coincided with the growth of Batkhela bazaar, which has 5,500 shops at 
present but had only 150-200 in the early 1950s.  
Batkhela bazaar is one of the biggest and most active elements of the district’s 
economy. The major sources of household income in the district are remittances, 
agricultural production or employment in the services sector (including the bazaar).49 The 
                                                          
46 PATA consists of seven districts, including Chitral and Swat (the largest districts), Dir (Upper and Lower), 
Malakand, parts of Kohistan, Shangla, and the tribal area adjoining Mansehra District (see Carter, 2017, p. 5) 
 
47 See especially Page 3: District Profile Malakand: A comprehensive district profile. A collaborative report of 
BOS-P&DD and Unicef-Peshawar. Available at: kpbos.gov.pk/files/1432635762.pdf [Accessed 5 July 2018] 
 
48 The total population of Batkhela according to the 1998 census was 43,179, with an overall literacy rate of 
39.3% (male literacy 55.2%, female literacy 22.7%) (Government of Pakistan, 2000); see also PBS, Malakand 
District at a glance, 2014. Available at: www.pbs.org. A full report of the 2017 census with the current 
literacy rate is yet to be published. 
 






demographic trends of Malakand District do not vary widely from other districts in the 
province, especially in terms of the deployment of the labour force in different sectors, the 
structure of the provincial economy, and poverty indicators (UNDP 2011). The role of 
industry in the district’s overall economy is negligible, with some small factories 
producing flour, cooking oil and polished marble. The two biggest sectors of informal 
employment are agriculture and trade, with the latter enjoying the larger share in providing 
employment. Although official statistics show agriculture as the largest sector of the 
economy (Malakand District profile, 2014), according to Jan (2010, p. 63), the informal 
sector, covering retail and wholesale trade and the services sector, employs nearly 62.5% 
of the labour force in the district. Even the agricultural sector is dependent on the local 
market, as it is the entry point for local agricultural produce (Suleri et al., 2016). 
Malakand District is administratively divided into two subdivisions (tehsils) called 
Swat Ranizai (with Batkhela as its headquarters), and Sama Ranizai (with its headquarters 
in Dargai) (see Maps 2 and 3 respectively). Below tehsil level, the district is divided into 
28 union councils (UCs) and 46 mauzas (revenue estates), with one municipal committee 
in the tehsil of Batkhela (PBS, 2014).50 A provincial LG act in 2013 divided the district 
into 82 village and neighbourhood councils. The district administration is headed by a 
district commissioner (DC), with assistant commissioners (ACs) at the subdivisional level 
and additional assistant commissioners (AACs) working beneath them. These officials 
represent the provincial government in the district, and enjoy administrative and 
magistracy powers. The major functions of the district administration include ensuring the 
implementation of municipal laws, collecting revenues, supervising local government 
development schemes, controlling LG budgets and maintaining order. The hierarchy of 
elected district government officials includes the district nazim and nayab nazim, who are 
the elected head and deputy head of the district council. Below the district council is the 
tehsil council, also headed by nazim and nayab nazim. The lowest tier comprises village 
and neighbourhood councils in rural and urban areas respectively (International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2014, pp. 3-4; Khaliq, 2012). 
 
  
                                                          
50 There has been a recent increase in the number of tehsils (subdivisions) in the PATA, but the number of 












Map 3: Swat Rani Zai  
 
 






Map 4: Batkhela bazaar  
 





 Batkhela bazaar is situated on the historic Peshawar-Chitral-Mardan road that 
connects the districts of Swat and Dir to the provincial and national capitals. The bazaar 
stretches from Amandara in the east to the hills of Malakand in the west, covering more 
than three kilometres on each side of the curved road (see Map 4). The bazaar traverses all 
three of the town’s UCs (Upper, Middle and Lower Batkhela) and spreads into the UCs of 
Alladand and Piran. Batkhela hosts all the areas’ major state facilities including the district 
hospital, district courts, district secretariat, district welfare office, district post office, 
national database and registration authority office, passport office and office of Pakistan 
Telecommunication and Exchange Ltd (PTCL) among others. It also hosts outlets of 
private courier and telecommunications companies.  
The significance of Batkhela bazaar to the local economy is considerable. It is the 
largest of the four major bazaars in the district (see Table 6.2); every village also has its 
own small bazaar (mainly comprised of retail shops). Local accounts confirm that 75-80% 
of the businesses in the villages of Swat Ranizai rely on Batkhela bazaar. It is the major 
generator of employment in the district, with 5,500 shops, 1,500 rickshaws (operating 
exclusively in Batkhela bazaar), 80 cart-pushers and 180 street vendors (Bazaar Union 
records, 2010). Findings from the exploratory survey of the present research show that 
57% of the business owners in the bazaar employ skilled and unskilled workers, who are 
paid monthly, weekly and in some instances daily. Eleven banks have their district 
branches in the Batkhela bazaar, and the exploratory survey shows that 58% of the 
business owners have bank accounts. 
The growth of Batkhela bazaar as a driver of economic change has implications for 
the social structure of the local economy, especially for land-holding patterns. As observed 
in Section 5.2.2, the structure of the local economy has implications for SC generation and 
its role in the operation of LG. The empirical evidence from Batkhela bazaar suggests that 
before the 1970s, with one exception, all the traders hailed from the landless class and 
none owned residential or commercial land (see Table 9.1). In contrast, 45% of the traders 
currently have their own shops, 76% own residential land, and 27% own either cultivable 
land or an orchard. This diffusion of land and economic resources limits the ability of a 
single actor or group of actors to dominate the local governance structure (Faguet, 2015): 
cooperation and interdependence are therefore a permanent feature of the local governance 
structure. In addition, before the 1970s, none of the leaders of local councils was directly 




52% of the district’s elected mayors and vice-mayors are involved in trading activities, 
although not necessarily in Batkhela bazaar.51  
5.3.4 Batkhela bazaar as an element of local governance 
In addition to its roles in local economic development, urbanisation and socioeconomic 
change, Batkhela bazaar is evolving as a new governance space at the interstices between 
formal and informal governance.52 This role as an element of local governance is due to 
the SC that the bazaar generates. The literature on bazaars in Pakistan, and particularly on 
those in the Malakand region, has focused on traders’ associations and individual networks 
of bazaar traders; however, systematic analysis of this SC in local governance is either 
missing (Akhter, 2017), superficial (Jan, 2014) or too general (Javed, 2017).  
The existing analysis of traders’ associations in Pakistani marketplaces does not 
extend beyond a few conventional characteristics that define the role of marketplace 
associations in general terms. For instance, Jan (2014) found that Batkhela bazaar had 
generated a new leadership for the region’s excluded traders’ community in the form of the 
Bazaar Union (BU). The rise of the BU was an expression of collective action against the 
political exclusion of traders who were denied the rights to representation on the council, 
to own property, and even to domicile. In the published version of the same study (2017), 
Jan omits any discussion of the traders’ associations. Overall, Jan regards the BU as a 
separate leadership category developed to represent the traders’ community, regarding it as 
weak as an association and embedded in local politics (Jan, 2010, 2014, 2017); whereas 
Akhter (2017) views traders (along with the legal fraternity) as the “only genuinely 
effective associational group in Pakistan” (p. 86). Hasan et al. (2008), in their study of 
hawkers in the Sadar bazaar in Karachi, note that associations of traders act as “designated-
yet-informal mediators with official agencies”. These associations also perform the 
unusual task of collecting as well as delivering extortion money, one of the fundamental 
problems faced by traders in the governance environment of Pakistan’s largest city (ibid., 
p. 42). 
                                                          
51 A short telephone demographic survey comprised of seven questions was conducted with the mayors and 
vice-mayors of 24 Union Councils in Malakand District. The author especially thanks Ubaid Baqsh, the 
secretary of Middle Batkhela UC and a business owner in the bazaar, for generating the contact numbers. 
 
52 Unlike its use in local governance literature on the developed world (Taylor, 2007; Howard and Lever, 
2011), “new governance space” refers to a field of power, as a claimed or created space, that evolves in 





Overall, this literature suggests that traders’ associations have a role as an integral 
element of governance and as facilitators of interaction between formal governance 
structures and informal marketplaces. Every bazaar in Pakistan has some sort of 
association, ranging from formally registered associations to entirely informal ones. 
However, generally, these associations are weak or inactive (Javed, 2017). The literature 
on marketplaces and their associations in Pakistan is yet to develop a systematic 
explanation of the role of traders’ associations as an element of local governance, their 
internal composition and the stakes of local political parties in their elections and 
representation structures. More crucially, this literature is entirely oblivious of the internal 
power dynamics of traders’ associations, the role of trust and interpersonal networks in 
their internal governance, and their interactions with state institutions. 
Batkhela bazaar also generates diverse interpersonal networks that help consolidate 
business in Batkhela and influence the government’s service delivery functions. Drawing 
on the entrepreneurial literature and Granovetter’s network perspective, Jan (2017, pp. 
312-314) argues that family/kinship and friendship networks are helpful for Batkhela 
traders in the improvement of their businesses. These businesses are rooted in the local 
governance structure, and the role of networks in generating positive externalities for the 
businesses may have negative implications for service delivery which Jan has failed to 
observe. Moreover, Jan correctly highlights the role of Batkhela bazaar in generating 
network diversity, especially in terms of weak ties (Granovetter, 1985), but his take on 
network diffusion admittedly does not extend beyond friendship, customers and suppliers 
(Jan, 2017, p. 324). This treatment by Jan of networks and their operation in relation to 
marketplaces fails to link social networks to formal governance processes that regulate 
everyday trading in the market. Khan (2017a) has demonstrated that patronage networks 
(among others) have also developed, facilitating the everyday engagement between traders 
and the local administration of Malakand. As noted in Section 5.3.2, Javed (2017) points 
out that traders in urban marketplaces forge networks of collusion with political 
representatives or bureaucracy to negotiate bribes for paying less tax, maintaining 
encroachment privileges, or ensuring the favourable provision of municipal services such 
as sanitation schemes, parking spaces or the allocation of police patrols for security. Javed 
does not offer any empirical explanation of how these processes occur in everyday life of 




in Pakistan, influences traders’ interactions with local authorities lacks systematic 
theoretical and empirical treatment.53 
The influence of traders’ networks also extends to the provision of social welfare 
by the government. Firstly, in terms of civic engagement, Jan (2014, 2017) highlights only 
traders’ support for literary and sports associations in Batkhela. Jan (2014) and Jan and 
Aman (2016) find that the lack of interaction between traders and NGOs leads to an 
absence of traders’ trust in these organisations. Doubtless the local community, including 
traders, does not trust most of the NGOs. However, for local social welfare associations 
(SWAs), the absence of the interaction proposition does not hold true. Therefore, the use of 
confounded terms such as NGOs, non-state providers and SWAs requires primary attention 
when exploring the bazaar’s connections with NGOs and local civic associations. 
Secondly, if the religious embeddedness of marketplaces is considered, an interesting link 
between the bazaar and LG through SWAs is developed. However, the existing literature 
on marketplaces in Pakistan either does not explore this link at all (Jan, 2017; Ahmed, 
1980; Asad Ullah, 2014; Hasan et al., 2008), or has methodological limitations and ends up 
with narrow empirical explanations (Amirali, 2017). Javed (2017) highlights the role of the 
traders’ community in the provision of social services through the bazaar’s relationship 
with the SWAs, but does not explore the implications of this interrelationship for local 
governance. Two limitations of this literature in particular need to be addressed: the role of 
trust and interpersonal networks in elucidating the bazaar-SWAs interrelationship, and the 
implications of this interrelationship for the practices of social welfare provision in the 
local governance structure. 
As Chapter 8 explores in greater detail, these associations have members in the 
bazaar, and the informal networks of these members and other traders facilitate their 
service provision activities. The generation of SC by marketplaces for these SWAs has 
significant implications in the context of weak local government. Overall, marketplaces 
generate both interpersonal and associational SC. The findings of the exploratory survey 
offer a foundation for viewing Batkhela bazaar as a generator of both associational and 
individual SC: 89.6% of the survey respondents were members of the BU, while 45.8% 
were members of political parties, and 12.9% were members of a community development 
organisation. Besides these associations, traders in the bazaar exert influence over various 
governance processes through their informal interpersonal networks. Of the survey 
                                                          
53 It should be noted here that none of these studies uses SC as a theoretical construct. Jan does not use the 
term in any of his studies on the region, and Javed uses it only once, and Akhter’s (2017) study does not 
mention the term. The absence of SC from Akhter’s considerations is understandable owing to his focus on 




respondents, 41.3% reported that their friends and family participated in local government 
elections, 68.2% said they had a government official as a family member, and 56.2% 
reported that they had a friendship with a government official. Only 4.5% of the traders 
directly participated in the local government elections, suggesting that traders in the bazaar 
influence local governance through both formal and informal networks. How these formal 
and informal networks are interrelated, and how their interrelation makes an impact on the 
local governance structure of Malakand District, will be explored in Chapters 6-8.   
Table 5.4: Formal and informal networks in Batkhela bazaar  
Responses/ 
Type of network involvement  




Membership of the BU 89.6% 10.4% 200 200 
Membership of political parties  45.8% 54.2% 190 200 
Membership of community development 
organisations 
12.9% 85.1% 188 200 
Contesting local government election 4.5% 95.5% 199 200 
Family or friends participating in local government 
elections 
41.3% 45.3% 173 200 
Family members as appointed government officials 68.2 31.8 200 200 
Friendship with appointed government officials  56.2 43.8 179 200 
Source: Survey data 
5.4 Conclusions and the way forward 
This chapter has outlined the context for the changing nature of local governance within 
Pakistan in general and the Malakand region in particular, and the role of bazaars as an 
element within this. The key features of this local governance context include weak local 
government; weak civil society due to hierarchical social structures and ineffective 
collective action; and individuals’ greater reliance on informal rather than formal 
institutions. Within this context, the literature indicates that marketplaces in Pakistan are a 
major force of socioeconomic change, political inclusion and mobilisation. 
 Marketplaces act to generate networks of exchange including economic, friendship 
and patronage ties. The SC generated by marketplaces shapes their role in the governance 
structure. However, the existing literature on marketplaces in Pakistan overlooks the role 
of trust and reciprocity, and is poorly developed when it comes to explaining the role these 
exchange mechanisms play in terms of the interrelationship between interpersonal 
networks and associations developed around the marketplace economy. For this reason, it 
implicitly treats the interpersonal and associational networks generated by marketplaces as 
binaries. Therefore, the literature on marketplaces in relation to their role as generators of 




the literature that views the traders’ community as an intermediate class emerging within 
the complex interaction between state and society. Nevertheless, a key contribution of this 
literature is its recognition of the integrative potential of marketplaces as an element of 
political economy and governance structure.  
 The literature often views individual networks and the collective action generated 
by marketplaces in Pakistan in a structuralist framework, or as a class-conflict dialectic 
(Akhter, 2017; Jan, 2017). These structuralist approaches, often drawing on Marxian 
political economy or Gramscian grand narratives, are insufficient to capture the dialectical 
relationship between the everyday practices of the use of individual agency and the 
informal institutions that structure these practices. The insufficiency of these approaches, 
as Stokke and Selboe (2009) note, is a result of their scant attention to individual agency, 
due to the inherent tendency of these approaches to assign an overdetermining role to the 
structures. Therefore, a practice-based political economy model for the role of SC in local 
governance, developed in Chapters 2 and 3, is required: one that simultaneously situates 
social practices within the context of the political economy and power relations (Stokke 
and Selboe, 2009, p. 60). For Pukhtun society, where Batkhela bazaar is located, Marsden 
and Hopkins (2013, p. 8) emphasise the need for a more complex political economy model. 
This model focuses on both structure and agency in dialectical state-society relations.  
Within this framework, individuals are not only passive recipients of structural 
influences, but also are active agents responding to any change. This explains why SC is 
context-dependent; why developing states like Pakistan need a radically different approach 
to SC from a Putnamian formulation; and why there is a likelihood of the development of 
associational SC in the local governance of Pakistan which is comparable to the Putnamian 
case of southern Italy. 
Instead of marketplaces or traders’ communities being viewed as a class, they need 
to be viewed as a “totality of relations (or a field) between competitive agents” (Bourdieu, 
2005, p. 81). This field of power interacts with the structure of social space comprising 
firms, industry, classes, state apparatus and other fields (ibid., pp. 71-85). This interaction 
is characterised by the distribution of capitals, which is internalised in agents’ dispositions 
as structuring structure. This schemata of feelings and perceptions allows agents to 
interpret the structuring effects of multiple fields such as market, state, religion, family and 
tribe ad infinitum. Here, one can see clearly why bazaars, through their traders’ 
associations, exhibit the occasional solidarity to mobilise in crises while remaining weak 
more generally. The literature on marketplaces, politics and informal trade in Pakistan 




their internal politics as embedded within wider governance. Moreover, it overlooks 
fundamental SC-governance issues, such as why and when the same hierarchical 
interpersonal networks that impede the development of associational SC may facilitate 
their role in the provision of social services.  
In the chapters that follow, the complex social logic of the local political economy is 
analysed in the context of the everyday governance of the marketplace and its role as an 
important element of the local governance structure in the context of Malakand District. 
The focus is on the evolving role of Batkhela bazaar in the processes of political 
participation, the implementation of regulations and the provision of social welfare. The 





Chapter 6 - Evolving collective social capital: The case of 
Batkhela Bazaar Union 
6.1 Introduction 
As the first of three empirical chapters, Chapter 6 specifically analyses the role of Batkhela 
Bazaar Union (BU) as a form of collective SC and as an element in the local governance of 
Malakand District, and assesses how the interpersonal networks of traders play an 
important role in shaping the BU’s role as an element of local governance. This chapter 
demonstrates that the structure and functions of Batkhela Bazaar Union have evolved 
within the changing structure of state institutions and the local economy. The evolution of 
the BU as an associational form of SC has implications for local governance structures: its 
roles as both an element of local politics and as a resource for individual traders are 
analytically investigated. In terms of local politics, the research explores the incentives 
which traders’ associations create for the local administration and political leaders in 
representative politics; while in terms of the BU acting as a resource for individual traders, 
the study investigates its role in the internal power structure of the bazaar. Undoubtedly, 
the politics of Batkhela bazaar are embedded within broader local politics, but by making 
this distinction between its two local roles, this chapter shows why the BU performs 
successful collective action in moments of crisis, while displaying weakness as an 
associational form of SC. To this end, the chapter draws on interviews with traders, BU 
representatives, political leaders and key officials in the local administration. The BU’s 
written records are also analysed, along with field notes from various BU meetings, its 
interactions with traders and government officials, and its participation in political events. 
Section 6.2 outlines the evolving structure and functions of the BU, and identifies its 
areas of strength and weakness as a form of associational SC. Section 6.3 explores the role 
of interpersonal networks and the norms of cooperation such as trust and reciprocity in the 
structure and functions of the BU. Section 6.4 analyses the implications for local governance 
of the BU as an associational form of SC, before Section 6.5 presents the conclusions of the 
chapter.  
6.2 An overview of the evolving structure and functions of Batkhela Bazaar Union 
The BU has evolved from an instrument articulating traders’ interests to a significant 
element of local governance in Batkhela. Three main processes account for this evolution. 
Firstly, its own governance has switched from a nominated committee of elders to a body 
of elected representatives. Secondly, instead of articulating the interests of the landless 




Thirdly, owing to the phenomenal growth of Batkhela bazaar, the BU’s significance as a 
facilitator of communication between the government and traders has increased.  
In addition to the BU, the bazaar has observed the emergence and decline of many 
smaller associations which are either sector-specific or market-specific unions. These 
unions have a dual function: facilitating communication between the BU and traders; 
dealing with trade-specific problems, mainly dispute resolution but also accompanying 
traders to government offices if needed; and collective action at sector level. Nineteen 
market-level and eight sector-level unions were found in the bazaar. Some of the sectors, 
including textiles, synthetic fibres, electronics, grocery, IT services, photo developing and 
mobile phone sales and repairs, do not have a union of their own. The smaller unions have 
a president and a general secretary who are usually elected with the collective agreement of 
traders and who hold their positions as long as they enjoy the traders’ confidence. This 
suggests that the economic activities in Batkhela bazaar generate associational SC, which 
is an essential part of bazaar life. Traders’ associations are essential for the efficiency of 
collective actions (Nadvi, 1999). However, the literature on Pakistan in general (Kamal, 
Naqwi and Usmani, 2015) and the Malakand region in particular indicates that traders’ 
associations are generally weak (Suleri et al., 2016; Jan, 2014). A detailed and systematic 
exposition of the causes of this weakness is yet to be provided. Batkhela Bazaar Union 
presents an interesting case for this task, since it is the most developed and represents the 
largest community of traders in Malakand District (set out in Table 6.1); and also since its 
functions do not vary widely from those of traders’ associations in the rest of Pakistan (as 
shown in Table 6.2). Moreover, an analysis of the BU’s structure and functions will 
identify the areas in which it is effective and ineffective, and the factors contributing to its 
strengths and weaknesses as an association. Its evolution is rooted in weak institutional 
infrastructure, political exclusion, increased governmentalisation and evolving 
participation structures. These factors together shape its role in the local governance. The 
BU is a manifestation of “unstable” “contingent social capital” generated by the bazaar 
(Lyons and Snoxell, 2005). This means it is a platform that exhibits traders’ solidarity and 
collective action, but manifestation of this solidarity is contingent on the situation, the 
underlying incentives for collective action, and the goals towards which the action is 























Size of the bazaar 
(fixed shops) 
 5,500  1,200  1,400  900  2,500 
Formation of the BU  Late 1960s  2000  2000  1995 Data not 
available 
First formal elections   1983  2010  2011  1996-7  2010 
Regular elections  Yes (since 
2010) 
 No  No  No  No 
Dependence on 
political actors for 
performance of its 
functions 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Inclusion of different 
political parties in the 
elected cabinet 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dependence of large 
business owners on 
the union 
 Relatively low  Low  Low  Low  Low 
Dependence of small 
business owners on 
the union 
Relatively high Relatively high Relatively high Relatively high Relatively high 
Collection of funds 
for helping business 













Location at district or 
sub-divisional 
headquarters  
 Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Involvement of local 
administration in 
elections 
 Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
BU-collected funds 
helpful for small 
traders in emergency 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Not applicable  Yes 
BU-collected funds 
helpful for large 
traders in emergency 
 No  No  No  Not applicable  No 
Socioeconomic status 












Source: Interview data, and a short exploratory survey with representatives of other traders’ 
associations at different bazaars  
Table 6.1 identifies the key characteristics of Batkhela BU and its role as an 
element of local governance in the wider context of the Malakand region, along with its 




differentiated utility for small and large traders. Moreover, the table also demonstrates the 
BU’s role as an emerging space for political participation (see Section 6.4.1 for an 
expansion of this point), its growing significance for the local administration, and its role 
as an occasional service provider for traders. This suggests that the bazaar creates 
interdependencies across the local governance structure.  
As collective associations of traders, bazaar unions perform a number of important 
functions. At Batkhela, the most significant of these include dispute resolution, 
philanthropy, lobbying and facilitating traders’ access to state institutions. Many of these 
functions stem from ineffective formal governance. For instance, the law relating to 
property rental provides for an annual rent increase of 10%, or 25% after three years. 
Violation of these laws is a key feature of the property market in Batkhela bazaar. In many 
cases, rent is increased by percentages of 30, 50 and 100, and in some cases up to 200. 
Rent increases and the resultant disputes are causing a shift in the bazaar from informal 
contractual relationships towards written tenancy agreements. Nineteen cases have been 
recorded in which contracts were specifically introduced because of disagreements over 
rent, and to avoid future disputes. However, signing written contracts does not guarantee 
the prevention of future disputes; it does, however, offers a basis for validity to the claims 
of the conflicting parties. Informality in the trading ties is still rampant. Traders do not sign 
any formal contracts for loans, purchase and sale on credit, or quality of the goods to be 
delivered, etc. Differences over loans and quality frequently arise. Moreover, welfare 
provision and formal social safety nets are absent: in the event of accidents and 
emergencies, the BU mobilises support for the affected traders. The BU performs an active 
but limited role in these governance problems relating to individual traders. Table 6.2 
summarises not only the functions of Batkhela BU, but places them in the context of other 





Table 6.2: Functions of Batkhela BU compared with other contexts in Pakistan  
Location of BU/ 
Associational and collective 
SC functions 
Batkhela  Peshawar  
(capital of KP) 
Punjab 
Resolution of business disputes  Limited role Limited role Limited role 
Collective action Most active on issues 
of taxation by central 
government and land 
use by local 
municipalities 
Taxation and land use Taxation and land use 
Lobbying with municipal 
government for the provision of 
services  
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Philanthropy and charity Yes, but occasionally Yes, but occasionally Yes, in some 
instances regularly 
Provision of temporary 
finances for business owners 
Yes No Yes 
Involvement in local politics Yes Yes Yes 
Source: For bazaars in KP see Table 6.1; for bazaars in Punjab see Javed (2015, pp. 10-11) 
The scope of Batkhela BU’s functions has increased considerably over the years. It 
was established for resolving disputes between different traders, and between traders and 
landlords. It also represented traders in their interactions with the local administration and 
protected their interests against the landed class. At present, it also protects traders’ 
interests in administrative decisions, facilitates the bazaar’s governance by the state, 
develops Batkhela’s reputation in other bazaars, and offers an alternative platform for 
political competition alongside the formal local participation structures. Analytically, the 
functions of the BU have two main categories: firstly, activities and action regarding the 
state (state-regarding) and secondly, activities and action regarding individual traders 
(individual-regarding). The former entails enacting traders’ collective action in response to 
state decisions or the absence of state institutions, while the latter includes its role as a 
resource for individual traders. This distinction makes clear the BU’s twin roles of 
successful collective action and individual representation. Table 6.3 chronologically lists 
the key historical events related to the BU’s state-regarding action to protect the collective 
interest of the traders’ community: its individual-regarding functions will be examined in 





Table 6.3: State-regarding functions of Batkhela BU: Collective interest and solidarity 
Actors’ roles/ 
Key events 
Role of state Traders’ interests Role of BU Outcome 
Digitalisation of 





digital phone lines 
to facilitate distant 
trade 
Organised protest 
in Islamabad to 
articulate traders’ 
demand  
Digital phone lines 
installed 
Sharia protesters 
block main road in 
Malakand, 1995 
Unable to appease 
Sharia protesters 
End to blockade 
that halted supplies 














of curfew to allow 
inflow and outflow 
of goods  
Negotiated with 








the bazaar by 
military, 2010 
Demolition of all 
encroachments in 












exemption for the 
region, 2016  
Including the 
Malakand region in 









reversed its move 
Source: Interview data and field notes 
The events and outcomes shown in Table 6:3 suggest that Batkhela BU has been 
able to successfully influence the state through collective action on a number of occasions. 
However, its role as an association is constrained by two key factors: the bazaar’s 
heterogeneity (Javed, 2017), and the centrality of informal networks. Table 6.4 highlights 
the key dimensions of the bazaar’s increased heterogeneity. It should be noted, however, 
that this increased heterogeneity creates network diversity, preventing domination of the 
BU by a single political party or group. 
The causes of this increased heterogeneity lie in status hierarchies owing to 
economic inequality, and the diverse political affiliation of traders. Heterogeneity itself is 
the outcome of an increase in the size of the bazaar’s economic activities and changing the 
structure of local politics. This contiguous evolution underpins the relational structure of 
Batkhela bazaar that has led to the centrality of informal networks. In contrast to the 
suggestions of the existing literature on traders’ associations in Pakistan (Kamal et al., 
2015), the question of a feudal mindset as a determinant of BU weakness is less relevant 
than the relational embeddedness of individual networks. This embeddedness shapes 
agents’ dispositions to rely on individual or associational networks. Jan (2014) is correct in 
stating that, for well-connected traders, the BU is ineffective. Jan (ibid.) is, however, 




implications of this for the BU as a collective entity. The unequal distribution of capitals is 
the cause of the BU’s weakness, not least because the BU is dependent on well-connected 
traders for the performance of its functions, and these traders in turn lack trust in the BU’s 
efficacy to serve their individual interests. Large traders rely instead on their personal 
networks to access state institutions, negotiate solutions to disputes with landlords, and 
acquire help in emergencies. As the owner of a recruitment agency stated: “For me, the 
role of our Union is zero. The president is very active in going with traders to the police 
station, and raising funds for those who have suffered accidents. These activities are good, 
but he is entirely unaware of my problems” (Haji Aleem interview, 17 May 2016).  
Table 6.4: Influence of increased heterogeneity of Batkhela bazaar on its representative structure  
Period/  
Key evolutionary dimensions 
Pre-1970 2016 
Percentage of traders (occupational class) owning 
land in the bazaar  
0% 35% 
Percentage of traders from landless class  95% 60% 
Percentage of business owners from landed class 5% (1 out of 20) 35-40% 
Number of political parties supported by traders Single party Six parties 
Class background of BU representatives  Landless class Mixture of landed and 
landless class 
Political affiliation of BU representatives Members of single 
party 
Members of six different 
parties 
Source: Interview data and field notes.  
The increasing political and socioeconomic heterogeneity of Batkhela bazaar has 
implications for the BU’s structure. Initially, the BU was formed as a committee of elders 
in the same pattern as a jirga, whereby bazaar elders would decide on important matters 
including the nomination of the president. However, as a key member of the BU’s election 
committee notes: “Shopkeepers were no longer prepared to accept a non-elected president; 
they demanded a vote for the post, which was held for the first time in 1983” (Sardar Khan 
interview, 10 May 2016). Thus, a “one shop one vote” election method was adopted and 
four elections were held between 1983 and 1993. Elections were suspended between 1993 
and 2009, and the BU remained a symbolic entity with a single president. However, 
traders’ dissatisfaction with their dormant association, an increasing interest from political 
parties in the bazaar’s politics, and the difficulties faced by the local administration in 
communicating with the continuously growing bazaar provided incentives for the BU to be 
reinvigorated. 
The urgency of reviving the BU came to the fore in the PATA military crisis of 
2009, when it was considered the only means for facilitating communication between 




multiple political parties and both the landed and landless classes were formed to contest 
elections in the winter of 2009-10. To accommodate the wide range of interests, the BU 
began to be elected in the form of a panel including a president, vice-president, general 
secretary and joint secretary, as well as posts covering finance and press relations.54 Since 
2010, three such elections have been held with two major implications for the BU’s role as 
associational SC: firstly, no single political party or class can control the BU; and 
secondly, informal networks instead of associational bonds are the basis of cooperation in 
its elections. For instance, in the elections of 2013 and 2017, both contestants for the post 
of bazaar president were active workers in the Pakistan People’s Party. 
In summary, Batkhela BU has evolved as an integral element of the local political 
structure, but it remains ineffective as a form of collectivity owing to the bazaar’s 
increased heterogeneity. The cause of its weakness lies in asymmetric power relations, the 
differentiated access of traders to state institutions, and agents’ dispositions towards the 
efficacy of associational SC. The BU for instance, as a grocery wholesaler commented, “is 
always there, which is the evidence of its significance. It is always there for those 
shopkeepers who need it” (Ehsan Haji interview, 16 July 2016). This suggests that use of 
the BU as a resource for individual traders varies widely, explaining why they consider it 
to be ineffective in individual-regarding functions. The following section explores how the 
BU draws on individual networks in its performance of these functions, and also the role of 
these networks in shaping individual dispositions regarding the BU’s effectiveness or 
otherwise. 
6.3 The role of interpersonal networks and norms of cooperation in shaping the 
functions of Batkhela Bazaar Union  
This section explores the influence of interpersonal networks of traders and norms of 
cooperation on the structure and functions of Batkhela Bazaar Union. The findings confirm 
the argument of Norris and Inglehart (2003) that analysis of these informal networks is 
fundamental to understanding the role of associational SC. Analysis of the role of Batkhela 
BU in local governance reveals that, with the exception of its collective action against the 
government’s decision to impose taxes in the region, the networks of its members play an 
active role in its structure and functions as an association.  
A number of factors determine the role of these networks both in shaping the 
capacity of the BU to perform its functions, and in determining the use of the BU in 
relation to any of these affairs by individual traders. These factors need to be viewed in the 
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broader relational context in which the BU operates. This is also important for tracing 
continuities and discontinuities. Firstly, members of the BU are dependent on the support 
of large business owners and local political actors for their election. Secondly, the BU, in 
its interaction with the administration, which is one of its key function, relies on the 
support of local political actors, who in turn rely on the BU’s support in their rallies and 
processions to pressurise the local administration. Thirdly, as in the past, the BU is an 
important resource for traders embedded in the wider political economy, but unlike in the 
past, its role and utility for individual traders varies in accordance with their 
socioeconomic status. In order to offer temporary relief to small traders in the event of 
accidents, it generates finances from affluent traders. The socioeconomic status of business 
owners shapes their reliance on the BU for accessing state institutions in relation to their 
individual affairs. For instance, large business owners have extensive and high-quality 
informal networks, and therefore do not need the BU’s help to access state institutions, 
whereas poor traders lack extensive and high-quality networks, increasing their reliance on 
the BU to access these institutions. The following section explores the role of multiple 
overlapping networks in the formation and functions of the BU. 
6.3.1 The role of informal networks in facilitating BU functions  
Analysis of the role of the networks of individual traders reveals five key types of 
individual networks: acquaintances, family, friendship, political and governmental. Jan 
(2017) identified family/kinship, friendship and economic networks in relation to 
economic activities in Batkhela bazaar. However, his analysis of these networks is limited 
to entrepreneurial activities which do not extend to politics, and therefore it does not 
explain how one form of network (e.g. economic or political) is transformed into another 
(e.g. friendship). Interestingly, economic networks (economic exchange relationships) do 
not play an active role in the election and functions of the BU. Nevertheless, due to their 
overlapping nature, these five types of networks cannot be accorded a discrete location in 
the BU’s election and functions. On aggregate, however, the BU benefits from these 
networks during elections and in the performance of its functions. Moreover, these 
networks are dynamic, and evolve from one form to another due to their interaction in the 
BU’s politics. Due to their cross-cutting nature, these networks are often bridging 
networks, serving as a structural whole to access resources that would otherwise be 
inaccessible (Burt, 2000, pp. 347-349). For instance, an acquaintance provides knowledge 
about the resourcefulness of a person, but access to that resource is unlikely to be gained 
unless it is mediated by friendship, family or political ties (see Chapter 8), or is turned into 




Representatives of the BU draw benefits from multiple interpersonal networks. These 
networks are dynamic, and evolve during the course of cooperation in the politics of BU 
(Fox, 2014). For example, an analysis of Faqir Khan’s network in Batkhela bazaar 
demonstrates the centrality of interpersonal networks and their dynamic nature. In elections 
for the post of BU president in 2009, Faqir Khan gained victory over Mujahid. Faqir drew 
on three main types of networks for his support in the elections: family, friendship and 
political. Both Faqir and his supporters were motivated by individual goal attainment, 
which was unlikely without mutual cooperation and support (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 
1993, p. 1,321). It is also important to note that the three networks used by Faqir spanned 
other boundaries: the family member belonged to an opposing political group; the friend 
was from an opposing party and different kinship group; and the political contact had 
nothing in common with Faqir except membership of the same party. Interestingly, all 
three nodes in Faqir’s networks also had ties to his rival. For instance, his family member 
and friend were active members of the same political party (PPP) as the rival. Furthermore, 
his friend and his political contact shared kinship ties with his rival. However, no one from 
the networks had family or friendship ties with the rival.  
The exchange between Faqir and his three different networks was not purely based 
on calculative computations: these ties had embedded history. For instance, Faqir’s 
relationship with the friend was originally developed during their shared membership of a 
political party (ANP), and although the friend had since changed his political affiliation, 
their bond remained intact, enabling Faqir to draw on his support.  
These ties are not a fixed source of support and evolve during the course of 
interaction in the BU’s politics. In Faqir’s case, the friendship and political nodes had 
evolved over time. For instance, the strongest opposition to Faqir emerged from the node 
in his political network who was a BU general secretary. A controversy over the control of 
a bank account used for managing the BU’s financial resources sparked open hostility 
between Faqir and his political contact. As an outcome, the latter joined the rival side in 
the 2013 elections. Similarly, the friend also supported shifted his support to Faqir’s 
opponents in 2013 because Faqir had failed to include him in the BU’s meetings (contrary 
to his expectations). Faqir’s family ties have remained stable, but this is not always the 
case in bazaar politics. As noted earlier, Faqir’s family member and his rival are members 
of the same political party, but because of internal party divisions, Faqir’s relative supports 
him instead of his own party’s candidate. 
This empirical example has three implications: firstly, that associational SC is weak 




BU are cross-cutting, dynamic and flexible; and thirdly, that the BU’s representatives rely 
on their interpersonal networks when contesting BU elections and performing their 
functions as bazaar representatives.  
Another example of the use of these networks can be seen in the case of a trader 
from Khar bazaar in Bajaur Agency, who paid his supplier in Batkhela bazaar using a fake 
cheque. The BU tried to help by communicating with both the BU of Khar bazaar and the 
local administration. In such instances, the BU generally communicates with other BUs, 
but rarely with the administration of the other district. In this case, the general secretary of 
Batkhela BU was an acquaintance of the political administrator of Bajaur. The general 
secretary of the BU claims that due to his personal ties with the political agent of Bajaur, he was 
able to facilitate resolution of the dispute in favour of the Batkhela Trader (Zalmay interview, 3 
May 2016).  
The empirical findings in this section require an understanding of the role of 
various types of networks and their relationship to the norms of cooperation in the structure 
and functions of the BU. The following subsections explore this in detail. 
6.3.2 Content of networks: Norms of cooperation, trust and reciprocity  
This section looks at the norms of cooperation such as trust and reciprocity in order to 
explore their role in shaping cooperation around the BU. In the social capital literature, 
trust has three major categories: interpersonal trust (relational trust/particularised trust) 
(Hardin, 2002); social trust (trust in strangers/generalised trust) (Uslaner, 2002, 2008); and 
civic or institutional trust (Fukuyama, 2001; Newton, 1999). These dimensions are related 
to different forms of networks – for example economic, political, governmental and 
family/friendship. This section looks at interpersonal (particularised) and social 
(generalised) trust, while institutional trust is treated as a determinant of greater reliance on 
either interpersonal or social trust (Rothstein and Eek, 2009). Similarly, reciprocity, which 
is closely related to trust, is both a cause and a consequence of trusting relationships. This 
section offers empirical evidence on the role of trust and reciprocity in the politics of BU, 
and explores the role of these elements of social capital in facilitating cooperation for 
certain functions of the BU. Table 6.5 sets out the relationships between different networks 





Table 6.5: Relationship between networks and norms of cooperation in Batkhela BU functions  
Norms/ 
Role of networks 





Economic network Closed interpersonal 
trust; no active role in 
facilitating BU 
functions; major source 
of votes; active source of 
situational solidarity 
Support for BU depends 
on its ability to protect 
interest; “win-stay, lose-
shift” behaviour 
Source of victory or defeat 
in BU elections 
Political network Lack of cohesion; readily 
available source of 
regular support 
Fixed bonds of mutual 
interdependence  
Seeking support in BU 
elections; forming 
alliances to prepare a 
panel to contest elections; 
seeking BU support 
against government; 





marked by mutual 
distrust and conflictive 
interests  
Zero-sum based on 
negative reciprocity 
Seeking support of BU to 
facilitate communication 
with traders; seeking 
government support to 
resolve traders’ problems 
Family and 
friendship network 
Based on expectation; 
pre-existing 
interpersonal trust  
Predominantly balanced 
reciprocity  
Helpful in gathering votes; 
facilitating access to 
resources; facilitating BU 
functions 
Source: Interviews with government officials, political actors and BU representatives 
6.3.2.1 The role of particularised vs. generalised trust in BU functions  
The empirical data gathered in the present research reveals low levels of institutional trust 
and organisational trust. This has implications for the role of interpersonal trust in the 
functions of the BU and for consequently traders’ trust in the BU as their representative 
association. This section demonstrates how interpersonal trust facilitates the functions of 
the BU, and the way it shapes agents’ disposition towards the BU as an institution. 
Traders’ trust in the BU and government institutions is then compared. 
Interviewees were asked about their trust in government institutions, political 
organisations and the BU. On aggregate, the results show a low level of trust among 
individuals for the protection of their interests. Fifty-two out of 60 traders said they lacked 
trust in government institutions for several reasons: the institutions’ ineptitude in 
performing their functions; differential treatment of rich and poor traders (or people in 
general) by the administration; and favourable treatment of the party in power. Trust in 
political parties was also low. As a wholesaler of electrical appliances stated: “None of the 




see their benefits for the public” (Rehmat Khan interview, 5 September 2016). On the other 
hand, trust in the BU as an institution to protect traders’ interests was higher. However, 
trust in the BU varied in terms of its expected role for the traders and the capacity of its 
members to perform this expected role. This distinction is similar to what McAllister 
(1995) calls intention- and competence-based trust. The capacity of the BU, the 
socioeconomic status of its members, and the relationships between BU members and 
business owners determine an agent’s trust in the organisation. A large majority of the 
survey respondents (92%) trusted the intentions of the BU to help its members when asked. 
However, two-thirds of the interview respondents (40 out of 60) exhibited a lack of trust in 
the BU’s capacity to serve their individual interests. This implies that traders have a higher 
level of trust in the BU’s role as an institution than in its competence.  
Sections 6.2 and 5.2.3 have recorded a general weakness of traders’ associations in 
Pakistan. The findings from Batkhela bazaar suggest an interesting dimension to that 
weakness. In order to maintain traders’ trust, the representatives of the BU rely on a 
multitude of interpersonal networks to perform its functions. For instance, in a dispute 
between a shoemaker and his landlord, the ties between the BU president and the landlord 
facilitated negotiation for settlement. This is not an exception but a rule: every member of 
the BU counts on such ties when available. Five instances of such settlements were 
recorded in which these ties cut across the traditional landless and landed classes. The use 
of these ties is underpinned by interpersonal trust. For instance, referring to a land dispute, 
A key member of the BU stated: “I had confidence in him: that’s why I asked him for a 
concession in rent for the retailer. I knew that he [my friend] would be annoyed, but I also 
knew that he would not disappoint me” (Ayaz interview, 4 May 2016). While reflecting on 
the utility of interpersonal trust in performing the BU’s functions, Zalmay Khan, a key 
member of the BU in 2013-16, stated: “Some of my friends are those who have come to 
Batkhela and purchased land here. If I ask such friends they honour [my request], but if I 
ask a stranger, he may say something undesirable” (Zalmay interview, 2 May 2016).  
In the absence of kinship or friendship ties with a BU representative, a political 
leader or influential business owner who has ties to the landlord is asked to accompany the 
BU members. Such reliance on powerful political leaders or business owners is grounded 
in clientelistic ties developed between the two in the existing power structure of the bazaar. 
This suggests that trust is at the basis of all these interpersonal relationships, which 
acquires meaning in the existing institutional order (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1983, p. 26). 
Table 6.6 compares two cases to demonstrate the utility of interpersonal networks of BU 




Table 6.6: Examples of Batkhela BU members’ trust in personal ties for resolving traders’ 
problems 
BU official/ 
Case information  
President of BU  
(2010-13) 
General secretary of BU 
(2013-16) 
Type of tie  Friend from landed class Friend from landless class 




Outcome Trader was allowed to stay for six 
months 
15% rent increase instead of 
35% 
Quotation from representative “When we were negotiating, I brought 
the shoemaker out of the room and 
asked him, ‘If you want an extension 
or if you want money, tell me clearly’ 
[…] I knew that my friend would 
listen to me” (Faqir interview, 1 May 
2016) 
“I knew that one of my friends 
could convince the landlord. 
That’s why, when I and the 
president were going to talk to 
the landlord, we picked him 
from his shop” (Bakhtiar 
interview, 19 May 2016) 
Source: Interview data 
Comparing the relative utility of the BU and interpersonal networks from the 
perspective of traders highlights the significance of competence-based trust relating to the 
functions of the BU. Well-connected traders with extensive networks do not rely on the 
BU, choosing to trust in the competence of their interpersonal networks rather than in the 
competence of BU (as can be seen in Table 6.7). This principle applies only to reliance on 
either interpersonal networks or the BU as an organisation, whereas trust in the BU as 
organisation is higher than trust in government institutions. In one example, when goods 
and money worth PKR 2.5 million were stolen from a prominent grocery wholesaler, 
Babu, he asked the BU to pressurise the administration to expedite the investigation. The 
BU threatened the administration with a blockade of the main road if the culprits were not 
apprehended. Six years on, the administration had failed to resolve the case, which further 
eroded the traders’ trust in the government’s competence. Nevertheless, in this case, the 
traders’ trust in the competence of the BU was higher than his trust in the administration. 
As Babu stated: “The government does not do anything unless you pressurise it. And then, 
how much can the networks of an individual achieve? The bazaar union was required to 
get the government’s attention. When the bazaar union raised its voice, they (government) 
took the matter seriously” (Babu interview, 17 May 2016). 
Traders’ varying dispositions towards the BU can be attributed to their 
differentiated socioeconomic status. A prominent wholesaler of synthetic fibre stated: “If I 
asked the Bazaar Union for help, it would do anything that it could, but I know that it 
cannot resolve my problem – that’s why I don’t ask for its help” (Sohaib interview, 8 May 




dependent on the BU for access to state institutions, and hence lack trust in the BU’s 
capacity to influence the state to protect their individual interests. Insofar as an agent’s 
trust in his personal ties rather than those of the BU is concerned, the former enjoys greater 
trust than the latter. Large and small business owners have similar dispositions towards the 
BU in those instances where agents do not have the required social capital for dealing with 
that problem, or those cases where traders’ networks of individual relationships lack the 
requisite capacity. This principle applies to all functions that make the BU a resource for 
individual traders, for instance, facilitating traders’ interactions with the administration 
(see Chapter 7), or resolving disputes with traders, especially distant traders, or between 
business owners and their landlords.  
Table 6.7 compares two land disputes, and shows the role of socioeconomic status 
in shaping the traders’ trusting dispositions towards the BU. This analysis of traders’ 
trusting choices to rely on either the BU or on their personal networks can also be used in a 





Table 6.7: Example of comparison between trust in personal ties and trust in the BU 
Name of trader/ 
Case information  




Type of trade Shoemaker Electronic goods wholesaler 
Nature of problem Landlord asking to vacate the shop Landlord asking to vacate the shop 
Duration of tenancy 26 years 30 years 
Channel used for 
dispute settlement 
BU Friendship and political ties 
Why channel used Personal networks ineffective to help BU ineffective to resolve dispute 
Trader’s description of 
trust in the BU 
“I knew that my stance was weak. 
The owner asked me to find someone 
to buy the shop, because he did not 
want me to be affected. Still, I took 
the matter to the BU with two 
demands: either the shop should be 
sold to me, or I should be allowed to 
stay in the shop for six months until I 
could make other arrangements.” 
“I knew that the union could not do 
anything in this case. It does not have 
any role for the business owner. But 
yes, it is a showpiece through which 
the president attends meetings at 
different levels of government.” 
Trader’s description of 
the availability of 
personal ties 
“I made efforts to find someone, but 
could not find anyone. I knew a 
person who had money. I asked him 
to buy the shop. I told him that 
currently I am paying PKR 26,000 
rent per year, but I will pay you PKR 
5,000 per month, and I will also 
reconstruct this shop, but he did not 
agree.” 
“I told my sons not to decide 
themselves and not to engage the union 
again. I asked them to make Shabeer 
and Bakhtiar arbitrators, and whatever 
they decided I would accept that.” 
Outcome achieved Business owner was allowed to stay 
for six months 
New contract for less than market price 
was signed 
Source: Interview data 
The cases shown in Table 6.7 have an interesting trust dimension related to 
institutional trust. The landlord in the first case was a practising lawyer, who despite all his 
legal claims to the land, chose not to pursue his case in the court. Instead, he tried first to 
negotiate with the tenant over six months, and following the failure of these one-to-one 
negotiations, he agreed to the settlement arranged by the BU rather than disputing the case 
in court. In the second case, Waqar was aware that his stance was legally unjustified. As he 
stated: “I had told my sons, if he wants to do business in his shop, it is his legal right to 
vacate his shop, but ask him to give us some time” (Waqar interview, 9 May 2016). The 
landlord agreed, and a three-year contract was signed. However, at the end of the contract, 
Waqar’s sons refused to vacate the shop when they found out that it had been rented to 
another business owner at a much higher price. In this case as in the first, the landlord 
decided not to refer the matter to the courts, since “it will take another three to five years 




resolving disputes informally suggests that trust in formal institutions is low. It also 
suggests that trust in the BU’s individual-regarding functions is shaped by an agent’s 
socioeconomic status, while trust in its state-regarding functions is the product of the BU’s 
successful articulation of traders’ interests. 
One may conflate familiarity with trust in the above examples, although all trusting 
decisions are made in a familiar environment (Luhmann, 2000, p. 95). The BU, 
interpersonal networks or government institutions constitute the trusting choices which are 
filtered by an agent’s habitus that makes sense of the existing social order in Batkhela 
bazaar (Karpik, 2014). Traders’ decisions to trust either the BU or their own interpersonal 
networks are structured by familiarity which presents alternative choices, while trust is the 
choice made by agents despite the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others 
(Luhmann, 2000, p. 97). A comparison between two instances already referred to in this 
subsection will clarify this position. In the case of Babu, the trader did not choose between 
alternatives. As he stated: “In certain matters, the networks of a single person are not 
enough to pressurise the government: only the bazaar union can do that” (Babu interview, 
17 May 2016). This represents familiarity with the BU’s role, rather than trust in either its 
intentions or its competence. Conversely, in both the cases outlined in Table 6.7, the 
traders arrived at their current choices after being disappointed by another alternative. In 
this case, the choice to rely on either the BU or interpersonal networks was clearly a matter 
of trust, i.e. choosing between alternatives despite the possibility of being disappointed 
(Luhmann, 2000, p. 98).  
6.3.2.2 Generalised vs personalised reciprocity: Cooperation within and with the BU 
Agents initially cooperate with other in expectation of future returns. Whether it be 
cooperation between BU members, cooperation of BU members with political leaders, 
cooperation with government officials, or helping business owners, the norm of reciprocity 
regulates these relationships. Failure to fulfil the cooperator’s expectations is punished by 
cutting off ties and shifting one’s support to opponents in bazaar politics; meeting these 
expectations strengthens the ties between the providers and recipients of the favour. The 
structure of cooperative relationships around the BU is characterised by unequal power 
relations; however, the principle of reward and punishment for trustworthy and 
untrustworthy actions applies (with slight variations) in all cases. This contradicts the 
findings of Molm (2010), who limits the role of reciprocity to strengthening cooperative 
ties in equal power relations. Table 6.8 summarises the role of reciprocity in cooperation in 





Trust and reciprocity together also shape the outcomes of the BU’s elections. The 
failure of existing representatives to meet traders’ expectations is punished in subsequent 
elections. For instance, the BU’s inability to prevent the demolition of encroachments by 
the military (see Table 6.3) had both short-term and long-term consequences for Panel 1. In 
the short term, the traders stopped their financial cooperation with the BU, while in the 
long term, Panel 1 was voted out in the BU’s 2013 elections. A market-level president 
stated: “We wanted a president who could speak eyeball to eyeball to the administration: 
that’s why we voted for the current president. The previous president was weak, and had 
many times failed to protect the rights of business owners” (Akbar Zaman interview, 4 
May 2016). Previously, in the 2009 elections, the incumbent president was defeated amid 
rising opposition and his inability to favour traders in the dispersal of aid.55 
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administration 
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opposing side in 
the next elections 
Source: Interview data 
Table 6.8 also demonstrates the role of reciprocity in governing various types of 
relationships around the BU. Failure to fulfil the cooperator’s expectations invites 
sanctions which affect the ability of the BU to perform its functions. In the case of the 
demolitions mentioned in Column 2, the traders’ subsequent decision to withhold funds 
affected the BU’s functions. As the a key member of Panel 1 explained: “Between our 
                                                          
55 The aid was a relief package for families affected by the 2009 military crisis. The president was able to 
secure aid because of his membership of the PPP, which was in office at the time; however, he favoured 





election and that event, we collected over PKR 200,000 from the traders. Our aim was to 
use that money to help traders. However, after that event, we were unable to realise that 
plan” (Falak Niaz interview, 5 May 2016). Also referring to the demolitions, a trader 
metaphorically explained: “I cannot allow you to stand on my shoulder and throw a fireball 
into my house [but] I will certainly support you if you aim to save my house from fire. In 
this way, both of us will be rewarded” (Akbar Zaman interview, 5 May 2016). 
Drawing a distinction between generalised and personalised reciprocity is 
important here. Elected representatives of the BU derive their support both from their 
personal networks and from the bazaar as a collectivity, which is critical to their ability to 
perform their functions as BU representatives. In terms of generalised reciprocity, traders 
offer support with an expectation of the BU’s help in the future. The findings of the 
exploratory survey suggest that 92% of the business owners support the BU because it 
represents their interests. However, in their additional comments, 90 respondents (45%) 
said they had never required the BU’s help, although they expected to ask for help in the 
future. As Table 6.8 shows, the failure of the elected cabinet to realise expectations leads to 
non-cooperation from members. Conversely, interpersonal ties around the BU are 
regulated by an agent’s “win-stay, lose-shift” strategy. Table 6.9 presents examples of the 
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Source: Interview data and field notes. Note: Campaigning for 2017 election had started during 
fieldwork in 2016 
Cooperation in the politics of the BU is reciprocal. The behaviour of a recipient of a 
favour is conditioned by the action of the cooperator (Eloire, 2014; Lin, 2008), and the 
cooperation persists unless one of the cooperating agents acts contrary to the other’s 
expectations in a way that is detrimental to the interests of the cooperator. Exchanges 
within the BU and with various actors are, however, not tit-for-tat: instead agents adopt a 
“win-stay, lose-shift” strategy to cooperate in bazaar politics (Nowak, 2006, p. 1,560). This 
principle governs almost all the cooperative ties surrounding the BU. This section also 
suggests that reciprocity stabilises cooperative relationships in the BU’s politics. In non-
game theoretic terms, cooperation lead to increased cooperation, while failure to 
reciprocate leads to punishment from the cooperator in the form of non-cooperation and 




6.4 The significance of the role of the evolving Batkhela BU for local governance 
Batkhela BU is embedded in a series of relationships that make it an integral part of the 
local governance structures. As an association of traders, it has implications for political 
empowerment and participation, competition in local politics, governing by the local 
administration, and as a public good for the traders’ community. This section demonstrates 
why the BU matters for local governance in Malakand District, and how its role has 
increased in the aforementioned governance processes.  
6.4.1 The development of Batkhela BU: Increased political inclusion and empowerment 
As shown in Table 6.4, the evolution of Batkhela bazaar has resulted in its increased 
political heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is present at all levels: membership of the BU, the 
composition of its cabinet, and the formation of its political patronage structures. The latter 
is particularly significant for demonstrating the implications of bazaar-generated SC for 
local politics, and by extension, for governance. Each political party attempts to maintain 
its representation in the BU in order to secure its share of the bazaar-generated social 
capital that has utility for realising its objectives. Conversely, these political linkages are 
significant for enabling the members of BU to perform their functions and to gain some 
influence vis-à-vis the administration. This mutual interdependence has two major 
implications for local governance: tolerance and political inclusion. This suggests a 
positive side of social capital for local governance (Ikeda and Kobayashi, 2009, pp. 76-77). 
Actors who are pitted against each other in the local political field often form alliances to 
secure their share in the BU against their political opponents. The BU has also developed 
as an important source of power for the local political elite against the local administration. 
Similarly, as an outcome of economic change, members of traditionally opposed 
socioeconomic categories often join hands in bazaar politics. These empirical trends are 
indicative of the BU’s role in facilitating political tolerance and inclusion. Table 6.10 
summarises the role of bazaar-generated SC and its implications for political inclusivity. 
The increased political significance of the BU also results in the increased 
empowerment of the traders’ community. It was found that three Union Council mayors, a 
vice-mayor, the district level general secretaries of three political parties, four members of 
the district council, one ex-member of the provincial assembly, one former national 
assembly member, and other political leaders all offer patronage to the BU. Moreover, the 
elected members of local government, especially from Batkhela’s three UCs, campaign for 
their preferred candidates during BU elections. This offers a degree of empowerment to the 
traders, especially the poor traders, in terms of attracting attention from these political 




it: “There are a very few traders, say 50 or 60, from my constituency. However I help 
everyone, go with them to the police station, or to the district food office, etc., because 
they have voted for the candidate of my choice. If I don’t do it today, they are not going to 
vote for my candidate tomorrow” (Khalilullah interview, 4 September 2016). 
Table 6.10: Evolution of Batkhela bazaar and political inclusion 
Period/ 
Political inclusion 
1970s After 2009 
Level of reliance by BU 
representatives on local 
political actors 
Low High 
Level of dependence by 
political actors on BU 
Low High 
Relationships between BU 
and local political elite 
Zero-sum Mutual interdependence 
Level of political support 
for and interference in BU 
Low High 





Local bureaucracy-elite nexus 
against BU 
Local elite/BU nexus against local 
administration 
Source: Interview data and field notes 
Responsiveness through elections is only one factor: competition among local 
political leaders adds to the BU’s power. As a senior elected member of the UC1 stated: 
“[Every politician] tries to help the BU before others to demonstrate his capability not only 
to the traders, but to the bazaar union’s members, in order to ensure their support in the 
future” (Nurullah interview, 11 August 2016). This has two important implications for 
local power relations. Firstly, the inability of a single political party and individual political 
leader to dominate the BU creates incentives for them to form cooperative relationships to 
gain support for the representative of their choice. Secondly, the electoral field of the BU’s 
politics, especially in the 2009 and 2013 elections, has proved to be an alternative electoral 
field in the absence of local government elections. Despite its imperfections, and the 
varying dispositions of the traders towards the BU as an effective institution, political 
leaders regard regular elections to the BU and the involvement of multiple political parties 
as an important “step towards democracy and representation in the bazaar” (Bakhtiar 
interview, 9 May 2016).  
 
6.4.2 Increased significance of the BU for local administration 
The BU’s role in the local governance structure and its significance for the local 




in the bazaar, participates in the price review meetings held by the local administration, 
facilitates the communication of administrative information, and occasionally supports 
government welfare provision activities.  
For example, following the military crises of 2009, the military decided to conduct a 
sports event in the district, and ordered the district administration to raise funds from 
influential members of the community. The administration had neither the mandate nor the 
trust of the traders to carry out the task, but the BU was well placed to administer it. A 
senior official in the district government stated: “It is not the job of the administration to 
raise funds from the community. Let me tell you clearly, it was an order from the military. 
They asked us to generate a certain amount of funds for them” (Liaqat interview, 15 
September 2016). Another member of staff commented: “The role of the bazaar union in 
this process was that it generated those funds for us. We asked them [the BU members], 
and they contributed their share. From whom they collect those funds is not our concern” 
(Fasiullah interview, 1 July 2016). Traders’ contributions to the event were entirely 
voluntary, and the friendship, political and other interpersonal ties of the BU members 
played an important role in facilitating the fundraising. However, the BU is neither willing 
nor able to permanently facilitate government requests in this connection, owing to the 
traders’ apprehensions regarding government intentions to impose taxes on the local 
economy. Cooperation in this connection is likely to erode traders’ trust in the BU as their 
representative association. For instance, the tehsil municipal officer asked the BU on three 
occasions to generate finances for waste collection, but was unable to persuade the BU 
members to help. 
Conversely, the BU has greater proximity to political leaders than to administrative 
officials. This proximity often clashes with the administration’s governance improvement 
agenda. The high level of interdependence between political leaders and the BU often 
results in cooperation against the administration. As an ex-member of the provincial 
assembly from Batkhela subdivision stated: “This arrangement [with the BU] is reciprocal: 
when the administration adopts a rigid attitude towards them, they want us to negotiate. 
And when we want to pressurise the administration, they provide us support in our rallies, 
or calls for strike” (Shahab Khan interview, 2 July 2016).  
This interdependence between the BU and political leaders leads to the BU’s 
involvement in broader politics. Its participation creates incentives for the local 
administration to seek its support. For example, in 2016, the district commissioner (DC) 
ordered the withdrawal of the private security of political leaders. The leaders who had lost 




other leaders who had not previously had security. The support of BU representatives for 
those affected generated additional pressure on the administration. These events unfolded 
alongside Panel 1’s plan to seek the administration’s support for new elections in the 
bazaar. In a secret meeting, the a key administrative official assured Panel 1 of the 
administration’s approval for the elections. Members of Panel 1 then met in the bazaar to 
deliberate on the future course of action in the light of this assurance. A political leader and 
key facilitator of the meeting with the aforementioned government official told them: “You 
are assured of support [for the elections] because he [key government official] is annoyed 
with the attitude of the BU. He wants someone to replace those people and that’s why he 
conducted today’s meeting with you” (Field note, 22 July 2016).  
The BU’s growing political influence also creates incentives for the district 
administration to patronise cooperative representatives of the organisation. Hence, in 
another example, Panel 1 was provided with a government-owned vehicle to facilitate the 
movement of its members. Similar recognition for Panel 2 was denied due to its hostility 
towards the administration. This patronage is not legally mandated, but rather is based on 
the pragmatic considerations of local bureaucracy, aimed at improved order in the region.  
A clear pattern of reciprocity underpins the enhanced role of the BU in the local 
governance structure. The conflictive interests of the local administration and political 
leaders serve as a generative mechanism that structures the increased power of the BU. 
This increased power creates incentives for both the administration and political leaders to 
patronise the BU. In sum, the increased political embeddedness of the BU and its capacity 
to facilitate or impede the administration’s functions increase its utility for the local 
administration. 
6.4.3 Development of the BU as a collective good 
The BU has developed as a public (or community/collective) good. It is a resource 
available to every business owner regardless of his class or status. The ways in which the 
BU carries out its role as a public good, and the implications of this for local governance, 
range from the resolution of interpersonal disputes between traders to initiatives that 
benefit the entire bazaar. The outcomes of its use as a public good are mixed for 
individuals, because the prominent wholesalers have enough informal ties and they rarely 
use BU for the functions that it performs in this regard. However, as an institution, it is 
available to all in a wide array of affairs. In addition, the stakes of political actors in the 
BU (see Section 6.4.1) have increased its utility for the traders, especially the poor, due to 
its increased leverage against the administration. Table 6.11 summarises the range of 




public good and its effectiveness in delivering the desired outcomes are relative questions 
(see Section 6.4). However, some of its functions clearly indicate not only its utility for 
business owners, but also its impact on local governance in the context of weak formal 
institutions. 
Table 6.11: Role of the BU as a public good 
Number and example/ 




Dispute resolution 45 Small business owner unable to repay credit; BU 
negotiated easy return. 
Helping traders in 
emergencies 
8 Tailor’s shop burnt; BU helped in rebuilding the 
shelves 
Matters of collective 
significance 
6 Preparing traders’ ID cards that facilitated their 
mobility during and after the military crises of 2008-9 
Source: Interview data 
This table demonstrates the utility of BU as a public good for business owners. Its 
benefits are not exclusive to a specific class, group or sector in the bazaar. The rules of its 
membership are even more inclusive: anyone trading in the bazaar becomes a member by 
default, has the right to vote in its elections and can ask for its support. However, its roles 
in dispute resolution and helping business owners with emergency relief are insignificant 
for large traders: these traders benefit more from the BU’s role in matters of collective 
significance. An example of this collective action benefiting the large traders was seen in 
the early 1990s, when the BU organised a protest in Islamabad to press for the installation 
of digital phone lines in Batkhela. The need was articulated by the traders’ community 
mainly to enable the large traders to carry out their distant trade. The installation went 
ahead, and indeed benefited not only these traders but the entire region. 
6.4.4 The role of BU in service delivery 
A deficit in service delivery is a significant problem in Batkhela bazaar. The involvement 
of the BU as a stakeholder in major issues ranging from the slides (covers) of manholes to 
rubbish collection through to the reconstruction of public buildings such as a girls’ schools 
and even the police station, indicates its role in local service delivery. The BU plays an 
active role in articulating these problems, and has far-reaching impacts on the 
administration’s decisions – to the extent that the resource-constrained and powerless tehsil 
municipal office occasionally seeks to benefit from this role.  
The role of the BU in articulating demands for the reconstruction of what is known 
locally as the “old police station” in Batkhela bazaar demonstrates its influence over the 
delivery of government services. The building had been destroyed by Islamic militants 




popular haunt of drug addicts. Its location in the centre of the bazaar and near Batkhela 
high school made it a serious social problem. Meanwhile, a municipal official told BU 
members about an unused share of district administration funds from the tax generated by 
the bazaar’s transport stand - one of the few locally-generated revenue sources in 
Malakand District. One of the BU’s members stated: “[The official] told us ‘I will show 
you a fund which the DC is not utilising. If you make some efforts for that, we can rebuild 
this police station with the help of that fund’” (Ayaz Ali interview, 4 May 2016). In later 
meetings with the District Coordinating Officer (DCO), the BU members repeatedly made 
two demands: either for the building to be merged with the school, or for the “old police 
station” to be reconstructed. In the end, half of the reconstruction costs were secured from 
the transport revenue, and the other half was secured by the district administration from the 
provincial government. 
Other than making demands in political meetings, as shown in the example above, 
pressurising the administration through press releases, and negotiating with it, the BU does 
not actively work to address the deficit in the delivery of services. Bazaar representatives 
(both from 2009-2013 and 2013-2016) have criticised the administration’s failure to 
provide services, and have listed the forums in which they have raised their concerns. 
However, owing to resource constraints and the absence of traders’ trust in the BU for 
spending bazaar-generated funds, the BU is unable to act as an effective self-help 
organisation for the provision of services. Nevertheless, it actively reacts against 
ineffective measures by major service providers that are detrimental to the interests of the 
bazaar or the public. For instance, the president of the BU (2009-2013) stopped a 
contractor from the Pakistan telecommunications company from working because the 
cables were being passed through an open drain, clearly causing damaging consequences 
during the rain. Similarly, the BU had a protracted conflict with the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) which wanted to replace a high-capacity transformer in 
the bazaar with a low-capacity one. After three weeks of conflict in the local press, the 
matter was resolved through the intervention of the District Commissioner, to the 
satisfaction of the BU. 
6.5 Conclusions and the way forward 
This chapter has analysed the evolution of Batkhela Bazaar Union as a form of collective 
SC and its role in the local governance of Malakand District. Its mobilising capacity to 
pressurise government in times of collective crisis, and to seek concessions for traders, has 
been successful on a number of occasions. Its integrative capacity in local governance has 




local governance. Firstly, its mobilising capacity to pressurise the administration creates 
incentives for the local political elite to patronise the BU. Since 2009, its electoral politics 
have become a main arena of political participation in the local field, with political actors 
forming alliances to gain support for representatives of their choice. The underlying cause 
of this alliance formation is the inability of any single party or group to dominate the field 
of bazaar politics, owing to the increased political and socioeconomic heterogeneity of 
Batkhela bazaar. In this way, the BU has evolved within the structure of power that 
historically surrounds it and has generated new forms of interdependencies within that 
structure. Secondly, the evolution of the BU as an element of governance has changed the 
traditional equation between the bazaar, political elite and local administration. The 
traditional bureaucracy-elite nexus against the local population, especially the traders’ 
community, has evolved into a local elite-BU nexus against local bureaucracy. This 
confirms Schappo and Van Melik’s (2017) findings that bazaars have greater integrative 
potential within the political field than in the administrative field. 
As an association of traders, the BU remains weak and this weakness has a central 
relationship to the informal nature of traders’ networks. Analysis of the role of the 
interpersonal networks of traders has two key implications for the role of the BU as an 
association. Firstly, the interpersonal networks of the BU representatives play a central role 
in facilitating its functions as an association. These networks are a mix of family, 
friendship and patronage ties. These ties are cross-cutting, overlapping political, kinship, 
and socioeconomic boundaries. Secondly, the interpersonal networks of the traders 
(ordinary members) shape their dispositions towards the BU as a resource. The economic 
inequalities in Batkhela bazaar determine not only the strength and quality of agents’ 
interpersonal networks, but their reliance on the BU for accessing state institutions. This 
resonates with the findings of Levien (2015) and Beall (1997), that individual SC can 
prevent the development of collective SC but does not necessarily do so. The role of 
interpersonal networks in the structure and functions of the BU demonstrates that 
interpersonal networks also facilitate the functions of associational SC.  
The chapter also identified three levels of trust that shape traders’ dispositions 
towards the BU’s role in the local governance structure, namely interpersonal trust, trust in 
the BU as a representative organisation, and trust in government institutions. The chapter 
confirms McAllister’s (1995) findings that each of these levels of trust is further divided 
into two dimensions: intention-based and competence-based trust. In relation to the three 
levels of trust identified in the bazaar, the findings of this chapter suggest that levels of 




representative organisation. In contrast, trust in formal institutions remains very weak. 
Trust in the intentions of the BU’s representatives is higher, because of the expectations 
rooted in their institutional role as the traders’ representatives. However, trust in the 
competence of BU members is lower than is the case with interpersonal networks. This 
triad of trust levels suggests that trust is temporal and relational. It is temporal in that it 
increases or decreases over time. It is relational because the decisions of individual traders 
to rely on the BU are shaped by their social sensibility. However, for the pursuit of 
individual goals, trust in interpersonal relationships remains the most significant.  
The findings also indicate that the interpersonal networks facilitate the functions of 
the BU as a representative organisation for traders, while reducing its value as a resource 
for individual traders. Especially in terms of access to state institutions in individual-
regarding matters, its value is clearly greater for small traders than for large traders. This 
raises two significant questions which will be explored in the next chapter. Firstly, if power 
relations shape an individual’s disposition to rely on the BU in relation to their individual 
affairs, what role do their individual networks play in their everyday engagement with 
local government? Secondly, since, as noted in Section 6.4.2, the greater political 
embeddedness of the BU and its increased interaction with the government administration 
has had negative implications for local governance, to what extent do these informal 
networks, embedded in asymmetric power relations, therefore represent the “dark” side of 





Chapter 7 – The everyday governance of Batkhela 
bazaar: Social capital and the implementation of price, 
health and quality standards 
7.1 Introduction 
Taxation, which might be expected to be the most direct link between the local 
administration and the bazaar, is absent in the governance structure of Malakand District 
(as discussed in Section 5.3.1). It is therefore the implementation of regulations relating to 
price, health and quality standards that is the most frequent subject of everyday interaction 
between the bazaar and the local administration. Within this context, this chapter analyses 
the role of interpersonal networks and the associated norms of cooperation, trust and 
reciprocity, in filling the void created by weak formal governance mechanisms. It is argued 
that weak formal institutions and asymmetric power relations structure agents’ propensities 
for employing SC in the everyday governance of Batkhela bazaar. Drawing on the types of 
networks identified in Section 6.3.1, this chapter explores the role of family, friendship, 
economic and political networks in the everyday governance of Batkhela bazaar. These 
networks create both negative and positive externalities for the governance of the bazaar 
and the broader Malakand District. 
This chapter asks what role is played by bazaar-generated social capital in the 
development of regulatory mechanisms for goods and services in relation to price, health 
and quality. It draws on interviews conducted with business owners in the food and 
pharmacy sector of the bazaar, government officials in the local administration including 
the district administration, food and health departments, and local political leaders. The 
chapter also draws on field notes and legal documents, such as various acts regulating 
price, quality and health and safety standards, and records of government inspections of the 
bazaar. The key findings are illustrated by summaries of thematically identical cases, for 
instance in relation to business owners’ violation of regulations and the role of state 
officials in their implementation. 
In the remainder of this chapter, Section 7.2 examines the weakness of formal 
institutions for governing price, health and quality standards in Batkhela bazaar. This 
weakness erodes the trust of traders (and of citizens more generally) in government 
institutions. SC performs a dual function here: firstly it stabilises economic exchanges in 
the context of weak formal institutions; and secondly it negatively affects formal 
institutions by obstructing the implementation of regulations on price, health and quality 
standards. Section 7.3 then looks at the role of individual networks in facilitating 




7.4 examines the role of trust and reciprocity in governing cooperative relationships in the 
multiple networks that are essentially embedded in asymmetric power relations. Finally, 
the conclusions and implications of SC for local governance are presented in Section 7.5. 
7.2 Formal governance structures relating to price, health and quality standards  
This section outlines the key regulations relating to price, health and quality standards, and 
demonstrates the weakness of formal institutions in the governance of these areas of bazaar 
life. The inefficacy of formal institutions has implications for traders’ trust in the formal 
institutions. weakness of formal institutions is not merely the function of SC, but also how 
the district is governed. 
7.2.1 Governance of price in Batkhela bazaar 
Prices in Batkhela bazaar are governed by a combination of market mechanisms, social 
capital and state regulations. The role of the local administration in this regard is both 
limited and ineffective. It regulates prices in the food, pharmacy and petroleum sectors. In 
the food sector, its role extends to both determining and implementing prices, whereas in 
the pharmacy and petroleum sector its role is limited to implementation. Furthermore, 
within the food sector, the prices for fruit and vegetables are determined by a designated 
food controller in consultation with the fruit and vegetable union’s representatives, 
whereas for all other food commodities the law requires a monthly price review. In 
practice, however, the price review meeting is held once a year, causing a discrepancy 
between official and market prices. The price review committee is presided over by the 
district commissioner (DC), accompanied by assistant or additional assistant 
commissioner, and includes representatives of traders and consumers.  
Traders’ violations of the formal rules regarding pricing are of two kinds: either 
they do not have an official price list or they do not follow it. Almost every trader 
possesses a copy of the price list because the law demands this, but the prices are violated 
very frequently. Fifty-two cases of price violations were recorded between May and 
September 2016. Twenty-two of the retailers concerned, along with five wholesalers, 
justified these price violations because of the discrepancy between market and official 
price. As a prominent grocery wholesaler stated: “Do you think that anyone is following 
these price lists in the bazaar? We have these price lists, but I will sell it at the prices that 
suit me, not the administration” (Zahid interview, 9 August 2016). The wholesale market 
price of goods is higher than the official prices, leaving traders with little or no profit 
margin. A grocery retailer stated: “If the administration expects me to follow the official 
price list, these officials first have to make sure that I get those goods below the official 




lists to avoid violating this aspect of the law, but the lists are often not displayed to avoid 
unnecessary arguments with customers. Nine retailers and three wholesalers were found to 
have the price lists locked in their drawers. When an official asked a grocery wholesaler 
the reason for not displaying price list, the wholesaler replied: “Why should I display this 
price list? The customer will demand this price and will argue with me. When I refuse, 
because of the higher price in the market, he will complain to you” (Shairzada interview, 
15 September 2016).  
The administration’s incapacity to rectify the discrepancy between official and 
wholesale market prices creates incentives for traders to manipulate prices. Moreover, the 
administration lacks the capacity to detect traders’ strategies of manipulating the prices in 
order to comply with price regulations. For example, to manipulate prices without violating 
the official price lists, fruit and vegetable traders sell low-quality goods at the official 
prices. The official prices for food and vegetables are determined, followed by bidding in 
the wholesale market (mandhai). A norm in the market is that a retailer purchases bags of 
fruit and vegetable in the wholesale market, and if retailer finds low-quality fruit and 
vegetables when he opens the bags at his shop, his supplier reduces the price accordingly. 
However, these fruits and vegetables are still sold to the public at the official price unless 
the retailer has to return credit to his supplier for the next purchase.56 Similarly, sellers of 
tea, rice, sugar and bakery items can also easily manipulate the regulations by selling low-
quality goods that comply with the official price if there is an imbalance between the 
official and market prices of the commodity. As one grocery wholesaler stated: “They have 
fixed the price of tea for [PKR] 500 per kg but they don’t know if I am selling a lower 
quality for the price which they have determined” (Zafar interview, 11 August 2016). 
The fact that administrative officials are incentivised to maintain records of their 
work, rather than to improve governance practices, is a major cause of institutional 
ineffectiveness. This is a key reason for discrepancy in the robustness of price 
implementation around the month of Ramadan, and indeed throughout the rest of the year. 
The graph presented in Figure 2 shows a summary of the price inspection records of the 
                                                          
56 Most of the retailers and street-vendors in the bazaar purchase goods from the supplier in the wholesale 
fruit and vegetable market on credit, and return the entire amount or part of it before the next purchase. 
Inability to make these returns will negatively affect their relationship, which makes it difficult for the 




district administration. The graph clearly indicates a substantial rise in the frequency of 
inspections and imposition of penalties during and around the month of Ramadan.  
Figure 2: Pattern of administration’s price inspections and enforcement of regulations in the bazaar. 
Source: Official records of District Commissioner’s office  
In short, the underlying causes of the administration’s ineffectiveness are non-robust 
price determination, defective implementation and the absence of mechanisms for 
detecting the manipulation of quality to comply with official prices. Within this context, 
the administration performs limited functions to regulate prices in Batkhela bazaar. As 
noted earlier, a single price review meeting was held in 2016. Towards the end of this 
meeting, a prominent wholesaler addressed the government officials and complained: 
“These prices are determined in the meeting, but they are not implemented in the bazaar” 
(Field note, 29 May 2016). Incensed by this comment, A senior administrative official 
responded: “This time you will see the change, but then none of you should come to 
intercede for a retailer, nor will you bring any politician along with you” (Field note, 29 
May 2016). This points towards the role of informal mechanisms along with the fragility of 
formal institutions in the poor governance of prices in Batkhela bazaar. 
7.2.2 Governance of health and quality standards in the bazaar 
Violations of regulations applicable to health and quality standards are also pervasive. This 
section focuses on the governance of the pharmacy and food sectors of Batkhela bazaar: 
these are directly regulated by the local administration. Seventeen of the 23 interviewees in 
the food sector had a charge pending for violating the rules, while 19 were found to have 
dealt with one such case in the past. Similarly, in the pharmacy sector, seven of the 12 
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were involved in interceding for their customers in cases regarding violations of health 
standards. A health official hinted at these pervasive violations and stated: “In the last 18 
days, I have made cases against 20 business owners” (Interview, 17 August 2016). The 
main regulations applicable to different sectors in the bazaar are summarised in Table 7.1.  
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Sale of counterfeit, 
unwarranted or 
misbranded drugs; 
health and sanitary 
conditions at firms 
where products are 
kept for sale or display; 
sale of expired and 
spurious drugs; sale of 
homeopathic and 
natural drugs at 
pharmacies; issues of 
licensing/registration. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from key acts 
Resource constraints and non-robust institutional mechanisms account for the poor 
implementation of these regulations. For instance, local officials intentionally ignore 
temperature and hygiene standards in the pharmacy sector. Strict enforcement of these 
standards would be likely to place greater demands on government resources. One health 
official explained: “Laws exist for regulating these standards, but I know that the 
government would be faced with more severe crises than the current situation if they were 
enforced. [If this happened], I am sure all the 300 pharmacies in the bazaar would be 
sealed and the patients would be unable to get medicines for their treatment” (Saleem 
interview, 17 August 2016). Furthermore, pharmacy owners and food wholesalers are 
required to hold licences issued by their respective government departments. In the food 
sector, none of the traders held a licence at the time of the fieldwork, while in the 
pharmacy sector, the administration had recently adopted stringent enforcement measures. 




interviewees who had switched from these businesses to the pharmacy sector before the 
change in the government’s attitude towards licence-holding. Despite the change, traders 
were working in all three areas (retail, wholesale and distribution) while holding a single 
licence. 
Enforcement mechanisms are also non-robust. Seven instances were found where 
not-for-sale medicines from the hospital’s stores were traded in the bazaar. All the 
pharmacies selling these not-for-sale medicines were owned by employees of the health 
department. Furthermore, regulations are not consistently implemented throughout the 
district. For instance, certain sections of the Drugs Act 1976 and the Drugs Regulatory 
Authority of Pakistan Act (DRAP) 2012 prohibit the sale of Indian medicines. However, 
these medicines can easily be traded if the trader is located away from the hospital area 
where all the pharmacies are concentrated, or in villages that are rarely inspected. As with 
other regions of Pakistan, the sale of these medicines is on the rise because they are less 
expensive and more effective than their local counterparts (Farooq, 2016). 
The incongruity between the theory and practice of the formal governance of health 
and quality standards erodes traders’ trust in the formal institutions. Unsatisfactory 
inspection and implementation practices, differentiated treatment of the rich and the poor, 
and inadequate regulatory procedures all erode citizens’ trust in formal governance 
structures. The inability of formal institutions to detect violations of certain health and 
quality regulations is governed by the norms of trust and reciprocity, which will be 
explored in detail in Section 7.4. Table 7.2 summarises the weakness of formal institutions 
and shows how this leads to the erosion of institutional trust in the governance of price, 
health and quality standards in the bazaar.  
The fragility of formal institutions inhibits the development of civic or institutional 
trust (Rothstein and Eek, 2009). This context of the ineffective formal governance of price, 
health and quality standards exposes the limits of the state’s coercive authority to enforce 
regulations. It not only prevents the development of healthy social capital but also allows 
its “dark” side to flourish (Wacquant, 1998). As an outcome, traders employ individual 
social capital that adds to the ineffectiveness of state institutions by facilitating violations 
of regulations through intercession and channelling bribes. Section 7.3 will show that SC 
on the one hand stabilises economic exchange relationships in the context of weak formal 
institutions, while on the other hand prevents the implementation of regulations, as 
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No Data not available 18 23 
Source: Interview data 
7.3 The role of individual networks in the governance of price, health and quality 
standards 
Interpersonal networks of various types play a major role in the implementation of 
regulations for governing price, health and quality standards in the bazaar. In this section, 
interpersonal networks instead of associational memberships in the governance of these 
standards are the focus of analysis for two reasons. As argued in Chapter 6, Batkhela BU 
as a resource in individual matters is less significant than the interpersonal networks of 
traders. Moreover, the regulations outlined in Table 7.1 apply predominantly to individual-




development of trusting trading relationships or networks of support for violating 
regulations. Furthermore, political affiliations or the BU are important only for small 
business owners in cases where the reciprocal obligations of economic exchange 
relationships are absent, or where an agent lacks useful family or friendship ties to 
influence these governance mechanisms. Employing relational networks to escape 
penalties is an institutionalised practice underpinned by weak formal institutions and 
cultural practices. This section argues that actors with strong socioeconomic standing and 
better endowment of social capital have more stable ties to operate for them in the realm of 
bazaar governance. The empirical findings suggest that the key networks in this 
connection, in order of significance, include economic, political, family and friendship 
networks.  
7.3.1 The role of economic networks in bazaar governance  
Economic networks perform a key role in the governance of price, health and quality 
standards. As argued in Section 7.2, a discrepancy exists between market and official 
prices, which leads to the pervasive violation of regulations. Within this context, as a 
market norm, wholesalers assume responsibility if a customer (retailer) is identified as 
violating official prices. Contrary to Varman et al. (2009), in Batkhela bazaar, no collective 
sanctioning mechanism prevents business owners from violating market prices. Even two 
neighbouring business owners, trading in the same sector, cannot influence each other to 
maintain prices at a certain standard. However, economic ties are effective in knowledge-
sharing about the rise and fall of market prices. This implies that retailers get updated 
prices in the market from their suppliers in the bazaar. In addition, a loyal customer or 
friend may be offered a concessional price; however, generally, robust market competition 
exists at each level of the market, e.g. among the wholesalers/suppliers and among the 
retailers. The role of associations is limited to representing business owners in the official 
price review meetings, or negotiating penalties imposed by the administration against small 
traders for violating price, health and quality regulations. Apart from these areas, 
associational ties play hardly any role in the governance of prices. 
Interpersonal ties based on economic transactions are a source of social capital for 
the mutual benefit of both the retailer and his supplier. The absence of collective sanctions 
and greater reliance on individual networks also have implications for the governance of 
health and quality standards. Economic networks governed by norms of trust and 
reciprocity have a dual role. Firstly, as Table 7.3 demonstrates, they stabilise economic 




institutions. Secondly, economic networks hamper the development of effective 
governance. 
Table 7.3: The role of SC in stabilising economic exchanges 





“Initially, when you don’t know a customer, you are very 
careful in dealing with him, but this relationship gradually 
develops. Almost all of my ties with my 500 customers have 
developed in this way” (Sohaib interview, 8 May 2016). 
22 
Trust or lack thereof 
determines continuity in 
exchange relation 
“One of my customers in Bajaur, who ordered 50 sacks of 
rice last month, complained about the quality. I asked him to 
send the rice back. If you want to remain in the business, 
you cannot do one-shot transactions (da yaway urazi rozgar 
nashay kawalay)” Azmat interview, 31 July 2016). 
20 
Suppliers strive to 
develop trust to increase 
customer base 
“If he wants to return even 1 kg of cornflour because of its 
bad quality, I will happily take it back because he is going to 
tell others in his circle and they may become my customers 
tomorrow” (Imran interview, 8 August 2016). 
8 
Retailers strive to 
develop trusted ties to 
acquire credit  
“We sometimes even sell at a loss, to get the cash for 
payment to the market dealers so that we may purchase 
vegetables tomorrow” (Haris interview, 31 July 2016). 
20 
Purchase of items from a 
trusted supplier only  
“I will do business with those who sell original goods, or 
those with reputation for taking responsibility for the 
quality” (Riaz interview, 17 July 2017). 
21 
Seller maintains buyer’s 
trust for continuity of 
exchange  
“When the DC charged him [customer] with violating the 
price of sugar which I had supplied, he rang me up and 
asked, should I give him the receipt that you gave me? I said 
yes, I will take care of it. this is how you retain customers” 
(Shairzada interview, 15 September 2016). 
22 
Breach of trust leads to 
cutting off ties 
“[The supplier] delivered low quality rice. My father asked 
me to pay him in full and never do business with him again” 
(Zafar interview, 21 August 2016) 
18 
Source: Interview data (Total respondents: 23) 
Economic exchange relationships, especially regarding price stability, are 
characterised by an absence of generalised cooperation and collective sanctioning 
mechanisms. The case of the union of traders in bakery items is illustrative of the absence 
of the role of collective SC in determining prices in the bazaar. Bakeries in Malakand 
District are divided into categories A and B, with the former selling higher quality 
confectionery for which the administration determines higher prices. However, instead of 
collaborating to maintaining prices in the bazaar, members of the union for category A vie 
with each other to acquire preferential prices from the administration for their products. In 
addition, four of them were found to be accusing each other of adulteration to reduce their 




stated: “My brother is the president of our union, but this union is not doing anything. In 
the past, when my father was its president, he would check if a bakery owner was selling 
below or above the price, but now everyone is the owner of his own shop and follows his 
own will” (Ibrar interview, 28 July 2016). Table 7.4 demonstrates the absence of 
generalised cooperation in the governance of prices in the bazaar. 
Table 7.4: Social capital and governance of prices in the bazaar 
Sector/ 
Governance factors 
Grocery sector Fruit and 
vegetable sector 
Bakery sector Pharmacy sector 
Official price 
determination 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Role of union in price 
determination  
Yes Yes Yes No 
Role of union in 
ensuring regularities 
in prices 











quantity to lower 
price (two oil 
distributors) 




at price review 







to earn greater 
returns 
Source: Interview data and field notes 
Cooperation is a product of competition as outlined in the bottom row of Table 7.4. 
Price competition in the bazaar incentivises some business owners to adopt alternative 
strategies such as purchasing low-standard products or contraband, or using low-quality 
ingredients. The actions of agents are structured by market competition, and they are 
forced by market demand to purchase such brands to remain in the market. This practice is 
widespread in the grocery and pharmacy sector. For instance, a grocery wholesaler, 
pointing towards a brand of spices in his shop, explained: “I know that this is not pure 
because the ingredients that it claims to have are far more expensive than its price in the 
bazaar, but I am forced to buy it because my customers always demand this” (Shairzada 
interview, 15 September 2016). Similarly, a pharmacy retailer, identified as selling a fake 
life-saving drug, alluded to the greater profit margin as a rationale for his act. In total 16 
cases were recorded of traders in the pharmacy, grocery, beverages and confectionery 




Economic ties along the supply chain facilitate cooperation to violate regulations. 
Both types of retailers – those who intentionally purchase counterfeit or below-standard 
goods, and those who avoid buying such products in order to maintain their reputation in 
the market – expect their suppliers to assume responsibility for a penalty against the 
retailer selling their products. On the other hand, for a wholesaler or supplier, the use of his 
networks for protecting his customers is fundamental to the sustenance and growth of his 
business. Hence, economic networks predominantly facilitate channelling bribes to avoid 
penalties in the cases where severe irregularities are involved. Table 7.4 summarises 11 
cases to substantiate this finding. In all the cases but one, economic networks performed a 




Table 7.5: The role of economic networks in channelling bribes after health and quality violations 
Case details/ 





Role of economic 
network 
Reason for relying 
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Through the use of bribes, economic networks hinder the implementation of 
regulations applicable to the governance of health and quality standards in the bazaar. In 
all 11 instances summarised in Table 7.4, the drugs and food inspectors had collected the 
samples for forensic testing not directly from the business owners but from their customers 
(either retailers in Batkhela bazaar or in the peripheral areas of the district). Building 
reputations in the bazaar, maintaining and increasing customers, and avoiding 
identification by local officials, are the underlying motives of these business owners for 
using bribes and avoiding penalties. Traders’ access to networks for channelling bribes or 
to government officials for subverting the implementation of laws is structured by the 
power relations in the bazaar. Only the pharmacy retailer mentioned in Row 3 of Table 7.5 
had personally paid the bribe, but again, one of his suppliers had helped him connect with 
the official who could channel the bribe for altering results in the laboratory (see Section 
7.5.2).  
This suggests that the economic standing of a business owner determines his ability 
to access the networks that facilitate the channelling of bribes for violating regulations. In 
some instances, these networks of large business owners can be an effective resource for 
small business owners, who lack access to such resources due to their limited networks 
with an ineffective radius. The size and quality of traders’ networks is often contingent on 
their economic standing in the bazaar. Owing to the scale and operation of their business, 
economic standing, direct access to government officials and dense networks of 
relationships, large traders do not rely on the assistance offered by political actors in the 
form of intercessions. For this group, bribing government officials proves to be a more 
viable and less expensive means of heading off penalties. As a cooking oil distributor 
boasted: “My products are not inspected in those places where I have ties to government 
officials. The problem arises where these ties are absent. Officials in those localities collect 
samples, send those samples for forensic tests, but I know that the outcome of forensic test 
will be what I want, because I feed them” (Zaheer interview, 22 August 2016). 
7.3.2 Political networks and intercession for escaping penalties or acquiring concessions 
Political networks are generally helpful for small traders. Where networks underpinned by 
market institutions are unavailable, political patronage serves as a resource. However, 
violations of price, health and quality standards by small business owners are also 
pervasive. Table 7.6 demonstrates the role of political networks in facilitating intercessions 
and the effect this has on the implementation of regulations relating to price, health and 
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Source: Interview data and field notes 
Political leaders are an important resource for small business owners for 
negotiating concessions in penalties. These ties promote the intercession that is 
predominantly the domain of political actors because of their access to, and value for, 
bureaucratic officials at the local level. Regardless of their seniority, all 10 government 
officials interviewed confirmed that political actors interceded most frequently in matters 
relating to violations of price, health and quality standards in the bazaar. In addition, 
officials in health, food and administrative offices confirmed that political actors had a 
greater influence in terms of extracting concessions in penalties from high-level 
administrative officials. A support staff member at one of the key administrative offices, 
whose friend had been charged with a price violation, stated: “Our senior [official] does 
not listen to us, but we are forced by our friends to ask him for concessions. To help them, 
we adopt other means. My friend was charged with over-pricing. When a politician came 
to intercede for several business owners, I called [my friend] to come to the office instantly 
so that his penalty could also be reduced” (Nauman interview, 26 August 2016).   
The capacity of political actors to extract resources for small traders through 
intercession is embedded in the power-dependence relationship between elected local 
government and local bureaucracy. In this interdependence equation, the small traders or 
the poor are an important resource for political leaders. As an elected member of local 
government stated: “Those who come to ask us for help, or request [access to] government 
officials, are largely small shopkeepers. The large shopkeeper does not need my help 
because he is a millionaire. He is already linked to those people” (Ibrar Khan interview, 1 
September 2016). The evidence suggests that decentralisation increases the frequency of 
intercessions by political leaders. A key official in the food department explained: “There 




nazim or councillor in every street. Thus, each business owner is accompanied by these 
members when a penalty is imposed” (Shakirullah interview, 27 August 2016). The local 
administration lacks both the capacity and the willingness to discourage these 
intercessions. The incapacity of administrative officials in this connection stems from their 
dependence on political leaders to facilitate their administration. For example, a key 
administrative official spent 57 minutes trying to convince two members of the district 
council who had come to intercede for nine traders charged with violating prices. The 
matter was resolved by reducing the penalty to a sixth of its original level (Field note, 26 
August 2016). When the council members left, the official stated: “They do politics with 
us, we do politics with them, and this is how it works” (Waseem interview, 26 August 
2016). 
An interesting dimension of the role of these political networks in facilitating 
corruption is that they are both bonding and bridging SC. For instance, political actors are 
likely to intercede for business owners even if they do not belong to their constituency and 
have no family or friendship ties, since this action, even for disconnected traders, displays 
power and ensures future votes in BU elections. This confirms Widmalm’s (2005, p. 188) 
suggestion of abandoning the idea that certain form of SC are per se connected to specific 
benefits or dangers. It also contributes to the literature by demonstrating that bridging SC 
is helpful in promoting low-level corruption. Moreover, the findings of this section 
question the literature that associates higher level of bridging ties with lower levels of 
corruption (Myeong and Seo, 2016).  
7.3.3 Family networks 
Family ties, or “strong ties” are also an important resource in the dynamics of marketplace 
governance and corruption. However, family ties are less consequential than interpersonal 
networks in facilitating corruption or affecting the implementation of regulations, for three 
reasons. Firstly, only five cases were recorded where family ties were employed to 
intercede, and in three of these cases, the networks connecting the traders with government 
officials could not extract benefits for the business owners because of the families’ lower 
status in the social hierarchy. Secondly, the effectiveness of family social capital depends 
on the socioeconomic standing of the business owner and the ability of a family member to 
influence government officials. Thirdly, all the key officials responsible for 
implementation, except those in the food department and police, are usually posted from 
other districts, reducing the scope for the strong ties necessary to make an impact on the 




availability of family ties by comparing the cases of a vegetable retailer and a spice 
distributor in the bazaar.  











Brother approached local 
politician for help 
No direct access to 
relevant official 
Penalty reduced 






Cousin contacted DC Inability to directly 
access and influence 
powerful government 
officials 
Fine not paid 
Source: Interview data 
In both cases cited in Table 7.7, the family ties provided an indirect link to 
government officials. They were relevant in these cases not only because the family 
member was able to extract benefits for the business owner or was close to the official, but 
also because the business owner was unable to pursue his objectives independently. The 
case of the spice distributor whose cousin raised his case with the DC is particularly 
interesting here. He also identifies himself as an active worker of the Pakistan People’s 
Party and claims that this connection is helpful in such cases. But in this specific instance, 
the matter was brought to the notice of the DC, which was beyond the sphere of his 
personal and political influence. As the spice distributor stated: “I don’t ask [my family 
member] about small issues. I try to handle these matters personally. I know some people 
in the offices. If something happens, I ask them. I have also been the vice-chairman of the 
People’s Party at district level. I can use those ties as well. But in this case, something 
extra was required. He has contacts even above the DC. I don’t know to whom he had to 
talk in that matter, but my problem was resolved” (Azmat interview, 31 July 2016). 
Intercession through family ties is more effective than political intercession in cases where 
the trader or interceder has a direct family tie with the relevant official in the local 
administration. This link is often missing in the governance of Batkhela bazaar because the 
government officials in influential positions do not have any family connections in the 
district. Wherever these connections do exist, they have a greater influence than political 
intercession. Table 7.8 compares the cases of two health and food inspectors to 





Table 7.8: Example of the impact of family ties on the implementation of regulations 
Origin of inspector/ 
Points of comparison 
Inspector resident of 
Malakand District 
Inspector appointed from 
another district  
Resistance to intercession High High 
Reputation for enforcing 
regulations in the bazaar  
Strict Strict 
Resistance to intercession from 
own colleagues  
High High 
Resistance to intercession from 
higher administrative officials 
High High 
Demonstrated rejection of 
political intercession  
High (5 cases) High (3 cases) 
Susceptible to intercession 
from friends and family  
Yes (demonstrated) Yes (potential) 
Ever posted in one’s native 
district  
Yes No 
Representative quotation “My maternal uncle asked me 
during a gathering to lift the 
penalty which I had imposed on 
his friend. I will tell you 
honestly, I did not lift the 
penalty, but I did reduce the fine, 
so he only had to pay 20%. The 
original was PKR 5,000, but he 
paid PKR 1,000 after the 
reduction.” 
“[At home] I have my relatives, I 
have my childhood friends. Here, 
no one knows me personally; I 
do not have close interaction 
with people. I cover the distance 
between three districts to 
perform my job here. I do not 
have any kind of social 
commitment. But if I was posted 
in my district, how could I 
impose a penalty on a store 
owner who has his shop in the 
street where I grew up? Or on 
people with whom I have had 
ties since the time of my 
grandfather?” 
Source: Interview data 
7.3.4 Friendship ties and their utility for dealing with penalties in the bazaar 
The influence of friendship ties over price, health and quality regulations depends on the 
resources embedded within the friendship networks. They imply that a friend’s position in 
the power structure and his ability to extract favours from government officials will 
determine the ability of friendship networks to have an impact on regulations. Nine cases 
were recorded in which traders employed friendship ties to thwart the enforcement of 






Table 7.9: Friendship networks and their influence on bazaar governance  
Case details/ 
Violations 
Business type and 
size of violator 








meat and violating 




for keeping records 
of penalties 
Tempered original 
penalty imposed by 
food inspector 
Fine reduced to 





Member of clerical 
staff in district 
secretariat 
Request lodged 
with senior official 











to health official 
Charge not filed 
against the violator 
Mixing fodder 
with spices  
Spice seller (retail) Local politician Interceded with 
relevant health 
official who is 
family friend 
Sample returned; 
charge not filed 
Selling expired 
goods 





Violating price list Grocery retailer Member of clerical 
staff in food 
magistrate’s office 
Asked food 
inspector for favour 
Charge not filed  
Selling rotten 
meat 
Butcher Maternal uncle of 
food official 
Forced nephew to 
remove penalty 
Penalty reduced 
from PKR 5,000 to 
PKR 1,000 
Source: Interview data 
A number of findings emerge from the analysis of friendship networks. Firstly, the 
location of the benefactor in the power structure is the major determinant of the influence 
of friendship ties on formal governance. Secondly, interactions in the bazaar also result in 
friendship ties operating across socioeconomic hierarchies, as Rows 4 and 5 of Table 7.9 
suggest. Finally, interpersonal bridging ties facilitate intercession to the detriment of the 
effective governance of price, health and quality standards.  
Overall, this section suggests that relational networks contribute more than 
associational networks to the fragility of formal institutions. Business owners frequently 
refer to interpersonal networks that facilitate intercession and bribes, e.g., economic, 
family and friendship, as the “means” (zarya) for escaping penalties. Furthermore, in terms 
of the role of Batkhela Bazaar Union and political affiliations, it is clear that most traders 
rely on these resources only in the absence of other means (interpersonal networks) of 




government institutions to effectively govern multiple facets of bazaar life. The utility of 
informal interpersonal networks in the governance of the bazaar is evident from the fact 
that, in addition to patronising local political leaders, administrative officials cultivate 
interpersonal networks to detect violations of health and quality standards. As a local 
health inspector stated: “I am not a prophet who has revelations about violators. We 
develop our own resources who point out the violators” (Saleem interview, 17 August 
2017). However, the utility of such resources for the improvement of governance is 
limited, as these informal sources often provide biased information that favours their 
friends and family members.  
7.4 The role of trust and reciprocity in the everyday governance of Batkhela bazaar 
Cooperation among agents in order to accrue benefits from their networks is underpinned 
by the norms of trust and reciprocity. Agents in various fields, whether economic, political 
or bureaucratic, draw benefits through such exchanges. One agent relies on another to 
intercede or pay a bribe only if a trusted relationship exists between the two. In the absence 
of direct ties between a business owner and a resource that is helpful in avoiding a penalty, 
a trusted channel for access is required: this channel is mainly provided by economic, 
friendship or, to a lesser degree, family ties. As noted earlier, each individual is embedded 
in multiple economic, political and social networks. An agent’s propensity to draw on a 
specific network is determined by the degree of trust which the agent exhibits in the 
capacity of that network (Lin, 2000). This means that trust is asymmetric. However, 
asymmetry in trusting relationships also accounts for a trade-off between trust in 
government institutions and trust in interpersonal networks. Irrespective of one’s business 
size and type, every trader in the bazaar believes that the government enforces regulations 
against him while larger traders get preferential treatment (Uslaner, 2008, p. 43). Within 
this context, which is characterised by low institutional trust in the government, 
interpersonal networks play an important role in bazaar life. The remainder of this section 
explores the role of trust and reciprocity in governing cooperation within the networks 
discussed in the previous section. 
7.4.1 The role of trust in governing the networks of relationships 
Ineffective institutions lead to low levels of generalised trust and greater dependence on 
interpersonal networks. The trust that is developed in these networks performs a dual role. 
Firstly, as Table 7.3 demonstrates, trust serves as an insurance mechanism to substitute for 
institutional weakness. Secondly, it governs the interpersonal networks developed around 
the bazaar’s governance that facilitate intercession and bribes. This trust is both role-based 




that the supplier will assume responsibility for the quality of the products or will pay the 
penalty. However, this upward disposition in the supply chain is not simply structured by 
the principle of economic transactions, but is also rooted in the past behaviour exhibited by 
the suppliers. In addition, the density of networks of the wholesalers and suppliers, their 
proven ability to bribe government officials, and their past record of assuming 
responsibility to protect the retailers, generates trust within economic networks. 
In those instances where mutual obligations of economic exchange are absent, such 
as price irregularities, encroachment or an individual’s acts of adulteration, political, 
friendship and family ties are employed. The trust of an agent in such cases relates either to 
the initiation of ties to the benefactor (cause of network development), or to the 
demonstrated utility of the latter in such cases (outcome of networks). Thus, the power and 
capacity of the benefactor, knowledge about his ability to influence the outcome of 
penalties, and the existence of personal or indirect ties, shape the initiator’s dispositions to 
trust or not to trust in each situation. In the instance recorded in Row 6 of Table 7.9, the 
grocery retailer had twice escaped a penalty with the help of a friend. As the retailer stated: 
“I know he personally cannot do it, but he had ties to people in that office, and that’s why 
he was able to do it for me in the past… If he fails to do it, I will look for another suitable 
person to get my job done” (Riaz interview, 17 July 2016).  
This negative outcome of interpersonal trust is linked to institutional fairness in 
Rothstein’s sense. As Rothstein (2013, p. 1,019) argues, when agents are aware that 
institutions and public officials who are responsible for implementing the law are corrupt 
and unfair, they will make an inference that most others cannot be trusted. A bakery owner 
who has paid penalties several times for poor health standards explained: “If you have ties 
to protect you from penalties, do whatever you like. But if not, you are doomed” (Shafeeq 
interview, 26 July 2016). A government official echoed the same sentiments when he 
stated: “We see it every day: those who have ties get concessions, or are even acquitted 
sometimes, and those who do not, there is no reason that the law will not work against 
them” (Ali interview, 9 August 2016).  
For instance, A and B, two bakery owners, were charged with a similar violation of 
health standards. A lacked any trusted ties that could save him from penalties, while B, due 
to his business size and socioeconomic status, had enough personal ties to protect him from 
penalties. In theory, both paid the penalty, but B visited the district food office with a 
senior elected member of the district council. The food official could not turn down the 
intercession of the politician. Unable to lift the penalty, but also unwilling to disappoint the 




got away with the penalty, but also demonstrated the influence of his networks over 
governance institutions. For this reason, trust in both the capacity and fairness of 
institutions is low, while trust in relational social capital to influence those institutions is 
high. Eighteen out of 20 respondents in the category of traders violating price and quality 
standards echoed low trust in institutional fairness and greater confidence in the ability of 
their interpersonal ties to  influence government institutions in their favours. A pharmacy 
retailer summed up this relational infrastructure of trust when he stated: “It is a custom 
here: if you have a lot of money, and ties to powerful people, then it’s fine, but if you 
don’t, you’re nothing. You will be doing your business, but you have to ask everyone for 
pity, even if your case is legitimate” (Goher interview, 11 August 2016). 
7.4.2 The role of reciprocity in governing the networks of relationships 
If trust creates expectations, reciprocity is a system of sanctions to maintain those 
expectations. In this sense, it offers stability to exchange relationships in the context of 
ineffective institutions. The interpersonal networks in the bazaar are regulated by the norm 
of reciprocity, which serves as an insurance mechanism. Two mechanisms, positive and 
negative reciprocity, underpin reciprocal exchange relationships. The former denotes 
goodwill that strengthens cooperation, while the latter refers to retaliatory actions that will 
follow the failure of either party to fulfil the obligations that a reciprocal relationship 
entails (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). For instance, the obligation by suppliers to assume 
responsibility for penalties is a norm in the bazaar. Abiding by this norm enhances the 
reputation and increased customer base of a trader, whereas failure in this regard invites 
retaliatory actions in the form of a bad reputation and declining numbers of customers. As 
a grocery wholesaler stated: “If I assume responsibility for my product, not only will the 
customer buy from me again, but he will pass on this information to others in the market. If 
I do not assume responsibility for my products, he will stop buying from me, and will tell 
others that this supplier does not assume responsibility of the quality of his product” 
(Imran interview, 8 August 2016). 
Exchange relationships are undoubtedly asymmetric, and the wholesalers enjoy a 
powerful position. However, increased competition among the wholesalers reduces their 
ability to dominate the field unilaterally. Two processes, competition between actors with 
approximately equal power, and dependence of powerful actors on weaker actors to 
achieve their objectives, create incentives for the powerful to be more responsive. These 
processes also give a degree of power to the weaker actors, since they can apply sanctions 
if the powerful actors deviate from their expected role. In one example, food department 




tests in Peshawar (since the penalty in such cases is not imposed unless confirmed by the 
outcome of the tests). Explaining his ties to the biscuit supplier, the grocery retailer stated: 
“I have been buying different items from him for the past five years, but if he does not pay 
the penalty for the items that he supplied, I will stop buying from him. Also, my brother is 
a salesman in the bazaar. He will tell everyone and people will be careful in dealing with 
him” (Inamullah interview, 5 August 2016).  
The flow of mutual benefits in exchange relationships is contingent on the capacity 
of both parties to fulfil their obligations. A pharmacy wholesaler, selling a large quantity of 
unregistered Indian medicines to business owners in the peripheries of Malakand District 
stated: “Some of those customers have been with me for ages, to the extent that we have 
developed family friendships. I know that they can sell my stock, and they know that Zakir 
[interviewee] is sitting in Batkhela, and if any problem arises, he is there to handle it” 
(Zakir interview, 13 August 2016). This finding contradicts Molm’s (2010) contention that 
reciprocity stabilises exchange only in equal power relationships. In Batkhela bazaar, the 
actions of the powerful actors, whether suppliers in the economic field or political actors in 
the political field, are structured by the principle of loss aversion. Explaining why political 
actors intercede for the poor if they violate regulations, an elected member of the local 
government stated: “If I don’t do it, someone else will do it for them!” (Nurullah interview, 
11 August 2016). 
Traders in weaker socioeconomic positions also have other weapons to punish their 
suppliers for unfair treatment. The power of these retaliatory actions is greater in the case 
of a wholesaler’s intentional involvement in illegal activities. For example, an ice-cream 
and beverages retailer discovered that his supplier was charging him more than other 
retailers for Pepsi. When he failed to get a reduced price, he anonymously informed the 
assistant commissioner, who raided the shop and confiscated a large amount of 
substandard beverages. As a consequence, the supplier had to suffer the loss of PKR 
20,000.  
Family and friendship ties with government officials are also regulated by the 
possibility of sanctions if an official fails to protect traders’ interests. The local food 
inspector mentioned in Table 7.8 reduced the penalty of a violator in order to protect 
family ties with his maternal uncle. As the inspector stated: “When I looked at [my uncle], 
he said, ‘I will be embarrassed in front of my friend – I’ve never asked you for any favours 
but I don’t want to go disappointed from your house.’ Thus, I had to do it for him because I 
did not want our family ties to be affected” (Ijaz interview, 15 August 2016). Protecting 




laws. For instance, the UC mayor of a village neighbouring Batkhela failed to help his 
friend deal with a penalty against expired confectionery. The confectioner cut off ties with 
the mayor. Explaining the event, the mayor stated: “You might have done 99 favours, 
including those that destroy your world and the hereafter, but if you fail to do one, your 
friendship is gone” (Zahir interview, 16 August 2016). This is not an exception but a rule.  
Loss aversion is not, however, the only sanctioning mechanism. Creating future 
obligations for achieving personal objectives also results in the development of reciprocal 
relationships. Traders involved in the sale of counterfeit goods and contraband cultivate 
bribe-based ties with local inspectors and with officials who have access to the forensic 
laboratories. The ties with the local government officials protect them from inspections, 
while those with the laboratory officials are deployed only if the local ties fail or if the 
local officials cannot be bribed. The continuation of these ties depends on the flow of 
mutual benefits whereby traders receive guarantees of protection against penalties in 
exchange for money or gifts. The failure of government officials to fulfil their obligations 
damages these ties, unless a credible justification for the failure is provided. In one 
instance, a government official imposed a penalty on a grocery wholesaler for violating 
price regulations. Instead of paying the penalty, the wholesaler offered a bribe in an 
attempt to establish a mutually beneficial connection. As the grocery wholesaler recalls: “I 
told him, ‘I will not pay this penalty, but if you come to my place, I will pay you PKR 
1,000 without any reason.’ He came the next day, and apologised for his act” (Zafar 
interview, 11 August 2016). However, on another occasion, adulterated tea was 
confiscated from Zafar’s shop. This time, the official failed to protect him from a penalty, 
and Zafar not only cut off ties with the official, but also used his networks to pay a bribe to 
alter the forensic test report.  
The payment of bribes to alter results in the forensic laboratory in Peshawar and the 
use of intercession through political actors involves a third party. These mediated exchange 
relationships create obligations between directly related nodes in the network. For instance, 
if a concession is granted by a bureaucrat in relation to a minor offence by a street vendor, 
the concession creates obligations not for the street vendor, but for the political actor on 
whose request the concession was granted (Lindholm, 1982, p. 123). In this process, the 
authority granting the concession invests in his relationship with the political actor, while 
the political actor who acted as mediator expects that the street vendor or a shopkeeper will 
return the favour in the future. In most of these cases, the seeker and provider of the favour 
are strangers. Box 7.1 presents an example in which the personal ties between an elected 




official) were affected when the former attempted to extract concessions for some street 
vendors but failed.  
Box 7.1: Reciprocity in mediated exchange: Implications for the ties of intermediaries 
In this example of intercession, traders were the potential recipients, the politician was the 
mediator, and the administrative official was the potential benefactor, as he controlled the 
resource valued by both the potential recipients and the mediator. The politician and 
administrative official had close ties, developed prior to the posting of administrative official to 
Batkhela. The traders asked the politician to intercede for them to acquire concessions in a 
penalty imposed for violating health and quality regulations. In the meantime, the politician 
was invited for tea by the administrative official at his official residence. While waiting for the 
tea, the politician asked the administrative official to undo the penalty against the traders, but 
the request was rejected. In reaction, the politician not only left the official’s house without 
having the tea, but personally submitted the fine for the traders in the office of the 
administrative official the following day. As the politician stated: “I handed over the papers to 
him and pretended we did not know each other. Then he [the administrative official] said, ‘I 
know that you’re upset over yesterday’s incident. Let’s have a cup of tea together.’ I replied, 
‘You know that these poor vendors cannot pay PKR 5,000. And leaving that aside, you did not 
respect our relationship (taaluq)’.” In this typical instance of mediated exchange for reducing 
penalties, the traders (potential recipients) and administrative official  (potential benefactor) did 
not have any direct relationship. Instead, the relationship was mediated by the politician, who 
was the interceder and directly connected to both sides. The administrative official’s rejection 
of the request affected his ties with the politician. However, the politician saved his relationship 
with the traders by submitting the penalties on their behalf. If the traders had not been helped, 
their trust in the politician would have been diminished. This suggests firstly that, in mediated 
exchange relationships, the mediator’s ties to the exchange parties are affected; and secondly 
that the mediator attempts to preserves his ties with the potential recipients if the potential 
benefactor fails to fulfil expectations. Failure by the mediator erodes trust in his capacity.  
Source: Interviews with Kalimullah (politician) and Shabeer (administrative official) 
Apart from the networks that connect traders to the forensic laboratory, the terms of 
return in mediated exchange relationships are usually unstipulated, and a favour need not 
be returned in a specific time-frame (Sahlins, 1972, pp. 193-194). As in the example shown 
in Box 7.1, government officials may expect cooperation from political actors in the future, 
and political actors may expect votes from street vendors in local government or BU 
elections. Explaining the underlying motives of his decision to intercede for the traders, the 
elected local government official stated: “Not all of them are from my constituency. There 
will be hardly 60 or 80 business owners from my constituency. However, I am a trader as 




the support of these people again in the next elections of the BU, I will have to do this” 
(Khalilullah interview, 3 September 2016). Regardless of how an exchange process is 
initiated, the acts of favour by a benefactor are dictated by his intent to create deferred 
obligations in the future (Sahlins, 1972, pp. 193-194). The role of reciprocity in governing 
networks of multiple types that shape bazaar governance is summarised in Table 7.11. 
Table 7.11: Reciprocity as a governing mechanism for networks 
Case details/ 
Type of request  
Expectations of request 
initiator 





expects from large 
trader 





Cutting off business ties 
and spreading negative 
word 
Large trader 
expects from small 
trader 
Increased number of 
permanent customers  
Development of trust and 
durable economic 
exchange 
Cutting off business ties 
Trader expects 
from political actor 
Intercession to reduce or 
omit penalty 
Seeking support in rallies 
and votes in the next 
election  





Development of reputation 
and increasing support-
base 
Increasing the numbers 




Fulfilling past obligations 
or creating future ones 
Maintaining friendship 
ties 
Cutting off friendship 
ties 
Source: Interview data and field notes  
A few key findings emerge from this section. Firstly, an agent will seek to avoid 
the sanctions identified in Table 7.11, unless the costs of cooperation exceed its returns. As 
noted in Section 6.3.2, trust in the intention of the benefactor to help also plays a key role 
in shaping the recipient’s decision to apply sanctions. Secondly, in addition to pecuniary 
gains, actors, especially political actors and large traders, aim to develop resources such as 
increased power, reputation and prestige through these exchanges, as the motives shown in 
Table 7.11 suggest. Thirdly, cutting off ties, shifting one’s trust to the benefactor’s 
competitors, reminding an agent of his failure in front of others, and spreading negative 
word about a person are powerful social sanctions that ensure the continuity of mutual 
exchange relationships. Finally, the structure of the networks is governed by the structure 
of reciprocity that is indicative of the “win-stay, lose-shift” behaviour of agents (see Table 
7.11, Column 4). In summary, giving benefits in return for benefits generates structures of 
relationships across various fields, and these relational networks are governed by the 
structure of reciprocity.  
These findings further suggest not only that economic relationships are embedded 
in social relationships (Granovetter, 1985), but also that economic exchange leads to the 




2010). This affirms Lawler and Yoon’s (1995) theoretical argument that negotiated 
exchange relationships develop into commitments on the basis of expressive exchange 
relationships. However, these ties and underlying commitments are affected in cases of an 
actor’s failure to reciprocate. In cases of severe or urgent need, the exchange relationship 
begins with trust in the benefactor or a third agent to whom the benefactor is connected, 
whereas in day-to-day economic transactions trust develops gradually to transform 
economic relationships into reciprocal exchange relationships. For instance, six cases were 
recorded of pharmacy retailers selling contraband on a permanent basis. These business 
owners sell these medicines only to trusted customers. A retailer explains: “If an ordinary 
customer asks, I will simply say that I don’t sell Indian drugs. I will sell them only to my 
trusted customers” (Goher interview, 11 August 2016). These trusted ties are strengthened 
through reciprocal exchanges in the market, where both the truster and the trustee fulfil 
their reciprocal obligations.  
7.5 Conclusions: Implications of SC for local governance 
The analysis of social capital’s operation in relation to key regulations for governing price, 
health and quality standards suggests that weak formal institutions have a significant 
bearing on how SC operates within the local governance structure (Wacquant, 1998). With 
regard to the role of SC in the governance of Batkhela bazaar, two major findings emerge. 
Firstly, in the context of weak formal governance, SC stabilises exchange relationships 
around price, health and quality standards in the bazaar. However, it has a “dark” side too, 
in that it promotes intercession and bribes, which in turn add further to the fragility of 
formal governing mechanisms. It was also found that bonding and bridging ties equally 
have a “dark” side that facilitates corruption, with negative implications for the 
enforcement of regulations relating to bazaar governance. However, this does not suggest 
that individual SC is merely an “obstacle to development” (Levien, 2015): it has a “bright” 
side too. Overall, SC performs both complementary and substitutive role in relation to 
weak formal institutions; on aggregate, however, its “dark” side prevails. Employing 
interpersonal ties to subvert the implementation of regulations is an institutionalised 
practice in Pakistan: in Batkhela bazaar, in 75% of the instances studied, SC was useful in 
achieving this end. Four key conclusions are derived from this chapter, as set out in the 
following four subsections. 
7.5.1 Social capital: Stabilising economic exchange relationships 
The fragility of state institutions outlined in Section 7.2 in terms of their power to 
implement regulations leads to social capital taking the place of these institutions. SC 




regulate. In this connection, the underlying roles of trust and reciprocity in structuring the 
norm of holding suppliers responsible for the price and quality of goods is an eminent 
example. Compliance with these norms stabilises ties between agents, while deviation 
from them invites sanctions (as shown in Table 7.11). Ties between business owners and 
their customers are also governed by this principle. Most business owners believe that 
customers will not complain to government offices about high prices or low quality, but 
rather will share their concerns directly with the business owner who is responsible for 
satisfying the customer. Family, friendship or regular economic ties are the forms of 
individual networks that facilitate trust and reciprocity in stabilising economic exchanges 
between business owners and their customers.  
7.5.2 Social capital and intercession: An impediment to better governance 
While social capital stabilises exchanges in the economic realm in the absence of effective 
formal institutions, it has a “dark” side too. As demonstrated in Section 7.3, various forms 
of networks facilitate intercession. Consequently, this situation has encouraged business 
owners to violate regulations relating to price, health and quality standards. The norms of 
trust and reciprocity stabilise cooperation around the violation of regulations. The 
embeddedness of a series of relationships in Batkhela bazaar does not just provide traders 
with multiple channels for intercession; it also limits the capacity of government officials 
to implement regulations. Interviews with government officials reveal that locally 
appointed officials have greater susceptibility to intercession than officials from other 
districts. It may be argued that the majority of local officials work in lower positions and 
are hence more susceptible to social pressure. However, this finding applies equally to 
executive officials who are responsible for imposing penalties. The majority of high-
ranking officials agree that family, friendship and even neighbourhood ties would have an 
impact on their capacity to enforce regulations if they were posted in their native district.  
Table 7.8 illustrates this finding by comparing the cases of two executive officials 
of the same rank. This comparison suggests that bonding social capital promotes low-level 
corruption by facilitating intercession at local level. However, consistent with the findings 
in Section 7.3, Section 7.5.3 demonstrates that bridging ties also affect the implementation 
of regulations. The difference between bonding and bridging ties, in the context of 
Batkhela bazaar, is that the latter are more instrumental in channelling bribes and therefore 
have more adverse ramifications for local governance. Bonding ties, however, limit the 




7.5.3 Bridging ties and bribes: Implications for governance  
Bridging interpersonal networks embedded in the economic field have a major capacity to 
affect the implementation of the law in cases of serious offences. Instances where samples 
of goods are collected from traders for forensic testing involve severe offences. The role of 
bridging ties in relation to this process has adverse implications for local governance. 
Bridging networks can frustrate even the most rigorous cooperation between local political 
leaders and bureaucracy (and such well-intentioned cooperation between the local 
administration and political leaders is rare). The severity of offences in this category ranges 
from using low-level ingredients in the production of goods to the sale of fake life-saving 
drugs. The latter may result even in the loss of human lives. Row 3 of Table 7.5 presents 
an example of a pharmacy owner whose act of selling contraband had led to such an 
outcome. Even before these samples are dispatched for forensic tests, intercession through 
friendship or political networks may affect the outcomes, depending on the interceder’s 
capacity to influence the official at local level. Wary of damage to their reputations, local 
politicians are careful in interceding in such extreme cases. Nevertheless, instances of 
political intercession were observed. These intercessions were unsuccessful because 
administrative officials are generally inflexible in such instances. However, despite the 
administration’s inflexibility, economic networks can affect the implementation of 
regulations in these cases. Eleven instances were recorded in the food and pharmacy 
sectors in which economic networks hindered the implementation of regulations (see Table 
7.3). These networks facilitated the channelling of bribes for altering the forensic reports 
on the samples. In five of these cases, intercession failed to yield results, while reliance on 
the bribery channels instead of intercession was preferred in three cases.  
7.5.4 The aggregate impact of bazaar-generated SC on wider local governance 
Local political actors, especially elected officials, are key players in the dynamics of 
bazaar governance. As an outcome of relational changes between the bazaar and local 
politics, the bazaar has acquired significance in the power play within the political field, 
and also between the political and administrative fields. This significance has also 
increased the political responsiveness of local political actors, who exert greater influence 
on the implementation of regulations in favour of traders, in return for patronising bazaar 
politics. Negotiating concessions in penalties for an individual business owner or on the 
initiative of the BU’s cabinet members is crucial for political actors in order to acquire 
support from the bazaar. These networks are most helpful for those business owners who 
lack economic or social capital (see Section 7.3.2). Thus, the participatory governance 




support of the business owners in the bazaar (and voters in general), the administration 
seeks cooperation with political actors because of the latter’s proximity to the community, 
and the poor business owners in the bazaar require political actors to negotiate on penalties 
with administrative offices. This suggests the development of a structure of reciprocity that 
offers a voice to the poor, while this power-dependence relationship affects the 
implementation of regulations. Table 7.6 demonstrated the significance of political actors 
for the poor and the negative implications of this SC for the everyday governance of the 
bazaar by formal institutions. These findings generally agree with Treisman (2002), who 
found that the greater the number of public officials employed at local level, the greater the 
level of corruption, owing to the greater proximity between citizens and their 
representatives at subnational level. 
This raises another significant question: if individual networks generated by the 
bazaar have a “dark” side for local governance and the implementation of regulations, does 
this SC have a “bright” side too? And if so, what makes the outcomes of SC good or bad? 
It is assumed that the motives behind its use and the structures which underpin these 
motives determines its “dark” or “bright” side for local governance. This assumption is put 
to the test in the following chapter, which explores the role of traders’ networks in the 
provision of welfare services and the implications for ineffective formal institutions. The 
question of motives as a determining factor also raises again the interplay between 





Chapter 8 - The role of Batkhela bazaar in the 
governance of social welfare provision 
8.1 Introduction 
In the delivery of social assistance in Pakistan, social welfare associations (SWAs) perform 
a key role because of the ineffectiveness of local government (LG) in the provision of 
welfare services. However, the role of SWAs is limited by their inability to generate the 
necessary resources, as a result of an absence of trust in these organisations, as most of 
them are poorly run and are corrupt, and often do not deliver what they promise. For this 
reason, most SWAs are inactive, and those that are active are often ineffective. Against this 
background, bazaars in general, and Batkhela bazaar in particular, perform an important 
role not just by providing resources, but more critically through the operation of 
interpersonal ties rooted within the bazaar, a role that is central to whether the SWAs 
function with any degree of effectiveness.  
This chapter explores this area of local governance through a particular area of 
social welfare provision: the provision of education for vulnerable children. It also assesses 
the relationship between this provision and the social capital and resources generated by 
Batkhela bazaar. Three factors have led to the decision to focus on this specific area of 
social welfare provision. Firstly, education in general, and that of vulnerable children in 
particular, is historically a key area of the activities of the non-profit sector in South Asia 
(Iqbal, Khan and Javed, 2004, pp. 13-14). At present, the majority of active NGOs and 
SWAs focus on educational activities of various kind (Ghaus-Pasha, Jamal and Iqbal, 
2002; Bano, 2007, p. 6). Secondly, in the context of Malakand District, education for 
vulnerable children provides a glaring example of ineffective local government. Thirdly, 
the ongoing provision of this particular service by the SWAs in Malakand District would 
be unlikely without the social and financial capital generated by Batkhela bazaar.  
In the remainder of this chapter, Section 8.2 looks at the ineffectiveness of LG 
institutions in the provision of social welfare in Pakistan, the role of SWAs in filling the 
void created by these weak institutions, and the role of the bazaar as a resource for SWAs 
to realise this objective. Section 8.3 explores the role of the interpersonal networks rooted 
in the social structure of the bazaar’s economy in enabling SWAs to perform their service 
provision goals. Section 8.4 demonstrates that the operation of these networks and the 
SWAs that benefit from them are regulated by norms of trust and reciprocity, and shows 
that compliance with these informal governance mechanisms is a fundamental determinant 
of the SWAs’ capacity to benefit from the resources that bazaars generate. Section 8.5 




SWAs’ activities and the role of the bazaar in the wider local governance structure; and by 
reflecting on the implications for SC theory. 
8.2. The local delivery of social welfare services  
8.2.1 Local government, social welfare associations and bazaars: The social welfare mix 
in Pakistan 
Local government, social welfare associations and the local economy are the key providers 
of social assistance in Pakistan. This section demonstrates the interrelationship between 
these constituent elements of the local governance of social welfare provision, and argues 
that bazaars in Pakistan are important yet understudied elements of this equation. The level 
of social welfare provision by the state is sharply out of balance with the need for these 
services. For instance, 33% of Pakistan’s population lives below the poverty line, while 
government-provided services cover approximately 2-3% of this population. The social 
welfare programmes that do exist are poorly targeted: between 30 and 33% of the services 
under the food support and zakat programmes respectively are distributed among the non-
poor.57 The historical trajectory of LG social welfare provision represents a recurring 
pattern of failure of both urban and rural community development programmes (Arif and 
Khan, 1998, p. 113; Quddus, 1989). 
Attempts by national government to incorporate community collective actions into 
the design of local governance have been going on since the late 1950s (Bano, 2007, p. 6). 
The provision of citizens’ community boards (CCBs) in the LG plan of 2000 represents the 
strongest expression yet of government attempts in this regard. Nevertheless, as Bano 
(2007) correctly observes, various LG shortcomings have led to a failure to establish 
fruitful relationships between the state at the local level and community organisations. The 
government’s lack of ability to deal with community participation at the local level, 
inflexible formal procedures for dealing with voluntary associations, difficulty on the part 
of citizens in understanding registration procedures, rent-seeking and delays have 
discouraged the formation of genuine SWAs as an expression of community self-help; 
while technical departments often emphasise procedures and standards while disregarding 
the CCBs’ capacity to perform activities (ibid., p. 11). This often leads to practices that 
prevent the development of coordination between district government offices and local 
community development organisations. Even worse, owing to political patronage, most of 
                                                          






the CCBs are able to acquire funding for large projects which they lack the technical and 
physical capacity to deliver (ibid., p. 12), which further erodes trust between government 
institutions and social welfare associations at grassroots level. “Top-down” measures 
aimed at improving community participation are rendered ineffective by a lack of political 
will, the incapacity of the local administration, and the preferences of local bureaucracy 
embedded in local power relations (Rafique and Khoo, 2018). 
Despite the absence of an enabling institutional environment in which grassroots 
organisations can operate, the experience of CCBs has at least demonstrated that collective 
action at the grassroots level exists in Pakistan (Kurosaki, 2006). As Kurosaki notes, one of 
the major causes of the failure of these organisations was their unfamiliarity with technical 
procedures and their reliance on informal mechanisms (Kirk, 2014). In other words, 
voluntary associations in Pakistan exist in the informal realm, and rely primarily on 
resources generated informally through local community relationships (Suleri et al., 2017, 
p. 14). The reliance of SWAs on community resources as opposed to government welfare 
departments can be attributed to their familiarity with the strong society and weak state 
context in Pakistan (Kirk, 2014, p. 20). The key characteristics of this context include the 
associations’ lack of technical capacity (Kurosaki, 2006); the absence of trust in 
government institutions, mostly due to their inability to perform their most basic 
responsibilities (Beall, 1995; Geiser, 2013, p. 172); the political patronage of the 
associations by the rich (Beall, 1997); the elite capture of most of the development funds 
provided by government institutions and development agencies (Suleri et al., 2017); and 
the power asymmetries and conflicts of interests that hinder the associations’ ability to 
incorporate members of diverse groups (Kirk, 2014, p. 22).  
Overall, the governance and development literature on the Malakand region 
provides an important lesson on the governance landscape of social welfare provision. The 
state’s ineffectiveness and the insensitivity of donor-funded social welfare projects has led 
to an environment of distrust towards both the state and the NGOs operating in the region 
(Geiser, 2013, pp. 171-172; Kirk, 2014, pp. 21-22). However, the role of locally created, 
self-help voluntary welfare associations has received scant attention in the literature (Suleri 
et al., 2017, p. 14). Suleri et al. identify certain features of these associations, providing the 
foundation for the discussion in the rest of this chapter. Membership of these associations 
is relatively inclusive (although male-only), but decision-making power often lies with 
influential members. The performance of their functions depends on the contribution of all 




et al.’s tanzeems (associations) in that the SWAs draw their support from the local 
community, performing long-term activities instead of short-term projects. 
A key dimension of the governance of social welfare provision is the role of 
marketplaces as a resource enabling the SWAs to deliver services. In this connection, two 
observations were made in Section 5.2.3: that the social welfare dimension of the role of 
marketplaces in Pakistan is linked to religion; and that this dimension of market life as an 
element of local governance remains underexplored in the literature. With the exception of 
Javed (2017), none of the 11 studies on marketplaces in Pakistan explores the role of 
SWAs in the provision of social services, nor does any of the literature cited in this chapter 
pay attention to the generation of local resources by community development 
organisations. It is clear from the work of Amirali (2017, p. 152) that affluent traders are 
frequent donors to religious initiatives, mosques, Islamic events and religious charities. 
Javed (2017) points towards a broader role of market traders in the provision of services. 
For Javed, an important area of bazaar associations’ activities is the funding and 
management of religious institutions around traders’ homes or workplaces. Major activities 
in this connection include donations to mosques, funding for madrassas (religious 
education institutions) and shrines; the provision of meals and rations during Ramadan; the 
provision of lorry-loads of relief goods during natural calamities or wars; and occasionally 
financing a dispensary or small school. Most of these activities are performed through 
NGOs linked to a religious organisation (ibid.). The findings from Batkhela bazaar provide 
an additional layer of knowledge, demonstrating that traders’ donations are not necessarily 
distributed through religious organisations.  
It is therefore clear that bazaars in Pakistan generate financial resources for SWAs 
that contribute to the provision of social welfare. Furthermore, religion is at the core of all 
welfare activities in Pakistan (Beall, 1995). However, traders’ decisions to cooperate with 
SWAs in the context of Malakand is underpinned by what Marsden (2005, pp. 7-8) calls 
“critical engagement” with religion and religious organisation. For instance, as Bano 
(2009, p. 23) correctly observes, Al-Khidmat (one of the largest social welfare 
organisations in Pakistan) enjoys “natural access” to religious donations, but it was found 
by the present study that the group’s affiliation with Jamaat-e-Islami is the major cause of 
the reluctance of non-member traders to cooperate, because they believe that Al-Khidmat 
uses its welfare activities to further its political objectives. Therefore, religious incentives 
or an association’s religious appeal are insufficient grounds to benefit from the financial 
resources generated by the bazaar economy unless an SWA or its members possess SC. 




performing SWAs, the value of the resources provided by the bazaar increases in terms of 
social welfare provision. Within this framework, the following section explores the 
governance structure of social welfare provision in Malakand District.  
8.2.2. Local governance of social welfare provision in Malakand District 
Local government institutions in Malakand District are ineffective owing to resource 
constraints and a lack of capacity to implement existing rules. The district social welfare 
office is responsible for the care of people with disabilities, the elderly, drug addicts, 
women who have suffered domestic violence, and street beggars, as well as for the 
education of vulnerable children. The office is mandated to manage rehabilitation centres 
for each of these categories, but none is active in Malakand District. The only operational 
facilities in the district are a school for children with hearing and speech impairment and 
four craft centres for training women, but limited resources affect their effective 
functioning. For instance, a senior staff member from the school spends two days a week at 
the district welfare office helping the resource-constrained staff there; and the office itself 
is located in a building allocated for a women’s craft centre, which renders the craft centre 
dysfunctional (Field note, 3 September 2016). A welfare official explained: “We did not 
have a building of our own before this – we shared a building behind the hospital, but 
when this building was constructed for the women’s craft centre, we shifted our office 
here” (Anonymous interview, 11 September 2016).  
The inefficiency of the government is a more significant problem than the 
availability of resources. The ineffective regulation of the SWAs’ activities by the district 
welfare office amplifies the challenges to social welfare provision. This also erodes the 
prospect of developing synergy between the state and non-state providers of services. At 
the time the fieldwork for the present research was undertaken, there were 97 registered 
voluntary social welfare associations in the Malakand District,58 47 of which were located 
in the Batkhela subdivision. Only 10 of these 47 associations were active, and only one of 
the 10 had any sort of active communication with the district welfare office (Field note, 15 
September 2016). The district welfare office can support the activities of small SWAs 
through grants-in-aid allocated in the annual development budget; however, these SWAs 
do not apply for the funds for two broad reasons: firstly because of the limited amounts of 
money available, the cost of applying and the complicated formal procedures involved; and 
secondly because the role of political patronage in the allocation of the funds erodes the 
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SWAs’ trust in the office. As a key social welfare official explained: “We receive a very 
limited number of applications for these funds.59 This is understandable, because 
sometimes we are not even aware and an association obtains funds with the help of its 
political connections” (Sahil interview, 13 September 2016). Owing to the ineffective 
governance of SWAs, as shown in the example in Box 8.1, many SWAs are registered with 
the district welfare office and are actively present in social media, but are completely 
inactive on the ground.  
Box 8.1: Example of SWAs as legally and virtually active but entirely inactive on the ground  
Source: Interviews and field observations 
Corruption is only one of the factors explaining why local officials do not attempt 
to develop any form of coordination with SWAs for the provision of services. Interviews 
with two successive district welfare officers revealed that they had never reached out to 
any SWAs. Most of the encounters between the district welfare office and SWA members 
occur at the time of an association’s registration or if an association applies for a grant-in-
aid (which is rare). On the other hand, SWAs frequently seek the support of key district 
officials by inviting them to their fund-raising and charity distribution functions. The 
officials do not participate unless personal or political connections exist between them and 
                                                          
59 On another occasion the same official stated: “We receive only two or three applications from these 
associations” (Interview, 13 September 2016). 
Praising the social welfare profile of his SWA, an elected Union Council nazim 
recounted more than a dozen instances of helping widows and orphans, and explained his 
presence on the internet to raise funds from “Angrezan” (a colloquial term for Westerners). 
The nazim also reported that his SWA had five paid staff members, including two women, 
who actively met vulnerable people, prepared feasibility reports and applications for donor-
funded projects, and ensured the delivery of projects. He added: “You can come to our 
office and see most of these things for yourself.” He assumed the researcher would have 
little interest in the operation of his SWA. The next day, when the researcher visited the 
SWA’s office, it was found that the organisation had vacated the building more than six 
months earlier. Having seen two other SWA offices located in the hujras (men’s houses) of 
their founders, it was assumed that the office might be operating in the hujra of the nazim. 
However, on the researcher’s visit to the hujra, he was told by one of the nazim’s brothers: 
“Don’t look for a thing that does not exist. [The SWA] did not live for more than four 
months. However, we still tell people that we have this NGO and we perform social welfare 
activities.” This example demonstrates that SWAs alive in the records of the district 





the members of SWA. The underlying philosophy of the government’s policy of social 
welfare provision is to support SWAs because the government alone cannot provide 
welfare services (Ghaus-Pasha and Iqbal, 2002, p. 884). The existing governance practices 
of government in the delivery of social welfare provision stand in contradiction to this 
philosophy. Therefore, the local government in Malakand is unable to develop fruitful 
synergy with the SWAs. 
SWAs in the Malakand District can broadly be categorised as either active or 
inactive. Inactive SWAs are in the majority in the district. The underlying motive of their 
establishment and registration was to benefit from developmental funds provided by 
national and international donor agencies. As an official in the social welfare office 
explained: “Most of these associations are registered with the aim of securing a place for 
their registration documents in our files. Once they are registered, we never see them 
again” (Sahil interview, 13 September 2016). In one example of practice regarding the 
closure of an association, a health SWA established an office in Batkhela bazaar, employed 
10 staff members, and secured funding for its first project from an international 
organisation. However, the founder, who was a pharmacy retailer, closed the organisation 
five months prior to the project’s completion. Explaining his reasons, the founder stated: “I 
was left with nothing. If I had continued for two more months I would have had to pay out 
of my own pocket” (Ziad interview, 17 September 2016).  
The active SWAs in the district – a minority of the total as noted above – can be 
classified into four categories in terms of their goals: sports activities, waste management, 
welfare for disadvantaged groups (widows, the elderly, vulnerable children etc.), and 
emergency relief services (including blood-donor associations). Most of the active 
associations in Batkhela tehsil (nine out of 10) rely on community resources. A common 
narrative across these active SWAs is that “the government cannot help because it does not 
have the resources to perform its own functions” (Furqan interview, 17 September 2016).  
Batkhela bazaar serves as an important resource for these active SWAs in the 
realisation of their service provision objectives. The bazaar’s value is underpinned by the 
Islamic institutions of zakat (the Islamic obligation to pay a percentage of income) and 
other forms of Islamic giving.60 Every qualifying Muslim is obligated to give away 2.5% 
of his/her annual surplus income to share God’s generosity with the poor (Kochuyt, 2009, 
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needy at the end of Ramadan); and awqaf (religious endowments and trust). The analysis in this study 





pp. 100-101).61 Most of the large traders (30 out of 36) in the data corpus of the present 
study reported paying zakat in Zbarga (the Pashto name for Rajab, the seventh month of 
the Islamic calendar). The bazaar’s value to the SWAs is not only due to Islamic giving: 
some SWAs, especially sports associations, occasionally benefit from business promotion 
campaigns sponsored by the traders’ multinational and national suppliers. Nevertheless, 
giving underpinned by Islamic injunctions is a permanent feature of the bazaar’s economy, 
and is utilised by most of the active SWAs for sustaining their long-term service delivery 
projects, such as the education of vulnerable children. The value of the bazaar in 
generating zakat and its significance for the governance of social welfare provision is by 
no means overstated here. Government institutions for social assistance also rely on zakat 
to run important agencies such as Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal,62 a federal welfare agency which is 
a key source of funds for district welfare offices for the education of vulnerable children 
throughout the country (Ghaus et al., 2003). 
Zakat is an obligation, “an order from God” which all qualifying Muslims are 
obliged to follow, but agency is actively exercised when an agent decides on the receivers 
of zakat. This socially embedded context of giving and receiving zakat and other Islamic 
donations explains why the incidence of giving is high in Batkhela bazaar, why 
government agencies and SWAs lack traders’ trust and why the interpersonal networks 
generated by Batkhela bazaar are fundamental to an SWA’s ability to benefit from the 
bazaar’s economy. The role of social trust and reciprocity in the dynamics of zakat in the 
Batkhela bazaar is evident from the fact that while making their donations in the name of 
God, traders do not even trust the religious Jamaat-e-Islami, which runs the largest SWA in 
Malakand District (Candland, 2000, p. 371). An expression of this can be seen in traders’ 
greater cooperation (both in terms of time and donations) with individuals than with the 
SWAs, as Table 8.1 demonstrates. 
  
                                                          
61 Nisâb is the minimum standard that qualifies/obligates a person to pay zakat. The rates vary from 1- 10%, 
depending whether one owns dried fruits, sheep, camel, precious metals or cash. However, the standard 
rate for financial income is 2.5%; most of the traders in Batkhela bazaar follow this standard when paying 
zakat for the goods they hold in excess of nisâb (see Kochuyt, 2009, p. 101, and the references therein). 
62 Shaikh (2015) estimates that zakat can produce up to 7% of GDP, which is sufficient for Pakistan’s social 
welfare needs. However, he sees the poor regulation of zakat by government institutions, and distrust 
between individual donors and the institutions, as hurdles in realising this potential. For an overview of 
literature on the dynamics of zakat in Pakistan and other developing countries with state-regulated zakat, 
see also (especially pp.21-23) Shaikh, S.A. 2015. Zakat Collectable in OIC countries for poverty alleviation: A 



























Gave help to 
individuals  




39.8% 60.2% 26.6% 13.8% 7.4% 198 200 
Source: Exploratory survey data 
Clearly, the bazaar is an important resource that the SWAs can utilise for their 
service provision goals. Its economic value for the SWAs lies in the traders’ philanthropy, 
motivated by religious injunctions. However, there are cases when not even the most 
religious SWAs can benefit from this resource, despite the traders’ propensities to 
contribute to the general good of society. In one instance which illustrates this point, a 
prominent wholesaler established a medical laboratory with the aim of providing free 
blood and urine tests for the poor, who are not treated well in government hospitals but 
cannot afford private clinics. However, the wholesaler quickly closed the laboratory when 
he discovered that one of the employees was using it to help a prominent blood bank. As 
the wholesaler explained: “I never wanted my lab to be associated with any NGO. I can 
work without these NGOs – they are not helping the poor, but promoting their own agenda 
[…] It’s not that we [traders] don’t want to help. Those of us who want to help cannot find 
the right platform” (Rehmat Khan interview, 5 September 2016). This latter claim was 
echoed in interviews with SWA donors and fundraisers. Despite the absence of traders’ 
trust in the SWAs, and the SWAs’ awareness of the low-trust environment which they 
navigate, the continuity and expansion of their service provision activities depends on 
cooperation from the traders’ community. 
8.2.3 Selected SWAs and the case of education for vulnerable children 
To look in depth into the relation between Batkhela bazaar, the SWAs and local 
government (LG) in the wider context of local governance, the rest of this chapter 
considers a specific case: that of education provision for disadvantaged children in 
Malakand District. The provision of education and support for vulnerable groups is one of 
the key welfare functions of LG, according to the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa provincial 




administration in this regard presents an appropriate example of institutional failure in the 
provision of social welfare by LG. Moreover, the fact that the SWAs caring for vulnerable 
children make up the biggest single group of active associations in Batkhela (three out of 
10), and given that they rely on the bazaar for support, provides a natural setting for an in-
depth insight into the LG-SWA-bazaar interrelationship as an important feature of local 
governance. To analyse this interrelationship, the operation of three different SWAs and 
their relationship to Batkhela bazaar, especially in terms of the role of SC, is analysed. This 
section sets out the SWAs’ key characteristics and their relationship to the bazaar. These 
associations vary in the size, scale and scope of their activities, and in their political 
outlook. 
The three organisations chosen for this close analysis are Al-Khidmat, Safe 
Actionable Activity for Next Generation Adults (SAANGA) and the Darman Welfare 
Society (DWS). Al-Khidmat is one of the largest and most organised networks for 
providing welfare activities in Pakistan. It is the social welfare wing of a fundamentalist 
religious political party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) (Bano, 2009). Al-Khidmat runs many social 
welfare programmes that are either funded by the central management of the party or by 
donations collected from its own members (Candland, 2000). The donor base of Al-
Khidmat is mainly local (Bano, 2009, p. 23). It runs a programme for orphan support, 
which provides education, food, shelter and health facilities (ibid., p. 26). In Malakand 
District, this programme draws on cooperation from local traders, most of whom are not 
members of Al-Khidmat. In contrast, SAANGA was founded by a foreign-educated 
government employee from a local landed family, is a small organisation comprised of 
seven members, and has a single agenda, focused on education for vulnerable children. 
Like Al-Khidmat’s orphan support programme, SAANGA relies on donations raised 
through the networks of its members. The third group, DWS, was founded by many small 
traders living in the same neighbourhood, and is larger than SAANGA but much smaller 
than Al-Khidmat. Its main source of funding is also donations raised through the networks 
of individual members. The education of vulnerable children is one of its five 
constitutional objectives. The focus of active SWAs on the education of vulnerable 
children is a measure of the significance of this problem in the region. Table 8.2 compares 
these organisations against certain key characteristics relevant to understanding the 
dynamics of the LG-SWA-bazaar interrelationships in the provision of social welfare in 





Table 8.2: Profiling and comparing selected SWAs  
Name of organisation/ 
Key characteristics 
Al-Khidmat SAANGA Darman Welfare 
Society (DWS) 
Agreement on strategy United Fragmented Fragmented 
Political affiliation of 
members 
Single party Multiple parties Multiple parties 
Membership base 
(landed/landless class) 




Trader earning PKR 
50,000 daily vs. 
unemployed 
volunteer 
Gov’t employee with 
monthly income of 
PKR 50,000 vs. 
monthly income of 
PKR 10,000 
Trader with daily 
income of PKR 10,000 
vs. member with no 
regular income 
Past reliance on 
international donors  
No No No 
Reliance on 
government funding  
No No No 
Past support from 
government  
Yes (non-financial) Yes (financial) No 
Registered with 
government 













with other associations 
No Yes No 




emergency and relief 
service; occasional 







food packages for the 
poor; awareness walks 
for health/sanitation 
Major source of 
revenue generation 
Bazaar Bazaar Bazaar 
Main strategy for 
revenue generation 
Through personal 
ties of members 
Through personal 
ties of members 
Through personal ties 
of members 
Difficulty acquiring 
non-member donations  
Yes Yes Yes 
Non-members’ distrust 
of purpose 
Yes Yes Yes 
Scope of projects for 
vulnerable children 
School expenses and 
monthly allowances 
for guardians  
Schooling expenses 
and health care 
Encouragement/ 
occasional gifts 
Status of projects for 
vulnerable children   
Ongoing, expanding 
since 2010 
Ongoing since 2014 -
2015 
Discontinued after first 
year 




Despite the variations in size of these SWAs, the differences in the scale and scope 
of their activities, and their differing outlooks towards international donors, they share 
certain key characteristics, such as a lack of reliance on local government, reliance on 
Batkhela bazaar, awareness of non-members’ distrust towards their SWA, and difficulty in 
acquiring cooperation from non-member traders. The non-dependence of SWAs on local 
government in Malakand District is consistent with the literature on non-profit 
organisations in Pakistan, which attributes SWAs’ lesser reliance on government to 
ineffective legal procedures and the trust deficit between SWAs and government agencies 
(Ismail, 2002, pp. 2-4). Therefore, the resource generation strategies of SWAs are targeted 
at societal resources where the traders’ community enjoys the highest priority because it 
provides the largest pool of resources. Table 8.3 shows that the largest number of SWA 
donors are traders in the bazaar, suggestive of the bazaar’s centrality as a resource for these 
associations. A more intriguing feature of the donors’ profiles is the SWAs’ ability to 
acquire donations from a large number of non-members, notwithstanding traders’ distrust 
in both the abilities and motives of SWAs (see Section 8.4). 






























Al-Khidmat 78 24 56 56 62 Listing personal 
ties of four key 
members 






4 3 1 3 3 Letters with 
association’s 
letterhead handed 
out to members 




Source: Records of SWAs, May-September 2016. Note: these donors’ profiles are only for 
activities relating to disadvantaged children. 
The numeric dominance of bazaar traders and SWA non-members in the donors’ 
profiles raises a more central problem relating to the role of the bazaar in the governance of 




role of the bazaar not merely as a generator of economic resource for the SWAs in the 
performance of their service provision functions, but also as a generator of much-needed 
SC that is fundamental to the SWAs’ ability to benefit from the economic resources that 
the bazaar economy generates. Here, it is necessary to caution against the seemingly 
intriguing paradox of the distrust of SWA non-members placed alongside the fact that this 
group forms a majority in the donors’ profiles of these associations. Column 6 in Table 8.3 
and Row 12 in Table 8.2 indicate that the SWAs rely on the interpersonal networks of their 
members to access the economic resources embedded in the social structure of the bazaar’s 
economy. Theoretically, this stands in tension with the theorists of associational SC, whose 
focus on this aspect leaves them oblivious to the productive role of interpersonal networks 
for the operation and outcomes of associations. This finding is not generalisable to all 
associations of the Putnamian type, but to one specific type of association, SWAs (Degli 
Antoni and Sabatini, 2016). These associations, as the case of education for vulnerable 
children suggests, distribute resources or provide services for the benefit of the wider 
community.  
The education of vulnerable children represents a significant example of the role of 
these associations in the governance context of Pakistan, and especially that of the 
Malakand region. Malakand is among the top 25 districts of Pakistan in terms of 
educational performance, but the overall governance of education in Pakistan is in a state 
of national crisis. The delivery of education for vulnerable children (orphaned children in 
the example studied in this research) is even worse at the national level. In the Education 
For All (EFA) index, Pakistan ranks 106th out of 113 countries (Alif Ailaan and the 
Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2015). The absence of systematic data at any 
level of government regarding vulnerable children impedes the identification of this 
vulnerable population. Gathering information about the population and identifying their 
needs is a prerequisite for effective policy formulation, let alone service delivery. Based on 
the analysis of the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2014) and UNICEF’s “The 
State of the World’s Children” reports, Radenkovic (2016) ranks Pakistan 10th out of 11 
countries with the highest population of orphans in the world. This classification is 
unsurprising: most estimates put the orphan population of Pakistan at around 4 million (2% 
of the total population) (The Nation, 2015).  
In Malakand District, both the district education and welfare offices lack any data 
on the number of orphans. As a key official in the district welfare office stated: “There are 
many methods to collect these statistics, but I do not have sufficient staff for this purpose” 




funds allocated in the annual development plan for the education of these vulnerable 
children (Sahil Interview, 13 September 2016). As another district welfare official 
corroborates: “We request the funds every year from the provincial government, but since 
we cannot spend those funds, we return them before the end of the financial year” 
(Interview, 15 September 2016). An insufficient level of staffing is one of the key causes 
of the inability of the district welfare office to deliver services for vulnerable children. The 
children’s home for orphans in Malakand District has been inactive since 2011 because of 
a legal stalemate between the home’s staff and the ministry of social welfare. The 
inefficient administration of justice,63 the under-resourced district welfare office, and a 
lack of effective policies to deal with the existing situation have translated into the current 
dormancy of the home. In this context, Batkhela bazaar generates SC enabling the SWAs 
to fill the void created by resource-constrained and inefficient LG institutions. 
8.3 The role of interpersonal networks in the operation of SWAs  
The SWAs that operate effectively and are able to expand their operations draw on the 
strong interpersonal networks of their members. These networks are largely embedded in 
the social structure of the bazaar’s economy. Those SWAs which decide not to rely on the 
networks, or are unable to do so, fail to expand their operations and even sometimes fail to 
survive. For instance, five affluent traders established the A-1 welfare association with an 
explicit commitment not to involve outsiders in the realisation of its objectives.64 
Consequently, the SWA soon lost momentum and its members lost interest in its activities. 
Another SWA, founded by a young university graduate, relies mainly on funds from an 
international development agency and has successfully delivered a project on waste-
management awareness, as well as working to support deprived people in the community. 
The major reason for its survival is the international agency’s funding, which is channelled 
through a regional officer who is the maternal uncle of the SWA’s founder. This 
association is unable to generate support from the bazaar because neither its founder nor 
any of its members have the strong interpersonal ties necessary to facilitate access to the 
traders’ community. As its founder explained: “We have been thinking for the past year 
about collecting donations from the bazaar, but it is difficult if you do not have personal 
ties to someone. If I or any of my companions had ties to two or three people in the bazaar, 
then we could start collecting donations from the bazaar” (Interview, 1 September 2016).  
                                                          
63 Manifested through the inability of the courts to resolve the disputes between the staff of the orphanage 
and the provincial social welfare department. 
 
64 The A-1 welfare association described here should not be confused with the A-1 cricket club, a group of 




Conversely, all three of the SWAs described in detail in the previous section either 
have traders as their members, or their non-trader members have strong interpersonal ties 
to traders, facilitating access to the resources generated by the bazaar’s economy. In any 
case, these interpersonal networks may enable the SWAs to enlist cooperation from non-
member traders who would otherwise be highly unlikely to cooperate with the 
associations. Significantly, none of the regular donors to an association in the data corpus 
of this research was found to be donating to another association at the same time. Referring 
to one of his friends who is an active member of Al-Khidmat’s fund-raising committee, a 
prominent donor and a strong critic of the group stated: “Who donates to these 
associations? But if Shair Alam asks me, I cannot say no, because it is all about friendship” 
(Rehmat Khan interview, 4 September 2016). 
Aware of the utility of interpersonal networks for generating resources, each 
association knows its priority is to capitalise on these networks. Explaining his strategy of 
reaching out for support from traders in the bazaar, the founder of SAANGA explained: “It 
depends on one’s personal relations” (Ghazali interview, 4 September 2016). The scale of 
an SWA’s service provision activities and its ability to expand its projects depends on the 
size of the interpersonal networks that its members can effectively mobilise. Comparing 
the role of interpersonal networks in relation to the scope of SAANGA and Al-Khidmat’s 
projects for vulnerable children, the founder of SAANGA stated: “It is a factor that Al-
Khidmat is an association of a well-organised religious political party, but it also has a 
large number of business owners as its members, who then have various ties to other 
traders in the bazaar” (Ghazali interview, 4 September 2016). The significance of 
interpersonal networks is evident in Al-Khidmat’s fund-raising strategy. Prominent 
members of its committee include large traders of good repute and with extensive networks 
of relationships in the bazaar. As a first step in the fund-raising campaign for vulnerable 
children, these members generate a common pool of their interpersonal networks, which is 
subsequently contacted either individually or collectively for donations by these committee 
members. Table 8.4 demonstrates the centrality of interpersonal networks in shaping the 
decisions of SWAs members in contacting traders for donations, and the decisions of 





Table 8.4: The centrality of interpersonal networks for SWAs  
Responses/ 
Methods of fundraising 
Respondents 
confirming the method 




Types of respondents 
Reliance on members’ 
interpersonal ties 
13 13 Founders/managers 
and key members 
Reliance on non-member 
donors 
13 13 Founders/managers 
and key members 
Requesting donations from 
strangers 
3 13 Founders/managers 
and key members 
Using personal ties as a first 
preference in requesting 
donations 
13 13 Founders/managers 
and key members 
Non-members do not donate 
to every SWA 
10 10 Non-member donors  
Personal ties are a major 
cause for giving to SWAs 
9 10 Non-member donors 
Source: Interview data 
The findings set out in Table 8.4 concur with those of Kashif, Faisal Jamal and 
Abdur Rehman (2018, p. 51), who found that operating through personal ties rather than 
organisations was the first preference of donors in Pakistan. However, Kashif et al.’s 
interpretation is too narrow to follow beyond this point, as they see a trade-off between 
interpersonal networks and charity organisations. Furthermore, there is a wider utility to 
these dyadic relationships, in that they ensure that donations raised in this way are spent in 
the “right place” and reach the “right people”. In contrast to the argument put forward by 
Kashif et al. (2018), pre-existing or emerging interpersonal ties serve as a resource for 
charity organisations which would be unable to benefit from the bazaar’s economy without 
these networks (Snow et al., 1986, p. 798, cited in Schervish and Havens, 1997, p. 240). In 
this sense, traders’ donations are also not a mere display of their generosity for the 
accumulation of political capital, as Amirali (2017, pp. 314-315) concluded in the 
agricultural market of Okara, Punjab.65 This goes beyond the existing understanding of 
marketplace relations with SWAs, in which traders are viewed as important committee 
members of NGOs and community organisations that help channel resources from these 
traders to the poor (Javed, 2017). In Batkhela bazaar, the networks of an SWA member are 
a necessary structural condition for the effective delivery of the group’s service provision 
goals. Referring to six of his friends and relatives who had donated to an Al-Khidmat’s 
                                                          
65 In her methodological reflections, Amirali says questions regarding Islam and economic life constitute a 






fund-raising conference at his request,66 a key member of the group’s programme for 
vulnerable children explained: “If these [traders] do not cooperate, we will not be able to 
help these poor people” (Hussain interview, 4 September 2016). 
Batkhela bazaar also generates what Pisani (2017, p. 143) calls reputational power. 
As observed in Table 8.4, members of the SWAs do not reach out to strangers for 
donations, and neither do donors give to strangers. Nevertheless, reputational power has 
important structuring effects on an association’s capacity to recruit participants and on 
donors' decisions to cooperate with an SWA in the absence of direct interpersonal ties. For 
instance, a key member of Al-Khidmat’s fund-raising committee and a prominent 
wholesaler in the bazaar explained: “Even if they don’t know me, they will cooperate with 
me, because my 35 years of life in the bazaar are enough for them to know me and 
cooperate with my association” (Furqan interview, 7 September 2016). Interviews with 
SWA members and donors corroborated this finding. In one example, a pharmacy 
wholesaler who is highly critical of Al-Khidmat’s political bias donated PKR 50,000 to its 
fund for vulnerable children in 2016. The underlying cause of his decision was the 
reputation of Al-Khidmat’s campaigners in the bazaar. As he stated: “Three friends from 
the bazaar came here. They were respectable people. They told me they had organised the 
event and they wanted me to attend and contribute as well […] If people like this are 
involved, I am sure that my money will not be misspent” (Salar interview, 10 September 
2016). In contrast, the pharmacy retailer referred to at the beginning of this section, who 
established his own SWA, was unable to enlist traders’ support for his organisation as a 
result of his poor reputation. Many traders suspected him of using donations for his 
personal use and thus decided not to cooperate with him. This leads to an examination of 
the factors that are central to the operation of networks.  
8.4 Factors central to the operation of interpersonal networks 
The key factors central to the operation of interpersonal and associational networks are 
trust, reciprocity and reputational power. Together these factors enable an SWA to benefit 
from the resources embedded in the economy of Batkhela bazaar. These distinct but 
interrelated elements of the informal governance infrastructure of social welfare provision 
in Malakand District are central to an SWA’s success in drawing on the interpersonal 
networks of its members. These cognitive dimensions of SC are reflected in agents’ 
                                                          
66 Since 2016, Al-Khidmat has organised an annual donors’ conference in Malakand District to raise funds 
for its orphan support programme. A key feature of this conference is that individual members extensively 





dispositions, which serve as an ordering principle for making judgements of various kinds, 
such as participating in an association, cooperating with an SWA because of a specific 
individual, or not cooperating at all.  
8.4.1 The role of interpersonal trust in facilitating SWAs’ welfare provision activities  
Interpersonal trust plays a central role at each step of the service provision activities of 
SWAs. The success or failure of an SWA depends on a series of decisions: its own strategy 
to rely on the interpersonal networks of members, those members’ individual decisions to 
reach out to certain nodes in their networks, donors’ decisions to participate in SWA 
activities where they have pre-existing interpersonal networks, and donors’ decisions to 
continue or end their cooperation. All these decisions entail a certain degree of trust, which 
stems from agents’ familiarity with their trust environment. For instance, all the SWAs are 
able to generate “thick trust” for holding their members together, but are unable to generate 
“thin trust”. Therefore, the SWAs rely on the interpersonal networks of their members 
when reaching out to non-members to expand their service provision activities. In this 
sense, the interpersonal networks contribute to the SWAs’ ability to generate a limited 
degree of “thin trust”. However, once trust in an SWA has been mediated by an 
interpersonal network, the obligation to maintain the trust of the new member or donor 
rests with the SWA. Table 8.5 demonstrates how trust operates at various stages of an 



















Prerequisite 9 10 “We formed a four-member committee 
to gather donations. Each of us gave 
the names of friends and 
acquaintances. I gave the names of 
people I was confident would donate. 
If I go to someone to ask for donations 
for Al-Khidmat, I have this confidence 
that he will donate” (Shahlam [al-
Khidmat member] interview, 16 
September 2016). 
Donor decides 
to give to an 
SWA  
Low trust in 
reputation of 
SWA, high 
trust in the 
reputation of 
members 
9 10 “I have neither been with other 
organisations, nor have any connection 
with them. I donate to SAANGA 
because Ghazali is my friend and I 
know that he spends his own money in 
that project as well” (Subhan 
[SAANGA donor] interview, 16 
September 2016). 
Donor decides 








10 10 “I contributed 100 suits when they 
were preparing the Eid package for the 
poor. I was also thinking that I would 
ask my suppliers for donations. 
However, the friends demonstrated 
weakness, therefore I now make my 
donations direct to the people in my 
neighbourhood” (Bakhtiar [Darman 
donor] interview, 14 September 2016). 
Source: Interview data  
Trust as a fundamental cognitive element of SC stemming from an agent’s habitus 
is linked to the operation of its structural elements (Frederiksen, 2014; Pedrini, Bramanti, 
Ferri and Minciullo, 2016). A recent study on charitable giving (Khan and Arif, 2016, p. 
7), based on data from the Pakistan household survey (2010) reported a high level (86%) of 
people’s donations going to individuals and a very low level (14%) going to organisations 
like schools, mosques and religious charities: this is also the case in Malakand District, as 
noted in Table 8.2. This context of a high level of donations to individuals due to intrinsic 
motivation underpinned by religious obligations, and a low frequency of giving to SWAs, 
is an outcome of the distrust associated with charity collections by voluntary associations.  
This context, characterised by a low level of generalised trust, underscores the 
primacy of interpersonal trust for the effective operation of the Batkhela SWAs’ service 




donate: he will treat you like a thief” (Jaffar interview, 16 September 2016). In such low-
trust environments, pre-existing trust, embedded in interpersonal networks, serves as an 
antecedent to the development of trust in associations (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve and 
Tsai, 2004). This suggests that particularised trust and individual reliance on interpersonal 
networks are not necessarily antithetical to associational SC. Particularised trust embedded 
in interpersonal networks is not the product of calculative computation, but of what Karpik 
(2014, p. 30) calls “interpretive frames and discussion processes that include the plurality 
of the decision criteria”.  
8.4.2 The role of reciprocity  
The role of trust in governing interpersonal networks, which in turn facilitates giving 
through SWAs, is supplemented by reciprocity. Reciprocity governs these acts of charity, 
which are both intrinsic, i.e. dictated by religious commandments, and a social norm that 
regulates the practices of giving and receiving in the context of service provision (Oliver, 
2017, pp. 280-81). It is evident from the preceding pages that the welfare mix in the 
Malakand region comprises religion, state institutions, SWAs and interpersonal networks. 
Religious reciprocity, or reciprocity with God, structures the traders’ motivations for 
donations and aggregates into the role of the bazaar as a resource for the SWAs. 67 Many 
traders in Batkhela help the poor to share God’s generosity with the poor, to trade with 
God (pa karubar ki barakat), to achieve peace of mind or happiness of heart (da zra 
Khwashali) or to earn good deeds (sawab gatal di). However, religious reciprocity is 
unable to capture the local context of social welfare provision, or the enabling role of 
interpersonal networks and trust in the SWAs’ service provision activities. Therefore, the 
role of the “religious obligation of the faithful to give” as a foundation for the high 
frequency of charity by individual traders is recognised; but in the operation of SWAs this 
section analyses the “social logic of zakat” and other Islamic giving (Kochuyt, 2009, pp. 
99-101).  
Reciprocity in the everyday practice of social welfare provision operates in a 
triadic fashion. However, unlike Kochuyt’s (2009) triad of reciprocity that comprises God, 
                                                          
67 Kochuyt (2009) offers an extensive treatment of the principle of zakat (charity) and the way the triad of 
reciprocity works between God, rich believers and poor believers. As he argues: “Being Allah’s agents on 
earth (khalifa), they have to be generous towards others, just as God is generous to them” (p.101 and the 
references therein). He argues that zakat is “the binding consequence of a reciprocal relation between God 
and his faithful believers: they give to the needy as God gave to them”, and rightly observes that religious 
reciprocity cannot work in isolation to the social context. However, by conceptualising Islam as an 
“imagined community” and the Muslim world as stratified between givers and receivers he overlooks the 






the faithful donor and the poor as recipient and the end user,68 the role of reciprocity in the 
triad analysed here governs relationships between the donor, the intermediary that links the 
SWA with its potential donor, and the SWA as an end recipient. Here, the role of 
reciprocity is particularly significant in the context of ineffective formal governing 
mechanisms for the activities of SWAs. 
As previously noted, SWAs initiate requests for donations mostly through the 
interpersonal ties of their members. Requesting donations creates an obligation to give, and 
receiving donations creates an obligation on the part of recipients to maintain donors’ trust. 
For instance, Shahlam, a pharmacy owner and key member of Al-Khidmat’s fund-raising 
committee, asked a friend for a donation, expecting him to sponsor a child for an entire 
year. Contrary to Shahlam’s expectations, the donor offered PKR 4,000, only 10% of the 
estimated cost.69 Under friendship obligations, the donor could not turn down Shahlam’s 
request, despite his unwillingness to donate due to his scepticism about Al-Khidmat’s use 
of donations for its political objectives. The incident disappointed Shahlam, who stated: “If 
I know that he has the capacity and he fails to cooperate repeatedly, I will think that he 
cannot be trusted in the future; thus I will reduce contact with him” (Shahlam interview, 15 
September 2016). When a connection is established between an SWA and a donor, the 
durability of this relationship depends on the SWA’s ability to ensure that donations are 
not spent on the SWA’s political objectives or the personal use of its members. For 
example, the DWS’s largest donor stopped giving when he discovered that the organisers 
had begun to use the charity’s money to serve their personal needs.  
Acts of giving by donors invoke two sets of obligations: one applies to the actor 
who negotiates the relationship between the SWA and the donor, and the other applies to 
the SWA as a beneficiary. It should be noted here that an association’s failure to maintain 
donors’ trust invites immediate sanctions from the donor against the SWA. However, it 
does not affect the pre-existing ties between the SWA member and donor. For instance, 
even though the DWS has been inactive since 2012, one of its key members still receives 
the same annual donation from a supplier. The former member stated: “[The supplier] 
                                                          
68 In this way, the structure of reciprocity does not comprise three actors as Kochuyt’s enhancement of 
Mosse’s notion of gift and reciprocity suggest. There are five actors, including God, the donor, an SWA 
member who has personal ties to the donor, the SWA itself, and the beneficiaries of the SWA. The role of 
beneficiaries was not explored in the present study’s fieldwork, a serious omission which be developed in 
future research. 
 
69 Al-Khidmat’s orphan support programme calculates a child’s expenses for a year, including schooling and 





knows me, not the DWS – that’s why he still gives me the donations to spend in my 
neighbourhood” (Arsalan interview, 18 September 2016). In contrast, another DWS donor 
immediately disengaged when he discovered the lack of transparency in the association’s 
handling of donations. As he explained: “I contributed 100 suits when they were preparing 
the Eid package for the poor. I was also thinking that I would ask my suppliers to donate to 
it. However, the friends [members of DWS] demonstrated weakness, therefore I now make 
my donations direct to the people in my neighbourhood” (Bakhtiar interview, 14 
September 2016). In this case, the personal ties between the donor and the DWS member 
who negotiated the donation for his association remained unscathed. 
Reciprocity, as a social norm and a relational process, stabilises social exchanges in 
the unstable environment of cooperation with the SWAs. However, the operation of 
reciprocity as a sanctioning mechanism evolves at different levels, initiating from the act of 
giving, and continuing through its mediation by interpersonal networks from a giver to an 
SWA. In this process, the power of the giver and recipient is shaped and reshaped as the 
act of giving evolves from one stage of giving to the other, for example moving from 
religious obligation to generalised reciprocity and fairness (belief that the trust of the giver 
will be upheld). These distinct forms of reciprocity are linked to three mechanisms of 
giving that shape the overall context of donations: firstly, the intrinsic motivations 
structured by religion that provide the incentives for business owners to donate; secondly, 
the trust in interpersonal networks that helps in bridging the gap between the SWAs and 
non-member donors, caused by the SWAs’ untrustworthiness; and thirdly, the ability of the 
SWA to develop and maintain donors’ trust once it starts receiving donations. Table 8.6 
summarises the order in which these forms of reciprocity and stages of giving are linked to 
each other, and the role of reciprocity in alleviating exchanges in the context of donations 
and cooperation with the SWAs. It also shows that reciprocity, as a social norm and a 
relational process, structures the power of the giver to decides on the act of donating and 
his ability to punish those who fail to meet his expectations. This implies that the structure 
of reciprocity shapes an agent’s habitus. As a generative mechanism, habitus structures a 
donor’s decision to selectively employ sanctions against the SWA and members with 





Table 8.6: Reciprocity as a norm and a relational process 
Donation details/ 













from God, not the 
beneficiary  
(Kochuyt, 2009)  
Anyone  Intrinsic No Absolute Immediate 
Generalised: giver 
acts in return for a 
favour received or 





Extrinsic Yes - personal 
ties acting as 
intermediaries 
Conditional 





is able to maintain 
giver’s trust and 
disperse donations 









Source: Author’s own elaboration 
8.5 Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates the key role of Batkhela bazaar in 
local social welfare provision through the extensive use of social networks, and the trust 
and reciprocity necessary for their functioning, which are strongly embedded within the 
bazaar. The implications of bazaar-generated SC for local governance are considerable, not 
least because it ensures that some social welfare provision is in place in the weak state 
context. However, the nature of this provision is highly uneven, and tends to reflect the 
interests of the dominant social networks in the bazaar rather than the actual social welfare 
needs. These implications lead to some key conclusions that are elaborated in the following 
paragraphs, with further evidence from the case study of education for vulnerable children. 
In the provision of education for vulnerable children, the evidence suggests that the 
government’s failure to meet this need is a result of inadequate staff, an absence of 
statistics on vulnerable children in the district, and lack of concrete planning.70 These 
factors are clearly reflected in the district government’s inability to employ even the scarce 
resources available through the annual development plan for the provision of services for 
                                                          
70 For facilities, capacity and other aspects of and responsibilities for orphanages at district level, see PBM 




vulnerable children. Even worse, the district government is not effectively regulating the 
SWAs, and neither are government officials attempting to develop fruitful engagement 
with these local associations, which results in the state’s failure to provide an enabling 
environment for active SWAs to operate (Mansuri and Rao, 2003, p. 47).  
This leads to the first conclusion: that in the context of ineffective local LG 
institutions, SWAs play a key role in the provision of social welfare. For example, four 
SWAs in Malakand District, with the help of their volunteers, managed to generate partial 
statistics on the number and types of these vulnerable children. These statistics were 
mostly generated in the surroundings where these SWAs were located: SAANGA collected 
statistics in four UC areas (Upper, Middle, Lower Batkhela and Khar), DWS only in a 
ward in which it was operating, and another SWA in the Dargai tehsil of Malakand. 
Meanwhile Al-Khidmat, with members scattered throughout the district, claimed to have 
representative statistics for the area as a whole. Together these records account for 2,000 
vulnerable children in the district. The role of SWAs extends beyond locating vulnerable 
children in the district. As Table 8.6 demonstrates, SWAs are the only provider of services 
for these vulnerable children in the absence of effective government institutions. 
Doubtless, the services provided by SWAs vary widely in their quality and frequency. 
However, their ability to operate in the vacuum created by weak LG institutions depends 
primarily on the economic and social capital generated by Batkhela bazaar. 
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Source: Interview data and official records of district welfare office and SWAs 
Owing to the economic and social capital generation that is fundamental to the 
operation and expansion of SWA’s service provision activities, Batkhela bazaar is a key 
element of the local governance structure. Members of both large and small SWAs 
acknowledge that the survival and expansion of their projects for vulnerable children are 
contingent on traders’ donations. As the founder of SAANGA explained: “If these people 
had not cooperated, we might not have helped those children” (Ziad interview, 17 




continuity of their activities. The centrality of traders’ cooperation for the survival of their 
projects was summed up by a key member of Al-Khidmat’s fund-raising committee when 
he stated: “If people stop donating, running this programme will be very difficult if not 
impossible” (Hussain interview, 4 September 2016). Despite this value of Batkhela bazaar 
as a resource in economic terms, the evidence in Section 8.3 suggest that SWAs cannot 
benefit from this resource unless their access is facilitated by the social networks 
embedded in the bazaar. The quality and size of networks that the member of an SWA can 
mobilise determine its capacity to untap the resources generated by the bazaar’s economy.  
Fundamental to the operation of these networks is the role of trust, reciprocity and 
social obligations that operate as informal regulatory mechanisms. Regardless of the 
intrinsic and extrinsic motives involved, the individual actions of SWA members and their 
collective strategies are guided by informal sanctioning mechanisms that regulate bazaar-
SWA relations. Compliance with these informal governing mechanisms determines the 
success of an SWA in benefiting from the bazaar’s economic and social resources. For 
example, the DWS not only lost its donors but also disintegrated when it breached donors’ 
trust and generated internal conflicts. This principle applies not only to SWAs: individual 
behaviours are also dictated by the rules of this informal governance structure. For 
instance, a wholesaler asked some of his friends in the bazaar to help a female madrassa 
(religious education school) pay its rent.71 His friends refused the request because the 
madrassa was renting the trader’s personal property and he was affluent enough to waive 
the rent. The wholesaler stated: “They told me, ‘You earn more than us, and this is your 
own property. Why don’t you waive the rent instead of helping them by collecting 
donations?’” (Salar interview, 10 September 2016). In this sense, the bazaar emerges as an 
alternative governance space for social welfare provision that provides economic capital, 
social capital essential to accessing economic capital, and regulatory mechanisms for 
utilising that capital. Although the type of services to which the bazaar contributes is 
entirely contextual (Hüwelmeier , 2013; González-Torre et al., 2016; Watson, 2009), the 
reliance of NGOs and SWAs on bazaars for a variety of services in varying contexts 
reinforces their resourceful value for the governance of social welfare provision. 
The findings of this chapter also have implications for SC theory. Firstly, they 
demonstrate that interpersonal networks are not necessarily antithetical to associational SC. 
In a context where SWAs do not enjoy the community’s trust, the interpersonal networks 
                                                          






of their members are a necessary structural condition for the SWAs to generate community 
cooperation for realising their service provision goals. In such contexts, the SWAs’ ability 
to increase their membership or acquire cooperation from non-members is limited. Here, 
interpersonal networks and interpersonal trust facilitate their access to both the tangible 
and intangible resources of the community. Finally, in a context where SWAs’ access to 
donations is mediated through interpersonal ties, trust and reciprocity are key relational 
processes that govern various stages of cooperation. Specifically, the SWAs play a second-
order role in the generation of trust. This means that the cooperation within interpersonal 
ties (e.g. between a donor and the mediator of the donation) is more stable than that 
between a donor and an organisation. Therefore, the interpersonal networks of SWA 
members are a primary resource for generating social and economic capital to facilitate 





Chapter 9 – An originator of local social capital: The 
bazaar as an alternative governance space 
9.1 Introduction 
The key theoretical contributions of this study to understanding the role of marketplaces as 
an element of local governance due to their SC generation are highlighted in this chapter. 
Overall, this study makes three important contributions to the knowledge regarding the role 
of SC in local governance, as a product of the evolving role of bazaars as an element of the 
local governance structure. Firstly, bazaars as a field of power evolve in the local 
governance structure and influence the processes of representation, the implementation of 
regulations, and social welfare provision, which are the key functions of local government 
in any developing state. Secondly, bazaars influence these processes by generating SC, 
which itself evolves as an outcome of the dynamic interplay between evolving state 
institutions and the social structure of the local economy. Thirdly, within this context, SC 
is embedded in local power relations that are dynamic and fluid. This context-dependent 
evolution has two major implications for SC theory, and for the role of SC in local 
governance. Firstly, bazaars generate both individual and associational SC, and viewing 
these forms of SC as binaries is incorrect. Secondly, neither form (individual or 
associational) of SC has a normatively “dark” or “bright” side: the context in which either 
of these forms is used, and the purpose underlying their use, determines their negative or 
positive outcomes for local governance (Edwards and Foley, 1998; Van Deth and Zmerli, 
2009; Portes, 1998; Lin, 2008; Hsung et al., 2009). 
In this chapter, Section 9.2 looks at the role of the bazaar as an evolving field of 
power and the implications of its evolution for its relationship to other fields in the local 
governance structure. Section 9.3 explores the interrelationship between the individual and 
associational SC generated by the bazaar, and the implications of these two forms of SC 
for the local governance structure. Section 9.4 contends that the foundations of the 
concepts of bonding and bridging SC are weak, and are built on misconceptions that result 
in viewing these categories as binaries. This misconception also pits interpersonal against 
associational SC. Viewing associations as inherent with internal inequalities as opposed to 
a unified whole, comprised of the totality of networks that agents produce, may help 
dissipate some of these misconceptions. Section 9.5 summarises the theoretical 
implications of this study for trust and reciprocity as elements of SC, and their theoretical 
linkages to the concept of habitus; Section 9.6 presents the aggregate impact of bazaar-




9.2 Evolving marketplace-local government relations in the weak state context 
A key finding that recurs throughout the empirical analysis is the weakness of the state as a 
field of power. The state is ineffective in the enforcement of regulations, in the provision 
of social services, and in offering equal opportunities for participation and access to state 
institutions. Although the state enjoys legitimacy and a monopoly over coercive power, 
this power is exercised in the local social structure, and the state is not as “disembedded” 
and “powerful” as Bourdieu (1994) argues (Schinkel, 2015, p. 216). However, this 
weakness in Bourdieu’s field theory does not empirically support the theoretical arguments 
in favour of its inapplicability to developing states (see W.R. Scott, 2013, pp. 266-267, for 
more on the argument that Bourdieu’s notion of the state as a meta-field is inapplicable to 
the developing state context). The state’s powers are dependent on the local social 
structures and informal institutions that allow other fields of power and actors within those 
fields to exert influence over state functions (Steinmetz, 2008, p. 598; Stokke and Selboe, 
2009, pp. 72-73).  
 Despite this weakness in Bourdieu’s conception of the state as a meta-field, it has 
certain merits for the study of decentralised local governance. It allows an understanding of 
the evolution of the bazaar as a field of power and its evolving influence vis-à-vis formal 
governance structures, i.e. the elected and bureaucratic spheres of governance. Bourdieu 
(2012, pp. 186-187) identifies two conceptions of the state: firstly as an administration and 
ensemble of institutions, and secondly as a national territory and the ensemble of its 
citizens. Bourdieu emphasises that the state in the first sense is produced as it produces the 
state in the second sense (ibid., pp. 197-199). State institutions, together with informal 
governance institutions, constitute the organisational field, or what DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991, p. 64). call “a recognised area of institutional life”. These fields, including the state, 
are not autonomous in the absolute sense of the term (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008, p. 2). 
Instead, they are inculcated in an agent’s habitus that constitutes and is constitutive of 
interactions between fields. It is this structure of positions and dispositions that explains 
citizens’ relationships to the political and administrative structures. From this standpoint, 
the state is not a static element of the SC-local governance relationship: it produces SC as 
much as it is produced by it. Situating Bourdieu’s notion of SC within this framework also 
allows the exploration of a dialectical relationship between the state and SC, thus 
increasing its theoretical purchase over Putnam’s and Coleman’s notions of SC, which 




9.2.1 The evolution of Batkhela bazaar as a field of power in relation to the political and 
bureaucratic fields 
Over the past six decades, both qualitative and quantitative changes suggest that Batkhela 
bazaar has evolved as a field of power in relation to the political and bureaucratic fields of 
governance (Schmitz, Witte and Gengnagel, 2017). The gradual integration of the BU into 
local politics (see Section 6.2) and the diffusion of friendship, political, economic and 
acquaintance-based networks (see Section 6.3, Section 7.3 and Box 9.2) are the outcomes 
of the increase in the size of Batkhela bazaar and in its socioeconomic transformations 
(Calhoun, 2010). 
As an element of the local governance structure, the bazaar has evolved from a 
closed space of struggle against the domination of the landed class to an open space where 
interests of various governance actors converge (Gaventa, 2006; Calhoun, 2010). The 
bazaar has not only developed its own rules of participation and inclusion (see Chapter 6), 
but has also influenced the terms of engagement within the social space, with implications 
for the interrelationships between the political, bureaucratic and economic fields (Khan, 
2017a). As Gaventa (2006, pp. 31-33) argues, people within a space have better access to 
the sources of power generated within that space. The increase or decrease in the sources 
of power within a field define the relationship of this field to other fields in the larger 
social space.  
The increase in the size of Batkhela bazaar has made it an important governance 
concern for the local administration, while its significance for political actors in the 
generation of political capital has also substantially increased. Similarly, significant 
changes have occurred regarding the past strategy by bureaucrats to patronise the local 
elite in order to control the local population – a designed act that clearly worked to the 
disadvantage of the excluded traders’ community (Hastings and Matthews, 2015, p. 555). 
Amirali (2017, pp. 283-284) notes a growing sense of powerlessness among administrative 
officials due to institutional reforms in the LG structure and the alignment of interests 
between political representatives and the traders’ community. In Malakand District, 
officials, besides avoiding antagonising their political patrons, offer incentives to the BU to 
avert its slide into the hands of opposing political forces. Patronising the BU is a 
significant element of the administration’s informal strategy. At the empirical level, this 
shift in local power relations due to the bazaar’s evolution as a field of power is 










Size of the bazaar Around 20 shops 5,500 shops 
Percentage of business 
owners from landed class 
5% 35-40% 
Mode of access to state 
institutions 
Through elders of the 
landed elite 
Through personal ties, BU, or political 
networks 
Number of sub-associations 
in the bazaar 
0 7 trade specific, 22 market specific 
Political inclusion/exclusion 
of traders’ community 
Marginal element in 
local politics 
Important element of local politics 
Role of bazaar in local 
economy  
Negligible Major source of employment and 
capital generation in the district 
Ties between business 
owners and landed elite  
Patron-client; landlord-
tenant 
Friendship, political and economic ties 
along with traditional patron-client ties 
Source: Interview data and field notes 
As a public space, the bazaar is not a neutral container of power filled with internal 
power relations. Its power has penetrated into the political and administrative fields where 
it exerts ever greater influence (see Sections 6.5, 7.5 and 8.4). This confirms Schmitz et 
al.’s (2017) contention that understanding a field and its influence over other fields of 
power requires a relational understanding of their evolution (Fligstein and McAdam, 
2016). The habitus of agents such as traders is shaped not only by the distribution of 
capital relevant to the bazaar, but also by their embeddedness in and position in the other 
fields (Schmitz et al., 2017, p. 66). Using the evolving relationship between the bazaar and 
the local governance structure as a starting point, this thesis has demonstrated the impact of 
changing distributions of capitals on the relational configuration between fields, and their 
respective relationships to the field of power (state) within the social space. The increased 
political agency of traders (Gillespie, 2016), the reconfiguration of the distribution of 
economic capital, and the differentiated abilities of agents to access state institutions, have 
influenced the bazaar’s relationships to the political and bureaucratic fields. Social and 
symbolic capital are the major mechanisms that connect the bazaar with the other fields 
within the social space. However, evaluating the role of SC across the spheres of 
governance is incomplete unless the evolving power relations in these spheres are 
considered (Christoforou, 2014a, 2014b). 
9.2.2 The evolution of the political and bureaucratic fields and its implications for 
bazaar governance 
The evolved governance structure of Malakand District and a shift in bureaucracy-elite 




governance structure. Unlike in the past, society in the Malakand region is decentralised 
(see Section 5.3). The local administration no longer formally controls local population 
through the elite (Giustozi, 2013), and as an outcome of decentralised local governance, 
the relationships between the bureaucratic and elected aspects of local government can be 
adversarial (Cheema and Mohmand, 2006).72 The increased role of Batkhela bazaar within 
these governance spaces – where bureaucracy tends to patronise the BU and political 
actors seek control over its election and decision-making – forms the relational context of 
local governance. The traditional patterns of interdependence between bureaucracy and the 
local political elite are still there, but unlike in the past, they are informal. The power of the 
political elite resides in the local population, while bureaucracy represents the interests of 
the provincial government. The evolution of the bazaar within this power-dependence 
between the political and bureaucratic fields shapes agents’ habitus, which represents their 
understanding of the decentralised governance context (Faguet, 2015). To understand the 
role of the bazaar and its implications for SC formation and use in local governance, Table 
9.2 summarises the evolution of inter-organisational relations, especially between the 
representative and administrative components of the LG structure.  
Table 9.2: Evolution of the governance structure: Political and bureaucratic fields 
Field/ 
Period 
Political field Bureaucratic field Pattern of interaction 
between the two 
Pre-1970 Land-holding a major 
determinant of political 
power; less concern for 
votes; no decentralised local 
government 
Administrator 
(political agent) sole 
representative of 
central government; 
less prone to political 
pressures; interaction 
with local elite only 




2016 More followers and better 
rapport with administration 
major sources of power; 
votes and proximity to voters 





government; prone to 
political pressures; 
interactions not 
limited to landed elite 
Patronage 
relationships with 
local political elite 
(informal governance 
strategy of officials) 
Source: Interview data and field notes 
The state and its related apparatus do not generate SC but offer a foundation for its 
generation and operation (Warner, 2001; Rydin and Pennington, 2000). As Rydin and 
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bureaucratic fields, see Wacquant (2005, pp. 6-7, 14-17, 142-146) and Wacquant, LJD, 2005, The mystery of 





Pennington (2000, pp. 155-157) argue, “policy delivery” approaches to the development of 
SC discount the role of social processes. Furthermore, these approaches are unable to 
challenge the local social structures characterised by inequality and exclusion (Gaventa, 
2006; Cento Bull and Jones, 2006). Therefore, “top-down” approaches to the development 
of SC are unable to capture the dynamic interplay between fields and the operation of SC 
across these fields (Rydin and Pennington, 2000). The evolution of Batkhela bazaar is not 
the outcome of institutional design: rather it is contiguous evolution with the changing 
forms of LG institutions, resulting in the immersion of traders into the stakes of the power 
struggle between the political and bureaucratic fields. This has resulted in the 
empowerment of the traders’ community (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 188; Stokke and Selboe, 
2009, p. 73). 
Equally, the “bottom-up” conceptions inspired by Putnam’s (1993) notion play down 
the role of state institutions, as the literature on institutional design correctly argues. 
However, in treating SC as an outcome variable, the institutional design literature also 
plays down its relational character and the “invisible institutions” that influence local 
governance as a response to change in policy processes (Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, this strand of institutional design literature on SC makes two significant 
contributions to the understanding of SC in the local governance structure. Firstly, it does 
not disregard the impact of public policy processes on the development of local networks 
(both formal and informal). Secondly, it treats SC as embedded in multi-level governance 
(Ruiu, Seddaiu and Roggero, 2017; Pisani et al., 2017). This indicates bi-directionality 
between institutional design and local social structures. As Górriz-Mifsud et al. (2016) 
observe, designing participatory structures may improve participation by marginalised 
groups, but designing institutions without consideration for pre-existing social structures 
may backfire in the form of negative implications for local governance. 
Putnam (1993, pp. 171-179) is correct in characterising social capital as path-
dependent with its contextual variability with respect to northern and southern Italy. 
However, Putnam plays down the contiguities between social structures and institutional 
weakness when he views SC as an explanatory variable to economic development and 
improved institutional performance (Harriss and De Renzio, 1997). Basically, the 
evolution of political institutions and market development structure the form and role of 
SC in local governance and development (Trigilia, 2001). Bebbington et al. (2006, p. 6) 
and Mansuri and Rao (2003, pp. 1-3), in their review of Putnam-inspired World Bank 
research on SC, highlight the weakness of this approach and point towards Bourdieu as a 




performance and economic development (Christoforou, 2014a). Batkhela bazaar has 
generated both associational and informal SC which is embedded in the institutional and 
social structure (Christoforou, 2013). This social capital has implications for various power 
relations in the local field. The ineffectiveness of formal institutions to perform their 
functions limits the powers of the state as the meta-field. This results in the increasing role 
of other institutions such as third sector (see Chapter 8) or informal institutions that are 
gradually formalised due to their evolving power (Chapter 6). It was found that the bazaar 
offers incentives for actors across these fields for increased interaction that links these 
institutions either directly or indirectly to the state, with implications for local governance. 
9.2.3 Mapping out the bazaar’s connections to various governance institutions 
The evolution of Batkhela bazaar has resulted in the development of both formal and 
informal networks of traders connected to multiple spheres of governance. Table 5.4 
provided a summary of various forms of associational membership of traders, which 
suggests that associational SC can exist or be developed in regions comparable to southern 
Italy (Pisani et al., 2017, p. 255). Similarly, almost every trader has informal ties with a 
member of a political party or an SWA that cut across political or associational boundaries. 
Coleman (1990, pp. 317-318) argues that an agent’s capacity to draw benefits (“credit 
slips”) is greatest in a group of which he is a member. However, Coleman is unable to see 
how cross-cutting intersubjective ties of individuals generate externalities for both the 
fields (ibid., p. 319). Sections 6.3 and 8.3 of the present study have demonstrated the role 
of these informal networks in membership-based organisations. Moreover, informal 
networks enjoy priority over formal SC in that they facilitate the functions of 
associations.73 As discussed in Section 6.3, various forms of networks are employed by BU 
members to achieve collective goals. Although members’ political party affiliations 
facilitate the BU’s functions, it was found that the cross-cutting, informal ties of its office-
bearers with actors across various fields of power have a greater influence on the BU’s 
structure and functions.  
Traders’ intersubjective ties and ability to extract benefits for themselves or their 
group are largely shaped by this objective structure of power, both within the bazaar and 
within the larger social space (Eloire, 2014). This structure determines both the volume of 
an agent’s social network and the efficiency of his social capital to realise his individual 
objectives (Levien, 2015). It also determines the utility of an agent’s individual SC to 
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contribute to collectivity (Burt, 2000). Hence, the bazaar is embedded in other fields 
through both the associational memberships and intersubjective ties of traders with agents 
in the political and bureaucratic fields.  
These networks are complex and overlap across various organisational and 
institutional boundaries (Aoki, 2007; Portes, 1998). For instance, Batkhela BU members 
belong to six political parties.74 Similarly, the 22% of traders who are members of SWAs 
(see Table 5.4) belong to any one of six political parties. Furthermore, there are cross-
cutting family, friendship and business ties between individuals belonging to different 
political parties and SWAs. Clearly, the bazaar generates associational SC and facilitates 
the operation of other associations (political parties and SWAs) through tangible and 
intangible resources. Cooperation among the members of formal organisations is facilitated 
by informal networks for the realisation of their objectives (see Box 9.1 for an example).  
On one hand, the findings in Chapters 6 and 8 suggest that the bazaar has contributed 
to the evolving powers of various types of formal associations, while on the other hand 
they resonate with the conclusions of previous literature on SC in Pakistan that 
associational SC is weak owing to the hierarchical structures of power (Beall, 1997; 
Mohmand, 2008). Contrary to Putnam’s (1995, 2000) theses on the decline of SC, 
associational SC is on the rise, while reliance on interpersonal networks is greater than 
reliance on associational networks (Fischer, 2001, p. 3; Watson, 2009). This suggests that 
membership-based associations, regardless of their unity of purpose, comprise agents who 
are endowed with distinct forms and quantities of capital that shape their habitus to act 
collectively, to use their capital for facilitating collective objectives, or to act against any 
threat to collective interest (Bourdieu, 1985, pp. 25-27). Contrary to individualistic 
interpretations of the network perspective, the findings from Batkhela bazaar suggest that 
interpersonal networks are not always antithetical to the development of associational SC, 
and may even facilitate its development or at least its functions and its influence over local 
governance (Krishna, 2002; Molenaers, 2003; Liang, Huang, Lu and Wang, 2015).  
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Box 9.1: Example of informal networks facilitating cooperation within weak associations 
 
Source: Interview data 
9.3 Types of SC generated by Batkhela bazaar? 
Batkhela bazaar generates both individual and associational SC (Peña, 1999; Watson, 
2009; Dines, 2007; Lyon, 2000). The bazaar economy is also instrumental in facilitating 
the functions of associations that develop outside the bazaar for purposes other than 
protecting traders’ interests. These processes of social capital formation are significant in 
that they help trace the continuities and discontinuities in the operation of SC in the local 
governance processes. By Putnamian standards, SC contributes to economic development; 
however, empirical analysis of the evolution of Batkhela bazaar suggests that economic 
development also results in the generation of SC that impacts local governance processes 
(Varshney, 2001). The increase in the scale and scope of the bazaar’s economic activities, 
and its increased involvement in local politics, have necessitated the development of cross-
cutting ties in both the economic and political spheres, rendering traditional forms of 
solidarity less useful (Trigilia, 2001). Therefore, the alignment and misalignment of 
interests in various social groups as an outcome of economic development occur 
(Bourdieu, 2005, Chapter 4). However, associational membership as a measure of social 
Zahid, Ibrar Khan and Faqir Khan were members of a single political party (ANP). Zahid 
and Ibrar were political actors who patronised the BU, while Faqir was a trader seeking 
election as BU president. Zahid and Ibrar were opposed to each other because of personal 
rivalry. In the 2013 BU election, Zahid did not support Faqir even though they were both 
members of the same party: instead Zahid supported a presidential candidate from the 
opposing party (PPP). Faqir’s close friendship with Ibrar, who had a personal rivalry with 
Zahid, was the main reason for Zahid’s support for the opposing side. In the same election, 
Faqir was actively supported by Ateeq Khan, a notable political leader in Batkhela and 
district general secretary of the PPP whose candidate was contesting the election against 
Faqir. Ateeq Khan supported Faqir for two reasons: firstly because of internal friction 
within his party over nominating a candidate for the BU presidency; and secondly because 
of his friendship with Faqir. Ateeq Khan, who supported Faqir, had a personal and political 
rivalry with Ibrar, and both Ateeq and Ibrar belonged to opposing political parties. 
However, due to their friendship ties to Faqir, they cooperated with him, which facilitated 
the functions of the BU after Faqir’s election as president. This example demonstrates that 
formal associations are weak due to their internal conflicts; that informal networks cut 
across various forms of formal SCs, which helps realise both individual and associational 
objectives; and that the BU as a field of power is embedded in the political field, which has 




capital’s implications for local governance is not a good indicator. Bazaars generate 
quotidian forms of associations (Varshney, 2001, p. 370) or less visible forms of SC 
(Watson, 2009, p. 1,583), which shape the operation and outcomes of formal, membership-
based associations. If SC inheres in the structures of relationships, which are essentially 
dynamic (Coleman, 1990), relational changes within and across these structures shape the 
formation and outcomes of various forms of SC for various spheres of governance 
(Bourdieu, 2005; Wacquant, 1998; Pieterse, 2003). 
9.3.1 The generation of associational social capital by Batkhela bazaar and its 
theoretical implications 
Batkhela bazaar as an element of local governance is connected to broader governance 
through two distinct types of associations: interest-based (Olson-type) and voluntary civic 
(Putnam-type) (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Trades unions (as an example of Olson-type 
associations) facilitate government interaction with the traders’ community, while SWAs 
(as an example of Putnam-type associations) are a substitute for absent formal institutions 
in the field of social welfare provision (see Chapters 6 and 8 respectively). The increase in 
the bazaar’s population has made the BU a central attraction for political parties 
(Grossman, 2016; Goodfellow and Titeca, 2012), while the increasing resources generated 
by the bazaar’s economy have amplified its utility for SWAs (Vermaak, 2017; González-
Torre et al., 2016). The evidence relating to these types of associations goes beyond 
Watson’s (2009, pp. 1,589-1,590) reasoning that marketplaces are sites for generating less 
visible forms of SC. Doubtless they are, but they are also sites for the development of 
associational SC of their own (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005). The associational SC developed 
by marketplaces is either in the form of trades unions, or in the support generated for 
SWAs of various types (González-Torre et al., 2016). This contradicts Brehm and Rahn’s 
(1997, p. 1,017) conclusions, which reject the impact of economic development on civic 
participation. Furthermore, the findings of Chapter 8 have demonstrated that, in the 
absence of support from national and international donors for SWAs, the bazaar economy, 
which is embedded in social and religious institutions, can be effective in averting the 










Names and types of associations 
Associations formed by 
business owners that interact 
with administration 
7 The BU; associations of pharmacy traders; 
mechanics; fruit traders; vegetable traders; 
barbers; bakery owners 
Associations constituted by or 
of traders for helping the poor 
4 DWS; Blood-donors’ association; A-1 welfare 
association; Al-Khidmat 
Membership of business 
owners in SWAs 
6 DWS; Al-Khidmat; SAANGA; A-1 Welfare 
association; Blood-donor Association; civil 
Defence 
SWAs dependent on donations 
from non-member business 
owners 
4 Al-Khidmat; SAANGA; DAS; A-1 welfare 
association 
 
Associations of bazaar-related 
businesses 
2 Transporter’s Union; Union of rikshaw drivers 
Less-visible/ 
informal associations 
49 Rotating credit-saving associations (27); market-
level associations (22) 
Source: Interview data and field observations 
The changing outlook of the local economy due to the bazaar’s development has 
resulted in a rich associational life (Beall, 1997, cited in Phillips, 2002).75 This finding has 
implications for the theory of the marketplace generation of associational SC. The value of 
traders’ associations depends on their dual role: facilitating trading and socialising in the 
marketplace (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005, p. 1,314). The role of the BU in trade facilitation in 
Batkhela bazaar is embedded in the structure of power. The utility of its trade facilitation 
function and the provision of financial support during times of economic crises is 
contingent on traders’ socioeconomic status (ibid.). However, agents trust informal 
(family, kinship, or lineage) ties; where these ties are absent, neighbourhood is the major 
organising principle (Beall, 1995). Chapter 6 of the present study has demonstrated that the 
politics of the BU have resulted in the development of cross-cutting networks across 
socioeconomic and political lines on one hand, and between the bazaar and local politics 
on the other (Varshney, 2001, p. 384). Traders’ associations cannot be termed as welfare 
associations, as Lyons and Snoxell (2005, p. 1314) argue: instead, they are interest-based 
associations for preserving traders’ collective interests against the government. In addition, 
their role is more dependent on the pre-existing social ties generated by the bazaar, rather 
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than the reverse (Beall, 1995). In short, despite the rise of associational SC, the trust and 
reciprocity embedded in the informal networks play a dominant role in the everyday 
governance of the bazaar’s life and its embeddedness in local governance through multiple 
associations. 
Two major theoretical outcomes follow. Firstly, the bazaar has generated a wealth of 
civic engagement, but of an idiosyncratic kind, which cannot be captured by the Putnamian 
view of associational life owing to the underlying power structures involved (Beall, 1997, 
pp. 559-560). Furthermore, these associations are often informal, governed by unwritten 
rules, tacitly understood and interpreted by the traders’ community (Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999; Lyon, 2002; Porter, Lyon, Adamu and Obafemi, 2010). For instance, 
membership of Batkhela BU is not formally recorded,76 nor there is any membership fee: 
every shopkeeper in the bazaar becomes a BU member and is entitled to its help in dispute 
resolution, access to state institutions, and help in the event of accidents or emergencies, 
etc. Secondly, the asymmetric power relations involved lead to the failure of these 
associations to develop social trust even within them. 
 This form of SC is clearly helpful in the weak state context for governance and 
development, but it is more useful for some individuals than for others (Beall, 1997, p. 
560). A frequent comment heard in development circles in Pakistan is that civil society and 
voluntary associations are weak, and the findings of this thesis seems to support this 
general contention. However, this weakness is due not to the inherent characteristic 
weakness of social capital, but to the specific structure of power within which it operates 
(Mohmand, 2008, pp. 385-386). An empirical puzzle in this literature is the absence of 
voluntary associations owing to the lack of a sense of community in villages (ibid., p. 389), 
and a “wealth” of associational activities in urban communities, even among the urban 
poor (Beall, 1995, 1997). Within this context, marketplaces facilitate the process of change 
in the local economy, from agrarian to market, and from rural to urban. This results in the 
emergence of associational life, with implications for the traditional hierarchical structures 
                                                          
76 The only exception to the recording of membership occurred in 2010, when the BU collected detailed 
information about 2,430 “traders with shutters”, in order to issue ID cards to facilitate the mobility of 
traders across the country, severely affected in the aftermath of the military crises in the region. During 
fieldwork in 2016, the author observed three instances in which the general secretary of the BU, at the 
request of the District Commissioner’s office, certified whether or not a trading premise existed in the 
bazaar. Unable to present any systematic record, the general secretary stated: “We have 6,000 traders in 
the bazaar… when I say 6,000, I am counting the fixed shops with shutters only.” He immediately added: 






of power (Ahmed, 1980; Lindholm, 1982; Chaudhary, 1999). In principle, the present 
study agrees with Mohmand’s (2008) argument that SC from macro- to micro-level is 
embedded in asymmetric power relations. Nevertheless, a fundamental theoretical 
weakness in the associational SC literature is that it loses sight of the role of interpersonal 
networks when considering associations as the sole unit of analysis (Molenaers, 2003, pp. 
128-129; Norris and Inglehart, 2003, p. 3).  
9.3.2 The role of Batkhela bazaar in generating interpersonal networks  
Batkhela bazaar has led to the development of friendship, economic and political networks 
that facilitate the functions of associations. The individual networks generated by Batkhela 
bazaar cut across family, kinship, political, ethnic, regional and 
associational/organisational boundaries. These market networks help realise the individual 
objectives of the traders (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005). As Chapter 6 has argued, individuals 
in the Batkhela bazaar rely more on interpersonal networks than on the BU for the 
realisation of their objectives. This is not due to the lack of a sense of community, as 
Mohmand (2008) would argue, but to greater trust in the capacity of interpersonal 
networks as opposed to the BU or any other association (Molenaers, 2003). The present 
study of the BU and SWAs has shown, however, that an aggregate of these networks may 
facilitate activities aimed at civic engagement (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). The literature on 
associational SC provides evidence on the implications of associational membership for 
individual networks (Degli Antoni and Sabatini, 2016), whereas conventionally, individual 
SC is viewed as an obstacle to the development of collective SC, which, in some instances, 
is undoubtedly correct (Levien, 2015; Portes and Landolt, 1996). The present research on 
the BU and SWAs in Chapters 6 and 8 respectively suggests that, in particular, the 
individual networks of key members of associations serve as a resource both for the BU 
and the SWAs (Liang et al., 2015; Molenaers, 2003; Krishna, 2002; Pedrini et al., 2016). 
The logic of cooperation in the market impels traders to purposively develop new 
networks with other traders, moneylenders and families (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; 
Coleman, 1990). However, through increased interactions, these networks evolve into 
more effective or expressive ties with benefits outside economic realm (Oh, Chung and 
Labianca, 2004, pp. 861-862; Coleman, 1990). This functionalist approach to the 
development of social capital, as Davis (2014, p. 100) argues, assumes that agents develop 
ties with those who are alike on the basis of shared interests. In this sense, it undermines 
the “strength of weak ties” proposition (Granovetter, 1985). The findings from Batkhela 
bazaar suggest that the development of social ties across the spheres of governance is 




individual and collective benefits embedded in these fields (McKie, 2017; Bourdieu, 
1986). This SC accumulation is both spontaneous and strategic, because distanced ties are 
employed in those spheres where strong ties are unable to accrue benefits for an agent 
(Granovetter, 1985). This means that social capital, both inherited from the family and 
accumulated during trading careers, is employed by traders to achieve their individual and 
group objectives (Eloire, 2015, Note 1). Even purely instrumental ties purposively 
developed in the economic field evolve into expressive ties with mutual benefits for both 
the sides in the long run. Box 9.2 offers an example of the development of such networks 
as an outcome of increased interactions in the Batkhela bazaar. 
Box 9.2: Example of the role of Batkhela bazaar in generating informal SC  
Source: Interview data and field notes 
These networks are not mutually exclusive as they cut-across political, associational, 
regional and socioeconomic boundaries (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005, p. 1,314). A trader may 
simultaneously belong to the BU, a political party and an SWA, while having an 
All 60 traders interviewed in the major fieldwork stage of this study reported the development 
of durable networks on the demand and supply side. Initially instrumental, these networks 
often evolve into expressive ties based on mutual trust and commitment. Most of the networks 
(85%) were developed from interactions in the bazaar’s economic, political or service 
provision activities. Thirty-two acquaintance-based networks were recorded that later 
developed into reciprocal exchange relationships: repeated economic exchanges, an actor’s 
reputation for helping, or a “structural hole” helped in the establishment of these relationships. 
For example, Waqar is a prominent wholesaler of electronic goods in the bazaar. In 1985, his 
father-in-law’s brother wrote to a prominent wholesaler in Lahore to connect Waqar to him. 
As Waqar stated: “Connecting with that trader was very important, because I knew that he 
could provide me goods on credit which my ties here could not afford.” (Interview, 9 May 
2016). The supplier in Lahore not only provided business advice and a loan, but helped Waqar 
connect to traders across the country. The ties between Waqar and his supplier in Lahore 
evolved into a reciprocal relation of mutual respect and commitment. In the late 1990s, the 
supplier had to shut down his business after defaulting on bank loans. Waqar tried to help his 
lifetime benefactor in his difficult situation. As Waqar stated: “He gave me credit when no-
one knew me in the market, he introduced me to many traders in the wholesale market, in 
short, after God and my hard work, he is the main source of the expansion of my business. I 
could not forget what he had done for me. I wanted to do something for him when I realised 
his difficulties. I not only returned his credit which I was supposed to pay in instalments, I 
also gave him one million rupees and said to him, use this money now, and return me 





interpersonal economic or friendship connection with another trader who also is a member 
of the BU but belongs to a different SWA and political party. Hence, relationally 
embedded multiplex networks serve as a resource for associations.77 This goes beyond the 
traditional emphasis of the SC literature on the utility of multiple affiliations of a member 
for the benefit of voluntary associations (Wollebaek and Selle, 2003). The findings from 
Batkhela bazaar have reinforced the significance of members’ informal networks for 
voluntary associations (Molenaers, 2003). The stability and success of voluntary 
associations is underpinned by the norms of trust and reciprocity inherent in the informal 
networks. Trust in these networks exists and even develops for mutual benefit without any 
associational life (Steenberg, 2014, pp. 11-12). This is not to undermine the significance of 
associations for bazaar-governance relationships, but rather to call attention to the role of 
informal networks that generate both economic and social capital for these socially 
embedded voluntary associations. 
 Elite capture can inhibit an association’s trust-generating capacity, which resides in 
informal horizontal relationships (Molenaers, 2003, p. 128). However, the capture of large 
associations like the BU, the mechanics’ association or pharmacy associations is unlikely 
for two reasons: firstly because representatives of these associations use their informal 
networks for gathering votes or performing the functions of these associations; and 
secondly because the membership of these associations cannot be controlled, unlike the 
membership of local development associations (Molenaers, 2003); sports associations 
(Tacon, 2014), cooperatives (Liang et al., 2015), or even some traders’ associations (Peña, 
1999; Ikioda, 2014). 
These associations can best be characterised as ongoing systems of social 
relationships (Hodgson, 2006) comprised of both individual networks and community 
norms (Steenberg, 2014). The weakness of associational SC and the greater use of informal 
networks is not purely a question of incentives, as rational choice theorists suggest 
(Hummely, 2016). The field of power and an agent’s capacity to realise his objectives with 
or without associational support shapes traders’ propensities to employ individual or 
associational SC (Odabaş and Adaman, 2014b; Kluttz and Fligstein, 2016). It is precisely 
this logic which explains why agents with differentiated endowments of SC rely on their 
individual networks while reflecting solidarity against threats to their collective interest 
(Bourdieu, 1985); or why SWAs, despite their inability to develop trust, are successful in 
                                                          
77 This raises another theoretical contention. Schmitz et al. (2017) use the notion of multiple habitus that 
allows an agent to identify with multiple networks at the same time, whereas the present study argues that 
identification is a decision that stems from habitus, which shapes an agent’s decision to use an association 




generating economic capital through the individual SC of their members. 
Counterintuitively, like the bazaar, these associations are embedded in a series of 
relationships. This nested embeddedness raises a more significant challenge to using the 
mainstream theory of SC to study marketplace-local governance relationships. In the 
context of the bazaar, where interactions are fluid and complex, and associational and 
personal networks proliferate, questions are raised as to how bonding and bridging social 
capital evolve and how these two types interrelate. 
9.4 The study of Batkhela bazaar: Implications for the bonding and bridging 
dimensions of social capital 
The empirical evidence from Batkhela bazaar has theoretical implications for the bonding 
and bridging dimensions of SC. Most of the research on SC employs these analytical 
categories as binaries, which often leads to narrow conceptualisations and consequently 
narrow conclusions, especially regarding the relationship between formal and informal, 
and individual and associational, SC. Putnam (2000, pp. 22-23) does not treat these as 
strictly either/or categories, but rather as analytical dimensions along which forms of 
association can be categorised. Confusion in the use of bonding and bridging arises from 
Putnam’s neglect of the inequality inherent in the two dimensions (Leonard, 2004, p. 929).  
For Putnam, horizontal associations are the actual SC, whereas contexts with vertical 
associations are characterised as having either an absence of SC (Fischer, 2001) or weak 
SC (Mohmand, 2008). In the developing world, where associational activities are largely 
informal and social relationships are vertically structured, the literature argues that 
verticality-horizontality classification has very limited utility for explaining the bonding 
and bridging dimensions of SC (Molenaers, 2003, pp. 123-124). Investigating local 
government and SC in Pakistan, Mohmand (2008, pp. 391-394) demonstrates that it is due 
to social stratification and the vertical dependence of the poor on the rich that associational 
activities are vertically structured. Beall (1997) found that Putnam’s much-celebrated 
notion of horizontal (bridging) associations was found to be inapplicable to contexts like 
Pakistan owing to the hierarchical social relationships and unequal access to state 
institutions (see also Levi, 1996). The inapplicability of the Putnamian notion of horizontal 
associations is primarily due to the prevalence of bonding (exclusive) social capital 
existing at all levels of society in Pakistan (Mohmand, 2008, p. 397; Beall, 1997). 
Associations in this context are better viewed as fields of power and as a totality of 
relationships. In the first sense, they are internally heterogenous and actors struggle over 




relationships between actors, rather than a mere quality of a group” (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 
2).78  
Thus, in contexts like Pakistan, making the bonding/bridging distinction between 
associations and networks in an interactionist framework becomes awkward for two 
reasons: the unequal distribution of capitals (Bourdieu, 1985, pp. 24-25), and the 
overlapping of networks (Portes, 1998). As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, group 
boundaries (class and association) are constantly evolving as a consequence of changes in 
the power of one field or another: their binding potential and bridging capacity therefore 
change over time (Christoforou and Lainé, 2014). Furthermore, the development of new 
fields such as traders’ associations, SWAs and decentralised local politics has led to 
complementarity between informal networks and multiple overlapping associational 
boundaries. Therefore, exchanges among agents are more fluid and complex, and their 
position in the social structure, based on their possession of various forms of capitals, 
determines their capacity to influence various governance processes. Each voluntary 
association (e.g. trade union, political party or SWA), socioeconomic category (landed vs. 
landless), or field (e.g. political, bureaucratic or economic) is heterogeneous owing to the 
socioeconomic diversity among members and uneven interests in various participation 
processes (Christoforou, 2014a, p. 66). Amid this heterogeneity characterised by power 
asymmetry, coincidences of interests cause the development of multiple forms of bridging 
associations (Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Coffé and Geys, 2007, 2008).  
The concept of bonding and bridging rests on weak theoretical foundations (Leonard, 
2004, p. 929). Three touchstones of the concept, if applied to the associations in Batkhela 
bazaar, will elucidate this argument. Firstly, the foundational principles include 
inclusion/exclusion (bonding/bridging), unity of purpose (bonding), and homogeneity vs. 
heterogeneity (bonding vs. bridging). Be it the BU or SWAs, the associations in Batkhela 
are inclusive in terms of allowing membership to anyone who wishes to join. Indeed, and 
as typically expected of interest-based associations, being a trader is the only condition for 
being included in the BU. Secondly, the purpose of these associations is to bond otherwise 
different actors in a single association or group;79 but again, the absence of internal 
homogeneity and horizontality often demonstrates differences in the seemingly unanimous 
                                                          
78 In this way, civic participation should not be equated only with membership of formal associations, as is 
often done. As Hooghe and Stolle (2003, p. 12) note, informal networks in some circumstances may have 
more powerful democratic effects than opposed to membership-based associations. 
79 Both the rich and poor make the achievement of associational objectives possible. In Batkhela, one often 
hears: “The rich is important for arranging money, and the poor are equally important for providing 





purpose of the association. Thirdly, and related to the second point, these associations have 
internal conflicts due to the varying economic and political interests of their members. 
These conflicts, however, lead to increased bridging on a personal level, when members of 
the community feel out of step with the existing social order (Portes, 1998, p. 2). This leads 
to another fundamental confusion regarding the concept, whereby some network scholars 
like Häuberer (2014) incorrectly view bridging networks as comparable to Burt’s structural 
holes, while regarding Bourdieu’s notion of SC as a bonding type based on exclusivity in 
terms of class such as nobility. Instead of suggesting that bonding and bridging as 
conceptual categories are flawed (Leonard, 2004, p. 930), conceptual refinement of these 
notions is suggested for their meaningful use in empirical analysis (Häuberer, 2014; 
Zmerli, 2002). At this stage, the only definitive conclusion on the relationship between the 
bridging and bonding dimensions is that the contribution of bonding to facilitating the 
development of bridging SC is the greater good of bonding SC (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 65) 
The bridging/bonding binary leads to another dichotomy: formal vs. informal, or 
individual vs. associational. This categorisation is indisputable. However, this treatment of 
associations as the sole unit of analysis either overlooks the productive role of informal 
networks in the dynamics of associations (Norris and Inglehart, 2003), or worse, reduces 
the role of individual networks to being antithetical to associational SC. Conversely, the 
literature suggests that informal interpersonal networks facilitate the development of trust 
for bridging associations in a low-trust environment (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004; Odabaş 
and Adaman, 2014b, pp. 90-91).80 Clearly, using bonding and bridging binaries as an 
analytical distinction facilitates the task of analysis, but this runs the risk of simplifying the 
outcomes of bonding and bridging networks and their “dark” and “bright” sides (Flora, 
1998; Larsen et al., 2004). The findings of this study are in agreement with Svendsen and 
Patulny (2007) that neither all bonding is bad nor all bridging is good, and a single network 
carries both qualities. Therefore, conceptualising bonding and bridging in a Straussian 
structuralist framework of binaries obscures not only the actual effects of these two types 
of SC but also their mutual interrelationship (Williams, 2005).  
Therefore, while investigating associational SC in the developing state context, 
particular attention should be paid to the inner composition of associations and to the role 
                                                          
80 This uneasy marriage of individual and associational SC (as the findings of the present study show) is 
possible with three theoretical components: that associations are a resource produced by the group as a 
collective and used by members; that associations create feeling of solidarity (recognition) among members 
facilitating the use of collectively produced SC (Bourdieu, 1980, p.3); and that actors who are exploiting the 






of informal networks in their operations (Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Norris and Inglehart, 
2003; Larsen et al., 2004, pp. 65-66). The literature often leads to a static conceptualisation 
of associations as either bridging or bonding, where the latter are viewed as homogeneous 
entities (Larson et al., 2004:65). This static conception often leads to incorrect 
interpretations of the mutually dependent relationship of interpersonal networks and 
associational SC. The associations studied in the present research resemble in some ways 
the local self-help groups studied by Krishna (2002) in India. Membership of all such 
associations includes both rich and poor, who participate due to mutual recognition 
(Odabaş and Adaman, 2014b, p. 91). Therefore these associations present a harmonious 
mix of bonding and bridging, in that they are inward looking in terms of realising 
collective interests, but outward looking in terms of drawing support for the achievement 
of those objectives (Svendsen and Patulny, 2007). Similarly, in the context of Batkhela 
bazaar, they derive their strength from community solidarity when faced with collective 
threats, but are weak as associations and often rely on the interpersonal networks of their 
key members. 
Viewing the bonding and bridging dimensions in this framework calls for the 
development of a theoretical approach that cancels out the weaknesses of the Putnamian 
and Bourdieusian approaches to SC. Albeit from different standpoints, Bourdieu and 
Putnam agree on rejecting the structure vs. agency dichotomy. Integrating Bourdieu and 
Putnam will enable an understanding of the processes that prohibit the development of 
generalised trust despite increased associational membership, and the consistent low level 
of generalised trust despite the rising number of associations and their increasing 
membership (Coffé and Geys, 2007; Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2017). In addition, Bourdieu’s 
lack of attention to the concept of trust and linking its various dimensions through his 
notion of habitus (Frederiksen, 2014, p. 178) can also be linked to the distribution of 
particularised and generalised trust in a specific institutional context (Putnam, 1993). 
9.5 The role of trust and reciprocity  
The current study of Batkhela bazaar has theoretical implications relating to two major 
social exchange mechanisms: trust and reciprocity. These norms are fundamental for 
governing cooperation in both associational and informal networks. This section 
theoretically situates the observed empirical patterns of high reliance on personal networks 
and low levels of social trust on one hand, and low institutional trust on the other. Trust 
and reciprocity are, however, interdependent. Trust is sometimes the cause and sometimes 
the consequence of reciprocity. Together these elements form the content of SC. The 




generalised trust (Siisiainen, 2003); however, his notions of habitus shaped by an agent’s 
surroundings and the structure of reciprocity have explanatory power to capture the 
interrelationship between generalised and particularised trust in the Malakand region 
(Frederiksen, 2014). 
9.5.1 Habitus as an ordering principle: Personal, associational and institutional trust 
The empirical data presented in Chapters 6-8 suggests a degree of complementarity 
between the levels of trust, i.e. institutional, associational and interpersonal (Odabaş and 
Adaman, 2014b, p. 83; Rothstein, 2013, pp. 1,019-1,021). These levels of trust are further 
divided into two dimensions: presumptive and competence-based trust (Blumberg et al., 
2015; McAllister, 1995). However, trusting decisions within this order of trust are shaped 
by an agent’s habitus (Frederiksen, 2014), which is the product of agent’s familiarity with 
institutions, routines, and the norms of cooperation (Luhmann, 2000; Misztal, 1996, 
pp.101-102). The complementarity between interpersonal, associational (social) and 
institutional trust is structured by differentiated distribution of capitals (Uslaner, 2008, 
2013). Uslaner (2013) situates the low level of institutional trust in economic inequalities 
and argues that these inequalities lead to a high level of particularised trust and a low level 
of institutional trust. It has also been found that an agent’s perception of trust is inherently 
linked to the question of ability/power which is not necessarily economic (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Navarro, 2006). For instance, the owners of small businesses in Batkhela bazaar vote for 
BU candidates who can influence government institutions in their favour. These 
institutions are perceived to be unfair and “stacked against the less powerful” (Odabaş and 
Adaman, 2014b, p. 94). Conversely, traders with reliable personal networks that can 
violate regulations in their favour do not rely on the BU. For them, interpersonal trust is 
higher, while associations perform a second-order role in the generation of trust (see 
Section 8.4; Anheier and Kendall, 2002). 
Two key theories on the relationships between trust, inequality and quality of 
government, Uslaner’s inequality trap thesis and Rothstein’s interconnected mechanisms 
and quality of government, are developed in the literature on trust and corruption. For 
Uslaner, inequality breeds corruption, leading to further inequalities and a lack of social 
trust. For Uslaner, governments do not do the job of increasing or decreasing trust, whereas 
for Rothstein (2011, 2013, pp. 1,019-1,023) the quality of government (competence) and 
institutional fairness (rule of law) are important determinants of the levels of generalised 
and interpersonal trust in society. The aim here is not to play down Uslaner’s inequality 
trap thesis, or to reformulate Rothstein’s quality of government argument. It is argued that 




inequalities to assess the operation of social capital and its implications for governance is 
possible by combining these arguments in a single framework (Ariely and Uslaner, 2016, 
p. 2). In the view of the author of the present research, Rothstein’s theory has three central 
elements: an agent’s familiarity with the quality of institutions; his/her 
understanding/perception of others’ positions; and a sense of one’s position in the given 
social order (Rothstein, 2013, pp. 1,019-1,021). 
In this sense, trust is a fundamental cognitive dimension of SC, rooted in one’s 
expectations which in turn result in more expectations (Uphoff, 2000, p. 219). It promotes 
cooperation among agents based on their expectations of the other’s intent and capacity to 
cooperate. As Uphoff (ibid., p. 220) states: “Roles are created by expectations, and at the 
same time they create expectations on the part both of (a) those who occupy (act according 
to) established and accepted roles, and (b) those persons with whom these role incumbents 
interact.” In this sense, the capacity of institutions and social structures to affect these 
institutions simultaneously affects the health of trust in the society (Rothstein and Uslaner, 
2005, p. 42). However, the quality of institutions (fairness) is the primary determinant of 
how social and interpersonal trust operate within a society. As Rothstein and Eek (2009) 
and Rothstein (2013, p. 1,011) note, where governments efficiently and fairly provide for 
many social needs, people do not have to develop and maintain trusting relationships or 
invest in social networks. The empirical findings in Chapters 7 and 8 of the present study 
suggest that non-robust government institutions and their inability to provide for various 
individual needs erode trust in the government. These factors also account for the low level 
of generalised trust and higher levels of interpersonal trust and cooperation among 
individuals. In this sense, trust reduces the complexity of social system (Luhmann, 2000, 
pp. 94-95). 
Thus, trust as a disposition stemming from an agent’s habitus works at two levels: 
presumptive trust, which is an agent’s trust in the perceived capacity of an agent or 
institution to perform an expected role (Blumberg et al., 2015, p. 93); and role-based trust, 
which is the accomplishment of that expectation (Blumberg et al., 2015). The former is a 
cause of the generation and strengthening of networks of cooperation in asymmetric trust 
relationships, whereas the latter is an outcome of these networks that ensures enduring 
cooperation. In this sense, trusting is not a stable disposition as proponents of strategic trust 
would claim (Hardin, 2002), but rather stems from habitus that is embedded in the situated 
experiences of agents, shaped by their interactions with situations (Frederiksen, 2014, pp. 
174-176; Luhmann, 2000, p. 95). These experiences and consequently trust are shaped by 




Narayan, 2000). Table 9.4 summarises this context in terms of institutional, social, and 
interpersonal trust. 
Table 9.4: Institutional, social, and interpersonal trust in Batkhela bazaar 
Examples of trust/ 
Level of trust 
Specific type of trust  Respondents reporting 





Ability to deliver services 




Fairness of government 




Trust in personal ties to 
influence institutions 
90% 60 
Trust in associations: 
intention 
Trust in the BU’s intent to 
preserve interests (social trust)  
90% 60 
Trust in associations: 
capacity 
Trust in the BU’s capacity to 
preserve interests (social trust) 
30% 60 
Trust in organisations: 
intention 





Role of interpersonal networks 
to generate resources for SWAs 
90% 20 
Social/generalised trust Trust in the intent of strangers to 
help (social trust) 
17% 60 
Source: Interview data 
The findings presented in Table 9.4 suggest that a high level of interpersonal trust, a 
low level of associational trust, and an even lower level of institutional trust exist in 
Malakand District. Trust is thus asymmetric, as argued in Section 7.4.1. An agent’s 
decision to rely on an institution, an interpersonal network, or any specific agent within his 
extended network, depends on the capacity of the trustee to preserve the interest of the 
truster. This implies that trust operates as an upward disposition in the interconnected triad 
of institutional, social and personal trust. These trust dimensions are linked in a temporal 
relationship in which change at one level (performance of institutions) affects the other 
(capacity of personal ties) (Rothstein, 2013, pp. 1,019-1,021). Box 9.3 presents an 
empirical example of how change in formal institutions affects the trust dynamics of 
everyday engagement between traders and local government officials. In this instance, a 
decision by pharmacists not to rely on personal ties was the product not of rational 
calculation but of social judgement (Karpik, 2014, p. 30) which is shaped by an agent’s 




Box 9.3: Example of the role of institutions in shaping individuals’ trusting dispositions  
Source: Interview data 
The findings of this study regarding institutional trust have two major theoretical 
implications for the trust dimension of social capital. Firstly, institutional trust determines 
the operation of interpersonal and social trust, which then allows inequalities to affect 
institutions (Rothstein, 2013, pp. 1,019-1,021). Secondly, to explain this cycle of 
interconnected levels of trust, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is instructive, allowing trust to 
be perceived as a product of habitus (Frederiksen, 2014). In this sense, trust is a cognitive 
disposition, but trusting is a norm specific to any social context: as Bourdieu would argue, 
the social context is not external to individuals, but they are the cause and the product of it. 
In other words, habitus is shaped by individuals’ subjective experiences within an 
objective structure of relationships. Trusting dispositions stem from these subjective 
experiences, which feed back into that objective structure in the form of either generalised 
or personalised trusting relationships. 
The notion of habitus is important in that it connects with social differentiation of 
social capital and consequently to generalised trust (Frederiksen, 2014, pp. 177-178). Trust 
in personal networks or in its generalised form is linked to the notion of the radius of 
A provincial government ban on political transfers reinforced the confidence of a local 
drugs inspector that he could perform his duties efficiently. His strict attitude towards the 
violation of rules had influenced Batkhela traders’ trust in the capacity of political leaders 
to intercede. A pharmacist (mentioned in Row 3, Table 7.5) decided not to rely on the 
intercession of a Union Council (UC) mayor who was also a friend. As the pharmacist 
explained: “My friend asked me to talk to the inspector, but I told him he would not listen, 
even though my friend is a UC mayor. This inspector does not listen to anyone” (Interview, 
15 September 2016). A second pharmacist in an identical situation also decided not to 
approach the inspector. Both pharmacists had a similar socioeconomic status and were 
charged with selling fake life-saving drugs. They lacked trust in institutional fairness, and 
both normally trusted their interpersonal ties to avoid rule enforcement regarding repeated 
violations of health and quality standards. This time, however, the first pharmacist not only 
declined to negotiate with the inspector directly, but also refused to seek the help of his 
friend who had been useful in many such instances in the past; the latter pharmacist had 
personal ties to the drugs inspector but still decided not to ask him for concessions owing 
to a previous failed experience. The second pharmacy owner recalled: “[The drugs 
inspector] said to me, ‘You should not come to me for illegal favours.’ I replied, “If it was 
legal, there would be no need for favours.’ He added, ‘As long as I remember that, I will 





trust.81 Delhey et al. (2011) note the influence of culture on the radius of trust. A 
Bourdieusian approach demonstrates that a specific composition of trust disposition (radius 
of trust) is differentiated by an agent’s or group’s economic or cultural capital. This 
classification is not only one of classifiable objective structures, but also a differentiation 
of subjective experiences (Frederiksen, 2014). The findings of the present study of 
Batkhela bazaar also suggest that trust in personal networks and lack of generalised trust 
have cultural underpinnings. The traditional division of society between the landed and 
landless (occupational class), failed state-building projects and their path-dependent 
effects, status envy and power struggles are some of the cultural and institutional factors 
that inhibit the development of generalised trust.82  
Overall, the findings of this research have three major implications for the theory of 
trust as an element of SC. Firstly, the marketplace generates various forms of associations, 
but, as Stoller (2002) argues, these associations do not necessarily promote generalised 
trust as Putnam (1993) would suggest. This should be viewed in the light of Karpik’s 
(2014) study on trust in markets, which rejects any assumed homogeneity of markets 
owing to the qualitative differences among actors, their subjective experiences and 
perceptions, and their other differing qualities. Secondly, and for this reason, interpersonal 
trust in society is higher than generalised trust. This is mainly due to economic inequalities 
that structure agents’ perceptions of institutional fairness (Uslaner, 2002; Odabaş and 
Adaman, 2014b). Thirdly, trust is not only a cognitive phenomenon, but it has a contextual 
dimension (Kramer, 1999, p. 574) that is shaped by the quality of formal institutions 
(Rothstein and Eek, 2009). Hardin (1992, cited in Cramer, 1998, p. 574) argues that trust is 
a three-part relationship that entails the attributes of the truster, the properties of the trustee 
and the specific contextual domain over which trust is conferred (Luhmann, 2000, pp. 95-
96). As it is demonstrated in this section, trust is a relational phenomenon “stemming from 
an agent’s habitus”.83 The notion of trust as habitus not only links the Bourdieusian notion 
of trust with the notion of generalised trust in social capital, but also offers a conceptual 
                                                          
81 For a detailed discussion of various forms of trust, e.g. strategic, group/identity-based and generalised, 
and their relationship to the concept of generalised trust, see Stoller (2002).  
 
82 For these subjects see more generally Lindholm (1982) for an anthropological explanation; Ginsburg 
(2011) for a legal and economic interpretation; Barth (1959b) for game-theoretic interpretation; and Ahmed 
(1980) for socioeconomic interpretation. 
 
83 There is a debate in the literature regarding whether trust is habitus (Misztal, 1996, p. 108), or stems 
from habitus (Frederiksen, 2014, pp. 175-176). The author follows the latter conceptualisation because 




link between personal, group and institutional trust, which is fundamental to the 
investigation of the ideal of social capital (Dasgupta, 2000, p. 333, cited in Fu, 2004, p. 9). 
9.5.2 The role of reciprocity in stabilising exchange relationships 
Reciprocity is not only closely related to trust, but has certain characteristics of its own that 
makes it the underlying governing mechanism for all cooperative relationships. The study 
of Batkhela bazaar has three major theoretical implications regarding reciprocity. Firstly, 
reciprocity is different from negotiated exchange relationships in that it necessarily entails 
repeated interactions by creating obligations. In this sense, negotiated exchange may 
develop into reciprocal exchange with the gradual development of goodwill and trust 
(Lawler and Yoon, 1998; Göbel, Vogel and Weber, 2013). The acts of gift-giving (Mauss, 
1954) or drawing loans are the starting points of the cycle of reciprocity (Coleman, 1990). 
The former creates deferred obligations, while the latter requires an immediate response. 
Failure to accept the gift or to provide benefits when requested prevents the development 
of cooperation. Secondly, complete dependence (unilateral receiving) or independence 
(unilateral giving) are not likely: therefore reciprocity is best viewed as an exchange 
characterised by interdependence (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 
2005). Unlike Molm (2010), the present study found that this interdependence stabilises 
exchanges even in unequal power relationships. Thirdly, reciprocity operates as a 
mechanical law that shapes agents’ habitus, and thus they are consciously or unconsciously 
aware of the outcomes of their actions (Bourdieu, 1972). In this sense, reciprocity serves as 
a system of rewards and sanctions, but decisions to apply sanctions are shaped by the 
relational context of reciprocal ties in both the economic and non-economic domains of the 
marketplace. In contrast to Torche and Valenzuela (2011), it was also found that not only 
does reciprocity become manifest and problematic when trust is broken, but it also causes 
the strengthening of trusted bonds if obligations created by trust-investment are fulfilled 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005, p. 875).  
As a starting mechanism, most of the exchanges are governed by the principle of 
generalised reciprocity that can be summed up as: “I will do this for you now, knowing 
that down the road you'll do something for me” (Putnam, 1993, pp. 182-183). Putnam 
(ibid., p. 184) regards generalised reciprocity as a foundation for generating high level of 
SC. In this sense, Bourdieu is correct in his scepticism of disinterestedness in all exchanges 
including acts of altruism (Siisiainen, 2003; Navarro, 2006). From support in BU elections 
to political intercession to negotiating charity for an SWA, generalised reciprocity governs 
the exchanges in Batkhela. Neither the time nor the mode of return is stipulated or 




are implicit, unspecified and an investment for the future (Abbott and Freeth, 2008, p. 
876). Generalised reciprocity governs both direct and mediated exchange relationships. 
Favours exchanged among agents are often unequal, but indeed they have greater value for 
the receiver. 
 Alignment or misalignment occur when interests are not protected. The structure of 
reciprocity governs the universe of actions in the economic, political and religious spheres, 
and in the entire social stratum. Reciprocity, or the system of inducements and sanctions, is 
internalised and sparks a series of exchanges unless one of the exchange partners reneges 
on his obligations to return. For instance, wholesalers are aware of the negative 
consequences of providing defective goods: this shapes their decisions either not to deal in 
faulty products or to implicitly assume the entire responsibility for the losses of the 
retailers. Both parties however, are aware of the terms of this social contract or structure of 
reciprocity.  
A few specifications of this structure of reciprocity emerge from the findings of this 
study. Exchanges are not tit-for-tat, but agents adopt a “win-stay, lose-shift” attitude. 
However, an agent’s position in the structure of power and the nature of any breach of trust 
determine the type of sanctions applied. Consider, for instance, two different scenarios in 
which A fails to fulfil B’s expectations – firstly by failing to assume responsibility for 
penalties in economic exchanges, or secondly by failing to donate to an SWA on B’s 
request. In both instances A’s action shapes B’s response (Eloire, 2014), but B’s reactions 
will not be the same in the two cases. In the first, B will swiftly respond to the breach of 
trust unless he is bound to A in a credit relationship. In the second, B will gradually 
distance himself from A after a few repeated failures on B’s part. These considerations 
apply only if A deviates from the norms of cooperative relationships. Such deviation is rare 
in both instances, due to the transactional pattern of interdependence that characterises the 
structure of reciprocity in the region (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962).  
Mediated exchanges such as political intercessions, using personal ties to collect 
charity for SWAs, or establishing channels of bribes to protect one’s customers, creates 
obligations between direct exchange partners (Lindholm, 1982). However, unlike 
Lindholm’s (ibid., pp. 122-123) mediated monetary loans, in which the discreetness of the 
recipient prevents the establishment of direct reciprocal obligations, the absence of trust 
prevents the establishment of direct exchange relationships. Once a reciprocal exchange 
has been mediated, the structure of reciprocity has two main implications. Firstly, any 
breach of trust invites reciprocal actions between direct exchange partners. However, an 




expectations may prevent sanctions from the latter. The question is not only one of 
reciprocation, but “what the recipient can afford and when” (Sahlins, 1972, p. 194). 
Secondly, when a repeated exchange relationship is established between strangers through 
a mediator, a breach of trust by the recipient does not affect ties between the benefactor 
and the mediator. However, this rule is inapplicable to mediated monetary loans (in the 
literal sense). The creation of obligations (Coleman, 1988) and loss-aversion (Molm, 2010) 
are the key underlying mechanisms governing all reciprocal relationships. Therefore the 
“mechanical laws” of the structure of reciprocity are the “unconscious obligations to give, 
the obligation to give in return, and the obligation to receive” (Bourdieu, 1972, pp. 4-5). 
Furthermore, if the system is to work, agents must not be unaware of the truth of their 
exchanges (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 7). As demonstrated in this section and in the empirical 
chapters, this general schema of exchanges entails multiple modalities that constitute the 
sub-clauses or sections of the broader scheme of exchanges (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 
2005; Sahlins, 1972). In this way, reciprocity is a fundamental institutional mechanism for 
stabilising cooperative relationships in the informal realm of governance. 
9.6 Bazaar-generated SC and its implications for local governance 
The evolution of the bazaar as a field of power and its embeddedness in the local 
governance structure has important theoretical implications for how marketplaces generate 
SC, and the implications of SC for local governance. A few key lessons for the SC-local 
governance interrelationship emerge from this chapter. Firstly, SC is neither an input nor 
an outcome variable in explaining marketplace-local government interaction: its role is 
contextual and is structured in a relational framework. Secondly, individual SC is not 
necessarily an obstacle to the development of collective/associational SC: the two types 
may have a mutually supportive relationship. Again, the “dark” or “bright” side of 
individual and associational SC for local governance is contingent on its intended use by 
agents or collectives. This section demonstrates the strengths of Bourdieu’s approach to 
social capital over Coleman’s rationalist and Putnam’s functionalist-integrationist 
approaches. If the trajectory of SC is path-dependent, as Putnam (1993, p. 179) argues, 
then his approach to social capital is unable to capture the role of bazaar-generated SC and 
its implications for local governance, simply because he makes only a passing reference to 
class conflicts and power relations, which are major features of Pukhtun society in the 
Malakand region. Similarly, the Putnamian conception also overlooks the role of formal 
institutions (institutional design) in the operations of social capital for local governance 




9.6.1 Bazaar-generated associational SC in the context of weak formal institutions 
In contrast to the “bottom-up” approaches to SC (Putnam, 1993) and local governance 
(Faguet, 2015), the structure of state institutions and public policy are important 
determinants of the health of SC (Wacquant, 1998; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Teles, 
2012b). However, statists are also incorrect in attributing the most important role to 
institutional design and public policy in constructing SC (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; 
Warner, 2001; Petro, 2001; Teles, 2012b). SC generation may well be an outcome of weak 
formal institutions, as this study of Batkhela bazaar suggests (Harriss and De Renzio, 
1997). For instance, the state’s capacity to implement regulations will positively or 
negatively affect its ability to develop SC (Teles, 2012b, p. 868). In this sense, Putnam is 
correct in arguing that institutional reforms are unable to develop SC owing to economic 
inequalities (Putnam, 1993, p. 185). Weak state institutions are unable to generate trust. 
Here, Bourdieu’s notion of state as a meta-field has its greatest weakness to explicate the 
influence of social structure on the state’s ability to influence universal rules. As Bourdieu 
argues, the universal laws of the state and their application in the local field may vary 
owing to local power relations (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 127, 130, 132). Therefore, the state 
does not or cannot construct SC, but provides the foundation for its development (Górriz-
Mifsud et al., 2016). 
The arrow of causality for social capital generation cannot be pointed in a single 
direction (Uslaner, 2008; Cronin, 1996). Therefore, a relational framework in Bourdieu’s 
field theory better explicates the simultaneous influences of state weakness and unequal 
structures of power on the processes of SC generation in the weak state context 
(Christoforou, 2014b). In Pakistan, weak formal institutions and economic inequalities 
have empowered the dominant classes at the cost of the dominated (Lindholm, 1979, 1982; 
Marsden and Hopkins, 2013). In this context, the present study has demonstrated that the 
evolution of the bazaar as a field of power has generated associational SC. Batkhela Bazaar 
Union is weak, as are other traders’ associations in Pakistan (Kamal et al., 2015; Nadvi, 
1999; Javed, 2017), and it has yet to develop as associational SC in the Putnamian sense; 
however, it is certainly far more developed than what Chatterjee (2004, pp. 39-40) calls 
“political society”.84 Its gradual evolution has increased its significance for both local 
                                                          
84 Chatterjee (2004, p. 66) however, does not recognise such associations embedded in unequal power 
relations as SC because they are not “civic communities” in the Putnamian sense. If Chatterjee had 
Bourdieu in mind, he would have thought differently about the notion of “political society”, the term he 
uses for organisations of the poor. However, the author agrees with Chatterjee that modern notions of civil 
society do not explain state-society relations in post-colonial India or Pakistan because of inherent 




administration and political leadership who attempt to patronise it for their purposes. This 
resonates with Evans (1997) who argues that conditions for building synergy, exist even in 
the most adverse situations, but in the context of the Malakand region, the state cannot 
generate SC due to the absence of citizens’ trust in weak formal institutions. Table 9.5 
summarises this finding. Heeding Harriss’ (2001) warnings against the depoliticised 
development of SC, it does not suggest, in the neoliberal vein, that society should be left to 
its own for the development of social capital just because marketplaces are the generators 
of SC. The empirical literature on Pakistan suggests that this arrangement will only work 
to the benefit of the powerful because the poor are unable to contribute to their own 
development (Harriss, 2001; Mohmand, 2008).  
Table 9.5: Inability of government institutions to generate social capital for local governance 
Responses/ 
Nature of issue 
Yes No Responses Respondent 
category 
It is difficult to find cooperative BU 
members 
4 1 5 Administrative 
officials  
Officials develop networks to identify 
violators of health/quality standards 
3 2 5 Administrative 
officials  
It is difficult to find reliable networks to 
identify violations of health/quality rules 
5 0 0 Administrative 
officials 
Business owners support BU-government 
cooperation 
5 16 21 BU representatives 
and their supporters 
Business owners cooperate with the 
administration to identify rule-violators 
1 24 25 Pharmacy, grocery 
and food business 
owners 
The administration cooperates with SWAs 
for social service provision 
3 20 23 SWA members and 
SWA collaborators  
The administration’s non-cooperation with 
SWAs is due to resource constraints 
23 0 25 Founders and 
members of SWAs  
Source: Interview data 
  





Overall, four main findings emerge from this section, as follows: 
(1) Economic development in the bazaar results in the development not only of 
individual but also associational SC, with implications for local governance; 
(2) The BU, as associational SC of the bazaar, is not a perfect civic association; 
however its greater political embeddedness and increased significance for the 
local administration has facilitated access of the poor to state institutions; 
(3) The fragility of government institutions inhibits the development of generalised 
trust: weak state institutions therefore lack the capacity to generate SC; and  
(4) Linked to the above, officials in the local fields develop personal SC to pursue 
administrative goals. 
9.6.2 Relational networks and their implications for local governance 
In addition to institutional fragility, two main factors inhibit the development of effective 
membership-based associations in Batkhela bazaar: firstly, the structure of power and 
individuals’ location within that structure (Mohmand, 2008); and secondly a greater 
reliance on individual networks rather than on collectivity (Levien, 2015). The empirical 
analysis of the BU and SWAs in Chapters 6 and 8 reveals that even voluntary associations 
are dependent on the personal SC of their key members. Undoubtedly, the bazaar’s 
development has caused a shift in the traditional distribution of capital between the landed 
elite and landless class. This shift has also developed cross-cutting ties across class and 
political boundaries (Jan, 2010, 2014). Nevertheless, those who rise up the socioeconomic 
ladder reproduce traditional patronage structures, albeit of a different kind from those 
suggested by Akhter (2017).85 Examples of this include the economic exchange structure 
whereby wholesalers are responsible for protecting retailers from penalties, and the fact 
that, despite the BU’s move towards a more civic orientation, powerful traders play a 
patronage role in the political competition that surrounds it (Schulman and Anderson, 
1999). Unsurprisingly, the representatives of the BU have greater significance for political 
actors than for traders. Levien (2015) correctly argues that theories of collective SC are 
unable to explicate the role of networks, norms and trust in evolving local economies from 
a rural to an urban outlook. Here, a simple explanation could be that the economically 
powerful are better connected and are therefore better able to pursue their interests without 
associational activity (Portes, 1998, p. 4). Conversely, it was found in the present study 
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bond of patron-client ties. Obviously, there are power inequalities between them, but relationships 
between representatives and the represented are often more complex and dynamic than they appear 




that the BU has utility for these actors when their individual networks are unable to realise 
their objectives. These networks also have utility for associational SC. 
Therefore, the question is not about the existence or absence of perfect 
membership-based associations, or about their relationships to better or worse governance, 
but about the form of SC as a public or private good, and the purpose for which it is used. 
9.6.3 The “bright” side of bazaar-generated SC for local governance 
On the “bright” side of SC, the economic development due to the bazaar’s evolution has 
resulted in network diversity and greater political inclusion (Jan, 2014; Varshney, 2001, p. 
384), which in turn have reduced political intolerance (Hsung et al., 2009, Chapter 4). This 
greater political tolerance is evident in the composition of cross-cutting political and class 
networks within the BU and its support structures. More broadly, a mixture of traditionally 
opposed landed and landless classes are found in the local political meetings. In the bazaar, 
15% of the traders are actively involved in local political meetings, while 4% offer 
financial support during the election campaigns of political actors.86 This reflects the role 
of the bazaar economy in the evolution of traditional political structures (Ahmed, 1981; 
Jan, 2014). The poor also benefit from this evolution owing to the greater embeddedness of 
the BU in the local political structure. The BU serves as a channel for poor traders to 
access state institutions (Peña, 1999). The BU’s ability to better articulate traders’ interests 
stems from its increased utility for the local administration (David et al., 2001), and the 
alignment of its interests with the political forces opposed to the local administration 
(Schappo and Van Melik, 2017). Because it represents a growing bazaar, its utility for the 
local political elite has increased. This has, among other things, increased the 
interdependence between the BU and political actors. Hence, the political embeddedness of 
the BU has made it an important public good (or community resource) available to 
individuals for realising varying objectives.  
The institutional embeddedness of the bazaar’s economy, coupled with the structural 
and cultural embeddedness of the SC it generates, has implications for the delivery of some 
specific services (Baker and Faulkner, 2009). Traders’ membership of SWAs and the 
networks of these members generate positive externalities for social welfare provision 
(Javed, 2017). This finding stands in tension with Levien’s (2015) scepticism about the 
positive role of individual networks in community development or in the production of 
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collective good. The findings set out in Chapter 8 suggest that agents with a greater 
endowment of economic capital are better connected as Levien (2015) suggests, but these 
networks have also utility for collective gains (Krishna, 2002).  
This resonates with the limited literature on cooperatives (Liang et al., 2015) and 
local development associations more broadly, which demonstrates the utility of individual 
networks of powerful members in heterogenous associations (Molenaers, 2003). This 
points the arrow of causality in a different direction, whereby the trust and reciprocity 
governing individual networks generate bridging SC for associations (Degli Antoni and 
Sabatini, 2016). A definitive prescription of the role of individual networks for voluntary 
associations and their outcomes for service delivery is avoided here because it would 
require sustained empirical investigation into this subject. However, two principles should 
guide research in this direction: firstly, any a priori designation of the “dark” side of 
bonding SC in local development should be avoided (Flora, 1998); and secondly, the 
tendency of agents to use voluntary associations for their narrow interests should be 
viewed in the broader structure of reciprocity (Odabaş and Adaman, 2014b). Having said 
that, Table 9.8 summarises the “bright” side of SC for local governance generated by 
Batkhela bazaar.  
Table 9.6: Bazaar-generated social capital and its positive implications for local governance 
Responses/ 
Type of membership or 
ties  








Traders’ membership of 
the BU 
Increased political inclusion 182 200 
(survey 
data) 
Traders’ membership of 
political parties 
Creating proximity between 




Traders’ membership of 
SWAs 
Provision of social services 33 60 
(interview 
data) 
Traders’ personal ties 
across associations 
Facilitating SWA’s functions in 




Source: Exploratory survey and interview data 
9.6.4 The “dark” side of bazaar-generated SC for local governance 
Negative and positive potentialities are simultaneously inherent in a single network, 
whether individual or associational. The “dark” side of SC is determined by the purpose 
for which it is employed, and the domain on which it is conferred. Thus, SC is not a 




and De Renzio, 1997; Van Deth and Zmerli, 2009; Fine, 2001; see also Chapter 7 of this 
thesis).  
Generally, the literature on social capital associates its “dark” side with bonding 
social capital (Portes, 1998; Portes and Landolt, 1996; Van Deth and Zmerli, 2009), 
whereas bridging social capital is associated with positive externalities as it helps 
communities get ahead (Putnam, 1993; Szreter, 2002).87 The findings of the present study 
contradict Putnam’s conception of SC, in that he neglects the negative impacts of 
“sociability” (Levi, 1996; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997). Social capital, if viewed in 
relation to the size and quality of an agent’s networks, based on their economic and 
cultural capital, explains how bridging social capital works to the detriment of the 
community’s interest (Levien, 2015). Moreover, as an association, Batkhela BU not only 
facilitates political inclusion, but also incentivises patronage and at times obstructs the 
implementation of rules through collective action. Batkhela bazaar has also seen the 
development of multiple forms of bridging SC manifested in the form of economic and 
political networks. These bridging interpersonal networks (or weak ties) also have a 
“downside” for both the community and local governance. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
bridging interpersonal networks also facilitate the intercession and corruption that prevent 
effective governance of the bazaar.  
Drawing on Coleman’s approach to social capital, one issue of American 
Behavioural Scientist (2010) focused on the “dark” side of social capital. The overall 
argument was that if more social capital led to a reduction of values (e.g. social equality 
and tolerance) or a rise in something negatively valued (e.g. corruption or “free-riding”), 
all such relationships were perceived as negative consequences of social capital (Van Deth 
and Zmerli, 2009, p. 632). Followers of both Coleman and Bourdieu agree in principle that 
informal networks and interpersonal trust embedded in specific institutional arrangements 
and social structures have negative implications for local governance (Van Deth and 
Zmerli, 2009; Levien, 2015). The findings of the present research suggest that the bazaar 
has generated sufficient SC to also reproduce inequalities and corruption (Odabaş and 
Adaman, 2014a). The mechanisms of intercession and corruption are underpinned by 
reciprocal exchanges and trust in networks of relationships that cut across various levels of 
governance. In this sense, trust and reciprocity in relational networks add to the fragility of 
formal governance institutions.  
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Marketplaces, as an element of the local governance structure, are embedded in a series of 
relationships. These relationships structure the role of the marketplace in local governance 
on one hand, while on the other hand, the evolving fields of governance, including the 
marketplace, determine the role of these relationships in state-society interaction. In this 
sense, SC as a set of networks governed by norms of cooperation is embedded in the 
dynamic structure of power. The actions of agents, both individual and collective, in the 
economic, political, social and regulatory spheres of governance are structured by the 
distribution of capitals. This distribution is dynamic and fluid, which accounts for the 
complexity of interactions across different spheres of governance at individual, field and 
institutional level. An individual’s choices to develop and use formal and informal 
networks is not the outcome of the calculative computation of rational agents, as Eloire 
(2015, pp. 2, 6) correctly observes: instead, the structure of power and an agent’s 
familiarity with this structure shape the order of judgment. This order is internalised in the 
habitus that serves as an ordering principle. Habitus, through its interaction with social 
structure, shapes the practices of local governance. In this order, trusting dispositions stem 
from an agent’s habitus, which is governed by the mechanical law of reciprocity, 
characterised by power-dependence. It is in this sense that the social world is what agents 
make of it, but they cannot shape it beyond a certain limit, and that limit lies in the 
dynamic distribution of capitals that evolve at both micro (agential) and macro (structural) 
level.  
Viewing bazaar-generated SC within this field-capital-habitus nexus, and intersecting 
the values of field-specific capitals across fields of power, rejects analytical dualities on the 
one hand, and the normative attribution of the “dark” or “bright” side of SC to any specific 
type of networks on the other. This chapter has demonstrated that both bonding/bridging 
and individual/associational networks have both “dark” and “bright” sides. Any outcome 
of SC for local governance is context-dependent, which is shaped by the distribution of 
power and the purpose for which SC is employed. This chapter also reject Bourdieu’s 
notion of the state as a meta-field to explain its role in the development of SC in the 
developing state context, because of its incapacity to generate institutional trust. 
However, the chapter suggests the utility of applying the Bourdieusian approach of 
SC to explain the internal heterogeneity of voluntary associations regardless of Putnamian 
or Olsonian types. It has been demonstrated that interpersonal networks play an important 
role in the realisation of associational objectives. In this sense, the individual and 




advance in the SC literature, which invites scholarly attention to the positive role of the 





Chapter 10 - Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
This research has aimed to enhance understanding of the role of marketplaces in the 
generation of SC, and the implications of this for local governance. Through an in-depth 
case study of Batkhela bazaar in Malakand, Pakistan, this study has provided a 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the integrative potential of the 
marketplace in local governance in a weak state context, by examining the role of the 
marketplace in SC generation. As such it has made two major contributions. 
Firstly, this study has developed a Bourdieusian-informed theoretical framework 
which has enabled the application of SC as a useful concept to grasp the contiguous 
evolution of marketplaces and local governance. Placing Bourdieu’s notion of SC in his 
theory of practice as a nexus of capital, habitus and field, has provided a powerful 
analytical lens through which to examine the dialectical relation between formal and 
informal governance on the one hand, and agency and structure on the other. This 
relational framework, unlike the perspective of pure statists and non-statists on SC and 
local governance, does not view SC as the product of institutional design and public policy, 
nor as the outcome of socioeconomic transformation that alone determines institutional 
performance. Also, unlike the Beckerian-type rationalist approaches to SC (Becker, 1974), 
it does not view agency as operating with complete autonomy in shaping the structures of 
governance. This means that none of the elements of local governance structure, e.g. local 
government, informal governance institutions, local economy, social structures, formal and 
informal networks and agency (both individual and collective) is a passive object of the 
influence of the other in this relational framework. 
Adopting a middle ground between the theoretical binaries of objectivism and 
subjectivism (Bourdieu, 1989, pp. 14-15), and remaining sensitive to the internal 
heterogeneity of the structural elements of bazaar-local governance relations, has helped 
incorporate power and conflict, crucial missing ingredients in Putnam’s notion of SC. In 
this sense, this thesis has demonstrated that SC is an emergent property of the interaction 
within and between the spaces of positions (fields of power) and their evolving power vis-
à-vis one another in the local governance structure. This dynamic theory of SC shows that 
institutional design (state structures) and the local economy (socioeconomic structures) and 
their evolving relationships structure the forms and operation of SC in local governance 
(Wacquant, 1998; Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2016). These objective structures are deposited 
into, and reflexively wielded through, what Schmitz et al. (2017, p. 65) calls “complex, 




both individual and societal levels.88 The application of this framework to the empirical 
context of Batkhela bazaar leads to the second major contribution of this study. 
Empirically, this study was a pioneering attempt to apply SC as a theoretical 
framework to the role of marketplaces in local governance in the weak state context of 
Pakistan. Existing studies in the Pakistan context have not, with the notable exceptions of 
Javed (2017), Hasan et al. (2008) and Amirali (2017), explored the role of marketplaces in 
local governance, and none has explicitly focused on the key components of SC in 
determining the role of marketplaces in local governance. Taking SC as a point of departure 
from the existing empirical literature on marketplaces in Pakistan, this study has 
demonstrated the integrative potential of marketplaces in the local governance structure, 
especially their implications for the processes of political empowerment, regulation 
enforcement and social welfare provision. Exploring this relationship in a meso-level 
theoretical framework has enhanced understanding of the integrative role of marketplaces in 
the organisational sphere of local governance (Schappo and Van Melik, 2017), especially 
their influence on the relationship between the representative and administrative spheres of 
LG on one hand (Amirali, 2017), and the state and social welfare associations on the other. 
The findings of this study suggest that economic development due to marketplace evolution 
has implications for associational SC, although of an idiosyncratic kind. These associations 
have implications for local governance, depending on the type of association under 
consideration, whether interest-based, such as traders’ associations, or philanthropic, such 
as SWAs. Section 10.2 sets out how the research questions have been addressed. The policy 
impact is discussed in Section 10.3, and the limitations of the study are set out in Section 
10.4. Finally, Section 10.5 suggests some avenues for future research. 
10.2 Addressing the research questions 
By integrating the existing literature on state decentralisation, SC and marketplaces with an 
in-depth qualitative case study of Batkhela bazaar within a critical realist frame, the 
research has addressed the thesis’s main research question: How has the social capital 
generated by the economically dynamic Batkhela bazaar, impacted on the evolving 
governance of the Malakand region? Answering this central question has required 
addressing several specific questions set out in Section 1.3. 
                                                          
88 This resembles what Uphoff (2000, p. 19) calls mental structures, which he argues shape the operation of 





10.2.1 Forms of SC significant to marketplace-local governance relations in the 
developing state context  
The starting premise of this research was that the existing conceptions of SC, especially the 
Putnamian view, is unable to explain the existing types of SC in developing countries and 
their implications for local governance. Nowhere more than in the literature on 
marketplaces is this view more clear, given that the focus here is predominantly on 
informal networks of interpersonal relationships (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Lyons and 
Snoxell, 2005; Watson, 2009; Vermaak, 2017), and that associations of traders are 
considered outside the remit of Putnamian-type associations (Varshney, 2001). The 
findings of the present study suggest that both types of SC – informal networks of 
interpersonal relationships and membership-based associations – are important for a 
holistic understanding of the role of marketplaces in the local governance of developing 
states. The problem lies not with Putnam’s conception of SC, but with its simplified 
analytical treatments, especially a lack of attention to the role of informal networks in the 
structure and functions of voluntary associations: this often leads to narrow conclusions 
such as a theoretical disconnect between “structure” and “agency” accounts of SC; and to 
viewing bridging and bonding as dichotomy rather than a continuum (Norris and Inglehart, 
2003, pp. 3, 5). Moreover, reducing the role of informal interpersonal relations to the 
“absence” or the “dark” side of SC for governance is an eminent example in this regard 
(Fischer, 2001, pp. 4, 8-9; Norris and Inglehart, 2003, p. 6; Flora, 1998). As Hooghe and 
Stolle (2003, p. 12) note, those who equate civic participation with membership-based 
formal associations often arrive at such conclusions regarding the role of SC in the local 
governance of the developing states (Molenaers, 2003). Therefore, both formal 
(associations) and informal (individual interpersonal) networks are important to 
understanding the role of marketplaces in local governance.  
10.2.2 The interrelationship between individual and associational social capital for local 
governance  
Crucial to understanding the role of SC in local governance is the interrelationship between 
personal relationships and associations. Most existing research views these types as 
binaries and hence obscures their mutually constitutive relationship. This study has found 
that, in many ways, personal relationships and associations are two distinct categories, but 
their relationship is not necessarily antithetical. As Granovetter (2005) correctly observes, 
networks’ ability to connect associations to other elements of the political structure 
explains much of their success and their outcomes for the community. If associations are 




associations is considered, then the analytical distinction between the negative and positive 
outcomes of interpersonal networks for associations is rather straightforward.89 Therefore, 
associations should be viewed as fields of power: that is to say that the inherent 
inequalities and conflicts of interest among their members should be considered when 
analysing their role in the local governance structure. This allows associations to be seen as 
an aggregate of hierarchical relationships grouped together for the achievement of 
collective goals. Based on the findings of this research, it can broadly be argued that most 
of the associations in the developing world are of this type. It is precisely this character of 
voluntary associations that leads Putnamians to argue that SC does not exist in contexts 
like Pakistan that are comparable to Putnam’s Italian south. Moreover, followers of 
Putnam relate SC to modern civic associations and their productive outcomes for 
governance. This leads postcolonial scholars of South Asia to argue that due to asymmetric 
power relations and often uncivic character of associations, SC is inapplicable in the South 
Asian context (Chatterjee, 2004). Contrary to the views of these researchers on political 
society, the findings from Batkhela bazaar suggest that informal networks of interpersonal 
relationships are a necessary structural condition for the successful functions of 
associations, which may also have positive outcomes for local governance.  
Governance in Pakistan and in South Asia is predominantly researched in relation to 
class, cast and kinship structures, owing to the historical linkages of these structures with 
states, politics and economic structures (Mohmand, 2008, p. 398; Amirali, 2017, Chapter 
3). With the exceptions of Mohmand (2008) and Beall (1995, 1997) the literature on 
marketplaces and local governance in Pakistan is reluctant to use SC as a useful concept 
for understanding governance because of its normatively productive outcomes in the form 
of civic action, its neglect of the role of the state as its major determinant, and its 
inapplicability to the hierarchical social relationships that are characteristic of politics and 
governance in Pakistan (Amirali, 2017, pp. 76-77). However, political and economic 
changes are inspiring new forms of organisations which demand more critical approaches 
to the role of inherited/ascriptive and contingent ties, the latter developed as an outcome of 
evolving local political economies. For this reason, the present research applied a SC 
theoretical framework to demonstrate the non-ascriptive character of cooperation taking 
place around the BU and SWAs as expressions of a developing civil society (Varshney, 
2001, p. 365). This is not to conclude that family, kinship or ethnic ties are insignificant, or 
                                                          
89 For a clear conceptual distinction between a field and system (apparatus) see Bourdieu and 





that informal associations built around neighbourhoods cannot be viewed as civil society. 
Instead, these associations are a combination of ascription and choice (ibid., p. 367). 
Therefore, structures are important, but without agency, the evolution of SC and its role in 
local governance cannot be explained. This is to say that agents reflexively develop 
networks of cooperation that cut across ascriptive boundaries. In this sense, communities 
form SC as an outcome of economic change due to the bazaar’s evolving relationship with 
traditional economic and political structures.  
The state is an important determinant of the practices of SC development and its 
influence over governance processes. However, it cannot be manufactured through policy 
interventions aimed at generating SC, but by improving the quality of state institutions. 
The state resides in the dispositions and beliefs of citizens, and as Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000) note, communities are structured in terms of their relationship to the state. Weak, 
hostile and indifferent governments have radically different implications for development 
projects than governments that respect citizens’ liberties, uphold the rule of law, honour 
contracts and resist corruption. This difference in the quality of the state is the outcome of 
two primary factors: the government’s quality and the structure of the local economy. The 
tradition of taking sides on the “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspectives on SC will 
follow for decades to come, unless the state-society synergy approach is mature enough to 
provide conclusive answers regarding the role of SC in local governance (Evans, 1997; 
Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).90 This research has demonstrated that applying Bourdieu’s 
field-habitus-capital model to the generation and operation of SC and its implications for 
local governance presents a real opportunity here.  
Application of this model to the empirical context of Batkhela bazaar has led to two 
further advancements in the SC-local governance theory. Firstly, it has allowed the 
construction of an evolutionary local governance framework in which SC, the local 
economy and the state are relationally embedded. In this framework, neither the quality of 
government institutions nor economic development are the outcome of the stocks of local 
SC: instead the stocks and flows of local SC are shaped by the quality of institutions and 
the structure of local economy. Certainly, the design of institutions and the structure of the 
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local economy do not operate in a determinist fashion, because agency plays a critical role 
in shaping the effects of the stocks and flows of SC for local governance (Nooteboom, 
2007, p. 33; Krishna, 2002). This means that governance practices are shaped by the ways 
individuals develop cooperative relationships in response to evolving governance 
structures. Habitus is the central interpretative framework that structures agency, in that it 
creates familiarity that allows a context for action. Within this context, it was demonstrated 
that the cognitive dimensions of SC, i.e. trust and reciprocity, stem from an agent’s habitus 
and play dual roles. Firstly, they provide informal governance mechanisms that are central 
to everyday governance in the context characterised by absence of government’s capacity 
and fairness. Secondly, and related to this, trust as an element of governance is 
interconnected at three levels: institutional, social and individual (Rothstein, 2011, Chapter 
3; Rothstein, 2013, p. 1,019). Therefore, personalised trust is higher in developing 
countries not because of the absence of SC, but because of the absence of institutional 
foundations for the development of generalised trust (Nooteboom, 2007, p. 30). 
10.2.3 The role of marketplaces as generators of social capital and an element of local 
governance  
The evolution of marketplaces, as this thesis has demonstrated, has implications not only 
for local economy but for the broader governance setting within which marketplaces 
operate. This point was schematically developed with reference to the role of marketplace 
in the broader developing state context (Section 2.4), in the context of Pakistan (Section 
5.2.3) and in the Malakand region (Section 5.3.4). This thesis empirically demonstrates 
that the social structure of marketplaces develops bonds of collective solidarity that are 
mechanically activated in reaction to government actions that are detrimental to the 
collective interest of the traders’ community (Dines, 2007; Mehta, 2013; Monteith, 2016). 
Doubtless, power struggles internal to the marketplace are linked to the power relations in 
the broader political structure that create alignment and misalignment of interests between 
actors across local governance spheres (Schappo and Van Melik, 2017). However, the 
evolution of marketplaces as a field of power also has restructuring effects on the political 
and social tensions in the wider governance structure. This points towards a much broader 
role of marketplaces as an element of local governance structure. In the case of Batkhela 
bazaar for instance, the inability of a single political party, ethnic group, or section of 
traders to dominate the bazaar’s politics owing to the bazaar’s increased size and 
heterogeneity necessitates cooperation to realise individual and group interests. 
 Thus, the role of marketplaces as generators of SC has implications for political 




Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively. Reducing the role of marketplaces as an element of local 
governance to their role as generators of social capital runs the risk of essentialising 
marketplaces as another tool for bottom-up development and governance. Marketplaces do 
not just generate SC: their evolution has implications for existing stocks of social capital 
and consequently for interactions within and across spheres of local governance. The 
implications of Batkhela bazaar’s evolution for the interaction between the local 
administration and the landed elite, and their increasing role in the local government and 
SWAs equation of local governance, aptly demonstrate how the bazaar’s evolution impacts 
upon existing stocks of SC and what its implications are for local governance (see Section 
9.5). 
10.2.4 The role of the economically dynamic Batkhela bazaar in generating SC, and its 
implications for local governance 
Marketplaces are an important element of local governance. Their centrality to the local 
governance structure of developing states such as Pakistan, and the Malakand region, was 
developed in Sections 2.4, 5.2.3 and 5.3.4. In order to empirically explore the role of 
marketplaces in the local governance of Malakand District, the major empirical research 
question was structured around three local governance processes: empowerment and 
participation, regulation enforcement, and social welfare provision (see Table 4.3). The 
role of bazaar-generated SC in shaping these governance processes was at the core of the 
empirical exploration throughout. In response to the order developed in Table 4.3, these 
questions were answered in three empirical chapters (Chapters 6-8). The findings presented 
in these chapters were guided by two ancillary dimensions developed around the central 
question of this thesis in Chapter 1: firstly to ascertain how the SC embedded in the 
bazaar’s economy affects the evolution of local governance; and secondly to understand 
how the local governance processes rooted in the bazaar influence the stocks and flows of 
local SC. 
10.2.4.1 Types of social capital generated by Batkhela bazaar  
This thesis has demonstrated that the evolution of Batkhela bazaar generates SC of both 
types: associational and individual. Although the associational SC that the bazaar has 
generated is of a weaker kind, it demonstrates an evolutionary trajectory whereby certain 
types of associations are fading while others are evolving to acquire more formal 
characteristics. As the empirical chapters of this thesis have demonstrated, the evolving 
social structure of Batkhela bazaar have resulted in the strengthening of traders’ 




trade-specific associations, such as association of bakeries, owing to the evolving power 
relations among individual traders. The evolution of the bazaar has resulted in the 
development of associations of two types. Firstly, there are interest-based organisations 
such as the BU, which contribute to the development of SWAs by generating interpersonal 
networks and economic resources that are fundamental to their survival and the expansion 
of their operations. Secondly, social welfare associations that draw primarily on the 
interpersonal networks have developed around the economic, political and social  
interactions in the bazaar. The socioeconomic change and evolving power relations have 
led to the development of individual networks of various types, such as friendship, 
political, economic and acquaintance-based networks. These networks overlap across 
political, economic and social boundaries. An agent can use these networks for both 
individual and collective advantage. Although traders’ membership of social welfare 
associations stands at 12%, as Table 5.4 suggests, for many of the SWAs discussed in this 
study, the bazaar is one of the most important resources. To benefit from this resource, 
these SWAs rely on the interpersonal networks of their members. The generation of 
networks of various types is not simply the outcome of the interactions that take place on 
the floor of Batkhela bazaar, but of its embeddedness in the complex social and political 
processes characterised by evolving power relations. 
10.2.4.2 The implications of bazaar-generated SC for empowerment and participation 
As demonstrated in Section 9.2, Batkhela bazaar has evolved as a field of power within the 
local governance structure. This evolution, especially in the form of traders’ solidarity 
manifested through the Bazaar Union, has led to a deeper entrenchment of bazaar politics 
in the local political structure. This has two major implications for the evolution of 
decentralised local governance in Malakand District. Firstly, Batkhela bazaar has emerged 
as a political space where local political leaders play out their rivalries in the absence of 
local government elections, and use it as an instrument to influence the administration for 
the achievement of their objectives. Secondly, this evolution has implications for the 
empowerment of the poor in that it facilitates their access to state institutions and increases 
their political agency. The findings in Chapter 6 suggest that for enabling access to state 
institutions, the BU has greater utility for small traders than for large and powerful traders. 
This does not imply that powerful traders lack a sense of community, or do not rely on the 
BU. The BU is a powerful expression of traders’ collective action against government 
measures that are detrimental to their interests as a collectivity, but it has differentiated 
utility for traders when it comes to the protection of their individual objectives. These 




are relationally embedded in the interactions between spheres of governance, and rejecting 
an interactionist framework that views marketplaces only as sites of face-to-face 
interaction or for the generation of networks of a Granovetterian type.91 
10.2.4.3 The implications of bazaar-generated SC for regulatory practices  
The BU has discernible utility for traders’ individual objectives owing to the size and 
quality of their individual networks, which in turn depends on their location in the 
socioeconomic structure. These networks play a central role in the everyday governance of 
Batkhela bazaar, especially in the enforcement of regulations relating to price, health and 
quality standards. Certainly, traders employ their interpersonal networks for their own 
individual benefit, but these personal interests are not attainable without taking care of the 
interests of others. In this sense, interpersonal networks operate in a relational space, 
generating both positive and negative externalities for the everyday governance of the 
bazaar. On the one hand, individual networks, governed by the norms of trust and 
reciprocity, stabilise economic exchange relationships in the absence of effective formal 
institutions. On the other hand, the ineptitude of the formal institutions is reinforced by the 
“dark” side of individual SC that facilitates corruption in the governance of price, health 
and quality standards in the bazaar.  
This suggests that interpersonal ties do not have a normatively “dark” or “bright” 
side. Instead, their negative or positive externalities for local governance depend on the 
purpose for which they are employed and the domain on which they are conferred. 
Extending this logic to the interrelationship between individual and associational SC, one 
may also observe that interpersonal networks can have positive implications for civic 
activities performed through voluntary associations. 
10.2.4.4 Bazaar-generated SC and social welfare provision 
The proposition that bazaar-generated SC plays a positive role in the provision of social 
welfare services, through the role of interpersonal networks in civic associations, was put 
to the test while addressing the third empirical dimension, concerning the role of bazaar-
generated SC in the provision of social welfare in the context of formal institutional 
fragility. The role of bazaar-generated SC in this respect is contextual, and in the context of 
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Pakistan is essentially embedded in religious institutions. Nevertheless, the success of 
religious associations (like Al-Khidmat) also depends on the informal bridging networks of 
their members, because of the groups’ incapacity to generate trust owing to their 
exclusionary character. It was found that friendship, economic and acquaintance-based 
networks of the key members of associations – both on religious and non-religious bases – 
contribute to the realisation of SWAs’ objectives. This finding clearly contrasts with the 
views of the followers of Putnamian associationalism and Coleman’s functionalist 
conception of SC, who fail to acknowledge the contextual embeddedness of individual and 
associational networks (Christoforou, 2013, p. 724). In this way, the present study makes a 
contribution to the limited literature on the interrelationship between voluntary associations 
and individual networks (Degli Antoni and Sabatini, 2016). However, unlike Degli Antoni 
and Sabatini (ibid.), who view interpersonal networks as a by-product of associations, this 
study concurs with Pedrini et al. (2016), and Nistor, Tirhas and Ilut (2011), who argue that 
interpersonal networks are a resource for voluntary associations in low-trusting 
environments. 
Overall, these findings are in agreement with the literature on the role of 
marketplaces in generating SC (Lyon, 2000; Lyons and Snoxell, 2005; Watson, 2009). 
However, going beyond the reasoning of this literature, this study has established that 
marketplaces generate both associational and interpersonal SC, which makes them an 
integral element of local governance. This role of marketplaces has implications for the 
local governance-SC debate in Pakistan. Two of these implications are especially 
significant. Firstly, they demonstrate that associational activities and civic participation, 
albeit of a different kind, can be developed in contexts like Pakistan. Secondly, they show 
that the structure of the local economy is an important determinant of the structure and 
functions of SC.  
Studies on local governance and SC in rural areas of Pakistan have found that 
associational activities are limited to the rich (Mohmand, 2008), whereas the literature on 
urban governance has reported a rich associational life of the poor (Beall, 1995, 1997). 
Amid this rural-urban divide, the literature on village economies notes, albeit in passing, 
the transformative effects of marketplace development for the traditional power structures 
in rural areas and the breakdown of traditional patron-client relationships (Hasan and Raza, 
2009, pp. 48-49; Martin, 2015, p. 421). The present study has demonstrated the 
implications of marketplace evolution both for economic restructuring and for the 




this study has clearly demonstrated that the generation of SC by marketplaces makes them 
an integral element of the local governance structure.  
This implies that the structure of the local economy underlying the local power 
relations structures the generation, functions and outcomes of SC (Mohmand and Gazdar, 
2007, pp. 6-7; Watson, 2009; Sajjad, 2012). In this sense, village economies, evolving into 
urban spaces due to marketplace development, lead to the generation of both informal and 
associational SC. This suggests more broadly that associational SC may arise and flourish 
in contexts identical to Putnam’s southern Italy (Pisani et al., 2017, p. 251). However, 
these associations are heterogeneous in terms of their members’ socioeconomic 
characteristics, which develops an order of coexistence between conflictive individual and 
coinciding collective interests. Here, a combination of Bourdieusian and Putnamian 
approaches to SC offers a promising theoretical avenue for the investigation of SC and 
local governance (Siisiainen, 2003).  
The generation and outcomes of SC as a function of the local economy are certainly 
not a pure “bottom-up” phenomenon, as neoliberal visions of governance would have us 
believe. It is the interaction between political, economic and cultural factors that condition 
the consequences which the use of SC can have on local development (Trigilia, 2001). The 
state is one of the key determinants of its generation and operation. This is because the 
state performs functions of institution, coercion, regulation and monopolisation, that is, it 
produces the objective reality of the social world that lies in the mental disposition of its 
citizens who live within its jurisdiction (Paolucci, 2014, p. 67; Wacquant, 1998, p. 26). 
Therefore, the quality of government, measured through institutional capacity and fairness 
in the performance of its functions, structures citizens’ dispositions to trust the state or not 
to trust it. The internalisation of the government’s quality is displayed through the ways 
citizens form and use SC within a particular governance structure (Wacquant, 1998).  
Ineffective state institutions contribute to the disenchantment (growing distrust) of 
citizens (especially the poor), who are aware these institutions are not performing their 
functions and are serving the interests of the few. Neoliberal thinking about state 
responsibility, and its promotion of SC in neo governance models, further exacerbates the 
distrust of citizens in state institutions, as it demands more from citizens rather than 
offering what it owes them as the provider of rights and services (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 4-5). 
Bourdieu questions the ability of such an “idealistic” vision of the world to bring any 
meaningful change, at least in the form of the empowerment of the poor, or the generation 
of solidarity or collective SC (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 102). Within this context, the state as a 




“only hope” for the development of SC. Thus, more rather than less state intervention 
defines the context for SC generation (ibid., p. 103; Mohmand, 2008, pp. 381-2). It is 
precisely through this vision of the state that Bourdieu’s field theory offered a deeper 
understanding of the way decentralised governments work, and enhanced understanding of 
local governance beyond the existing decentralisation models reviewed in Section 2.2. 
The application of this field-capital-habitus framework to the role of marketplaces 
in generating SC has made a distinct empirical contribution to the existing knowledge on 
the role of both marketplaces and local governance in the Malakand region (Marsden and 
Hopkins, 2013; Jan, 2014; Khaliq, 2012; Suleri et al., 2016, 2017). None of this literature 
offers a relational understanding of the processes of empowerment and participation, the 
implementation of regulations in the everyday governance of marketplaces, and the 
provision of social welfare services. The present contribution hopes to generate a new 
debate on local power relations in a relational framework, in contrast to Barth’s 
methodological individualism and the structuralist determinism of his critiques on political 
organisation in the region (Asad, 1972). The author’s aim is not to undermine the value of 
these classical anthropological works on the region. Instead, it is to invite a rereading of 
this literature through the prism of Bourdieu’s relational sociology in order to make better 
sense of the continuity and change in state-society relations.  
This contribution has two major implications for the study of marketplaces and SC 
in the context of Pakistan and developing economies more generally. Firstly, marketplaces 
are often viewed as places for socialisation and the development of distinct types of 
informal institutions for regulating exchanges, but their role as an integral element of local 
governance is often under-investigated. This is mainly due to the obsession of scholars and 
policymakers with the informality that surrounds marketplaces. Exploring their integrative 
role in empowerment and participation, in the implementation of regulations, and in the 
provision of social welfare services in other contexts across Pakistan and the developing 
world, will illuminate the hitherto neglected role of marketplaces in local governance. 
Secondly, civil society in the developing states, including Pakistan, is weak as a result of 
state fragility, socioeconomic stratification and power asymmetries, but the conditions for 
synergy, as Evans (1997, p. 177) argues, may exist even in the most adverse 
circumstances. The study of Batkhela bazaar has demonstrated the transformative potential 
of marketplaces and their implications for power asymmetries in state-society relations and 
the reconfiguration of political society. The bigger empirical question now for the 
Malakand region, for Pakistan, and for the developing world as a whole, lies in exploring 




social capital of the Putnamian type. To this end, in the cultural and political settings 
outside the West, “the purposes of activities rather than the forms of organisation should be 
a critical test of civic life” (Varshney, 2004, p. 433). 
10.3 Policy impact 
The findings of this study highlight the need for decentralised governance design to take 
more active account of marketplaces, given their role in certain areas of local governance. 
Marketplaces as drivers of urbanisation and as emerging centres of the local economy in 
small towns like Batkhela present significant opportunities and challenges for existing 
local governance policies. The government of Pakistan, at all levels, appears to be 
completely oblivious to these critical challenges and opportunities. For instance, Batkhela 
bazaar has evolved over seven decades from a small cluster of shops into the only 
officially designated urban town of Malakand District, and continues to expand rapidly. 
One can erect a building whenever, wherever and however one wants, as long as the act of 
building does not constitute encroachment of the roads and passageways. As a rapidly 
urbanising country with 448 small towns and thousands of large and small bazaars, 
Pakistan is likely to find this becoming a central problem for local planning and 
development.92 This in itself is a significant comment on the need to address the 
governance deficit regarding marketplaces in local governance policies. More crucially, 
policies relating to marketplace governance in terms of regulation enforcement and service 
delivery are inadequate and impervious to change, which suggests the need for government 
policies to catch up with the pace of local development. 
In terms of the enforcement of regulations (analysed in Chapter 7), there is an 
urgent need to design robust mechanisms for governing price, health and quality standards 
in marketplaces. In its current form, the governance structure has many deficiencies. 
Standardised procedures for officials to inspect markets are absent. District officials do not 
regularly follow price determination procedures and contraband goods are flooding into the 
market, creating incentives for violating regulations. The outcomes of the forensic 
examination of food and pharmaceutical products suffer from a lack of transparency and 
are often manipulated. The ease of manufacturing, supplying and selling substandard food 
and medicines presents a serious challenge to the health of citizens; however, the 
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incapacity and unwillingness of government officials to regulate these practices promotes a 
culture of corruption.  
Drawing on the findings presented in Chapter 7, a number of policy measures could 
be implemented to deliver substantial improvements in the governance of price, health and 
quality standards in the markets. Firstly, standardised procedures for market inspections by 
local regulators could be ensured. Secondly, the discretion of local officials in the 
determination and application of penalties for violating health, price and quality 
regulations could be reduced to a minimum. Thirdly, to discourage collusion between 
government officials on the one hand, and manufacturers, suppliers and local traders on the 
other, severe penalties are required for the government officials concerned. Fourthly, local 
offices should be resourced with sufficient staff and logistics to effectively perform their 
functions. Fifthly, the government’s recruitment and transfers policy relating to local 
officials need revision. The current policy preference for local domiciles in the 
appointment of officials should be reversed for food and health inspectors. The evidence in 
Chapter 7 suggest that non-local officials are less prone to family, friendship and 
neighbourhood pressures in the implementation of regulations. Finally, robust price 
determination mechanisms capable of keeping pace with fluctuating commodity prices in 
the market are required. To this end, price review committees at the local level should be 
strengthened and their regular meetings should be ensured. Undoubtedly, policy measures 
alone cannot prevent informal networks from obstructing regulation enforcement. 
However, robust institutional design for governing local markets, including the above 
measures, would increase trust in the quality and fairness of government actions, which in 
turn would reduce the incentives for violating regulations. 
The ineffective local governance of health and quality standards in the food and 
pharmacy sector is linked to ineffective governance at the national level: for instance, 
inadequate and ineffective forensic facilities, the illegal cross-border trade in Indian 
pharmaceutical products, and the development of supply networks for the distribution of 
these pharmaceuticals at the local level require urgent policy and scholarly attention. 
Counterfeit and misbranded medicines pose a significant threat to the health of millions of 
Pakistanis. Indian medicines, owing to their effective functioning (according to patients 
and traders in Batkhela bazaar) and cost-effectiveness, are increasingly purchased and sold 
in the local markets. Not only is the illegal cross-border trade is on the rise (Taneja and 
Bimal, 2016), but the manufacture of counterfeit and misbranded products is 
mushrooming. This growing trend in the manufacture of counterfeit and misbranded 




through improvements in the existing governance structure, will have damaging impacts 
for the health of citizens countrywide. For this purpose, the national policy on food and 
health regulations requires a holistic reconsideration that takes into account the impacts of 
national policy on local policy, and the other way round.  
Before any policy reconsideration, the scholarship informing those policies should 
avoid simplistic formal-informal binaries on the one hand, or confusing informal with 
illegal on the other. Taneja and Bimal’s (2016) informative study on informal trade 
between India and Pakistan provides vivid evidence of the dangers of confusing illegality 
with informality. Such simplistic treatments of the complex reality of formal/informal and 
informal/illegal inhibits the formulation of meaningful policies that would realise the 
potential of the informal economy for improving the political economy of the country on 
the one hand, and deal with issues of rule violation on the other. In this respect, one 
question relating to local governance is the identification of those governance areas where 
the informal economy generates positive externalities for local governance, and those 
where it is a governance challenge. Such an understanding would pave the way for the 
effective incorporation of marketplaces as an element of governance in the country.  
Policies relating to social welfare provision at the local level, especially to local 
social welfare offices and the governance of non-profit sector, also need urgent revision. 
The evidence presented in Chapter 8 suggests that a resource-constrained social welfare 
department and the ineffective regulation of SWAs prevents coordination between the state 
and civil society in the provision of welfare services. If the rising number of associations 
and the growth in their membership is a measure of SC, Pakistan should celebrate this 
increase in its stocks of SC, at least in relation to the phenomenal rise in the number of 
NGOs and social welfare associations in the country (Naviwala, 2010). Yet the findings 
from Malakand District suggest that a dominant majority of these associations exists only 
in the records of the district social welfare office. This divorce between the number of 
government-registered SWAs and those actually operating in the field is largely due to the 
ineffective registration and monitoring policies of government. These ineffective policies, 
along with incentives offered by quick-fix, donor-induced community participation 
programmes, have triggered the proliferation of thousands of associations in Pakistan 
(Bano, 2017). As well as existing in the files of district welfare offices, many of these 
SWAs have a presence in the virtual world, with attractive websites, carefully crafted 
mission statements, and often fabricated images and videos of their social welfare 
activities; but few exist in the real world. Their sudden appearance in and disappearance 




of the bazaar in generating both social and economic capital for these associations. 
However, the improved regulation of SWA activities by district governments would allow 
genuine associational activities to flourish while preventing the proliferation of fictitious 
and inactive SWAs, a situation which affects the long-term health of the local stocks of 
SC. 
To this end, current efforts of national government for improving the governance of 
the third sector needs to be supplemented with increased coordination between national, 
provincial and local governments for better regulation and monitoring of social welfare 
services. Avoiding duplication of social welfare provision, increasing capacity at the local 
level to collect data on social problems, monitoring activities of service providers in the 
third sector, and developing robust mechanisms to weed out inactive SWAs and NGOs at 
all the levels, may increase coproduction of social welfare services. 
10.4 Study limitations 
This thesis has both methodological and practical limitations. The single case study design 
and the choice of case selection has restricted the generalisability of the findings to certain 
specific aspects of marketplace governance. For instance, in terms of the enforcement of 
regulations, the omission of tax regulations and the focus on regulations applicable to 
health, price and quality standards was shaped by the governance settings of Batkhela 
bazaar characterised by “legalised informality” (Khan, 2017a). Adopting a comparative 
case study design or selecting a case study site in the settled areas of Pakistan would have 
extended the analysis to the role of SC in the enforcement of tax regulations. It was found 
in Chapter 7 that SC stabilises economic exchange among traders in the context of weak 
formal institutions, but also reinforces institutional weakness. If these findings were put to 
the test in relation to tax regulations, the “bright” side of SC would be unlikely to emerge, 
because the absence of these different types of regulations creates varying incentive 
structures for cooperation in the informal realm of governance. Health, price and quality 
standards create interdependency up and down the supply chain. However, such 
interdependencies are indiscernible in the everyday governance of taxes related to markets.  
Empirically, the study has demonstrated both the role of Batkhela bazaar as an 
evolving field of power, and the increased political agency of the traders’ community with 
the evolution of the bazaar. The bazaar’s evolving relationships with other spheres of 
governance was the central focus of the empirical examination. This approach meant that 
two large but marginalised sections of the bazaar’s population – street vendors and waged 
workers employed in the majority of fixed shops – remained excluded from the study. This 




in the voluntary associations. The silence of traders regarding these key groups clearly 
demonstrates the evolution of the bazaar as a field of power with its own dominant and 
dominated groups. This also challenges the conventional conceptions of bazaars as 
inclusive public spaces and their ability to generate SC of the Putnamian type, and suggests 
that the role of marketplaces as public spaces, and the type of SC they produce, is context-
dependent.  
Anyone with only the slightest acquaintance with Pakistani markets, or the gender 
roles in Pakistani society more broadly, will be aware that women as traders are entirely 
excluded from the trading space in the public sphere, let alone from membership of 
traders’ associations.93 This exclusion of women as traders, and even the limitations on 
their access as customers owing to cultural constraints, illustrates not only the institutional 
embeddedness of the local economy, but also its role in the reproduction of SC along 
gender lines. Despite the bazaar’s influence on the changing distribution of capital and on 
the generation of ties across political, economic, associational and regional lines, networks 
(both formal and informal) across gender boundaries cannot be developed in the public 
sphere. Women’s economic activities in the Malakand region, as in most of South Asia, is 
largely limited to the private sphere of the home. These home-based, female-owned micro-
enterprises are dependent on the marketplaces for their supplies. Traders of garments and 
cosmetics in Batkhela bazaar pointed out such trading relationships. Within the research 
design of this study, it was impracticable to explore the gendered dimension of social 
capital, linking the economic activities of the marketplace with these home-based, female-
owned enterprises. This calls for an in-depth exploration into the role of trading networks 
within and across gendered segregated social capitals in connecting marketplaces and 
household economies where the former is reserved for men and the latter for women.  
Gender-segregated and male-dominated public spaces also have implications for 
the type of associational SC generated by bazaars in Pakistan, and local civic life in 
general. Most of the literature on South Asia, Pakistan and the Malakand region cited in 
this study, with a few exceptions, remains gender-blind in its conceptual apparatus and 
methodological designs. This implies that most of the associational SC revolves around 
men’s networks. Admittedly, the present thesis could not break away from this convention. 
                                                          
93 In contrast to South Asian marketplaces, women in African markets are actively involved not only in 
trading, but in organising and wielding political interest (see Prag, 2013, pp. 66-7); to a lesser degree this 





As explained in Chapter 4, this was mainly due to the absence of women from the spheres 
of governance explored in this study. 
Exploring the centrality of trust to the governance processes related to marketplace 
governance revealed some interesting findings which require further development. Trust, 
as a component of SC, was successfully demonstrated to be the product of habitus, which 
is a significant theoretical contribution of the present research. In doing so, three levels of 
trust were empirically identified that impact the role of marketplace-generated SC in local 
governance processes (see Section 3.3.1). Each of these dimensions was further divided 
into two dimensions: competence-based and motive-based trust (see Section 6.4.1). Trust 
in the competence of an individual, association/organisation, or institution is shaped by 
one’s place in the game, or possession of various forms of capital. In this sense, a person’s 
propensity to trust is differentiated from his or her familiarity with the existing trusting 
order. Familiarity, reflexively yielded through habitus, reduces the complexity of the 
existing trusting order and shapes trusting choices (Luhman, 2000). High levels of 
interpersonal trust and low levels of institutional and organisational trust in any context can 
be explained through this reflexive engagement of agents with their existing institutional 
environment. Therefore, trust not only governs interpersonal relationships in the context of 
weak formal institutions, but also serves as an insurance mechanism necessary to substitute 
institutional fragility in governing various economic and noneconomic transactions.  
This reflexive engagement with the existing trust environment explains why agents 
rely on interpersonal networks as opposed to institutions, and why they trust the capacity 
of interpersonal trust to influence institutions for personal benefit. The findings of this 
study suggest that interpersonal trust generates both negative (Chapter 7) and positive 
(Chapter 8) externalities for the local governance structure. Within this context, trust serves 
as a central element of the local governance structure, which shapes exchanges related to 
political participation, regulation enforcement and the provision of social welfare. 
However, the context of trust and the interrelationship between the three dimensions of 
trust (along the axis of intention and the capacity of the trusted) is shaped by two factors: 
the quality of government institutions and the social structures. Trust in this sense has both 
temporal and contextual dimension. Exploring the interrelationship between these three 
dimensions of trust in their temporal and contextual specifications requires further 
research. As argued in Section 9.5.1, plugging in Bourdieu’s notion of habitus that 
interprets the social order of trust will help us better understand interconnected levels of 




governance of market and its role in the local governance will overcome weaknesses in the 
existing conceptions of trust. 
10.5 Questions for future research 
The methodological and empirical limitations of this thesis raise critical questions relating 
to marketplaces, local governance and social capital in the developing world in general, 
and Pakistan in particular. These relate, in order of priority, to the institutional design of 
LG and its implications for the role of marketplaces in the generation of SC for local 
governance; the type of civic activities that evolve as an outcome of the bazaar-SWA 
interaction and the role of religion in shaping the implications of this interaction for social 
welfare provision; the role of social capital in governing the evolving relationships 
between business owners and waged workers as a distinct but interdependent classes in the 
bazaar; and the gendered dimension of SC emerging from the interaction between home-
based economies and marketplaces in the context of ineffective state institutions. In 
addition, the research also raises critical questions for the role of marketplace-generated 
SC in conflict and post-conflict governance. 
A first key question for future research is: How does the institutional design of 
local government impact on the processes of SC generation by marketplaces, and what are 
the implications of this SC for local governance? The informing idea here is that the 
institutional design of LG defines the governance settings of marketplaces, which then 
serve as a context for the development and operation of SC in marketplace-LG relations. 
To this end, institutional design variances in the role of LG in the governance of the local 
economy in Pakistan provide an ideal natural setting. Comparing marketplaces in tax-
exempted regions, like the PATA and FATA, against marketplaces in the settled areas of 
the country, offers a good starting point.  
A second question would be: What are the implications of a bazaar’s religious 
embeddedness for local civic life and the governance of social welfare provision? As 
argued in Chapter 8, marketplaces are an important source of charity owing to the 
embeddedness of their economy in the institution of zakat and alms. Neither the state nor 
the social welfare associations are able to extensively benefit from this resource, as a result 
of a general absence of traders’ trust in these institutions. Individual networks mediate 
donations for SWAs, as observed in the context of Batkhela bazaar. However, the type of 
social welfare provision to which bazaars contribute is a contextual question. Therefore, 
other types of social services, where religious embeddedness in the bazaar economy 
contributes to the governance structure of social welfare provision, requires further 




members mediate the donations of individual traders, with notable implications for certain 
areas of social welfare provision. An exploration of the role of interpersonal networks in 
negotiating traders’ donations to SWAs and their aggregate impact for local governance 
beyond Malakand District is required. This would answer a number of other questions, for 
example: Has this triad of religious, interpersonal and generalised reciprocity impacted on 
the governance of social welfare provisions in other contexts of Pakistan?; and How does 
this institutional logic of state, market, society and religion shape marketplace-SWAs 
interrelationships in other developing economies? These questions could be usefully 
explored in relation to the role of SC in marketplace-local governance interaction in a 
comparative perspective that considers different religious traditions, such as Islam, 
Hinduism and Christianity. 
A third area for future research relates to the role of social capital in the governance 
within marketplaces of the relationships between traders and waged workers, as employers 
and employees. Much of the marketplace literature in Pakistan, whether in the political 
economy models of class analysis (Javed, 2017; Amirali, 2017) or in Granovetter’s 
embeddedness models, celebrate the rising power of marketplaces and of traders as a class 
(Jan, 2010, 2017). However, a critical question relating to marketplace governance remains 
unanswered. For instance, it was observed in the present study – and most of the literature 
on evolving local economy in Pakistan would agree – that the economic relationships 
between the dominant and the dominated are monetised and that the traditional bonds of 
patron-client relationships have been replaced by wage contracts. In marketplaces in 
Pakistan, most of the employment relationships that do not involve family ties are purely 
monetary contracts. However, the silence of traders regarding their employment 
relationships, the governance of these employment relationships by purely informal 
contracts, and the lack of any associational activity for the labour force employed in 
trading units, requires further study. Questions in this area would include the following: 
Who negotiates access to state institutions for these labourers in terms of any dispute with 
their employers?; What role, if any, do marketplace traders’ associations play in such 
disputes?; What impact does this have on the development of SC along vertical lines?; and 
What impact does the evolution of the bazaars have in relation to the SC of waged workers 
in the marketplaces?  
 A fourth area for future research would be: To what extent do marketplaces in 
Pakistan develop SC across gender boundaries? This is one of the most important but most 
underexplored research questions. Weiss (1998, p. 71) noted the “practical and symbolic 




to characterise research on marketplaces and female-owned, home-based micro-enterprises 
in Pakistan as a distinct research geography. The entire marketplace literature comes from 
male researchers (with the exception of Amirali , 2017), while women’s entrepreneurship 
literature emanates predominantly from the pens of female scholars. Much has been 
written about the barriers to women’s access to markets and their exclusion from 
marketplaces as traders (Khan, 2017a), and about the institutionally embedded and 
constrained household entrepreneurial activities of women (Gohar and Abrar, 2016). A 
critical gap in these different bodies of literature is the role of social networks generated by 
the contiguous evolution of men’s economic activities in the marketplace and women’s 
enterprises in the private sphere of the household. This field of research could explore the 
following questions: What role (if any) does SC play in connecting these gender-
segregated trading spheres of the local economy?; and How do trust and reciprocity govern 
the relationships between male traders as suppliers and female entrepreneurs as customers? 
This gender analysis of SC across the trading spheres is especially significant from a 
governance perspective. The state, as a governing institution, is reduced to a secondary 
position in this area, while faith-based and local cultural norms are the primary institutions 
that regulate social behaviours towards women’s trading activities and their participation in 
local markets.  
Militancy and conflict have influenced governance and local economy in Pakistan. 
The present research did not engage with this aspect of governance, owing to its specific 
theoretical and empirical objectives. However, as noted in Section 5.3.2, marketplaces in 
the Swat and FATA region experienced varying impacts of the militant crisis in 2008-9. In 
this connection, three categories of marketplaces in the country can broadly be identified. 
Firstly, there are those marketplaces in areas where actual military conflict took place, 
which suffered complete closure, infrastructural damage, and displacement of the local 
population. Marketplaces in FATA and Swat region fall under this category. Secondly, 
there are those marketplaces in areas where direct confrontation between military and 
militants did not take place, but the markets remained closed due to protracted curfews. 
These marketplaces did not suffer infrastructural damage, nor was there displacement of 
the local population dependent on these markets. However, prolonged curfews had serious 
short-term economic implications for them. Batkhela bazaar falls into this category. 
Thirdly, there are those marketplaces in districts that suffered neither direct conflict nor 
curfews. However, the massive influx of displaced persons temporarily increased demand 
on their capacity to provide goods and services, as well as making cheap labour available. 




increased crime, suicide bombings, and the increased insecurity of traders. Marketplaces in 
the districts of Mardan, Peshawar and other settled districts can be classified in this 
category. 
 To date, no systematic empirical analysis of the responses of these three categories 
of marketplaces to conflict in the region has been conducted. Important empirical questions 
that have been left unanswered may enhance our understanding of the role of marketplaces 
in conflict and governance in Pakistan and in the developing state context. For example, 
what impact did the conflict have in the evolution of the role of marketplaces in the local 
political economy of these three types of area? What role did these varying impacts of 
conflict have on the social capital generated by their marketplaces and on its implications 
for the role of marketplaces in the local governance of their respective areas? How did the 
marketplaces in these varying contexts respond to post-conflict governance in the short and 
long-term? Furthermore, a field analysis of these questions, e.g. taking into account the 
distribution of capitals (economic, social and human) would provide an opportunity for 
entrepreneurship research to explore the differentiated entrepreneurial capacities of market 
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Appendix 1: Contiguous growth of Batkhela bazaar and urban 
population in Malakand District 
Census Year Urban population Rural Population Size of Bazaar 
1981 0 257797 150 shops 
2017 68,200 652095 5500 shops 






Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Exploratory Survey 
Respondents’ Identification Data 
This section, containing four items, will be filled by the researcher prior to interview on the bases 
of classification/categorization which will be made before going into the field for administering 
this questionnaire. 
Number of the questionnaire for data entry into computer program: ____________ 
Name: ___________________________ 
Firm name: _________________________________________________ 
Date of the interview:_________________________________________ 
Interviewer request for help: explaining questionnaires objectives 
I am conducting my PhD study on Batkhela bazaar and the role it plays in the local 
economic development and local governance process. For this purpose I am conducting 
this survey. The aim of this questionnaire is to understand the nature of the economic 
activities of bazaar, the features of business owners and economic transactions/operations 
of the bazaar.  It also seeks to set ground for the significance of entrepreneurial activities 
and their social relations in the governance process. 
For this purpose, the questionnaire is broadly designed on 4 dimensions. 
The first dimension covers the nature of businesses in the bazaar, the features of business 
owners, and features of transactions that take place in the bazaar. Here the transactions 
refers to economic transactions only.  
The second dimension seeks to understand If and how do formal governance institutions 
impacts business activities in the bazaar. 
And the third dimension determines how informal governance in the bazaar relates to 
formal institutions. 
The fourth dimension seeks to understand if the networks of relations, norms and trust 
within the bazaar plays any role in the local governance process. 
 
This survey will help in building rapport with the potential interviewees, and will play a 
crucial role in specifying interviewees for the detail interviews, and will determine our 
purposive sample.  
1. Features of businesses in the bazaar 
 
1.1 What business activity are you engaged in? ________________ 
1.2 In what year did you start this business? __________________ 
1.3 Were you engaged in other business activity prior to this? (Y/N) 
1.4 If yes, what was that business? _________________________ 
1.5 Why did you move into your current business? _________________ 
1.6 How many people do you employ in your current business? ________ 




1.8 How many of these are close relatives?  ______________ 
1.9 Do you pay your employees on a: 
 (1) daily basis; (b) weekly basis; (c) monthly basis; or (d) some other (please specify)  
1.10 Can I ask you about the average daily/or monthly income of your  
business? (yes/no). If yes, please specify. 
1.11 Could you estimate what percentage of your customers come from: 
a) Batkhela ________ b) Surrounding villages ________ c) Broader region____ 
1.12 How many customers do you deal with on an average every day?  
 (1) 01-10    (2) 11-20    (3) 21-50    (4) 51-100    (5) 100-200    (6) over 200. 
1.13 Do the numbers of customers rise and fall with the season? Y/N 
1.14 If yes, what number of customers would visit you daily at periods of high peak 
demand?   (1) 01-10   (2) 11-20    (3) 21-30    (4) 31-50    (5) 51-100    (6) 100-200. 
1.15 What number of customers would visit you daily at periods of low peak 
 demand? 
(1) 01-05   (2) 06-10    (3) 11-20    (4) 21-50    (5) 51-100    (6) over 100. 
1.16Can you distinguish (in numbers) in your frequent and occasional customers? 
1.17 Could you estimate what percentage of your customers come to you: 
(a) daily ____   (b) weekly ______ (c) monthly ______ (d) annually_____ 
1.18Can you please identify your three most important suppliers? 
i) _____________  ii) ____________  iii) ______________ 
2. Features of the business owners 
2.1 Are you the owner of this shop?      Yes        No 
2.2 Do you have any other shops at other locations in the bazaar? Yes     No 
2.3 Do you have any other business premise as an extension of your business 
outside the bazaar? Yes          No 
2.4 Do you have any other business interests?   Yes         No             
If yes, please specify _______________________ 
2.5 How many children are you supporting in education in private schools? 
 _________ 
2.6. Would you mind if I ask about their respective levels of education?  
(1) school         (2) college (higher secondary or degree college please specify)  
(3) university  
 
3. Features of economic transactions in the bazaar 
3.1 Do you have a bank account?           Yes         No 
  
  








3.2 If this is a rental property, do you have a written contract? Yes         No 
3.3 If no, please specify the nature of the contract.______________________ 
3.4 Do you lend money to other business owners in the bazaar? Yes       No 
3.5 If yes, to whom do you extend this loan?  
(1) family/relatives   (2) friends   (3) acquaintances   
 (4) to your neighbour shopkeepers only  (5) to anyone in the bazaar  
 (6) any other, please specify.  
3.6  Do you make any written contract when you lend money to other business 
owners in the bazaar?  Please explain your answer. 
 Yes   ____________________________ 
 No   ____________________________ 
 Sometimes  _____________________________ 
3.7 Do you sell products to your customers on credit? Yes / No. If yes, please 





3.8 To which type of customer do you extend this credit facility? (if more than 
one, rank in order of importance) 
(1) family (2) friends (3) acquaintances (4) loyal customers (5) any customer. 
3.9 Do you make a written contract for selling on credit? Yes          No 
3.10  If no, do you make an oral contract? ___________ 
3.11 If the customer does not pay back on time, how do you recover the money? 





3.12 Do you have any formal contract with your employees? (Yes /  No /   n/a) 
3.13 Have you been involved in any business dispute in the last two years?  
(Yes / No) 
3.14 If yes, how it was resolved? (a) by the police; (b) courts; (c) bazaar union; (d) 
family; (e) friends; (f) combination of these; (g) other (please specify). 


















3.15 If you need a loan for your business activities, from where would you obtain 
this? (a) family (regularly/sometimes/never) (b) friends 
(regularly/sometimes/never) c) bank (regularly/sometimes/never) d) other – 
please specify (regularly/sometimes/never) 
4. Bazaar governance, and the broader governance process  
4.1 Are you member of the bazaar union? (Yes /No) 
Please state the reason for your answer.____________________________ 
4.2 Do you think bazaar union is effective in solving bazaar problems? (Yes  /No 





4.3 Are you actively involved in local government?  (Yes  / No) 
4.4 If yes, please provide details (e.g type of involvement; status of membership, e.g, 
union council, tehsil council, or district council). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.5 Are you a member of any political party? (Yes/No) 
 If yes, which one?________________________________ 
4.6 How often do you attend meetings of the political party of which you are a 
member? (1) regularly; (2) sometimes (3) never 
4.7 Did you vote in the recent local government elections? (yes/no). 
4.8 If yes, would you mind saying for which political party? (optional). 
4.9 Did any family member or friend contest the election? (yes/no) If yes, did you 
vote for them? 
4.10 Was that family member from the same political party for which you have 
 voted? 
(Yes / No) 
4.11 was that family member contesting for the seat of Nazim? 
(Yes / No) 





4.13 How would you rate the impact of local government activities on your 
 business? 
(1) very significant (2) significant (3) neither significant, nor insignificant (4) of 




4.14 Is there any NGO conducting developing functions in the bazaar? (Yes / No) 
4.15 Is there any NGO that is working to help businesses in the bazaar?  
(Yes/ No/Don’t know). If yes, please give details of the NGO (if No, go to question 
 4.17) 





4.17 How would you rate the impact of NGO activities on your business? 
(1) very significant (2) significant (3) neither significant, nor insignificant (4) of 
limited significance (5) of no significance at all.  





4.19 How would you rate the impact of banks on your business?    
 (1) very significant (2) significant (3) neither significant nor insignificant   
(4) limited significance (5) of no significance at all. 





4.21 How you rate the impact of Levies (police) on your business?  
 (1) very significant (2) significant (3) neither significant nor insignificant   
 (4) of less significance (5) of no significance at all. 





















5. Informal relations that relate to governance  





5.2 How would you rate the impact of family relations on your business?   
 (1) very significant (2) significant (3) neither significant nor insignificant   
 (4) less significant (5) of no significance at all. 





5.4 How would you rate the impact of your friends on your business? 
 (1) very significant (2) significant (3) neither significant nor insignificant   
 (4) less significant (5) of no significance at all. 
5.5 How many close friends you have within the bazaar? 
 (1) less than 2  (2) 2-to 5 (3) 6- to 10 (4) 11 to 15 (5) more than 20     . 
5.6 How many close friends you have outside the bazaar? (state the numbers only).  
 (1) less than 2 (2) 2 to 5 (3) 6 to 100  (4) 11 to 205 (5) more than 20   .  






5.8 Are any of your friends government officials? (Yes / No)  





5.9 If you have family or friends who are government officials, have you ever 
contacted them in relation to your business activities (Yes / No)  








6. Social capital: collective dimension 
6.1 Are you a member of any association outside the bazaar? 
(Yes / No) 





6.3 Does this association impact upon your business in any way?  
(Yes / No) 
6.4 Have you contributed to any community development project in the last 3 years?  
(Yes /No). (If No, go to 6.8) 
6.5 If yes, what was the nature of your contribution?  
(E.g. cash, volunteered services, other) 
6.6 Was this community development project important for your business?  
(Yes / No) 
6.7 Was this community project/ significant for the bazaar? 
(Yes / No) 
6.8 Have you helped anyone in your community in the last one month? 
(Yes / No) 






7. Classification questions 
7.1 Age 
(a) less than 20  (b) 20-29. (c) 30-39. (d) 40-49.  (e) 50-59. (f) 60 or above. 
7.2 Are you the Head of the household?  
(Yes / No) 
7.3 Do you live alone? 




7.4 What ethnic group do you belong to? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
7.5 What religious group do you belong to? 
(a) Sunni  (b) Shia  (c) Other 
7.6 Please indicate your level of formal education: 
 (1) no formal education    
(2) primary  
(3) secondary school  
(4) university undergraduate degree   
(5) postgraduate 
7.7. Are you a resident of Batkhela? 
(Yes / No). If no, please specify your place of residence.____________________ 
7.8. Could you indicate the value of your daily average sales:   
(1) less than Rs. 10000  (2)Between Rs. 11000 to 20,000   (3) between Rs. 2,0000 or Rs. 
 5,0000   
(4) Between Rs. 50000 - Rs. 100000  (5) above Rs. 100000  
(6) above Rs. 200000  (7) above Rs. 300000. 
7.9 Could you indicate the level of your monthly income:       
(1) less than Rs. 20000  (2) Between Rs. 21,000 - Rs. 50,000  (3) Between Rs. 51,000 - 
Rs. 100,000 
(4) Between Rs. 101,000 – Rs. 200,000  (5) Between Rs. 201,000 - Rs. 300,000  
(6) Between Rs. 301-000 - Rs. 400000; (7) over Rs. 400,000. 





Appendix 3: Short survey with SWAs and responses  
This survey consisted of nine questions, including six binaries, two rating-scale questions and two 
open-ended questions. For responses to the binary questions see the table below, while the 
responses to the other four questions are summarised here. In the first question, the 
founders/managers of SWAs were asked about the activities that their associations performed. The 
response distribution was: blood-donor association (1); sports associations (2); mix of welfare 
activities such as health, sanitation, education, and emergency help and relief (3); education only 
(1); for disabled people and widows (1 [inactive]); health (1). When asked which section of society 
was most helpful in contributing to their activities, the respondents were given four options (1) 
bazaar; (2) government employees; (3) students; (4) illiterate and unemployed. Eight of the 
associations answered that the bazaar community was the most helpful. In the third question, the 
respondents were asked to rate the significance of the bazaar on a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 = very 
significant; 2 = significant; 3 = of limited significance; 4 = of no significance at all.  Five of the 
respondents answered “very significant”, three answered “significant” and one regarded the bazaar 
as of no significance at all.  In open-ended question, the SWAs were asked if there were any other 
facts they wanted to share about the significance of Batkhela bazaar in relation to their activities? 
Five responses were coded as an alternative resource to government support, while three regarded 
the active networks of traders as a significant resource. One of the SWAs did not comment. The 
binaries are summarised below.  
Question Affirmative Negative  Number of total 
responses 
Do you have any 
bazaar-related 
projects, or projects 
for any specific 
business sector? 
0 9 9 
Have you collected 
charity from the 
traders in the bazaar 
for any of your 
projects?  
1 8 9 
Do you ask for 
voluntary help of any 
kind from the bazaar? 
7 2 9 
Is the financial help 
generated from the 
bazaar helpful for 
your activities? 
8 1 9 
Is voluntary help from 
the bazaar helpful for 
your projects? 






Appendix 4: Contact directory log 
 
Pseudonym Date Occupation and Context Gender 
Faqir Khan May 01, 2016 Pottery retailer, President of the Bazaar 
Union 
M 
Irfan May 02, 2016 Cloth/garment wholesaler, and contestant 
for the Bazaar Union election, chairman 
of EC 2009-2013; PPP 
M 
Zalmay Khan May 03, 2016 Wholesaler and GS of bazaar union M 
Ayaz Ali May 04, 2016 Retailer in automobile parts, GS in 
previous cabinet of the Bazaar Union 
(2009-2013). Affiliation with PPP  
M 
Akbar Zaman May 05, 2016 Garment retailer M 
Falakniaz May 05, 2016 Grocery, mixed size business/or small 
wholesale. Affiliation with PPP 
M 
Sohaib May 08, 2016 Synthetic fibre wholesaler, actively 
involved in JI, no inclination to become 
bazaar president 
M 
Waseem, May 09, 2016 Prominent garment wholesaler, no 
political affiliation 
M 
Waqar May 09, 2016 Prominent electronic wholesaler, 
affiliation with JI, doing business since 
1959, started off as a milk seller in a cart, 
and rose to his current status 
M 
Sardar Khan May 10, 2016 Hardware seller and owner of a market 
(landowner) was an active follower of 
ANP, but denies any affiliation with 
politics at present, belongs to traditional 
land-owning class 
M 
Hajee Aleem May 16, 2016 Owner of two travel agencies, two 
markets (400 shops), political affiliation 
with PMLN, belongs to traditional 
migrant family 
M 
Babu May 17, 2016 Large wholesaler, political affiliation 
unknown, belong to traditional migrant 
class 
M 
Khatir Khan May 17, 2016 A local journalist. Was interviewed 
because had been the member of bazaar 
elections committee in the previous two 
elections 
M 
Shah Jahan May 19, 2016 Mechanic, small size falling under Rs 
10,000 category, political affiliation with 
PPP, VP in the current cabinet 
M 
Bilal May 26, 2016 PA to district commissioner M 
Bakhtiar May 29, 2016 Large wholesaler of electronics, Tehsil 
Ameer of JI (this cannot be shown in the 





identity), one of those belonging to 
traditional landless class 
Saddam Hussain May 31, 2016 Recruitment agency owner M 
Shab Khan June 17, 2016 Ex-provincial minister from Malakand 
District 
M 
Fasiullah July 01, 2016 Computer operator in district 
commissioner’s office 
M 
Zahid July 01, 2016 Active local politician M 
Ishaq July 01, 2016 Local politician, son of a landlord and an 
active member of ANP 
M 
Zameer Khan July 08, 2016 Shoemaker and retailer M 
Qazim July 14, 2016 Large wholesaler of grocery items M 
Riaz July 17, 2016 Grocery retailer M 
Shafeeq July 26, 2016 Bakery owner M 
Ibrar July 28, 2016 Bakery owner M 
Azmat July 31, 2016 Food distributor (wholesaler) M 
Mujahid August 02, 2016 Second-hand car dealer M 
Fazal Wahab August 05, 2016 Grocery retailer M 
Majid August 05, 2016 Grocery retailer M 
Inamullah August 05, 2016 Grocery retailer M 
Haris August 07, 2016 Vegetable retailer with fixed shop M 
Imran August 08, 2016 Grocery wholesaler M 
Zahid August 09, 2016 Grocery wholesaler M 
Aziz Ahmad August 09, 2016 Pharmacy distributor and director of a 
private hospital 
M 
Abid Khan August 11, 2016 Seller of Indian medicines (unregistered 
medicines) 
M 
Goher August 11, 2016 Pharmacy retailer M 
Noorullah August 11, 2016 UC mayor Batkhela M 
Khadimkhan August 11, 2016 Reader to additional district 
commissioner 
M 
Bakht raees August 12, 2016 Local police post commander M 
Zakir Muhammad August 13, 2016 Pharmacy distribution M 
Shoaib August 14, 2016 Pharmacy retailer M 
Khawar August 15, 2016 Pharmacy retailer M 
Ijaz August 15, 2016 Food inspector M 
Salman August 15, 2016 Clerical staff member in district office, 
responsible for compiling reports of 
various types of penalties imposed by 
DC, AC and DFC 
M 
Zakir August 16, 2016 Vegetable wholesaler M 
Zahir Khan August 16, 2016 UC Mayor Piran (neighbouring village of 
Batkhela) 
M 
Zorawar Khan August 17, 2016 District commissioner M 
Saleem August 17, 2016 Drugs inspector M 
Zafar August 21, 2016 Grocery wholesaler M 




Zaheer August 22, 2016 Oil distributor  M 
Shakeel Khan August 24, 2016 Pharmacy wholesaler M 
Ibraheem August 25, 2016 Pharmacy retailer  M 
Waseem, August 26, 2016 Additional assistant commissioner M 
Nauman August 26, 2016 Reader to assistant commissioner M 
Shakirullah August 27, 2016 District food controller M 
Khalid August 27, 2016 District vice-mayor M 
Akbar August 28, 2016 Pharmacy wholesaler M 
Hamza khan August 28, 2016 District president of PPP M 
Sahil September 01, 2016 District social welfare officer M 
Ibrar Khan September 01, 2016 UC mayor Batkhela M 
Khaleelullah September 03, 2016 UC vice-mayor Batkhela M 
Hussain September 04, 2016 Medicine distributor M 
Ghazali September 04, 2016 Founder of SAANGA, son of a landlord, 
and official in social welfare department 
in another district 
M 
Rehmat khan September 05, 2016 Wholesaler of electronic goods M 
Furqan September 07, 2016 Wholesaler of synthetic fibres M 
Kaleem September 08, 2016 Tailor M 
Salar Khan September 10, 2016 Medicines wholesaler M 
Mujahid September 11, 2016 Second-hand car dealer and president of 
the BU 
M 
Khaliq  September 14, 2016 Pottery retailer M 
Bakhtiar September 14, 2016 Textile wholesaler M 
Shairzada September 15, 2016 A large wholesaler of grocery items M 
Liaqat September 15, 2016 Assistant commissioners M 
Ateeq Khan September 15, 2016 Active local politician and ex-UC mayor 
Batkhela 
M 
Shahlam September 16, 2016 Wholesaler of electronic goods M 
Subhan September 16, 2016 PSO station owner M 
Jafar September 16, 2016 Cosmetics retailer M 
Ziad September 17, 2016 Pharmacy retailer M 
Arsalan September 18, 2016 Mixed-size business of auto spare-parts M 





Appendix 5a: Example of interview guide used  
This was the interview guide that was specifically developed for the Bazaar Union. The 
schedules for the SWAs had some of the themes, but not all were applicable given the 
principle of respondents’ expertise, hence different interview schedules guided by the 
major thematic concerns of this study were constructed. At this stage, I was interested in 
Batkhela Bazaar Union and its different dynamics relating to bazaar governance, especially 
how social capital influences its different processes. In addition, I was interested to know 
how this influence extended to some aspects of the local governance processes. An in-
depth understanding of the BU’s creation and evolution, the current state of its structure 
and functions, and its interactions with actors in the bazaar and other important 
stakeholders, was therefore important. For this purpose, in the first stage, the key members 
of the BU were interviewed (current president, vice-president and finance secretary (if one 
exists]), along with some of the members who have acted as key BU members in the past, 
and business owners who have observed the BU’s creation and evolution. 
1.1. Establishment of the bazaar union: 
When and how was the bazaar union established? 
Why was the bazaar union created? 
How was it created, i.e. what was the process? 
Who were the main people involved in its creation? 
Did they belong to any specific group or class? 
What other classes or groups of people existed at that time in the bazaar? 
How did they react to the establishment of the bazaar union? 
1.2. Evolution and development of the bazaar union 
What functions does the bazaar union perform? 
What changes have you seen in its structure and functions since its creation? 
Do you remember any special occasions that represented change in the structure and 
functions of the bazaar union? 
What is that change, and is it reflected in its current structure and functions? 
Does the bazaar union serve the interests of any specific group or network of people 
in the bazaar? 
Who are those people? 
What do you think are the reasons why the bazaar union serve their interests?  
Are they the same groups/group who actually created it? 
1.3. Effectiveness of the bazaar union 




Do you think that the bazaar union is performing the functions which it is expected to 
perform? 
What happens if it does not perform its functions? (For instance fails to communicate 
bazaar problems to government officials, or is unable to solve individual problems) 
What are the causes of its inability to perform its functions? Lack of resources? 
Is there a specific group or groups of people in the bazaar that pose challenges to the 
union in the performance of its functions? 
If yes, who are those people/that group? 
Is it dominated by a certain group or actors who do not enjoy the support of the 
whole of the bazaar?  
Can you think of any powerful group or network outside the bazaar union posing 
challenge to the credibility of the bazaar union? 
What is that group and who belongs to it? 
Is there any written code for the bazaar union members to perform their functions? 
If no, can you tell me, what are those norms which force its members to perform 
their functions? 
Do you think that the fear of non-cooperation from the bazaar members forces the 
union’s members to perform their functions? (example of reciprocity)  
Can you think of a specific example in this regard? 
Do you think that the norms of Pukhtunwali force them to perform their functions? 
1.4. Key stakeholders interacting with the bazaar union 
With what kind of organisations does the bazaar union interact frequently? 
What are those organisations/unions inside the bazaar?  
What are those organisations outside the bazaar? 
With what types of individuals does the bazaar union interact? 
On what matters does the bazaar union interact with those actors and organisations? 
1.5. Implementation of health and quality regulations and the role of the BU  
What type of laws are enforced by the local administration in the bazaar? 
Do business owners violate these laws? 
What role does the bazaar union play in the implementation of these regulations? 
What type of business owners frequently violate the regulations? 
What type of business owners frequently contact the bazaar union if a penalty is 
imposed against them for violating regulations? 
1.6. Effectiveness of the bazaar union 




Do you think that it is able to solve the problems of the bazaar? 
Do you think, as a business owner, that it is able to solve your problems? 
In your opinion, in which areas of bazaar life it is most effective? 
What are the causes of its ineffectiveness? 
Does this ineffectiveness in the performance of its functions have any impact on the 
social ties of the bazaar union’s members? 
1.7. Bazaar security and the role of the bazaar union 
Was the current security system created by the bazaar union? 
When was it created?  
How was it created? 
Why was it created? As an initiative of the bazaar union, or was the need felt by the 
members of the bazaar? 
What was the response of the offices responsible for the security of the region? 
What was the security arrangements in the bazaar before the creation of this system?  
How does this system work? 
Do you think that in the presence of the security forces (levy and military) this 
system is needed?  
Who pays for the security guards? 
How does this payment system work? 
Are there any written rules for maintaining the security system of the bazaar, or any 
part of this system?  
Do any business owners opt not to join this system? 
If yes, can you identify who are those business owners? 
In your view, was the management of this system possible without the bazaar union? 





Appendix 5b: Sample of analysis from interview excerpt  
Below is an example of coding from a 35-page interview. This was the very first interview 
conducted for this research. The initial codes are italicised within the text, and the table at 
the end of the excerpt shows how these initial codes were organised into conceptual bins. 
Some of the codes in the excerpt are not included in the table, which suggest that the 
emerging codes did not all fit the pre-arranged themes. This flexible thematic analysis 
allowed for the expansion of the conceptual categories as themes emerged from the 
compilation of those codes. The table has been adapted here for the purposes of 
presentation, whereas in the original database, indices for different categories were 
generated. 
 
Interview with the president of the BU (2009-13).  
Key facts: 
● Date of interview: 1/5/16 
● Interviewee’s name: Faqir Khan 
● Age: 50 
● Business: pottery (manufacturing and retail) 
● Education: Bachelor’s degree 
● Monthly income: PKR 30,000 (average) 
● Background: Member of traditional landless class 
● Interview form: Started with informal conversation, so the list of questions (see 
Appendix 6) was not mechanically followed. Consent to present this excerpt was 
renegotiated on 1 June 2017.  
 
Interviewee 1: 1. Importance of collective support. The opinion of the intelligent and 
experienced people is very important, because once an opinion of [collective action] by the 
mature people is acquired and the decisions made accordingly, the president will not be 
alone then, because if I make a decision alone, that will be my decision alone (Salman 
sahib). 2. Reciprocity to “make union work”. But if I do it in accordance with your 
suggestion, and according to the suggestion of the guy sitting there, and the steps are taken 
accordingly, then if you step back, I can call you, remind you that Salman sahib is this 
decision mine alone, or yours? You have pushed me to the field, then why you are leaving 
me? Come forward. It is also important because your conscience will make you feel guilty 
in that I was also involved in this decision so how can I sit back? I will side with them. 
This is the way to make the union work. 
 
Interviewer: Can you tell me when and why was the bazaar union created? 
 
Interviewee 1: 3.  few large business owners created the union. Dear (Yara), it was created 
even before the decade of 70s. in the very beginning some large business owners 
(Dukandaran) gathered and a person whose name was Fazlurehman was made the head of 
this union. He was the first president, he gave it a good start, and however after him it 
could not be maintained. He is dead now, but I believe that he was made president in 
1966). Those were a few people who created the union. 
 





Interviewee 1: 4. Causes of union’s creation. Though I do not have exact knowledge, even 
at that time they might have faced some problems such as transportation of goods, or may 
be because it was a very small bazaar comprised of say 20 shops. 5. Large traders and 
distant trade. In that, if I tell you now, there were business owners called Malaks of Dir, if 
anyone needed anything in the region they would provide it. I have seen one of their record 
books (khata), written around 1959. At that time they have sold some goods to the wali of 
Swat. They had those dealing with the wali of Swat, with the Nawab of Dir, they would 
provide goods from Batkhela bazaar to those people. If someone needed rice, they would 
deliver that rice. Even at that time there was no transport system so those people, for 
instance the wali of Swat would send their own vehicles to collect the goods that they 
needed. There records of that time are still here with those business owners. 
 
Interviewer: Was there any opposition to the BU when it was created? 
 
Interviewee 1: 6. Evolution of opposition to BU). It’s very obvious, whenever a step is 
taken it has its opponents, but it was not organised. Even now, I mean before my 
presidentship of the Bazaar Union, such presidents came and they were gone. For instance 
Shakirulla was made president. Elections were conducted and he became president. A long 
time passed after he became president, when we would remind him of elections, he would 
avoid what we would tell him. His argument was that how can it be done, people trust me, 
they have voted for me saying that you will be the president. Twenty years passed and he 
remained president. We were in friendship with him (colleagues). (Author’s note: The 
interviewee used the word “malgartia” which literally in Pashto mean friendship. However here he 
refers to the fact that he and Shakirulla were part of the Bazaar Union at the same time.) No one 
would say anything to him, but I was secretary with him.  
 
Interviewer: Interesting! Can you tell me a bit more about its history? 
 
Interviewee 1: 7. collective decision [reaction to accident]. Let me tell you how I became 
secretary. An accident took place in the bazaar. There is a business owner, Fazal, he had a 
son whose name was Ehsan. He was doing recovery in the bazaar and some robbers came, 
he was martyred in the bazaar and the killers ran away at that time. In that matter, people 
gathered in the mosque on the third day and were discussing the matter. I was not there, 
and neither had I said anything to anyone, but people were very emotional in reaction to 
that incident. I might have been good in their opinion, so they said that from today he [the 
interviewee] will be the secretary of the bazaar with Shakirullah. They came to me and told 
me about the matter. I said it’s a difficult task to do, but I agreed in the end. 8. Trust in the 
role creation. I was feeling happy about the fact that I had not said a word to anyone about 
getting a role in the Bazaar Union, but the people trusted me and collectively raised hands 
in my favour, that he is our representative. After that I became determined.  
 
Interviewer: Can you tell me about the history of the Bazaar Union’s elections? 
 
Interviewee 1: 9. Elections and trust in BU. This was another thing that I wanted to talk 
about. For instance I would tell someone that Shakirullah is our president, or the president 
of this union. They would reply, how he is my president? I have not voted for him, my 
father might have cast his vote in his favour but he is dead now; first have an election, then 
I will accept you as president. All this would be communicated to me by the person very 
clearly. Then I would discuss this thing between our friends - why is this happening? And 
then I would ask the president to hold the election but he would not agree. I told him that 




using other tactics. We set up an interim president just to force [the president] to agree on 
the new election. That interim president was just a nominal (havaie) to compel [the 
president] to hold the election. We gathered people in a market… we said Mr so-and-so is 
our president, and Mr so-and-so is our secretary, and this is an interim cabinet and their 
responsibility is to look after the pre-election, and to conduct the new election, because 
elections do not take place. Even then he (the president) refused to agree. He said that I do 
not accept that president (the interim one).11. Patronage and elections. And finally we 
stood together, and conducted the election with the agreement of the Masharan (elders). 
As a consequence of that election I became the president of the Bazaar Union. 
 
Interviewer: Was there any change in the structure of bazaar union before that election? 
 
Interviewee 1: 12. Association without organisation. No change. In those 20 years (1993-
2009), I was the secretary and he was the president. Apart from that we did not have any 
structure. There was nothing. I used to tell him: president sahib, if it does not have office, 
union and funding, what is it? It is not a union then. It is just a name. Nut he would not pay 
heed to all those suggestions.  
 
Interviewer: Alright. What change occurred when you became the president of the Bazaar 
Union? 
 
Interviewee 1: 13. Restructured BU. Even now I have all the records. If I tell you these 
two boxes are full of bazaar’s record, you have the details which I gave you of the names 
and addresses of the business owners in the bazaar. We started from one end of the bazaar 
towards the other and collected all the details of the bazaar. For instance A has a business 
of what? Is it retail or wholesale? What is his name, what is his mobile number? What is 
his father’s name, where does he live? We collected all these details in that form. 14. 
Cooperation with the state [civic responsibility]. But now, the most important thing here 
is, whoever talks against tax, he is our favourite. Now I need every facility: road, gas, 
electricity etc. How should I demand these things without paying tax? How? Say for 
instance it is your house, your father and all of you people do not cooperate in that how 
will it run? How will this house be maintained? 
 
Interviewer: What were the functions of Bazaar Union in the past? 
 
Interviewee 1: 15. Functions of the old bazaar union. So his [former president’s] major 
contribution was that whenever there was an accident in the bazaar, he was very active in 
responding to that. Whenever something would occur for instance, accident, or an 
inspection by food inspectors, or any other form of checking of the bazaar, he would not 
miss that. It was his belief that he is the president and he will deal all this. I would often 
tell him that… the union cannot be run alone, you need structure, and you need an office, 
and people to help. 16. Individual acts weakens union power. I will give you a lively 
example of that. An SDM was posted here. During my presidentship, I had a vice-president 
who was running a fast-food business. But the cups and plates in his restaurant were 
broken (below standard) in which he used to serve the customer. I told him many times 
that you are a member of the union and you keep these broken utensils. If you are doing it, 
how can we ask someone else not to do the same? Or to keep their utensils (cups) clean? 
You should replace these cups and plates. 17. Inspection and division in the BU. One day 
SDM sahib came to bazaar, and got very angry with him. In that anger he had broken those 
plates and cups. He [the VP] got very angry at that incident. I told him that we are running 
the union, now if a government official, or any other person comes and inflicts damage on 




him, can make him accountable for that. But if SDM sahib comes for that, you should 
clean your shop, or correct the things that are not in order, then it is justifiable because he 
is responsible for that, and we are also responsible for that. So how can I tell him that he 
has done something wrong? 17. BU and civic responsibility. He is an officer with some 
responsibilities which he will fulfil, and I have some responsibilities which I should fulfil. 
His purpose is to benefit society, and the purpose of the union is also to work for the 
benefit of the society.  if someone fulfils these responsibilities then who is Gulpoor [name 
of the VP] and who is Mian Sayb [alias of the interviewee]. 
 
Interviewer: So, the situation did not change even when you became president? 
 
Interviewee 1: 18. creation of sub-associations. In our tenure (when the interviewee was 
president), we created many sub-associations. What we did, that related or relevant 
businesses for instance, cloth houses had some problems which only they could understand 
only. So when any issue would arise regarding the businesses of garments, or we had to 
make some decision, or if there was a transaction (financial) related problem between two 
business owner in that sector, the president of the garments union would be called, because 
he had a better understanding of those problems, far better than us. He would give us his 
opinion on the matter. 
 
Interviewer: What are the functions of union at present? 
 
Interviewee 1: 19. Opposition and distrust. The current union has no effective structure, 
there are nominal roles distributed among people, you are secretary, and you have this 
office and so forth. There are the president and secretary; they do things according to their 
own sweet will. I do not see any discipline of the union. (Author’s note: This response is 
based on political bias, and since the interviewee is in opposition to the present 
representatives of the BU, his comments on its functions present that specific worldview. 
This is the reason that I have coded this passage as opposition and distrust.) 
 
Interviewer: Interesting! What do you mean by discipline of the union?  
 
Interviewee 1: 20. Executive committee. The union was based on collective opinion. 
Whenever we had to make a decision we would include people in that. The union exist, but 
along with that we set up an executive committee [majlisay amla] comprised of some 
specific elders. For instance, the presidents of the markets in the bazaar, the presidents of 
classes (different sectors of businesses) were the part of that executive committee. Any 
major decision would be made in consultation with that executive committee. Any specific 
issue would be presented to them and their opinion acquired on that. 21. No confrontation 
with government. We made it clear from the very outset that we are against strikes, 
conflicts, unrest and closing shops. These things will never happen. We will do 
consultations and negotiations, be it with the DC, the governor or the military. In our days 
there were no such strikes. 22. Conflicting roles and distrust. But there is another aspect of 
it. I am not president now, and even if Shakirullah (current president of the BU) does 
something right I will tell you that he is wrong. This is our problem. Because if I become 
president and I am performing worse than him, but my presidentship is the number one 
presidentship and that of Shakirullah (current president) is not. But I am telling you 
something which does not have any of those elements. 
 





Interviewee 1: 23. Larger issues and collective agreement. The strength of the executive 
committee was usually between 25 and 30. Sometimes, if there was an issue that demanded 
a larger opinion, then we would consult the non-executive committee members of the 
bazaar as well. The process was that we would send an invitation to that person saying that 
a meeting of executive committee is held on an issue and you are invited.  24. EC 
structure. There was a chairman and a vice chairman along with 25-30 elders in the bazaar. 
 
Interviewer: But I do not understand if this executive committee was a part of the bazaar 
union? 
 
Interviewee 1: 26. BU members as members of EC. No, it had its own chairman and vice-
chairman. As office bearers of the Bazaar Union, from the president to the finance 
secretary all the members of the bazaar union were its members. We were its members….  
27. Functions of market level unions. Then we created presidents at the market level. His 
functions were to deal with the problems of immediate nature, and minor problems. The 
president of the Bazaar Union was not needed for solving problems at that level. The 
president of the market was told that it is an internal problem of your market and you have 
to handle it. If I am needed, you can call me, I will be there to help, but overall you will 
deal with small problems in the market yourself. He would take interest in his 
responsibility and was working enthusiastically. Not only this, he would take care of the 
cleanliness of the market, its lighting, or other matters related to the market. Sometimes, 
these market-level presidents were also the part of the executive committee. 
Flexible thematic analysis: Creating conceptual bins  
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Appendix 6: Contact directory log (reflexive development) 
The concept, design and use of this log is based on Miles, Huberman and Suldana (2014. 
pp. 124-6). However, it has been adapted for the purposes of this study. In addition, the 
column on additional reflexive notes on the interviewee (Column 6) has been omitted from 
this example. 
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Appendix 7: Consent form 
Information sheet 
This research aims to understand how personal ties of the people in the bazaar, their 
involvement in associations of various type, and the norms of cooperation among them, 
impact the governance of economic activities in the bazaar, and what are their impacts on 
the governance of the region. 
This doctoral research is sponsored by the Business School of Middlesex University 
London, UK. Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You have the right: (1) not 
to answer any question which you consider sensitive, or which makes you feel 
uncomfortable; (2) to withdraw from the research at any time; (3) to ask at any later stage, 
before the submission of my thesis, that the information which you have provided should 
not be used for this research; and (4) to decide whether the interview should be audiotaped 
or not. 
The information in this research will be treated confidentially and only I 
(Muhammad Salman Khan) will have access to it. The recording will be stored on a hard-
drive on my computer and will be used for the purpose of this research and any other 
publications resulting from it. Moreover your name will be kept anonymous so that the 
information that you provide should not allow local people in the bazaar, or in any 
government organisation to identify you. 
If you do not understand the purpose, or anything else about this research, you can 
ask Muhammad Salman Khan (the researcher) to explain that particular aspect until you 
are satisfied. 
______________________________________________________________ 
Informed consent certificate 
I have been invited to participate in the research about the role of day-to-day activities in 
the bazaar, social interactions and their impact on the governance of this region. 
 
The information about the objectives of this study has been read to me. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about it and any questions I have asked have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I give my consent, voluntarily, to be a participant in this 
study  
Print Name of Participant__________________     
Signature of Participant ___________________ 
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